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Problem: The study is an economic analysis of the growth of Soviet
foreign trade, foreign trade plans, and Soviet foreign trade policy during
the period 1921-1928 (the NEP period). Two focal questions of this study
are the causes of export stagnation and the effects of the resultant im-.
poti constraint and balance of payments problems on the recovery of
Soviet economy and economic policy decisions. Analysis is concentrated
on the interaction between the problems and poor performance in foreign
trade sector and 1) changes in the operation and institutions of Soviet
foreign trade, 2) Soviet agricultural policies, 3) Soviet goals of rapid
growth, price stability, political stability and social justice, 4) foreign
mark~t structure, and 5) various Soviet policies (including export-ex-
pansion and import-substitution) to accelerate economic growth and in-
dustrialization during both the NEP and in the adoption of the 1st FYP.
New statistical data: The study develops several new statistical re-
sources for the period 1913-1940 including 1) the foreign trade plans for
the NEP and for the FYP, 2) new estimates of the prices and volume in-
dexes for total foreign trade and by commodity group, 3) estimates of
Soviet export of precious metals, Soviet foreign reserves and Soviet
foreign debt, 4) estimates of the import-consumption ratios and export-
output ratios for pre-19l4 and Soviet foreign trade, 5) time series of
domestic and foreign prices of selected exports, and 6) estimates of the
purchasing power of selected agricultural products. The reliability and
classification of Soviet foreign trade statistics are evaluated.
Findings: The important characteristics of pre-19l4 Russian foreign trade
were that 1) export-output ratios for most exports were relatively small,
2) import-consumption ratios were high for many materials and machin-
ery products, 3) light industry was significantly dependent on imported
materials, 4) investment was significantly dependent on imported machin-
ery, 5) exports lagged behind imports during industrialization in the late
1890's, 6) exports consisted largely of agricultural products, and 7) much
import substitution was occurring in pre-19l4 Russia.
World War I, civil war and nationalization totally disrupted Rus-
sian foreign trade and destroyed much of the foreign trade network.
Soviet foreign trade recovered slowly relative to other sectors
and stagnated far below pre -1914 levels. Despite depletion of foreign re-
serves and accumulation of foreign debt during the NEP, imports could
not supply sufficient materials to Soviet industry. Materials shortage re-
stricted the growth of light industrial output and the initial output plans
(especially light industry) had to be reduced because of cutbacks in the
initial import plan. The demand for materials led to a curtailment of
finished consumer goods imports, but the share of imports used directly
or indirectly by the consumer (including materials used for consumer
3goods) remained high and contrasted sharply with developments during
the 1st FYP. Machinery imports were financed largely by foreign cre-
dits; by the end of the NEP, Soviet planners worried about machinery
shortages as a potential constraint on investment. Increasing emphasis
was placed on import-substitution as the shortage of import capacity in-
tensified; import-substitution followed pre-19l4 trends.
Although other agricultural and industrial exports also failed to
recover, the low-level stagnation and collapse of Soviet grain exports
was the major caus e for the poor recovery of Soviet exports. The study
examined various causes for the failure of Soviet exports to recover
to pre-19l4 levels. Territorial losses were an insignificant factor in re-
tarding the recovery of most exports to pre-19l4 levels, and should have
actually increased the export capacity for grain. The terms of trade
were slightly better than before 1914. Limited foreign markets hindered
the expansion of some exports, (particularly of products of the extractive
industries and several agricultural products). The major constraint,
however, was the inability of the Soviet government to formulate an ap-
propriate set of polic:y measures both with respect to aggregate demand
and to relative prices, wages, and economic institutions to expand ex-
ports through the production or marketing of exportable surpluses. In-
creasing overvaluation of the ruble forced the Soviet government to 'abandon
their goal of 1) reestablishing a convertible gold ruble, and 2) reestablish-
ing Soviet foreign trade operations on the basis of commercial profitabil-
ity and initiative of individual enterprises. Exports were "forced II and
foreign prices ceased to influence domestic prices of export goods (espe-
cially in agriculture).
The foreign trade plans for the first FYP (1928/29-1932/33) pro-
jected high growth rates for exports based on industrial exports in the
early years and then on a resumption of grain exports based on moderate
collectivization of agriculture. Imports were to expand at a lower rate
than exports because of balance of paym.ents pressures. Imports were
considered a major constraint on growth and much import substitution
was planned.
Despite the forced expansion of exports during 1929-32, a huge
trade deficit was incurred, which was financed by short term debt and
precious metals export. The deficit was caused by the collapse of the
Soviet terms of trade in 1929-33. Trade barriers against Soviet exports,
increasing domestic shortages of export goods, instability of foreign cre-
dits and adverse terms of trade all contributed to the Soviet government's
decision to sharply reduce imports (and exports) in 1932-34 and run a
trade surplus to avoid default on outstanding debt. The level of imports
and exports during the mid-1930's was :hot the result of a policy of eco-
nomic autarky but the result of unexpected developments in the world and
domestic economy.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Purpose of study
This study examines the development of Soviet foreign trade,
foreign trade plans, and foreign trade policy during the period 1921-1928
(the NEP period). An attempt is made to identify the causes of export
stagnation and the effects of the resultant import constraints on the rap-
idly growing Soviet economy. The study is focused on the interaction
between the problems and poor performance in the foreign trade sector
and Soviet agricultural policies, Soviet goals of growth, price stability
political stability and social justice and various Soviet policies (including
export-expansion and import-substitution) to accelerate economic growth
and industrialization during both the NEP and in the adoption of the 1st
FYP. Little was known about Soviet problems in the foreign trade sector
during NEP so that it was not pos sible to evaluate the feasibility (much
less the optimality) of the various growth strategies debated prior to the
adoption of the 1st FYP from the viewpoint of the constraints imposed on
economic growth by foreign trade and from the viewpoint of the oppor-
tunities offered for growth by foreign trade. 1 Because of this lack of
1
The debate among Soviet economists about industrialization
strategy and economic goals in the 1920 r s has been carefully analyzed in
Erlich-bO. Source citations are in an abbreviated form, which is des-
cribed below on p. 48, and in the introduction to the bibliography.
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information, the problems and behavior of Soviet foreign trade during
the interwar period have not been considered or adequatly integrated
into conventional Western and orthodox Soviet explanations of the causes
and rationality of both the growth strategy and growth policies embodied
in the 1st FYP (1928/29-1932/33) and also the growth patterns and pol-
icies actually followed up to 1939. Thus, I also have re-examined these
Soviet debates about growth strategy and the conventional explanations of
Soviet growth strategy in terms of this study's findings about the proliems
and prospects of Soviet foreign trade in the 1920' s and the implications of
those findings about the feasibility or desirability of various growth strat-
egies and goals. From this latter analysis, we can better judge the ex-
tent to which and perceive the reasons why Soviet planners and leaders
during late NEP intended to forego some gains of trade in favor of other
conflicting economic and non-economic goals in~the process of develop-
ing the Soviet economy.
Case study focused on five empirical questions
The study is focused on five questions about Soviet foreign trade
and growth during the NEP.
First, what were the significant developments, characteristics
and patterns in Rus sian foreign trade and balance of payments before,
World War I and to what extent and in which areas was the Russian econ-
omy and Rus sian economic policy oriented toward export specialization,
import-substitution, and import-dependence?
Second, what were the Soviet foreign trade policies, methods of
foreign trade planning, and foreign trade plans during NEP; what were
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the actual developments of Soviet foreign trade, balance of payments
and foreign reserves during NEP and how did those developments com-
pare to the foreign trade plans, to developments of other domestic econ-
omic sectors during NEP, and to pre,:,,19l4 trade?
Third, why did Soviet foreign trade fail to recover to pre -1914
levels along with other sectors of the economy and how were other sec-
tors of the economy and economic policy formation influenced by this
relatively slow recovery of foreign trade and by corrective measures,
1) to expand foreign trade (such as investments and price-support pol-
icies) and, 2) to mitigate the restrictice effects of slow-growing foreign
trade (such as foreign capital, import- substitution and import-depri-
vation) ?
Fourth, under various as sumptions about growth rate, invest-
ment level, and allocation, consumption, etc., what were the real and
imagined barriers to export expansion (demand deficiencies, and supply
deficiencies) and what were the actual pos sibilities and Soviet expecta-
tions for rapidly expanding Soviet exports to pre -1914 levels and beyond?
Under similar assumptions about growth, in vestment allocation, etc.,
what were the requirements for importable goods projected by the Soviet
planners and to what extent did the Soviet planners intend to provide
these importable goods via imports financed by export receipt and for-
eign capital and to what extent were they to be provided by domestic
output bas ed on existing capacity and on new capacity?
Fifth, what did Soviet economists consider to be the relation-
ship between rapid industrialization and foreign trade and how did the
past problems and future prospects for expanding foreign trade influence
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and restrict their policy decisions (choices) about the "tempo" and "stra-
tegy" (investment allocation, source of saving" and the feasible goals
available to Soviet planners and policy-makers in the late 1920 r s?
The discussion of the theoretical interpretations of the problems
and growth of Soviet foreign trade and of the effect of Soviet economic
policies during NEP is deferred to Chapter II. We have not presented
here any formal analytical model developed specifically to analyse the
relationship between foreign trade, various investment allocation pol-
icies, policies to mobilize savings and selected economic goals consid-
ered during NEP (autarky, minimum investment goods capacity, maxi-
mum GNP at specific times and in long-run, embargo etc. ). 2
Summary of finding s
Pre -1914 Rus sia. Rus sian foreign trade and industry grew at
an uneven but relatively rapid rate in the decade s preceding 1914.
Rus sian exports were largely dependent on a near - subsistence level
agriculture which was growing at a much slower rate. Grain exports
constituted about one-half of total exports, but export-specialization in
grain (with the exception of barley) failed to keep pace with growing dom-
estic demand, so that the share of grain exports (as a fraction of grain)
output declined in the decades before 1914. Measured by export-output
ratios, export-specialization in Russia had also occurred for several
other products including flax, timber, manganese ore, asbestos ore,
2 For a discus sion of these policies in an open multi- sector
fixed coefficient growth model for the NEP Soviet economy, see Dohan-
67. This study was written in the spring of 1966 for presentation to
Abram Bergson r s seminar on Soviet economy in 1966 and was written up
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furs, platinum, butter, eggs and several minor agricultural products
and held large shares of the world market for these products. But ex-
ports were a relatively small fraction (8 -1 0%) of GNP. Moreover, ex-
ports of most products competed directly with increased domestic con-
sumption and relatively little capital was invested in producing output
with zero or negligible-utility uses elsewhere in the domestic economy.
Russian imports were about 2/5 industrial materials, slightly
more than 2/5 consumers' goods and about 1/9 equipment. The import-
dependence of the economy for some consumer goods and raw materials
and types of equipment was high as measured by import-consumption
ratios. In addition to the expected complete import-dependence for
so-called non-competing imports (rubber, jute, copra, tea, tin, nickel,
aluminum), Rus sian industry and especially the consumers' goods in-
dustry relied extensively on imports for their supply of cotton, wool,
leather, dyes, tanning materials, paper, zinc, lead, and to a lesser
extent, coal, copper and several chemicals. On the other hand, Russian
industry usually supplied all the domestic demand for (and occasionally
exported) major textiles, ferrous metals, basic industrial chemicals,
and sugar, substantial import- substitution was occurring in cotton,
copper, zinc, paper and chemicals. Although consumers I goods were
2/5 of total imports, only two imported goods - tea and herring - were
of direct importance in the consumption pattern of the general popula-
tion; in general, the other consumers I goods imports were diversified
and purchased by the wealthier segment of the population or reflected
in Dohan-67. (Unpublished).
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differences in transportation costs.
The large Russian machinery industry, protected by a tariff,
provided a major part of the large growing demand for agricultural,
railroad and electrical equipment and substantial portions of the textile
and metal-working equipment. The Rus sian machinery industry supplied
however, only about one-half of the machinery installed in 1913 and in-
vestment in the newer fields, or newer processes, or reql,iiring complex
equipment depended almost entirely on imported equipment, so that short-
run acceleration of investment rates and "modernization" were highly
import - dependent.
The Rus sian balance of trade was very favorable in the two
decades before 1914, but interest payments, tourism and other "invis-
ible" items on current account caused a deficit on "current account" and
the pressure on the balance of payments forced continual borrowing from
abroad. Considera hIe capital, management, and skilled technicians
carne from foreign countries.
Recovery of foreign trade during NEP. World War I and the
Civil War totally disrupted Soviet foreign trade and destroyed the com-
mercial and financial network in foreign commerce. This disruption of
foreign trade and the dependence on imports for modern equipment,
parts and raw materials hindered the mobilization and defense efforts
of the Tsarist government during World War I and severely aggravated
the economic crfsis during War Communism, Regarded as a "comman-
ding height" of the economy, foreigp trade operations were declared a
state monopoly soon after the Bolshevik revolution. As foreign trade
began to recover in 1921, the effectiveness and compatibility of the
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state foreign trade monopoly in the emerging NEP economy was bitterly
debated among Party leaders and economists. Although the general
principles of the foreign trade monopoly were retained and still subjec-
ted to government planning, the initiative and implementation of export
and import operations (within the plan) was decentralized to individual
enterprises or special trading firms, whose basic motivations were
"commercial profitability" subject to the constraints of the plan. The
collapse of industrial output and the famine forced the Soviet government
to expand imports much faster than exports in the initial years of foreign
trade so that the Soviet gold stock was almost exhausted and compelled
a cutback in imports in 1922/23. In 1923, the exchange rate for the new
stable currency unit (chevronetz:ruble) was established at the pre-1914
gold parity of the gold ruble and exports were initially so profitable that
export quotas, export tariffs and price limits were set to prevent upward
pressure on prices and to insure availability of domestic supplies. The
initial basis for planning exports was "exportable surplus" which was
the difference between output and domestic demand with price stability
in retail markets.
Exports expanded rapidly in 1923/24 and the large trade surplus
(forced because of the currency reforms) was achieved despite above-
plan imports of raw materials, The resumption of substantial grain ex-
ports from a moderate harvest led to great optimistism about a rapid
restoration of Soviet foreign trade along the export structure of pre-
1914 Russian foreign trade. A five year foreign trade plan for 1923/24
to 1927/28 in its optimal variant predicted a complete recovery of Soviet
exports by 1927/28 (based largely on grain).
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The expansion of exports in 1924/25 slowed to a near stand-
still when the export plan had to be cut because of a poor 1924 harvest.
Other agricultural exports were pushed and resulting domestic price
rise conflicted with price ceilings set by the government to maintain
price stability. Grain prices were rapidly bid up and grain purchased
with foreign exchange reserves was imported to stabilize domestic grain
prices in the spring of 1925. Price stability was a primary policy goal
in 1924/25 and at least in the foreign trade sector, economic planners
behaved in a stabilizing manner by running a large trade deficit. Ex-
panding output in light industries depending on imports increased demand
for imported materials and along with increased imports of foodstuffs
for the price stabilization policy forced up imports much more than ex-
ports. Machinery imports were relatively unimportant because of ex-
cess capacity in industry. It was under these conditions, when the first
important exchanges in the industrialization debates occurred. The
"goods famine" (scarcity of manufactured goods) became progressively
worse but there was little leeway to increase manufactured goods im-
ports through further depletion of foreign exchange reserves or through
further changes in the import structure, for a Preobrazhensky recog-
nised, cutting back imports of "producers' goods" (mostly industrial
materials) in order to import consumer goods would reduce output of
consumer goods dependent on imported raw materials.
The year 1925/26 was to be the pivotal year in restoring for-
eign trade and in the recovery of the Soviet economy in general. A
doubling of exports was projected largely on the basis of large grain
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exports from the expected excellent harvest. Consumer goods and raw
materials for light industry purchased on credit were imported on a
substantial scale for sale in grain surplus regions. But the many
grain-purchasing agencies rushed to fill their quotas and halted and
reversed the decline in domestic grain prices: grain exports became
commercially unprofitable and early attempts to force down grain prices
(eventually accomplished by elimination of private grain traders) resulted
in drastic drops in state procurements for export. Procurements by
state agencies fell far short of the goal in the fall of 1925 and the export
targets for grain were cut sharply and forced a drastic downward revision
of both export and import plans. This in turn resulted in a cutback in
many output targets in industries depending on imported materials.
Foreign prices of several major agricultural products (eggs,
butter, £lax) also fell while domestic prices were rising (especially in
retail markets), so that exports of these products became commercially
unprofitable from the viewpoint of the exporting agency. Attempts to
lower procurement prices to make these exports commercially profit-
able caused a reduction in state procurements exports and output of
these products. Part of the high price-elasticity of procurements (esp-
cially of animal products) could be explained by the active competition
of private traders shipping to higher-price domestic markets, but total
marketing and output of many agricultural products also seemed sensi -
tive to relative prices. Which set of relative prices (i. e., among agri-
cultural products or between agricultural prices and manufactured goods)
was the important question! The "exportable surplus" of some agricul-
tural products was further reduced in 1925/26 by the diversion of pro-
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cured butter and eggs, destined for export, to domestic urban areas to
stabilize these markets. Timber exports also become commercially
unprofitable and domestic firms began to ship to domestic markets
rather than to honor export commitments: the decentralized system of
export initiative, based on more or less orthodox commercial principles
began to falter as foreign prices weakened and domestic prices rose
under a demand-pull, wage-push sequence of increases in agricultural
and industrial prices. Social and political pres sures tended to prevent
deterioration in the real wages of the workers. Thus, agricultural
exports other than grain failed to expand at all while industrial exports
were hindered by imperfect foreign markets and growing domestic de-
mand. The drastically pared export plans were underfulfilled and even
this level of exports required the "forced export" of products which
could be sold more ''profitably'' on domestic markets. The voluntary act
of exporting by the individual firms was becoming a binding obligation.
The import plan was cut even more (to yield a trade surplus),
but actual imports exceeded the plan because of repeated "emergency"
imports of raw '.materials, etc., and a large trade deficit was incurred
requiring the additional shipment from the sinking Soviet foreign re-
serves and the accumulation of additional short-term foreign credits.
The continued trade and payments deficit forced the Commisariat of
Finance to abandon their attempts to reintroduce the chevronetz -ruble
on foreign exchanges and to stop spending foreign reserves to maintain
defacto convertibility between gold and the chevronetz -ruble on the
"free Mos cow bour se". Another orthodoxy dead. But significant im-
provements in the availability of foreign credits occurred in mid-l926
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when Germany guaranteed a 150 million ruble medium-term credit for
machinery imports.
Machinery imports, financed almost entirely with foreign cre-
dits, became increasip.gly important as the rising investment levels
caused the demand for machinery to outpace the recovery of domestic
metallurgy and machine- building. The failure of Soviet exports to grow
much even in a good year had obvious implications about the risks and
limitations of relying on the expansion of agricultural exports as a basis
for expanding the supply of materials and machinery required for indus-
trialization (as it had been proposed by the Right wing of the Party lead-
er ship).
Under the strict directive to force a large trade surplus, the
1926/27 foreign trade plan was drawn up more carefully than the 1925/26
plan and projected a ..cutback in imports and a moderate increase in ex-
ports based largely on additional grain exports from the larger harvest.
The policy of "goods intervention" with imported consumer goods was
judged a failure because possible imports of consumer goods were too
small relative to excess demand. The policy was judged too costly in
terms of the alternative demands (especially raw materials) on import
capacity. Thus, imports of consumer goods were to be cut back and
replaced by additional raw materials imports (especially cotton because
of a poor crop). The import structure was still oriented toward the
direct or indirect satisfaction of the consumer needs (especially when
compared with the import structure in 1932 or 1933). The dependence
of both industrial output and the level of investment and modernization on
imports was also very evident in drawing up the output and investment
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targets for 1926/27.
The 1926/27 foreign trade plan, at least in current prices, was
succes sfully fulfilled. Agricultural exports (excluding grain), however,
fell somewhat. Even the grain export plan was only partially fulfilled
and grain exports were actually suspended in the spring because of
domestic shortages. It was clear by the end of 1926/27 that the "re-
construction" of exports was to proceed very slowly (even with increased
emphasis on industrial exports).
Increased machinery imports made up a large portion of total
machinery installed in 1926/27, while the expansion of industrial output
(especially in light industry) was very dependent on large increases in
raw material imports. To continue similar rates of expansion of in-
vestment and output in the future would require finding new domestic
sources of machinery and materials, given the current expectation about
export growth, availability of credit, and the absence of any further pos-
sibilities to eliminate consumer goods imports in favor of materials and
machinery. Thus, already in 1926 considerable efforts and plans were
devoted to expanding both the important traditional import-substitute
sectors - cotton, paper, non-ferrous metals, dyes, chemicals and also
machinery - as well as developing several new industries.
The year 1927/28 was a crisis year in Soviet foreign trade - a
fact apparently foreseen by Soviet planners because of the virtual absence
of any (published) foreign trade plans in early 1927/28. The primary
problem of expanding exports was posed by the decline in the grain crop
and the increasing grain procurement problem in 1927/28. Increasing
domestic demand and weak foreign markets for other important export
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products complicated the picture. The planned increas e in exports was
modest. Exports failed to grow at all in 1927/28 because of an almost
total collapse of grain exports and even this level of exports had been
attained only by forcing the exports of goods which were in increasing
excess demand in domestic markets. By 1927/28, the earlier concept
of commercially profitable "exportable surplus" based on satisfaction
of the domestic demand at some desired price level had been abandoned
and replaced by a policy of "forcing exports" and the economic criteria
for deciding which exponts to "force" were much less clear. Imports
rose sharply in 1927/28 because of increased machinery imports, inc-
reased raw materials import and emergency grain imports.
Although machinery imports (financed largely by credits) were
not a constraint on investment levels in 1927/28, they formed both a
very large fraction of total machinery installed and a large fraction of
imports in 1927/28. The demand for imported raw materials, however,
was not at all met despite upward revisions of the materials import plan
and increased domestic output. Imports had become an important con-
straint on achieving desired output targets if not investment targets in
1927/28.
The large trade deficit in 1927/28 was only partially covered by
the expansion of foreign credits and large expenditures of foreign re-
serves were again neces sary from the now depleted stock of So.viet for-
eign reserves. Furthermore, Soviet efforts to force exports were en-
countering more forei:gn competition and prices of several major ex-
port products declined as Soviet exports tried to expand Soviet market
shares. The balance of payments crisis of 1927/28 was So.bad as to
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force a cutback in imports in the following year.
The failure of Soviet exports to recover to pre -1914 levels by
1927/28 can be attributed largely to the complete failure of grain ex-
ports during NEP. Although the debate continues over the cause of this
failure, I attribute it to the poor recovery of rural per capita grain
output, lack of draft power, low relative prices of grain to other cash
agricultural products (and especially animal products which used some
grain as an input), higher urban demands, higher disposable incomes of
peasants, and, to a much lesser extent, to the conventional explanations
based on poor relative prices of grain to manufactured products pur-
chased by the peasant and to the redistribution of out put from large est-
ates to small individual producers. It is important to note that the pos-
sibilities and policies of solving the grain export problem are different
and more difficult if the true causes of the grain export problem are
closer to the first set of causes than the conventional explanation of the
grain and grain export problem.
Other exports also failed to recover to pre -1914 levels. In
part this can be explained by the territorial losses. But the failure of
some major exports to recover was caused by a number of reasons in-
cluding the failures of output to recover on a per -capita basis, smaller
marketings, and large domestic demand for marketed output of export-
able products (from rising living standards and increased output of in-
dustry using "exportable products "). The possibilities for attracting
large amounts of foreign capital was unfavorable, for not only had the
policy of attracting foreign capital through concession grants failed by
1927/28, Soviet relations with its major creditors had deteriorated in
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1927 and 1928 and the prospects of a large expansion of foreign credit
seemed remote.
The possibility of rapid restoring of exports to pre-1914 levels
along traditional lines of agricultural exports based on the NEP agricul-
tural economy had to be abandoned, primarily because of the govern-
ments r inability to manage its agricultural policy (and general economic
policy) to generate growing exportable surpluses (and especially grain
surpluses) with some regularity. Increased emphasis was being placed
on the traditional industrial exports over which the government had much
greater control and on so-called secondary exports - the traditional
pattern of Russian exports was not completely abandoned, but rather
altered toward commodities, which the Soviet government could rely on
as a basis for the expansion of exports with more certainty that could be
found in relying on agricultural exports. The poor crop of 1928 and the
worsening grain marketing problems was correctly interpreted as pre-
venting any large-scale resumption of grain exports in the near future
(at least as long as a market system existed). This complete failure of
grain exports by the end of NEP both diminished the chances of a rapid
restoration of exports to pre -1914 levels, increased the urgency of
finding new export resources and forced the Soviet government to vigor-
0usly promote import- substitution if industrial growth was to grow at the
desired rates. The alternative was to accept lower growth rates.
Soviet industrialization policy as adopted in late 1928 called for
rapid expansion of exports (based on both expanded industrial exports)
and eventually of grain exports from the moderate number of collective
farms planned for in the 1st FYP. Exports were to expand faster than
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world trade and it was thought that foreign competition would be an im-
portant constraint on the growth of industrial exports. Despite the plan-
ned rapid expansion of exports during the 1st FYP, exports were still a
"lagging sector" relative to the demands for imports implied in the 1st
FYP and the :balance-of-payments position inherited from the NEP. The
growth of imports had to be restricted to relatively modest levels com-
pared to the growth of exports and the other sectors of the economy.
Not only did the balance of payments have to be restored to equilibrium
(after disastrous deficits during NEP), but extra caution in making im-
port commitments had to be exercised due to 1) the unfavorable condi-
tions for obtaining more credit abroad, 2) the rising deficit on the "in-
visible items" part of current accounts, and most important, 3) the
very small size of Soviet foreign reserves relative to both the
balance of payments deficits during NEP, and relative to the amount of
outstanding short-term foreign debt. Since the growth of demand for the
so-called non-competing imports would be accelerated with rapid indus-
trialization, this implied that other growing import-demands had to be
met by the import- substitution (cotton, non-ferrous metal, chemicals
and some types of machinery) and by the continued development of those
industries, such as ferrous metallurgy and textiles, from which both
Russia and the USSR had been almost totally independent of imports
before 1914 and during NEP. To a large extent, I think, the 1st FYP
continued the trend which had been evolved in the pre-1914 economy -
the real novelty of the 1st FYP was the targeted growth rate - and the
very high targeted growth rate accentuated these pre-19l4 trends.
The development of foreign trade during the 1st FYP and beyond
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is discussed in Chapter XIV.
Note on statistics and sources
The basic data of Soviet foreign trade during the period 1917-
1938 were taken from primary Soviet sources and Soviet trade journals;
these sources are discussed briefly in Appendix A, Technical Note 1.
These data consist basically of annual figures for exports of merchan-
dise of domestic origin (excluding bullion), f. o. b., in current prices,
recorded at the time they cros s the border, and for import of .merchan-
dise for internal use (excluding bullion), c. i. f. in current prices, re-
corded at the time goods are released for domestic use from customs
warehouse. Several problems arise in using the se statistics for inter-
national and intertemporal comparisons, some of which can be easily
corrected. The major exceptions to the above description occurred be-
tween 1918-1923/24 when trade across various Asian borders was not
recorded and when all trade was recorded in "pre- World War I" prices:
these variations are described briefly in Appendix A, Technical Note 2.
The major problem in comparing Russian foreign trade statistics with
Soviet foreign trade statistics is the adjustment for the loss of the Baltic
and Polish provinces from the Rus sian empire in the formation of ;the
Soviet state; this problem and the interpretation of various types of ad-
justments is dis cus sed in detail in Chapter III.
Another inconsistency in the Soviet trade data includes the hap-
hazard inclusion and exclusion of platinum and silver exports and im-
ports with various time series and between various sets of data. All
figures cited in this study for total export and import are net of any
trade in silver, gold and platinum. Since platinum exports became quite
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important, a separate series including platinum is given in Table A. 3a
in Appendix A, Technical Note 3. Platinum exports and its relative im-
portance as an earner of foreign exchange are presented in Tables D. 5
and D. 8 in Appendix D. This explains some but not all of the inconsis-
tencies between various times series of data presented in Soviet primary
sources (see Technical Note 3 in Appendix A).
At certain periods during 1918-1940 considerable amounts of
exports were shipped abroad to warehouses without being sold (and paid
for), and therefore the values recorded for the customs statistic reflec-
ted the then prevailing world prices or the officials' opinion of what they
should be sold for abroad. Little was exported on the basis of credits to
the }Juyers. This export to warehouses abroad distorted the measurement
of the export receipts in two ways. First, actual export receipts from the
ultimate sale of these goods were often less than the recorded value when
prices were falling (as they tended to do) between the time of export and
the time of sale, and second, exports receitps were overstated in the
recorded statistics when inventories were accumulating in warehouses
abroad.
Although the currency used to record Soviet foreign trade stat-
istics was the ruble, the ruble value was derived (in most cases) by an
artificially established cros s -rate of the invoice currency to the dollar
or some other gold-based currency as described in Appendix A, Techni-
cal Note 1. That is, the values of Soviet trade in rubles reflect foreign
prices trends rather than domestic prices and only for a brief period in
the mid-1920's were the two price levels at all similar at parity exchange
rates.
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The extensive series of foreign trade plans drawn up by various
economic agencies during NEP and the 1st FYP are almost completely
unstudied in both the West and the USSR. The basic data on these for-
eign trade plans presented in this study have been reconstructed from
both direct and indirect information appearing at the time in Soviet econ-
omic journals, Soviet trade and professional journals, and an occasional
monograph.
Output prices and marketing data for selected agricultural and
industrial products for most of the NEP have been taken directly from
contemporary sources (journals, books, statistical handbooks), for this
was the data available to economic planners and policy-makers at the
time. When analysing planning and policy decisions, the data published
at the closest date to the time of the decision were used even though they
differed significantly from data publis'hed at a later date. For the years
after 1927/28, most data on output, marketing and prices were taken from
major Western studies done at the RAND Corporation and other research
institutes. The reliability and qualitative problems of these data have
been discussed in Grossman-60, Nutter-62, Nove-66, Jasny-49, and
others.
The most difficult data to obtain for this study were reliable
and consistent data on production and trade in precious metals, on
foreign reserves, and on foreign credit, and on other items in the
balance of payments. For the balance of payments and foreign credits
during NEP, this study has drawn most of its data with some modifica-
tion from Shenkman (Shenkman-32a and Birmingham-32a), and as des-
cribed in the Notes to Table T-14; these data for some items are at
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best a rough approximation. Since few figures on Soviet trade in pre-
cious metals {including gold, silver, and platinum} were published in
Soviet sources, estimates of Soviet trade in precious metals were re-
constructed from trading partners' trade statistics (see Appendix D).
These trade estimates combined with estimates of changes in foreign
currency holdings abroad, and in the State Bank, gives us rough esti-
mates of the Soviet holdings of foreign exchange. This entire estimating
procedure is briefly described in Appendix E.
Since Soviet foreign trade statistics were recorded in current
prices (with the exception of some estimates in pre -1914 prices) it was
necessary to calculate both price and volume indexes for selected com-
modity groups as well as for total exports and imports in order to esti-
mate plan fulfillment, the recovery of foreign trade in constant prices,
and also the change in export and import prices and the commodity terms
of trade. This was done for the weight years, 1913, 1926/27, 1927/28,
1932 and 1937: the procedures are described in Appendix F.
The second major set of operations on available Soviet foreign
trade data was: I} to reclas sify later foreign trade data into the com-
modity groups used in planning during NEP; 2) to clas sify imports into
"consumer -oriented imports" used directly and with some proces sing
by consumers; and 3} to reclassify exports into "agricultural-dependent
exports" along the lines used to divide American trade into agricultural
and other classifications. These procedures are described in the notes
to Tables T-18 and T-19, Appendix A, Technical Note 4 and Appendix F.
Organization of study. This study consists of textual chapters
a tabular section, and several appendixes. A brief discussion of theor-
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etical implication and interpretations of the problems of Soviet foreign
trade and economic growth in terms of modern international trade theory
is presented in Chapter II. In Chapter III we review the development of
Rus sian foreign trade before 1914, the relationship of the economy to
foreign trade, and the impact of the territorial losses on the volume and
structure of Soviet trade.
The next six chapters (IV -X) describe and analyze the foreign
trade plans and the recovery of Soviet foreign trade during NEP and the
relationships between the foreign trade plans, actual performance of
Soviet foreign trade, the recovery of the economy, and Soviet economic
policy.
Chapter XI analyzes the causes of the collapse of Soviet grain
exports and its impact on the recovery of foreign trade. Chapter XII
summarizes the major trends in foreign trade during NEP while Chapter
XIII relates the problems of developing foreign trade to the expectations
and projections for foreign trade during the 1st FYP. Chapter XV re-
views briefly the actual development of foreign trade and the forces which
pushed the Soviet economy to an unplanned degree of economic autarky
during the 1930' s. Description of procedural matters, terminology,
statistical techniques, and sources have been relegated to the appendixes.
A note on Soviet terminology and
other terms used in this study
Several terms encountered frequently in this study are descri-
3
bed below.
3 For a more detailed breakdown of commoditiesconsidered in
each term, see Appendix A, Technical Note 4.
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Industrial exports (Soviet usage in 1920 's) included export of
all processed products including sugar, flour, vegetable oil.
Agricultural exports (Soviet usage) included not only the usual
agricultural exports products, but also fish and furs.
Producers I goods (imports) included all goods used for produc-
tion including machinery, semi-processed and raw materials.
Consumer s I goods (imports) included goods consumed
directly by consumers such as foodstuffs or manufactured
consumer s' goods.
Consumer-oriented imports included imports consumed either
directly by consumers, or indirectly through use in pro-
ducing consumer goods in domestic tanning agents). 4
Gross marketings of agriculture produce includes all sales of pro-
ducts by peasants to all ;buyers gross of repurchases by the
peasants.
Net marketings of agriculture produce includes sales of product
to all buyers net of repurchases by peasants.
Planned procurement agencies or planned agencies are economic
and trading agencies which are given or allocated or permit-
ted specific plan of purchases of agricultural goods (procure-
ment) and whose purchases became more and more under the
control of the government.
Economic year runs from October 1 to September 31 of the fol-
lowing year and is indicated usually by the simple "split
year" e. g., 1923/24. But when there could be confusion
between the ec anomie year and the agricultural years, the
economic year is indicated by the split year followed by (EY).
Agricultural year runs from July 1 to June 30 of the following year a
and is indicated by the split year followed by (AY), e. g. ,
1924/25 (AY).
Grain product exports includes exports of all grains, all grain
by-products (bran and flour) and beans, peas, and lentils.
Exports of grain and related products includes not only all grain
products but also oil seed and oil cake.
"Goods famine" refers to shortage or absence of manufactured
4 See Notes to Table T-IB.
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consumer "goodsll for sale at current prices (i. e., ex-
cess demand) especially in rural areas.
"Commercially profitable exports" refers to exports which
are profitable to the exporting agencies when the receipts,
converted into rubles at the current exchange rate, are
compared to costs.
Ruble when used in discussing Soviet foreign trade statistics
refers only to the II gold" ruble with a gold content of
O.77423 grams. For the relationship of the gold ruble to
other rubles of different gold content used in later periods
to record Soviet foreign trade statistics, see Appendix A,
Technical Note 1.
Russia all pre-1918 data refers to the territory of Tsarist
Russia (excluding Finland) unless otherwise noted.
USSR all post-1918 data refers to territory on which Soviet
power existed at the time. The coverage of Soviet foreign
trade statistics varies in the years 1918-1922/23 and the
reader is referred to Appendix A, Technical Note 2 for
further description of these variations.
Soviet territory (abbreviated Sov. Terr.) refers to the terri-
tory of the USSR as of 1925. Thus, adjustment of pre-1918
Russian data for the loss of Polish Russia, Latvia, Estonia,
Lithuania, Bessarabia and the Kars province are described
as data for the Soviet territory of Sov. Terr.
Transliterations and Translations
A modified form of the Library of Congress system of Slavic
transliteration is employed: the only modification is the omission of
the connective and the double apostrophe for the hard sign.
Translations from Russian, German, or French references
are by the author of this study unless otherwise noted.
Notes and sources for tables and charts. All notes and sources
for tables and figures presented in the text are in Appendix B. Simi-
larly, all notes and sources for tables presented in the Tabular Section
will be found in Appendix C.
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Note on method of citation 6
Due to the large number of sources cited in this study, a system
of abbreviated references has been adopted to simplify citation. Sources
are indicated by surname of author, or name of issuing organization or
by abbreviated versions of the title. This is followed by a hyphen and
the last two digits: of the publication date and the page numbers. Where
more than one publication in a year is cited for the same author, etc.,
identifying letters are shown after the last two digits of the publication
date. A full list of sources is provided in alphabetical order in the bib-
liography.
References to anonymous journal articles are cited in the fol-
lowing manner: ~bbreviation of journal title, volume number (if avail-
able), issue number, date in parentheses if relevant, and pages. The
list of journals is located at the beginning of the bibliography.
6 Adapted from Moorsteen-66, p. 17.
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CHAPTER II
THEORETICAL AND POLICY ISSUES IN THE SOVIET ECONOMIC
RECOVER Y AND FOREIGN TRADE DURING THE NEP
The purpose of this chapter is to 1) outline the goals of and the
constraints on the new Soviet government as compared to the T sarist
government, 2) examine the theoretical issues in the recovery of Soviet
foreign trade during NEP, and 3) to outline the major policy and theo-
r etical issue s of the industrialization debate.
Goals and Constraints in the NEP Soviet Economy
The ideological framework of Marxism-Leninism was worker-
and industry-oriented. The Marxist revolution assumed essentially an
advanced industrial state with a mass of workers and a few capitalists
rather than a few workers and a mass of peasants and peasant-capital-
ists. The Soviet leadership, by virtue of its fundamental ideology, was
biased toward industrialization, as opposed to agrarian development.
Major economic change s from the Revolution
The Bolsheviks' rise to power in 1917 was accompanied or fol-
lowed by several fundamental changes in the Russian economy which
were to be important factors in the recovery of the Soviet Russian eco-
nomy from the economic depths of War Communism and in the transi-
tion to a policy of rapid economic growth.
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Agriculture. The major changes in agriculture were 1) the
distribution of the estates and large peasant holdings to the poor and
middle peasants, and 2) the collapse of the system of taxes-rents-
debts which were considered to be an important pre s sure on the peas-
ant to produce and market grain and other agricultural produce. 1
By 1922 four other major changes had occurred in agriculture
which were to affect the behavior of the peasant; namely, the govern-
ment policy of confiscating (with the aid of the poor peasants) most
visible grain supplies during the period of War Communism, the great
famine of 1921, a drastic decline in workstock because of the famine,
and the existence of many legal restrictions (as compared to Tsarist
lJasny-49 (pp. 151-160) and Carr-52 (pp. 36-52) described the
distribution of land to the peasants after the revolution, the Land De-
crees of 1917 and 1918 and the ambivalent Bolshevik attitude toward land
tenure. Solovei-3l (pp. 285-286) discusses the taxes and rents paid by
the peasants before and after the Revolution. Before the Revolution,
in addition to the land tax, ther e existed numerous local taxes (zemstro
dues, etc.) and the peasant's cash rental payments to the landowners
(in addition to payment-in-kind) were alone as much as the Soviet direct
agricultural tax in 1927-28 (375 million rubles) (Solovei-3l, p. 285).
The Land Decree of 1917 ended the renting and buying of land by law,
and although the land was "nationalized" and belonged to the "people, "
it was effectively "owned". by the peasants, who did not have to pay rent
to the state (Jasny-49, p. 154). Even if the renting of land had not been
(temporarily) prohibited, the redistribution of the land from large land-
owner s would have effectively reduced the quantity of land rented. With
respect to the debt of the individual peasant, I suspect that the Revolu-
tion, elimination of landlord and local capitalist, and the monetary
chaos wiped the slate clean for many peasants. Erlich-55 (p. 84) cited
Preobrazhenkii' s view (in 1925) that the Russian peasant enjoyed t1a
much greater freedom [than before the Revolution] in the choice of the
time and terms at which to dispose of his own surpluses because of the
decrease in "forced sales, " in order to meet such obligations as taxes
of in pre-Revolutionary Russia or payments to the landlord." See
also Pasvolsky-24, p. 37.
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Rus sia) on the leasing of land and hiring of labor. 2
Most important, the attitude of the Party was politically and
ideologically hostile towards the peasantry in general and in particular
toward the rich peasant or "kulak, " who was regarded as a "peasant
capitalist" exploiting the labor of the hired labor and who represented
by virtue of their economic po sition a political challenge to Soviet
authority in the countryside. 3
This ideological hostility was reflected in the Party's concern
about the changes in the political and economic power which might re-
suIt from various economic growth "paths" (agriculture ver sus indus-
try). The Party by and large was particularly apprehensive of a rapid
growth of the rich peasant, whom they regarded as a potential base
for the restoration of capitalism in Russia and in the long-run, it was
clear to the Party that the socialist sector (either State industry or
collectivized agriculture) must grow faster than the capitalist elements
(rich peasants, traders, and small entrepreneurs) if the Bolsheviks
b . h. 4were to e secure ln t elr power.
2Baykov-47 (pp. 20-24) and Carr-52 (pp. 147-152 and 284-285)
described the confiscating measures and the famine in the Volga dis-
tricts in 1920-21. The necessity to confiscate grain arose basically
because of the lack of goods to exchange with the peasant for grain
(Carr-52, p. 50). Furthermore, the peasantry held large sums of
paper money, the value of which was depreciating rapidly in 1917-1920
(Ibid., p. 51). Carr-52 (pp. 288-289) described the legal restrictions
on hiring of land and labor.
3Carr-52, pp. 291-295. The early political challenge came
from the SR IS (Social Revolutionarie s), the peas ants' party.
4preobrazhensky-26, pp. 78, 280 for example. This theme
ran throughout his work.
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Thus1 for both ideological and political reasonsl the Soviet
government wanted (and tended) to favor the poor peasantl the hired
agricultural worker and collective types of agricultural organization.
Neverthelessl the Party leadership was ambivalent in its stance toward
the middle and rich peasant (kulak) 1 because the leadership (with vary-
ing opinions among them) thought that until the resources could be found
for the rapid development of large scale socialist farmsl agricultural
recovery and growth had to be based primarily on the successful in-
dividual peasant - and if the peasant was successfull he became a middle
or rich peasant. But these economic gains from the emerging kulak and
middle peasant conflicted with the Party's ideological political and social
goals so that the measures to relax the restrictions on hiring of labor
and renting of land (to improve resource allocation and provide incen-
tives) precipitated sharp intra-Party debates. 5 Lenin1s alliance of the
workers and the peasants (smychka) as a basis of continued Soviet power
(and the NEP economic recovery) was founded on economic interests
rather than basic ideology of the Bolshevik Party. 6
The foreign sector. Foreign capital inflow and foreign commer-
cial relations were almost totally disrupted by the 1917Revolutionl the
annulment of all foreign obligations 1 nationalization of industry, banks
and trade (including foreign-owned) without compensation and the Bol-
sheviksl ideological hostility toward "capital" and the capitalist
5Carr-521 pp. 289-2961 Carr-541 pp. 85-89 and Carr-58,
Chapter V. The relaxation of the restrictions on hiring of land and of
agricultural workers aided the development of a "kulak" class; it also
improved the position of the now legally unemployable agricultural
worker and poor peasant.
6See Carr-54, pp. 3-51 16-19.
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world.7 The pos sible economic benefits of attracting foreign capital
led to an ambivalent attitude toward a future role of foreign capital
in the Soviet economy and from late 1919 to 1930, the Soviet government
tried without much success to attract direct foreign investments in
"concessions" in the USSR.8 All attempts to get massive reconstruc-
tion laons from the West failed. 9 The basic source of foreign capital
inflow during NEP was to be short-term credits for foreign trade.
Economic independence as a Soviet policy goal
The goal of economic independence has figured prominently
in Soviet discussion of economic policy and has its roots in Marxist
theory of foreign trade, in Tsarist Russia's industrialization experi-
ence, in Lenin! s writings, in the economic disruption caused by the
blockaded trade routes during World War I and during the Civil War,
d. h . t f d .1. h. 10an ln t e requlremen s 0 a mo ern ml ltary mac lne.
In particular, Soviet leader s felt that the technological back-
wardness and the inadequate size of the Soviet machine building in-
dustry (and the supporting metal and chemical industries) was most
7Pasvolsky-24 (pp. 197-198) for decree on annulment of for-
eign debt.
8Dohan-65.
9pasvo1sky-24, p. 162 ff and pp. 199-236.
10The relationship of Marxist theory of foreign trade to
Soviet goals of economic independence is discussed below. Carr-58
(pp. 338) attributed part of the Soviet desire to be self-sufficient in
heavy industry to the Tsarist industrialization policies for pre-19l4
Russia. See Lenin, Sochineniia (5th ed.), Vol. XLV, pp. 209, 287
as cited by Carr-67, p. 279; Stalin-28a, pp. 257-262; Bukharin-28a,
Bazarov-28a, in Spulber-64, p. 261 and p. 223.
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strategic type of import dependence on the capitalist world. 11 There
were many reasons for the early Soviet emphasis on "economic inde-
pendence" (e specially in machine building and heavy industry).
First, military security - especially in a hostile capitalist
world - was an important reason for being "import-independent" in
some fields and mo st all Party leader s supported the development of
selected "national defense industries ..,,12 World War I and the Block-
ade had revealed Russia's weaknesses in this area. Early steps were
taken to diver sify Soviet technological capacity for dome stic construc-
tion of airplanes, auto-transport (trucks) and tractors (convertible to
tanks and other military production). 13
Second, the Soviet leaders emphasized "economic" independ-
ence as the only alternative to becoming an exploited "economic append-
age" of the capitalist industrial nations. Some Soviet leaders, based
on their Marxist heritage and their interpretation of Russian economic
history, believed that to trade "cheap" Soviet raw materials for man-
ufactured goods (and especially machinery) was to open the economy
llThe Soviet leaders were as concerned about the technological
capabilities of producing most modern types of machinery on a mod-
erately lar ge - scale basis as well as being able to completely satisfy
all their equipment needs from domestic producers - technological
independence perhaps even more than the economic productive "capa-
city" independence was the Soviet leaders' chief concern.
12
See, for example, Bazarov-28a in Spulber -64, p. 223.
l3The early secret military agreements with Russia exchanged
the right of the German army to develop, test, and maneuver with new
weapons on Russian soil for the German obligation to build munitions
factories and train workers and officers, and to grant technical aid in
building tanks and airplanes (Dyck-66, pp. 20-24, 25).
to exploitation by foreign capitalist manufacturers. And clearly the
Soviet leaders did not wish to become a mere exploited agrarian
colony of Western Europe, in the way India was of Great Britain. 14
Development of selected import- substitution industries would also
increase the bargaining power of the state monopoly of foreign trade
in their dealing with capitalist cartels. But this desire to avoid eco-
nomic exploitation was more an ideological concept and did not pre-
clude the expansion of foreign trade and specialization along the lines
of their comparative advantage, along with industrialization.
Third, Soviet leader s realized that economic growth and the
level of investment depended on the supply of investment goods and
they wished to be sure of their ability to maintain an adequate level
of investment regardless of the behavior of the capitalist world (1. e. ,
embar go). As stated in the resolution on industrialization at the 14th
Party Congress in December 1925:
that the Soviet Union be converted from a country which imports
machines to a country which produces machines, in order that
by this means the Soviet Union in the midst of capitalist encircle-
ment should not become an economic appendage of the capitalist
world economy, but an independent economic unit which is build-
ing socialism. 15
Krzhizhanovsky summarized the problem again in 1927:
l4The Soviet fear of becoming and "economic appendage" of
the industrial world can be traced back to Marx's Capital. "A new
international division of labor, a division suited to the requirements
of the chief centers of modern industry springs up, and converts one
part of the globe into a chiefly agricultural field of production, for
supplying the other part which remains a chiefly industrial field"
(Marx-06, p. 493). See also Gottheil-66, pp. 122-127.
15As cited in Dobb-48, p. 192.
55
56
The unavoidable implacability of the whole capitalist encircle-
ment toward us obliges us to give special attention to organiz-
ing our own internal market and building the kind of economic
complex that will ensure both our defensive capability and fur-
ther economic progress "on our own": hence, the unavoidable
emphasis on both heavy industry and the production of means
of production as central to our general economic efficiency and
defense capacity. 16
And Stalin reiterated the theme of economic appendage~
Should we, perhaps, for the sake of greater caution, retard
the development of heavy industry and make light industry,
which produces chiefly for the peasant market, the basis of
our industry as a whole? Not in any circumstances! That
would be suicidal; it would undermine our whole industry in-
cluding light industry. It would mean abandoning the slogan
of industrializing our country, it would transform our coun-
try into an appendage of the world capitalist system of eco-
nomy.17
Thus, import-substitution especially in the investment goods
industries was essentially a policy of "risk reduction" or a "less-
regret strategy" which would reduce the effects of depression or
embargo on Soviet economic development so that the Soviet economy
could continue to grow regardless of developments in the foreign sec-
tor.18 Even Stalin, however, realized that if other sociali st state s
existed, industrialization might proceed without preliminary expansion
of their investment goods industry, but that under Soviet conditions of
a hostile capitalist encirclement, the Soviet economy must be consid-
ered a "closed economy. ,,:19
l6Krzhizhanovsky-27a in Spulber-65, p. 424.
17Stalin-28b, p. 98.
l8See Neuberger-63.
19Krzhizhanovsky-27a in Spulber-65, p. 424. Stalin-28a in
Spulber-65, p. 270, Feldman-28b in Spulber-65, p. 327.
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The foreign trade problems during the NEP, however, were
not the result of the "hostile capitalist encirclement" but rather the
result of the inability of the USSR to increase its export capacity.
With respect to the various growth paths, Soviet Party leaders thought
that industrialization and in particular the development of heavy indus-
try would make the Soviet economy more independent of both the world
economy and the peasant, while emphasis on agrarian expansion for
export (even temporarily) would increase their dependence on both the
world capitalist economy and the peasant. Thus, Soviet goals were
from the start biased against growth policies based exclusively on
development of the traditional Russian comparative advantage in agri-
culture and extractive industries.
The question really was the extent to which they would forego
the gains of trade which still might be got from this development path.
As Strumilin wrote in 1928 in reply to Bazarovl s advocacy of greater
attention to the "international division of labor" in the perspective five-
year plans:
it seems to me that this advocacy of the division of labor on an
international scale is somewhat premature •••• There are only
two ways of solving fully [emphasis added] the problem of the
international division of labor: either by bringing world revolu-
tion closer or by capitulating to capitalist encirclement. Only
the first method is acceptable to us •••• 20
Nevertheless, the Soviet desire to be economically independent
of the world capitalist economy did not imply the absence of any desire
to expand foreign trade - on the contrary, the Soviet government
20Strumilin-28a in Spulber - 64, p. 456.
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formulated very ambitious trade expansion plans during NEP and for
the 1st FYP as can be seen in Chapter XIII.
Income distribution. The socialist nature of the Revolution
and its supposed sources of political support caused a redistribution
of income, not only away from the rich propertied classes, but also
toward the workers in terms of real income, and distribution of goods
and government services. Ideological and political criteria were
important in the distribution of taxes and "forced savings'f among vari-
ous social clas se s. The worker or poor peasant tended to be increas-
ingly favored by tax exemptions during NEP. 21 Furthermore, the
socialist nature of the Revolution probably imparted an urban bias in
the distribution of available commodities and an upward bias in the
wage-determination system and made it more difficult for industry
to restrain the growth of money wages, especially when food prices
.. 22were rising.
Active government economic policy and rapid industrialization.
The Revolution brought into power a government whose goals were bas-
ically economic goals and which took an active economic policy through
interference in the economy to achieve these goals of economic recovery,
income -di stribution, price - stability, industrialization, etc. The Party
leadership believed that planning and government direction of the eco-
nomy were important instruments in promoting industrialization - not
21Reingold-3l, pp. 164-166, 174.
22See Deutscher-50 and Carr-54, pp. 69-87. See Chapter VII"
p. 236.
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entirely unlike S. Witte's attitude about the government's role in eco-
nomic growth. Furthermore, the Soviet leaders believed that the
"socialist form of economy" was superior to the capitalist form of
economy, so that the temp of Soviet industrialization had to exceed
the tempo of capitalist industrial growth in order to demonstrate the
superiority of the socialist system and to eventually change the bal-
ance of industrial power so as to increase the international security
of the Soviet state. As Strumilin in 1927 summariz ed the issue:
The tempo of our industrial expansion in the coming five year s
period is governed by a whole series of objectives and material
factor s •••• That tempo must be faster than the r ate of our
agricultural development, or we shall never eliminate the
dangerous disproportion between our industry and agriculture.
It must also surpass the rate of development in capitalist coun-
tries, for unless we were able to show the advantages of the
collectivist over the capitalist economy in this respect, there
would be no chance of victory for the socialist revolution on a
world scale.23
Theoretical Issues in the Recovery of
Soviet Foreign Trade During NEP
In this section we examine analytically some of the problems
affecting the recovery of foreign trade during NEP.
Monopoly of foreign trade
Foreign trade was a State monopoly, which was aware of "the
capacity of the market" for Soviet goods. Although the purpose of
this monopoly was basically the enforcement of State priorities in the
23Strumilin-27a in Spulber-64, p. 434.
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FIGURE 11.1
FOREIGN TRADE EQUILIBRIUM OF SOVIET FOREIGN
TRADE MONOPOLY AND TSARIST FREE TRADE
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import sector, the maintenance of the balance of payments, and the
forcing of exports, it is valuable to ask what effect a monopoly of
foreign trade in a large economy has on the level and pattern of for-
eign trade as compared with a free trade situation (assumed to be
more representative of trade under Tsarism despite the high pro-
tective tariffs). The monopoly of foreign trade is assigned the task
to achieve as high a "social indifference curve" as pos sible, where
the marginal rates of transformation in trade, output and consumption
are all equal and where trade is balanced. The main decision variables
available to the foreign trade monopoly are the quantity of export
offered on the world markets, and quantity of imports demanded on
world markets. Looking at the Soviet Union's trade indifference
curves and the offer curve of the rest-of-the-world in Figure 11.1,
the problem is analytically similar to the question of the optimum
tariff and the solution is also the same. The point FT represents the
competitive solution if Soviet foreign trade was conducted on a free
trade competitive basis. Clearly FT is a sub-optimal position for the
Soviet Union, for by exporting fewer exportables and thereby reducing
imports by some amount the USSR could reach its highest indifference
curve S'U' at M in Figure 11.1. This is also the point which the opti-
mum tariff will reach (barring retaliation) with the offer curve OT
in Figure 11.1. 24 Since the State foreign trade monopoly is the Soviet
Union's sole entrepreneur on world markets, tariffs are not necessary
24See Kindleberger-63, pp. 663-666 for a discussion of the
optimum tariff.
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for the purpose of inducing many independent buyers and sellers to
adjust their supply and demand. Rather the State monopoly simply
buys the proper amount for export from the otherwise free domestic
market and sells it abroad; similarly, it buys the optimum amount
on the world markets and sells it for the highest pos sible price
which clears its supplies of imports. 25
Two important points about Soviet foreign trade emerge from
the above discussion of monopoly.
First, all other things being equal, theory suggests that the
monopolization of foreign trade by the Soviet government in a large
export economy would result in less foreign trade than under the
more competitive system operating before the revolution, and as
the economy recovered, the optimum level of foreign trade under a
State foreign trade monopoly would be constantly lower than the level
of trade operating on a free trade basis. Considerable evidence
points to a Soviet awareness of their influence of price on specific
commodities, and that they (I) tried to use their influence and (2)
that this perceived influence did affect resource allocation.
Second, the monopoly of foreign trade, aware of the down-
ward-sloping demand curve for its exports, and the rest-of-the-
world supply curves, equates the marginal rates of transformation
in domestic production to the marginal rate of transformation in
25The reasons for tariffs during NEP are discussed in
Chapter s IV -X.
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world trade and these two to the marginal rate of substitution in con-
sumption. Thus, the expansion of exports and the expansion of the
export sector will be less than under competitive free trade. The
State monopoly, unlike competitive free trade, would halt the expan-
sion of exports (and production for export) somewhat before the unit
elasticity point on the rest-of-the-world's offer curve, namely at the
point where the marginal rate of transformation of exportables into
import goods on the world market (which is higher than the price
ratio or average rate of transformation) equals the marginal rate of
transformation domestically. The important conclusion here is that
at this optimal ,equilibrium point, difference between domestic rela-
tive prices based on domestic relative costs and world relative prices
still persists in favor of the export good, so that the price system and
profit-and-Ioss signals continue to call for expanded output and export
of exportables. To do so, however, would be to move to a lower in-
difference curve.
The difference between marginal and average rates of trans-
formation of Soviet goods in world markets for the Soviet Union weakens
the arguments of the export-expansion protagonists on the Right and
strengthens the arguments of the Left for import substitution and indus-
trialization.
Retaliation against the foreign trade monopoly worried the
Soviet Union, and could invalidate the above conclusions. The Soviet
Union, however, successfully overcame most forms of outright dis-
criminatory retaliation against their monopoly. Indeed, evidence
demonstrates a rational use of monopoly power in countering Western
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oligopolie s.
Foreign trade as a solution to the "Goods Famine"
The purchase of "sufficient" agricultural goods and especially
grain by the State purchasing agency on the domestic marketplace
turned out to be quite difficult in the USSR during the NEP, and the in-
adequacy of agricultural foodstuffs and raw materials hindered the
provisioning of urban populations, industry and the growth of exports. 26
Most Soviet economists believed that the main cause of the peasants I
unwillingness to market more grain was the lack of additional consumer
goods to trade with the peasant for additional grain.27 A policy of
"goods intervention" was advocated by many Soviet party leaders, where-
by consumer goods would be imported to trade with the peasants for
grain which would then be exported to pay for the imported consumer
goods.28 And the whole operation would leave some extra grain (or
some extra consumer goods) in the hands of the State trading agency
because at current domestic price ratios and world price ratios, it was
thought that the USSR had the comparative advantage in the export of
grain. The policy of a "goods intervention" and grain export would
overcome the" goods famine" and expand the marketing of grain - at
least this was the argument and rationale behind the policy of the" goods
intervention" in 1925.
26This theme is developed through in Chapters VII-XI.
27This hypothesis is examined critically in Chapter XI. See
also references to "good famine" in Chapter VIII, p. 273.
28See Chapters VII, VIII and XI.
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Let us develop a simple model to examine the conditions
under which the policy of consumer good imports and grain exports
- namely, expanding foreign trade - will solve the grain marketing
problem and the" goods famine." To let the cat out of the bag, we
find that such a policy of "good intervention and grain purchase
export" will not necessarily increase grain marketing and overcome
the" goods famine," but, on the contrary, under Soviet conditions,
such a policy may actually result in diminished grain marketing and
worsen the goods famine.
There are two goods, cloth (denoted by C) and grain (denoted
by G). The peasants sell grain solely to buy cloth. The State trad-
ing agency has a monopoly on the sale of cloth and a monopsony in
the purchase of grain; its policy is to hold the ruble price of cloth
constant and to vary the price of grain.29 For analytical simplicity,
we shall as sume a simple linear supply curve of unit elasticity~
G = a Pg
G = grain marketed by peasants
Pg - price offered for grain by State
trading agencies
a .- price coefficient
where the peasant assumes that he can spend his income purchasing
cloth at the fixed price PCo. Thus, changes in Pg result in real
changes in the value of grain (if cloth were available at the fixed price).
(In reality, the marketing curve of grain is probably more elastic at
lower prices and less elastic at higher prices -- it might even bend
backwards. )
29This assumption is very close to actual Soviet practice during
the mid 19201s; see Chapter VIII.
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The total income of the peasant from the sale of grain is
2
TR = Pg G = a Pg. The most important point here is that in our
simple model the marginal cost in rubles to the State trading agency
is twice the average price offered for grain in rubles. And since the
only item the State trading agency traded with the peasant was cloth
which it sold at a constant price to the peasant, the State must offer
in cloth double the value of the average price of grain in order to
coax the peasant to market another unit of grain.
Now let us assume that the State trading agency wants to
purchase a certain amount of grain (Go) for the cities and for export
at the necessary price (Pg ) so that the peasant would earn Pg Q
000
2
(aPg ). Now the State trading agency, much to its dismay, findso
that its supply of cloth at constant price s (C Pc ) would be Ie s s than
o 0
the demand for cloth by the peasant, i. e. Pg G Pc C , so that
o 0 0 0
there would be excess demand for cloth. For various reasons we
assume that the Russian peasant saved little of his money income.
Now the question is, "Should the State Trading Agency raise
its grain purchase program, export the extra grain, and import cloth
in order to attempt to eliminate the exc es s demand for cloth?"
The answer, of course, depends on the commodity terms of
trade of grain for cloth on foreign markets. (Initially we shall assume
that the State Trading Agency can buy and sellon world markets at a
constant commodity terms -of-trade.) If we compare the "domestic
terms of trade" of cloth for grain (Pg / Pc) originally set by theo 0 su
State Trading Agency (prices which do not clear the market for cloth)
and the foreign terms of trade (Pg/ Pc) ,we (presumably) find thatw
FIGURE II. 2
"OPTIMUM" GRAIN PURCHASE-EXPORT PROGRAM BY
ST ATE TRADING AGENCY WITH GRAIN PURCHASE
MONOPSONY AND CLOTH SALES MONOPOLY
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2. Under State Trading Agency, purchases of G~:~equate the
domestic marginal rates of transformation of grain into
cloth to the marginal (and average) rates of transformation
of grain into cloth on world markets.
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Russia indeed has the "classical comparative advantage" ingrain
exports (for, if anything, the domestic price of cloth should. be
higher). That is, (Pg / Pc) is les s than (Pg/ Pc) •o 0 su w
Should the State Trading Agency buy the extra grain: and import
cloth according to the classical theory of comparative advantage - as
was advocated by several Party members? Not at all certain! In fact,
... ,
maybe the best policy is to reduce grain purchases and exports and
cloth imports. Because the State Trade Agency is a monopsony in its
purchase of grain from the peasant, the relevant comparison is .the
domestic marginal cost of purchasing grain in terms of cloth (rather
than the domestic average price) to the foreign price ratios. In our
simple case, the marginal cost is twice the average cost, so the State
Trading Agency should expand grain exports (and cloth imports) only if
(2Pg /Pc) is less than (Pg/Pc) and cut back grain purchase'ando 0 su w
grain exports if (2Pg / Pc) is greater than (Pi/ Pc) .. In FigUreo 0 su w
11.2, the domestic price ratio of grain to cloth of (Pg/ Pc) ~:~:is,the
su
borderline price ratio between expanding and contracting grain purchase
for exports in exchange for cloth if the world price ratio is (PgfPc>w.
The optimum amount of grain to buy from the viewpoint of minimizing
,,~
the excess demand for cloth is G;'" and it would be purchased I.at (Pg/
,,~
,,"
Pc). To the naive, however, the theory of comparative advantage
("international division of labor") would recommend expanding grain
purchases and exports out to Gr - but this would actually increase the
excess demand for cloth. While it might be clear to officials in the
State Trading Agency, that grain purchases for export beyond G' are
irrational in terms of increasing the excess demand (goods famine) for
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cloth, these sam.e officials thinking in terms of average prices rather
than mar ginal cost might have difficulty in under standing why any grain
purchase-and-export program. between G~~and G' should be cut back to
G~:~as a method of cutting excess demand for cloth. Thus, the monop-
sonist position of the State Trading Agency is an important factor to
consider when evaluating the policy of the "goods intervention" in 1925
for at that time it was believed that the additional grain purchased with
the imported consumer goods could be exported to pay for the imports
and that at these prices the State Trading Agencies could accumulate
grain or consumer goods.
If we add the complicating factor that the USSRwas (or could
be) a large grain exporter relative to world markets, so that the com-
modity terms-of-trade decline as grain exports increase - as we dis-
cussed above - this further reduced the profitability of exporting grain
and importing cloth. To a limited extent, foreign trade monopoly of
the USSRwas a monopsonist in the purchase of grain on domestic
markets and faced a downward sloping demand for Soviet grain in
foreign markets, so that the marginal "cloth imports" made possible
by exporting another unit of g'rain is less than average cloth imports
purchased with the receipts from grain exports (Figure 11.3).
The level of grain exports which be st reache s the government's
goal (namely minimizing the excess demand for cloth [om1in Figure 3)
would in. this case be even lower than 0* in Figure II. 2 (0* in Figure
11.3), and domestic and foreign price ratios become even a less rele-
vant guide for the State Trading Agency which is attempting to
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FIGURE 11.3
"OPTIMUM" GRAIN PURCHASE-EXPORT PROGRAM BY STATE
TRADING AGENCY FACING IMPERFECT WORLD MARKETS
quantity
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purchasing additional unit
of grain by State Trading Agency
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GRAIN PURCHASES AND EXPORTS
relative price of grain to
price of cloth in perfect
world markets \
t
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before any
Soviet grain
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imperfect
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OQc = grain required by cities.
OQf = grain purchased in free trade market of which Qc -.Of is
exported to an imperfect world market.
~ ~
OQ'" = grain purchased by State Trading Agency, of which Q -Q'" is
cexported to a perfectly competitive market.
OQm = grain purchased by State Trading Agency, of which Qc-Qm is
exported to an imperfect world market
The State Trading Agency is a monopsonist in the purchase of grain on
the domestic market and a monopolist in the sale of cloth to the grain-
selling peasants. In this example, we illustrate its equilibrium in
imperfect and perfectly competitive world markets.
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establish equilibrium in the rural cloth market. 30
Three comments are appropriate here. First, the grain pur-
chases target had to at least meet the domestic demand for marketed
grain from urban areas, and that this minimum amount might be greater
than the optimum amount Q*, so that no leeway would be available to cut
export and grain purchases so as to reduce the goods famine. As will
be seen in Chapters VII-X, grain export plans were rarely fulfilled,
primarily because of the inability of the State to purchase sufficient
grain for the export plan without causing an excessive increase (or in-
adequate decline) in the price of grain - but it is doubtful if the above
type of marginal cost estimates were even considered, much less
actually estimated or used.
Second, if the peasant's short-run supply curve becomes more
inelastic, the policy of goods intervention and additional grain exports
is much less likely to be a beneficial policy to overcome the "goods
famine" and, in fact, the purchase of grain at rising prices in order to
pay for the imported consumers' goods will most likely aggravate it.
Third, the obvious policy solution to exces s demand for con-
sumer goods in the countryside (given that adjusting the level of grain
purchases is not possible because of minimum needs in the city) would
be 1) increase direct taxes on agriculture, 2) divert additional con-
sumer goods from the urban population, or 3) allocate more funds from
existing export receipts or foreign reserves to import additional con-
sumer goods.
30The State Trading Agency is not deliberately trying to maxi-
mize profits or export receipts. Rather it is trying to reduce excess
demand for cloth in rural areas.
72
The real situation during NEP was much more complicated
than our simple model, because grain was exported, raw materials
for consumer goods were imported, labor was hired to turn these raw
materials into consumer goods, the workers purchased additional
grain, consumer goods, and exportable goods from their earnings,
etc. Nevertheless, our simple model represents a most important
problem of expanding grain exports during NEP.
Reduced fixed obligations on peasants. The reduction of fixed
monetary payments due about harve st time (or through the year) from
the peasants would, under most circumstances, reduce the quantity of
agricultural goods marketed by the peasant at any given set of prices.
In Figure II. 4, offer curve R-R would be the peasant's offer curve,
given fixed payments of r in terms of grain, where r equals the value
of the fixed payment divided by the price of grain. Curve SU-SU is
the offer curve of the Soviet peasant of grain, all other things being
equal, except that his fixed payments are lower. The curve SU-SU
lies below RR because of the Soviet peasants higher "disposable in-
come" resulting from reduced fixed payments, and the assumption
that within the income ranges of a Russian peasant, the total demand
for grain in all forms - grain, grain-based products (livestock pro-
ducts and alcohol), the "asset-demand for grain reserves," and for
feed for workstock - exhibits some positive incon1.e elasticity. Thus,
for any terms of trade (dotted line) between manufactured goods and
grain (as agricultural goods) the peasant tends to market less.
Two other important points should be noted. Fir st, the
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FIGURE 11.4
EFFECT OF REDUCTION OF FIXED MONETARY OBLIGATIONS OF
PEASANT ON PEASANT MARKETING OF GRAIN
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strategy for maximizing grain marketing is to reduce grain prices
when the most taxes, rents, and other fixed obligations are due
because the peasant will be forced to sell more grain (Ilrll in Figure
1l.4) to cover his fixed money debts; then raise the grain price to
induce additional marketing. It should be pointed out that if grain
and grain-based products are a superior good with respect to income,
so that the offer curve could turn down at some point, then increasing
the terms of trade would not necessarily increase grain marketing,
but on the contrary, might decrease it.
Second, the users of hired agricultural laborers - estates and
kulaks - also were forced to sell their grain because of the wage bill
(insofar as they were not paid in kind). The estate was forced to mar-
ket at least some grain (equal to the annual wage bill), and this factor
as well as the diminishing marginal utility of large surpluses of grain
to the estate owner as compared to other goods, led to large grain
marketing by estates. What I am suggesting here is that the larger
the amount of hired labor, etc., in grain production, the larger the
gross marketing from any given crop will be.
Foreign trade and the Soviet industrialization debate. 31
The goal of "rapid industrialization" was widely accepted in
the Party leadership. In the mid-1920t s the major issues were not
industrialization versus agricultural development, but rather about
3lBased largely on Erlich-60, Carr 58a, articles in Spulber -64,
and Dohan-65.
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the tempo of industrialization, the pattern of industrialization and
the method of accumulating the resources for industrialization,
during the next five or ten or fifteen years. The basic ground rule
in the intra-Party debate on these issues was that the NEP form of
economic organization and markets - especially in agriculture - would
continue to exist or could be modified only slowly in the coming years.
Below we summarize in an oversimplified way the major alternatives
and issues proposed by various factions within the Party. The "Right"
refers to arguments developed by Bukharin, Rykov, Shanin and others,
while the "Left" refers primarily to the arguments of Preobrazhenskii,
Trotsky, and others.
The Right's strategy for industrialization emphasized the de-
velopment of agriculture, light industry and export fields up to the
capacity of world and domestic markets or exhaustion of favorable
investment opportunities. It was argued that this path was the faster
and least-cost way of satisfying the rapidly expanding demand for
imported raw materials and for equipment for the expansion of indus-
try when compared with a policy of immediate "forced draft develop-
ment" of heavy industry. Heavy industry, it was argued, had larger
capital (output) requirements, were less profitable and hence a poor
source for accumulation (corporate savings and taxes) and would
aggravate the" goods famine" because of a longer period for con-
struction and because of the higher "prime costs" (especially labor)
of domestically produced heavy industry goods as compared to simi-
lar goods obtained through the foreign trade sector. The Right
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conceded that the exigencies of national defense compelled selective
development of several branches of heavy industry, and the limited
capacity of world markets for Soviet agricultural produce and other
exports and increasing costs would eventually retard the growth of
foreign trade and the profitability of expansion along the traditional
lines of comparative advantage. It was inevitable that in the future,
some resources would have to be diverted toward heavy industry to
ensure the growth in the supply of machinery and raw materials for
the growing Soviet economy. But until this point, the development
of heavy industry was to be postponed in favor of exploiting the eco-
nomy! s comparative advantage as the better method of obtaining
these products.
The justification for expanding agriculture and light industry
had two other important aspects in addition to the greater productiv-
ity of resources in agriculture. First, such a growth path was thought
to strengthen the smychka (alliance) between the worker and the peas-
ant, while "forced draft industrialization" was imagined to destroy the
smychka by antagonizing the peasant producer through an unfavorable
price relationship between agricultural products and industrial con-
sumer products and a worsening of the goods famine. It was thought,
by both Right and Left, that much of the economy's surplus value (re-
quired for investment) was created in agriculture (because of its large
share in national income and its higher "rate"), so that the rate of
inve stment in industry was determined by the amount of surplus value
which could be transferred ("alienated") from agriculture for industrial
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investment. Since the peasants would be antagonized by an attempt
to take from them excessive amounts of "surplus value" (either through
high direct taxes, or relatively high manufactured goods prices reflect-
ing indirect. excise taxes or monopoly profits), the Right emphasized
that the preservation and strengthening the smychka of worker and
peasant placed an upper limit on the rate of investment in industry
which could be "financed" through surplus value transferred from agri-
culture. It was in the interest of the smychka that the Right counciled
more moderate rates of industrial investment (especially in heavy in-
dustry) than did the Left.
Second, the Right argued that the capacity to accumulate (in-
vest) for industrial expansion would actually be larger in the long run
than if resources were invested in agriculture and light industry in-
itially rather than being immediately diverted into a forced draft de-
velopment of heavy industry. Not only would national income increase
faster, but the rate of accumulation (investment) would be higher with
the development of agriculture and light industry because the higher
profitability (rate of surplus value) of light industry and agriculture
could be used to finance (through taxation of surplus value and direct
reinvestment) a higher rate of industrial expansion than if the same
resources had been initially invested in heavy industry. Light industry
and agriculture would grow faster than heavy industry (at least in the
short run), according to the proponents of agricultural development,
but heavy industry could grow faster in the long-run under the policy
of the Right than under the policy of forced industrialization because
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of the higher growth rate of investment resources (savings) and the
increased availability of inexpensive imported machinery.
The overall success of the Right's policy for industrializa-
tion was critically dependent on the government's success in three
interdependent areas - foreign trade, stimulating agricultural market-
ing of foodstuffs and raw materials for a growing urban work force,
industry and exports, and maintaining macro-economic and inter-
sectoral equilibrium. The whole argument of the Right loses meaning
if exports can not be expanded rapidly enough to provide an uninterrup-
ted increase in imports of raw materials and equipment for the recon-
struction and expansion of industry. Furthermore since the Russian
peasant was free to grow and market what he desired (after the pay-
ment of the monetary tax), the success in all three areas depended on
the governmentJ s ability to maintain overall price stability and the
proper configuration of relative prices among various agricultural
goods and between industrial and agricultural goods. It had to formu-
late a tax and price -policy which would" optimize" marketing and
growth of output of the relatively most desirable items while restrain-
ing peasant demand to the availability in rural areas of consumer and
agricultural producer's goods (determined by current output and extra-
rural demand), and also to determine the optimum level of imports
of this latter group of goods for sale to the peasants (the policy of
"goods intervention"). A sophisticated non-ideological approach to
the formulation and administration of economic policy and the price
system was required of Marxist revolutionaries raised on ideology,
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32class warfare, and the labor theory of value.
Preobrazhenskii. and the Left. The Left's industrialization
policy called for rapid development of industry based on high rates of
investment to be financed through credit expansion and profits from a
monopolistic industrial price policy vis-a-vis the peasant (which would
alienate or transfer" surplus value" from the private peasant sector
to the socialist industrial sector). Usually, advocates of rapid indus-
trialization also advocated rapid expansion of heavy industry and espe-
cially metallurgy and machine-building - recall, however, that in
Tsarist Russia these industries also grew very rapidly and at times
more rapidly than light industry so that by 1913, for example, Russian
industry supplied most of the domestic iron and steel requirements.
Most economists on the Left recognized that resources currently
employed in heavy industry seemed less efficient in producing heavy
industrial goods than obtaining these same goods through foreign trade.
Even T sarist machine -building and metallur gy r equir ed tariff protec-
tion and lucrative government contracts to survive and grow, and in
the mid-1920's, variable costs (primarily labor input) were substantially
higher than during the Tsarist period.
33The Right would also encourage foreign investment of capital
in concessions and through foreign loans, and would perhaps reduce the
rate of expansion of investment, especially in heavy industry, until the
goods famine was overcome.
This is an oversimplified description of the Right's position,
and was not unanimously supported by those on the so-called "Right" of
the Party. Besides Erlich-60, see Shanin-25 and Shanin-26 for two
articles expounding the above version of the Right's policy. These are
reprinted in part in Spulber-64, pp. 205-220.
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Recognizing the comparative disadvantage of domestic heavy
industrial products, the Left appealed for the continued development
of a domestic heavy industry on a melange of other arguments (national
defense, capitalist exploitation, capitalist encirclement, risk of
embargo, etc.) as discussed above. More important than these argu-
ments for an increased degree of economic independence was perhaps
the Left's fear of the continual increase in the economic and political
power of the non- socialist peasant agriculture which was implied by
relying on expanding foreign trade to supply machinery and other heavy
industrial goods. For the Right! s path clearly called for a rapid ex-
pansion of agriculture - largely on the basis of private peasant efforts,
and especially on the efforts of the middle peasants and the kulak - to
expand exports.
Thus, continued expansion of socialist industry increasingly
depended on the cooperation (and market response) of the private peas-
ant sector, which by its very nature - private ownership of the means
of production - was ho stile to the socialist state and therefore, the
growing private sector would increasingly threaten the political ex-
istence of the socialist state. Was the demise of socialism not inevit-
able if private agriculture grew faster than socialist industry? These
two essentially non-economic arguments for heavy industry - capital-
ist-encirclement and a reluctance to rely on the private peasantry -
seemed to be at the heart of the Left's policy of forced draft indus-
'.1' , 33trla lzatlon.
33This theme ran through Preobrazhenskyls New Economics.
See, for example, Preobrazhensky-26, pp. 78, 178, 231-232, 246,
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Another justification for forced draft industrialization, as put
forward first by the Left in the mid-1920.s and then by Stalin in 1928
and 1929, was that it was the only permanent solution for successfully
overcoming the goods famine within a short period. According to this
ar gument, immediate mas si ve expansion of heavy industry would per-
mit large-scale production of the capital equipment needed to expand
light industry and the mechanization of agriculture, and the expanded
light industry would then supply the additional consumer goods neces-
d th d f 0 34 ThO oldsary to en e goo s am1ne. 1S Slmp e argument seeme eco-
nomically irrational and carried little weight in mid-1925, just on the
eve of an anticipated massive expansion of exports and imports based
on the expected increase in grain marketing and grain exports (see
Chapter VIII). For all recognized that the quickest and cheapest
35method of equipping light industry was via the export sector. But
by the end of"1927/ 28, this simple argument of the Left seemed to
reflect the realities of the moment - for foreign trade simply could
not be forced fast enough to meet the expanding demand for raw ma-
terials and equipment (see Chapter X)0
248-251, 298. "If our country were now to become bourgeois, such
proportions of accumulation would not be demanded by economic
necessity, and the expansion of foreign trade would solve many of
the problems [my emphasis] which we can solve only Preobrazhensky-
emphasis by intensive accumulation and rapid industrialization (Ibid. ,
p. 298).
34See Preobrazhensky-26, pp. 178, 186-187, 248-250, 252,
269, 282, 298-299. See Stalin-29a, pp. 61 passim.
35preobrazhensky-26, pp. 116-122, 127-128, 139, 163-166.
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Preobrazhenskii, however, maintained that in the long-run
expansion of Soviet heavy industry was rational from the economic
viewpoint. He asserted that domestic costs in heavy industry would
eventually fall below the costs of its Western counterparts as a re-
suIt of introducing the most modern equipment, scientific "manage-
ment," and increasing skill of the work force. 36 That is, the differ-
ence in the costs between domestic and imported machinery was due
entirely to the "technical backwardness" of Soviet machine building
industry and the lack of skills and discipline in the labor force, rather
than "factor proportions" a la Heckscher-Ohlin; these deficiencies,
however, could be overcome by the "technical reconstruction" of
Soviet industry and training of the worker. 37
Closely associated with the Left's emphasis on heavy industry
was their support of a monopolistic pricing policy in the sale of indus-
trial goods to agriculture to transfer or IIalienate" II surplus value"
from the private peasant sector and private trader to the socialist
industrial sector. 38 Not only was this to speed the growth of the
36
See Preobrazhensky-26, pp. 250-256.
37preobrazhensky-26, pp. 127-128, 250-251, 254, 261. An
essential distinction between primitive socialist accumulation and
socialist accumulation was that in the initial years in backward eco-
nomies, the inefficient socialist industrial sector can exist and be ex-
panded only behind a wall of socialist protectionism and a monopolistic
price policy which is the instrument of transferring surplus value from
the private sector to the socialist sector for investment. As accumu-
lation (investment) proceeds and the industry is modernized, costs
fall and eventually prices can be lowered to world prices without re-
tarding accumulation in state industry.
38Alienation of II surplus value" could be interpreted as a
method of providing the monetary means for financing industry or in
its real counterpart, namely the reduction of the quantity of industrial
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socialist sector, it was also to restrict the growth of private capital,
an act which was desirable from a political viewpoint, if not from an
economic viewpoint. Preobrazhenskii argued that the most efficient
method - more efficient than direct taxes - of alienating surplus value
from the peasant was to maintain prices sufficiently high to yield a
large profit to socialist industry which could be used to finance the con-
struction of industry. 39 Since domestic industrial prices were much
higher (both absolutely and relative) to agricultural prices than world
prices, the price policy toward the peasant was described as "non-
equivalent exchange." Exchange at world prices, which would prevail
under free trade, was denoted by the term "equivalent exchange." The
policy of "primitive socialist accumulation" through a price policy of
"non-equivalent exchange with agriculture" and the survival of domestic
heavy industry depended on the shield of "Socialist protectionism"
(foreign trade monopoly) and Preobrazhenskii opposed any step toward
a trade policy of freer trade and away from the foreign trade monopoly.
The Right, on the other hand, stressed the importance of re-
ducing prices of industrial goods sold in the countryside as a key ele-
ment in their policy to expand agricultural output and marketing (and
hence, export surplus). The Right as sumed that the price elasticity
of the peasant's demand for industrial goods was greater than one, so
that the peasant would market and produce more agricultural goods in
goods which had to be exchanged for a unit of agricultural produce.
39See Preobrazhensky-26, p. 11.
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response to higher prices. Preobrazhenskii on the Left also assumed
that the peasant's price elasticity of demanci at the then prevailing
. 1 1 h. 40 A bprlce eve s was greater t an unlt. s we saw a ave, however, the
beneficial effects on maintaining inter sectional equilibrium by increas-
ing agricultural marketing (and foreign trade) through lower relative
prices of industrial goods should be questioned in each case.
Official Price Policy during NEP
The official price policy during most of NEP was a policy to
reduce industrial prices as a method of improving the terms of trade
between agriculture and industry while maintaining overall price sta-
bility (Chapters VII_X).41 In fact, prices of industrial goods in the co-
operative and state wholesale and retail systems were often "forced
reduced" despite the existence of excess demand at the higher price.
The economic rationality of this policy of "forced reduction of prices"
during NEP in the face of excess demand is questionable.
This "forced reduction of manufactured goods prices in the
state and cooperative trading network and at the wholesale level" was
supposed to lower the price level of manufactured consumer goods and
to compete down the prices of similar goods sold in the private trade
network which in general were much closer to the "market clearing
prices" for the goods available to the private trader. With a fixed
supply of industrial goods and existing excess demand at "official
40preobrazhensky-27, in Spu1ber-64, pp. 137-138, and 169-
170, and Preobrazhensky-26, pp. 176-177.
41Zalkind-26c, pp. 4- 6.
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prices, II (so that private trade prices were above "official prices"),
it is likely that further reduction in "official price" would actually
increase (the market clearing) prices of private traders. In Figure
II. 5, we have a simple representation of the demand and supply for
manufactured goods, where Q is the fixed supply of industrial goodss
and dd is the demand curve for industrial goods. P f is the market
clearing price in a free market and prices in both private trade and
State and cooperative trade are equal. Now the State wants to lower
the "official price" below Pf in order to improve the terms of trade
of agriculture. We shall assume that a definite quantity of industrial
goods (OB) is made available to the State trade network to sell at the
new lower price (Po) while BQs is allocated for sale by the private
trader at any price. What happens to prices in private trade? The
demand for industrial goods rises to Qo- The behavior of prices in
the private trade depends on who buys the industrial goods in the state
and cooperative network at the lower official price. If, for example,
industrial goods were sold only on a II socialist basis" to the poorer
peasant and worker, whose demand (we shall assume as an extreme
example) makes up the demand curve between de and d" or a quantity
of OB (the entire amount sold by the State and cooperative trade net-
work) between QI and Qo then the entire part of the demand curve
from dS up must be satisfied by the sale of BQs by the private trader,
and in this extreme case, the private trader would be able to sell
it for Pp' far above the previous market clearing price in a free
market (see Figure III. 5) where OQ" equals BQs, the private
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FIGURE 11.5
EFFECT ON PRIVATE TRADERS' PRICES WHEN OFFICIAL PRICES
ARE "FORCED REDUCED" BELOW THE MARKET CLEARING PRICES
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tradersl allotment. Those demanders on the demand curve between dp
and de are not willing to buy Pp in the private trade, but are willing to
buy at lower price, queue up at the State stores and represent part of
the" goods famine."
In general, the smaller the allotment of the private trader,
and the greater the sales on the demand curve below dp' the higher
the private trade price will rise above the free market price, and the
greater the excess demand. In fact, simple rigorous division of the
market into private trade (from dp up) and state-cooperative trade
(from dp down) - i. e., price discrimination - will have the same effect
on private trade prices - this was in fact the bias in Soviet selling pol-
icies during NEP. A private trader1s price above the official price
therefore, may result from sales at an official price below the real
market clearing price to those on the demand curve below the real
market clearing price, or from segregation of the market place (on
a socialist basis?). The "free market" or private market clearing
price, it should be noted, is above the real market clearing prices
in a free market (in almost all cases).
In summary, lowering the official price (below the market
clearing price) and given a fixed supply and allocation of goods be-
tween the private and state-cooperative trading networks tends to
raise prices in private trade, and increase excess demand (worsen
the "goods famine").
From the viewpoint of "socialist accumulation" and the over-
all effectiveness of the policy of price reduction, Preobrazhenskii
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made the most telling criticism of the policy of lowe'ring retail and
wholesale prices of manufactured consumer goods during the goods
famine (excess demand for consumer goods at current prices).
Preobrazhensky opposed the extensive price reduction policy during
NEP not merely because it reduced the surplus value transferred to
socialist industry and trade, but also and equally important, the
many benefits of price reduction (especially of whol,esale prices)
accrued not to the peasant but to the private trader capitalist who
continued to sell his wares at high or higher prices. The peasant
wanted consumer goods, not low list prices on empty shelves.
Economic growth and sectoral investment
patterns in the USSR
The NEP was basically a period of economic recovery. The
debate during NEP about sectoral growth patterns was a debate largely
about future allocations of investment and the structure of the economy,
although the debate often raged over the distribution of investment
during the NEP - investment intended basically to overcome some sec-
toral disproportions during the NEP caused by territorial losses (tex-
tile, paper, chemicals), damage from the war (ferrous metallurgy),
or changes in the supply and demand for selected commodities from
changes in economic organization (land redistribution), income redis-
tribution, etc. Investment during NEP was more oriented at establish-
ing equilibrium within the recovering economy than establishing the
proper sectoral configuration to achieve the desired long-term growth
rate.
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CHAPTER III
RUSSIAN ECONOMIC GROWTH AND FOREIGN TRADE TO 1917
The economic cause s and significance of the failure of Soviet
foreign trade to recover to pre-19l4 levels during the NEP are under-
stood better if we review the maj or characteristics and trends of pre-
1914 Russian foreign trade and its relationship to both the domestic eco-
nomy and world markets. The economic effects on foreign trade re-
suiting from the economic, social, and political changes wrought by
the 1917 Revolution, and the basic continuity of the policies and prob-
lems of import substitution, protectionism, export -expansion and
export instability between the Russian economy and the NEP Soviet
economy can be more easily defined within this context.
Tsarist Russia: Growth and Trade
Rus sian economic growth before World War II
While Russia of 1913was economically backward compared to
the major industrial powers of its time --United States, Great Britain,
Germany and France --Russia was significantly more developed in 1913
than many so-called underdeveloped countries today not only absolutely
1For a more complete discussion of Russian economic growth
between 1860 and 1913, see Gerschenkron-65a, Goldsmith-61,
Gerschenkron-47 and the Soviet historian's study, Liashchenko-49.
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(in terms of per capita GNP, educational systems, social overhead cap-
ital, etc.) but even more so relative to the industrial powers of their
respective periods. 2 Russian output grew at about 2% from 1860 to the
early 1880' s and then accelerated to about 3% from the early 1880' s to
1913; per capita growth of output was slow - about 1% - and close to the
European average, but much below the United States, Germany and
Japan.3 Agricultural output grew at 1. 75-2% per year, crops grew at
1. 75-2. 25% per year, and livestock grew at 1. 0-1. 25% per year from
1860 to 1913.4 Since population grew at 1. 5% per year during this period,
per capita output of crops rose slightly but per capita output of animal
products declined from 1860 to 1913.5 There is evidence that growth
2A rough estimate of per capita output in 1913 in 1958 dollars
for Tsarist Russia would be 300 dollars. This rough estimate is based
on estimates of 1928 per capita output of Soviet Russia of 170 1929 dol-
lars (cited in Bergson-63, p. 2) adjusted roughly for change in per cap-
ita output between 1913 and 1928 on Soviet territory (about 11%according
to STAT -56, p. 21 when adjusted for a 70/0population increase [Table T-
48] and adjusted for a doubling of U. S. prices between 1929 and 1950
(Implicit price deflator for U. S. GNP in ERP-67, p. 216). Kuznets-66
(pp. 360-361) cited gross domestic products per capita in 1958, in 1958
U. S. dollars, of roughly $84 in Mainland China, $69 in other Commun-
ist Asian nations, $262 in Latin America, $196 in Middle East, $70 in
India, $128 in Africa. Per capita GNP in the U. S. in 1929 was about
1700 dollars in 1929 and $2560 in 1958 (both in 1958 dollars, GNP di-
vided by population in ERP-67, p. 219, p. 235). Liashchenko-49
(p. 697) cited the following figures estimated by Gosplan on per capita
output (Soviet definition) in 1913: Russia, 102 rubles; England, 463
rubles; Germany, .292 rubles; France, 355 rubles; and the United
States, 695 rubles.
bOldsmith-61, p. 443.
4co1dsmith-6l, p. 453.
=tIoldsmith-61, p. 441, and Eason-63, p. 72 from 1860 to
1914 on Soviet territory. For references to decline in meat consump-
tion in Moscow and for entire country during 1860-1913 see Goldsmfth-
61, p. 452.
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rate s of crops accelerated from the mid-1880's (to about 2. 3%) and that
the growth rate of livestock herds in size and quality increased after
1900 (possibly as high as 1. 75%) under the stimulus of expanding foreign
6markets.
Industry (manufacturing and mining) expanded at the relatively
rapid rate of 5% from 1860 to 1913; heavy industry (coal, oil, iron and
steel) grew more rapidly during this period, but textile and other con-
surner goods industrie s remained relatively more important during this
period.7 Industry expanded most rapidly between 1888 and 1900 (7. 0-
7.6% per year) when the Russian government, under the guidance of
Minister of Finance, S. Witte, embarked on a major expansion of the
railway system built deliberately with domestically supplied products
which were protected by government tariffs and subsidies. 8 An influx of
foreign capital, both direct investments in Russian industry and banks
and indirect inve stment in State loans, helped finance this upsurge in
inve stment during the 1890' s. 9 The growth rate of industrial output
slowed to about 3.8-40/0 during 1900-1913 because of a shift in government
6Goldsmith-6l, pp. 447, 453.
7Goldsmith-6l, p. 442.
8Goldsrnith-6l, p. 465 for growth rate. See Gerschenkron-65
(pp. 124-134) for discus sion of the role of government in Rus sian indus-
trialization. See Liashchenko-49 (pp. 532 -534) for role of railway con-
struction and (pp. 553-560) for his interpretation of the expansionary
role of government in the 1800' s. The new import tariff of 1891 raised
rates considerably (Liashchenko-49, p. 558).
9See Liashchenko-49 (pp. 534-538) for role of foreign direct
investment in industry. See Pasvolsky -24 (pp. 16-22) for discus sion of
growth of foreign-held Rus sian state debt.
trade.
trade.
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priorities and government resource s away from industrialization, a
temporary depression, the 1905 Revolution, and a diminished inflow of
foreign capital. 10 According to both Gerschenkron and Liashchenko,
the expansionary role of the government of the 1890' s was to a limited
extent replaced by the creation of an autonomous internal market and
the expansionary monetary policies and entrepreneurial guidance of the
growing banking system; after eight years of fairly slow growth (1900-
1908), an industrial boom got under way in 1908 which carried right
through to World War 1.11 Thus, the new Soviet government's task on
the assumption of power was not to start self-sustaining rapid economic
and industrial growth, but rather to maintain the growth rate and to
accelerate the growth rate. Tempo - not stagnation - was to be the
problem. But did the 1917Revolution destroy vital parts of the economic
growth mechanism?
The growth of Rus sian trade in 191312
The value of exports grew on the average at about 3. 25% per
year from the late 1880's to World War I, but exports stagnated almost
completely between the late 1880' s to 1900 be cause of low grain price s
lDcoldsmith-6l, p. 465, and Gerschenkron-65, pp. 132-133.
For foreign capital, compare Liashchenko-49, p. 536 and p. 716.
llGerschenkron-65, pp. 135-136, and Liashchenko-49, pp. 700-
717. Liashchenko emphasized that foreign capital controlled Russian
industry through foreign capital in the Rus sian banking system (pp. 707-
708) as well as through direct investment (pp. 717-719).
12see Pokrov skii -47 for a Marxist ana1ysi s of pre -1917 Rus sian
See Pasvo1sky-24 for a non-Marxist analysis of pre -1914 Rus sian
TABLE III. 1
THE FOREIGN TRADE OF RUSSIA 1887 - 1913
(millions of rubles in current prices)
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a a Balance a Grain Exports Value ofExport Import
of Weight Value % of Non-grain
Trade total Exports
export
( 1) (2) (3) (4) (5) ( 6) (7)
1887-91 722 401 321
1892 476 404 72
1893 599 464 135
1894 672 562 110
1895 698 545 153
1896 689 590 99
1897 727 560 167
1898 733 617 116
1899 627 650 -23
1900 716 626 90 4991 305 42.6 411
1901 762 594 168 5637 344 45.1 418
1902 860 599 261 7080 432 50.3 428
1903 1001 682 319 7823 478 47.8 523
1904 1006 651 355 8113 495 49.2 511
1905 1077 635 442 9286 567 52.5 510
1906 1095 801 294 7707 471 43.0 624
1907 1053 847 206 7012 428 40.6 625
1908 998 913 85 6153 376 37.7 622
1909 1428 906 522 12,258 748 52.4 680
1910 1449 1084 365 12,221 746 51.5 703
1911 1591 1162 429 12,045 735 46.2 856
1912 1519 1172 347 8962 547 36.0 976
1913 1520 1374 146 9663 590 38.8 930
a Including platinum but excluding bullion and specie.
Source~ Notes to Table III. 1, Appendix B, p. 751.
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13and poor harvests (Table III. 1). The value of imports on the other
hand grew fairly steadily at about 5% per year from the late 1880' s to
1913 so that by the end of the 1890's, the large trade surpluses of the
late 1880 IS had been converted to a small trade deficit (Table III. 1). 14
The value of both imports and exports grew more rapidly than national
output between the late 1880 IS and 1913, but precisely during the critical
period of the great industrialization push by the Rus sian government in
the 1890's exports failed to expand while imports grew at about 4% per
year (even after th~ 1891 tariff). Thus the Russian government was
forced to push grain exports and to seek foreign loans abroad.
The value of Russian exports and imports grew faster (about
6% per year) and more than doubled during the fourteen years preceding
World War I; the annual trade surplus was much larger than in the pre-
ceding decade (Table III. 1). But exports grew unevenly and remained
at a plateau of 1000-1100 million rubles between 1903 and 1908.15 The
value of exports then jumped to another plateau around 1425-1590 million
rubles during 1909-1913; the increase in 1909 was largely due to a near
doubling of grain exports in 1909, when grain exports equalled 53% of
lbrowth rates based on average value of exports from 1887
to 1891 and 1911-1913. Data from Pasvo1sky-24, p. 27. See Pasvo1sky-
24 (p. 29) for volume and value of grain exports from 1870 to 1913.
14crowth rates based on average value of imports 1887 -1891 and
1911-1913. Data from Pasvo1sky-24, p. 27.
1~iashchenko-49, pp. 666-667. The harvests were good in
1908.
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total exports. 16 Non-grain exports grew steadily and doubled during
the 1900-1913 period. Imports fluctuated around 600-700 million rubles
during the crisis and depression years of 1900-1905, and then rose
steadily to 1375 million rubles in 1913.
The structure and role of exports
in the Russian economy
Russian exports before 1914, consisted primarily of agricul-
tural products dominated by grain (Tables III. 1, III. 2, III. 3). Agricul-
tural-dependent exports were 66.3% of total exports' according to Soviet
definition excluding furs and fish, and 75. 20/0of total exports according
to U. S. definition (Table T -19). 17 In addition to grain, the most impor-
tant export products during 1909-1913 (0/0of value) were flax (5. 7%),
butter (4.2%), eggs (5.l%), oil seed and oil cake (40/0), timber (9. 6%),
sugar (2. 7%), petroleum products (2. 5%), and cotton fabric (2.2%)
(Table III. 3). Grain plus these eight products made up 81%of the value
of average annual exports during 1909-1913. Fur exports, manganese
exports and even petroleum products exports were relatively unimpor-
tnat in the total structure of pre-19l4 Russian exports (4.3% of total
exports) especially when compared to their share in Soviet exports
(Tables III. 3 and T -4). Platinum exports were also unimportant (0. 6%
----------~--_._---------------_. ---------
16Grain exports from Table III. 2 and exclude oil seed and oil
cake. Grain exports including oil seed and oil cake exports equalled
56. 4% of total exports in 1909. Liashchenko-49, pp. 669 ff.
l7See Notes to Table T-19, p. 803, for discussion. The Soviet
definition excludes sugar, vegetable oil and several other products.
TABLE III. 2
RUSSIA: VALUE OF EXPORTS BY COMMODITY GROUP 1909-13
(millions of rubles at current prices)
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1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1909-13
TOTAL EXPORTS 14 15. 5 1435. 6 1576. I 1502. 7 1506.0 1487. 1
Ag ricultura1 a 1109.5 1127. 1 1196.2 1099.6 1104. 3 1127. 3
A. Crops
b
886.2 898.8 907.8 773.4 784.9 850.2
grain
c
676.8750.1 748.0 739.5 551. 9 594.5
oil seed 14.8 24.8 28.8 31.3 21.2 24.1
oil cake 33.6 31.6 34.4 39. 1 38.9 35.5
flax
d
67.9 73.9 70.4 116.1 94.2 84.5
hemp
d
16.712.4 11.5 17.6 19.5 22.9
tobacco 2.8 3.6 4.8 5.6 7.7 4.9
other crops
e
4.6 7.55.4 12.3 9.9 5.5
B. Animal Pro-
ducts
f
169. 1 167.1 211.122.1.9 250.2 247.2
butter 48.9 51. 3 71 . 1 68.5 71.6 62.2
eggs 62.2 63.7 80.8 84.7 90.6 76.4
meat 3.2 5.4 6. 1 8.5 9.6 6.5
rawhides 22.9 16.9 29.1 48.1 36.1 30.6
horsehair 3. 7 1 . 5 2.8 4.3 3.1 3.0
b-ristles 4.8 6.0 6.8 9.5 8.9 7.2
wool 6.8 5.5 8.0 11.2 10.7 8.4
C. Fish and Furs 20 . .1 23.3 24.7 29.8 25.3 24.6
fur 12.0 15 . .1 15. 8 22.9 17. 1 16.5
caviar 3.6 3.6 4.3 3.3 4.2 3.8
D. Other Agric. g 34.1 37.9 41.8 46.2 46.9 41.3
li ve animals 20.8 24.0 26.4 31.0 34.4 27.3
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T ABLE III.2 (continued)
1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1909-13
D. Other (cant.)
vegetable oil 1 . 0 1.0 1.5 3.0 2.3 1.7
Industrial 305. 9 308.5 379.9 403.1 401.7 359.8
A. Timber 126. 6 138. 2 142.4 153.4 164. 9 145. 1
B. Mining 58.6 51.8 51.9 61.4 74.1 59.6
oil products 34.8 29.7 30.4 38.4 50.1 36.6
manganese
are 7.6 7.7 6.6 12.0 14.6 1.0
iron are 3.2 5.2 5.4 4.1 3.0 4. 1
othe r mining
i
13. 0 9.2 6.49.5 7.1 9.0
C. Other indust. j 120. 7 118.5 185. 6 188. 1 162. 7 155. 1
sugar 28.2 25.4 66.2 56.6 27.5 40.8
cotton cloth 23.4 25.2 32.0 37.8 43.9 32.4
alcohol 5.2 5.5 7.5 9. 3 5.2 6.5
Source and explanatory notes: Notes to Table III.2, Appendix B, p. 751.
TABLE Ill.3
GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF RUSSIAN EXPORTS 1909-1913
(per cent of total exports)
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Annual
1909 1910 1911 1912 average1913 1909-1913
TOTAL EXPORTS 100. 0 100. 0 100.0 100. 0 100.0 100.0
Agricultural 78.4 78.5 75.9 73.2 73.3 75.8
A. Crops 62.6 62.6 57.6 51.5 52.1 57.2
grain 53.0 52.1 46.9 36.7 39.5 45.5
oil seed .1.0 .1.7 .1.8 2. 1 1.4 1.6
oil cake 2.4 2.2 2.2 2.6 2.6 2.4
flax 4.8 5.1 4.5 7.7 6. 3 5.7
hemp 0.9 0.8 .1.1 .1.3 1.5 .1.1
tobacco 0.2 0.3 O. 3 0.4 0.5 0.3
other crops 0.3 0.4 0.8 0.7 0.4 0.5
B. Animal Products 12.0 11.6 14.1 16.7 16.4 14.2
butter 3.5 3.6 4.5 4.6 4.8 4.2
eggs 4.7 4.4 5.1 5.6 6.0 5.1
meat 0.2 0.4 0.4 O. 7 0.6 0.4
rawhides .1.6 1.2 .1.8 3.2 2.4 2. 1
horsehair O. 3 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2
bristles 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.5
wool 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.6
C . Fish and Furs 1.4 .1.6 1.6 2.0 .1.7 .1.7
fur 0.8 1.1 .1.0 .1.5 .1.1 1.1
caviar 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3
TABLE III. 3 (continued)
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Annual
average
1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1909-13
D. Other Agric. 2.4 2.6 2.7 3.1 3. .1 2.8
live animals 1.5 1.7 1.7 2.1 2.3 1.8
vegetable oil 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1
Industrial 21.6 21.5 24.1 26.8 26.7 24.2
A. Timber 8.9 8.7 9.0 .1 O. 2 10. 9 9.6
B. Mining 4.2 3.2 3. 3 4.1 4.6 4.2
oil products 2.5 2.1 1.9 2.6 3. 3 2.5
manganese
ore 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.8 1.0 0.7
iron ore 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3
othe r mining 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.6
C. Othe r Indust. 8.5 8.3 11. 8 12.5 10.8 10.4
sugar 2.0 1 . 8 4.2 3.8 1.8 2.7
cotton 1 . 7 1 . 8 2.0 2.5 2.9 2.2
alcohol 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.4
Source: Notes to Table III. 3, Appendix B, p. 752.
TABLE III. 4
RUSSIAN EXPORTS OF SELECTED COMMODITIES
BY WEIGHT 1909 - 1913
(OOO's of metric tons)
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Yrly Av.
1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1909-1913
Grain exc ludin% 12480 13899 13499 9037 10662 11915oil seed, etc.
Grain including 13243 14628 14410 10032 11647 12792oil seed, etc. a
Wheat 5151 6136 3940 2638 3329 4613
Rye 581 664 882 501 647 832
Barley 3581 4008 4302 2764 3927 3636
Oats 1223 1375 1394 848 600 1206
Corn 674 449 1340 769 582 721
Oil seed 140 207 252 291 250
} 993Oil cake 623 576 659 704 735
Flax 275.1 254.4 225.7 353.2 305.1 305
Hemp 54.6 48.3 67.2 64.5 67.9 54
Tobacco 9.8 9.8 10.8 11 . 3 13.4 10. 9
Butter 57.0 56.4 76. 5 72.9 78.0 68.1
Egg s (millions) 2845 2998 3682 3397 3572 3169
Horsehair 3.88 1.57 2.88 3.55 2.28 2.83
Bristles 2.36 2.44 2.64 2.75 2.60 2.55
Rawhides 28.2 22.9 28.0 50.8 41.7 12.7
Fur 10.5 12.0 12.1 15. 5 13.4 12.7
Caviar 2.64 3. 11 2.77 2.51 3.32 2.87
Timber 6945 6831 6829 7012 7597 7042
Sawn 3039 3207 3137 3466 4718 3513
Raw 2637 2407 2418 2418 2872 2550
Oil products 795.4 858.4 854.4 838. 5 947. 0 858.7
Benzine 51.9 67.8 67.7 116.1 152.1 91.1
Kerosene 491.2 512. 9 448.7 396.2 439.7 457.7
Lubricants 204.2 226.6 253.0 269.9 238.5 238.4
Manganese are 620.6 683.9 634.9 1007.8 1193.8 828.2
Iron are 517.6 847.1 886.0 663.2 469.7 676.7
Sugar 204.9 148.9 453.6 376.5 145.3 259.8
Cotton cloth 9.75 1 0.16 12.70 14.92 17.2 12.94
Source: Notes to Table Ill. 4, Appendix B, p. 752.
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of total value of Russian exports including platinum}. 18
The growth of grain exports was extremely erratic both in
quantity and value and was responsible for the fluctuations in the
growth of Russian foreign trade. 19 In Table III. 1we see that grain
product exports expanded to a peak in 1905, declined through 1908,
doubled {in value} in 1909 and then declined during the next three years
{Table III. I}. 20
Non-grain agricultural export s expanded rapidly during 1900-
1913. Significant exports specialization of production and marketing
{the latter often controlled by German and English firms} was beginning
to emerge for such products as butter, eggs, bacon, flax, oilseed and
sugar, and export s accounted for significant portions of total output
{a's much as 31%of eggs, 550/0of butter, 440/0of oilseed, 81%of flax and
10% of sugar output were exported in the period 1909 -19l3}. 21 Rus sian
l8platinum exports are not included in the trade data cited in
text of this study and are discussed in Appendix D {Tables D.4 and D. 5}.
l%ee chart in Pasvolsky-24, p. 29. Timoshenko-32 {pp. 475-
477} emphasized the large cyclical fluctuations of pre -1914 grain exports
{particularly of wheat}, with the correlation between the size of the
wheat crop and wheat exports being quite high {+. 77 for period l892-l9l3}.
29\ccording to the Pokrovskii data cited in Table III. 1, the
quantity of grain exports peaked in 1909, but the Vissarionov data used
for Table III. 4 showed the quantity of grain exports peaking in 1910. The
difference is probably due to definitional differences in the term "grain
export." See Appendix A, Technical Note 6.
21rable T-20, and EIKSSSR, p. 137, pp. 143-145, pp. 157-159,
pp. 225 ff. Export-output ratio for butter for 1913 {Table T -20}. Sugar
exports {largely to the Asiatic countries} were encouraged by export
premiums {Pokrovskii-47, pp. 354-355}. See Liashchenko-49 {po 592}
for role of English capital in butter.
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exports were sufficiently large to affect prices in export markets. Rus-
sian flax exports held a near -monopoly position after driving out most
Western European production during the late 19th century through low
prices.22 Furs were exported largely in unworked form to Germany,
and Russian furs equalled roughly half of the world production. Almost
23all furs produced in Russia were exported.
Industrial exports. Timber exports rose more rapidly than
exports in general during the 1900-1913 period and accounted for roughly
25% of the total industrial timber output (Table T -20). Petroleum pro-
duct exports reached a high point in 1904 (about 30% of output). 24 After
the burning of the oilfields in 1905, exports declined in 1906 to 36% of
1904 exports and both output and exports recovered extremely slowly
s~ that oil exports in 1913were still less than one-half 1904 exports.
Kerosene exports predominated (about 50"0/0).25 Other mining products
exports expanded proportionally to the rest of exports in 1909-1913, and
26equalled only about 1. 6 -2. 0% of total exports. Mangane se ore,
2~IKSSSR, p. 225. Much flax was grown in the Baltic area,
and the newly created Baltic states became strong competitors on the
flax export market (Ibid., pp. 225-231).
2~IKSSSR, pp. 277-279. Only squirrels, wolverines and kara-
kul were used extensively in the domestic consumption.
21tIKSSSR, p. 245. Petroleum product exports were 1. 83 mil-
lion m. t. in 1904 and 880, 000 m. t. and 12% of total output in 1913.
2~okrovskii-47, p. 358. In 1901 Russia held first place in
world oil exports. The industry was largely owned by foreigners
(Liashchenko-49, p. 682).
2ttxcluding platinum and oil products. Table III. 3.
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platinum and asbestos were developed almost entirely for the export
market and Russian exports of platinum and manganese supplied a
major part of world exports. Russia was also the principal supplier
of asbestos to Europe. 27 Cotton fabric exports (largely to Asia) in-
creased rapidly during 1909-1913 and by 1913, almost 7.2% of total
cotton cloth output was exported (Table sIll. 4 and T -20). During the
1909-1913 period as a whole, export of cotton fabric equalled about 4%
of output, imports about 1. 1% of output. 28
The pre-19l4 Russian economy could not be described as being
"export-dependent" in the sense that a large share of domestic output
was exported and that large quantities of the economy's fixed capital
(or skilled labor) was inve sted in the export sector. In 1913 exports
equalled about 8-10% of GNP and 11.6% of gross agriculture and indus-
trial output.29 In contrast Kuznets cited the following ratio of mer-
chandise exports to national income for the pre-19l4 years (in current
. ) 30prlces :
27Rus sia accounted for 52% of world manganese exports before
the war and almost 98% of its output was exported (SUA, Vol. VIII, No.
14 (1929), p. 18 and Table T-20). Russia supplied 93% of the world's
platinum before the war (Lumb-20, p. 34). See Appendix D for a dis-
cussion of Russian and Sovietplatirium exports. Between 56% and 80%
of Russian asbestos production was exported during the period 1909-1913,
largely to Germany, Great Britain, Austria-Hungary and Holland; com-
petition (from Rhodesia and South Africa) increased during the period
(EIKSSSR, pp. 321-325).
28Pokrovskii-47, p. 356.
29Holzman-63, p. 327, and Mishustin-38b, p. 93.
30Kuznets -67, pp. 96-120. See Michaely-62, p. 110 for export-
national income ratios during 1950-1956. It is interesting that Brazil's
export-GNP ratio in the 1950's was only about 6%-7%.
Great Britain (GDP)
France (NNP)
Germany (NNP)
Italy (GNP)
Denmark
U.'S.'A.' (GNP)
Australia (GNP)
1909-13
1911
1910-13
1911-13
1910-14
1904-13
1911-13
(approximate)
18.8%
11..3
17.8
11.4
29.0
6.3
19. 1
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Because of the structure of exports (largely agricultural), the low ex-
port -output ratio of grain and the relatively low levels of pe r capita
consumption of agricultural products, a much smaller portion of aggre-
gate resources was employed in producing export products which could
not be used elsewhere in the economy if exports ceased, or from which
the se resources could not be shifted. 31 Few industries - such as man-
ganese ore, platinum, asbestos and, to a lesser extent, timber with a
relatively small share of total industrial capital - were devoted entirely
or largely to export, so that the "permanent" export specialization was
even less than suggested by the ratio of exports to GNP. Despite the
arguments by Liashchenko, Russian economy in the decades before
World War I would not be accurately described by the concept of an
"enclave export economy" exploited by the industrialized nations without
transmitting growth to the exportingcountry.32 Although foreign capital
occasionally was important in the direct expansion of the few exclusively
export industries, the largest portion of foreign capital was invested
-.------------------------------------.-------
31Crops such as flax and oilseed were competitive with grain,
and grain and oilseed products could easily be used for feed for produc-
ing animal products, for which per capita consumption in the country-
side was quite low.
32Liashchenko-49, pp. 737-739.
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in industries serving primarily the domestic market (metallurgical in-
dustry), in social overhead capital or in government securities (some
of which financed railway construction). 33 Furthermore, Rus sian eco-
nomic growth from 1890 to 1913was not" export-led. II On the contrary,
the stimulus to develop industry during the 1890t S came from the govern-
ment and resulted in considerable import substitution. Exports stag-
nated during the 18901s. The development of the export industrie s was
too small to have any large impact on Russian industrial development.
Although improved foreign market conditions helped accelerate agricul-
tural growth (and especially animal husbandry) after 1900, the domestic
market for these exportable agricultural goods as well as for import-
substitutes (cotton in particular) seemed to be equally important in the
growth of total demand for agricultural output during this period. 34
Little foreign or government capital was directly involved in the produc-
tion of these agricultural exports, but foreign firms and banks did play
an important role in collection, financing and the actual export opera-
tions for major agricultural export products (flax, butter, bacon, egg s,
f d . ) 35ur s an even gr aln •
33For distribution of total direct foreign investment among
various industries in 1916-17, see Liashchenko-29, p. 715, which cited
data compiled by P. V. 01, Innostrannye kapitaly v ros sii (Moscow? ,
1922). Liashchenko-49 discussed the role of foreign capital several
times in his book (see pp. 534-538, 686-687, 707-708, 712-717, 737-
738). See Pasvolsky-24 (pp. 16-22) for growth and distribution of state
debt held abroad.
34See Liashchenko-49, p. 736.
35Liashchenko-49, pp. 592, 738-39, Baykov-46, p. 5. German
firms dominated exports of furs and flax (Poprovskii-47, p. 367). For-
eign capital was not important in increasing the supply of agricultural
commodities, but it did playa significant role in the marketing of these
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Pre -1914 grain exports and Russian
foreign trade36
The importance of the export of grain and related products in
the total value of pre-19l4 Russian exports can not be overestimated.
Exports of grain and related products equalled almost 50% by value of
total exports in 1913 and 1913was not a particularly good year for grain
37
exports. Several basic trends and characteristics of pre -1914 grain
production, consumption and exports should be noted in order to under-
stand the grain export problem during the NEP (see Chapter XI).
First, a relatively small share (11.8%) of the gross harvest of
the seven major grains was exported during 1909-13 (when crops were
above average), but these grain exports were a fairly large share (about
42%) of domestic shipments).38 Thus, small fluctuations in the grain
harvest could be magnified into large swings in grain exports (because
of relatively stable domestic demand for marketed grain).
Second, exports as a percentage of the gross harvest and of
railway shipments tended to decline for wheat, rye and oats, and grain
~----------_._---------------------------
goods, i. e. foreign capital was more important in widening the market
and increasing demand.
39rhe reader is referred to two studies, Timoshenko-32 and
ENSOVEX, (a collection of articles by Russian economists on exports
and the grain trade) for a detailed analysis 0 f pre -1914 grain production.
37During 1909-1913 - for the share and quantity of the export of
grain and related products in total exports was considerably higher than
in 1913 (Table 111.1 and Table III. 3).
38The concept of "shipments on domestic transportation" is
roughly analogous to the concept "total marketing II (outside the village).
See below, pp. 265, n. 50.
TABLE 111.5
GR ass HAR v EST, EX paR T AN D SHIP MENT S OF MAJO R GR AINS
IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE 1909-1913
( ann u a .1 a v era g e, 1 0 0 0 I S 111 e t ric ton s )
Average gross harvest Shipll1ent on Exports Exports Shipll1ents Exports
based on T sSK data dOll1estic as % of as % of as % of
with 19% correct. trans. gross gross ship-
Total Per Capita (ll1arketing) harvest harvest ll1ents
(kilograll1)
Rye (grain +flour) 27,863 166 4,257 774 2.8 15.3 18.2
Wheat (grain + flour) 26,389 158 13,152 4,545 1 7.2 49.8 34.5
Millet 3,096 19 775 33 1. 1 26.2 4.2
Buckwheat 1,425 9 523 52 3.6 36.6 9.8
Corn 2,604 16 831 763 29.3 31.9 91.8
Barley 13,072 78 3,276 3,718 28.4 25.0 113.5
Oats 18,805 112 3,206 1,088 5.8 1 7.0 33.9
Total of 7 grains 93,254 547 26,009 10,982 11.8 27.9 42.2
Source: Notes to Table III. 5, Appendix B, p. 752.
......
o
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in general and rose quite distinctly only for barley during the period
1890-1913. 39 Wheat exports - the most important export grain by value -
showed little upward trend during 1901-1913 even though wheat output and
marketing showed a definite strong upward trend, for dome stic per cap-
ita wheat consumption was rising due to urbanization and growth of pop-
ulation in the rural wheat-consuming regions.40 Rye output rose slowly,
rye exports fell and became relatively insignificant by 1913.41 Barley
output and exports, directed almost entirely to Germany, rose rapidly
from 1901 to 1913, and by 1913 dominated grain exports (Table III. 6),
Barley was basically a cash export crop rather than a domestic feed
grain, Below we summarize characteristics of the four major export
grains during 1909-1913:42
39Timoshenko - 32, p. 475, and Table III. 6,
40Timoshenko-32, pp. 372 -374, 378 and Table III. 6.
41Timoshenko-32, p. 378 and Table III. 6.
42The following table is from Table III. 5. Barley exported
exceeded barley shipped on dome stic transport because of direct car-
riage by cart to port by peasants. These figures differ slightly from
those cited by Mikoian-28, presented in Table T -20 and also those cal-
culated on the basis of Table III. 7. This is due to corrections made by
Soviet statisticians in crop estimates by Tsarist ministries.
TABLE III.6
RUSSIAN GRAIN HARVEST AND EXPORT 1891 - 1913
(1000's metric tons)
0/0 total % harvest harve st
exports grain exported (72 gub)
e orts
(2) (3) (4)
WHEAT
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total
grain
roducts
( 7)
1891-1895 2805 38. 81 37.9 7,226
1896-1900 2734 37.57 28. 7 11,360 2457 58.2 7,276
1901-1905 3782 37.06 26.6 16,110 3410 56.8 9,975
1906-1910 3736 29. 18 25.6 17,060 4510 55. 2 10,079
1911 3940 29. 19 34.2 13,850 4361 44.2 13,499
1912 2638 29.19 16.2 19,600 4344 40. 1 9,037
1913 3329 31. 22 15.0 25,920 5327 4h A 10,662
RYE
1891-1895 931 12.88 5.7
1896-1900 1224 16.82 6.8 20,380 .1165 59.3 see
1901-1905 1271 12.74 6.3 22,000 1389 57.6 above1906-1910 693 6.87 3.9 20,420 1309 33. 3
1911 882 6. 53 5.4 19,350 1271 42. 1
1912 501 5.54 2.2 26,470 1089 32. 6
1913 6.06 2 25 420 1
BARLEY
1891-1895 1516 20.97 34.6
1896-1900 1329 18.26 26. 9 5,500 606 75.4 see1901-1905 2023 20.28 31. 1 7,090 994 77.4
1906-1910 2970 29.46 37.4 8,670 1632 81. 0 above
1911 4302 31. 86 52. 5 9,020 2218 82.9
1912 2764 30. 58 29.8 10, 190 1781 83.0
1913 3927 36.83 34.2 12.460 2234 83. 5
TABLE III. 6 (continued)
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exports
0/0 total harvest
OATS
total
1891-1895 932 8.02 10. 7
1896-1900 802 11.02 8. 1 11,610 1,486 52.3
1901-1905 1260 12. 63 11. 3 12,820 1,944 59. 8 see
1906-1910 929 9. 21 8.0 13,790 1,940 52.0 above
1911 1395 10.33 13.4 12,460 2,277 49. 5
1912 848 9.38 6. 6 15,500 2, 184 48.8
1913 600 5.62 4.0 17,790 1,769 40.8
Source: Notes to Table III. 6, Appendix B, p. 753.
Wheat (grain and
flour)
Barley
Oats
Rye (gr ain and flour)
Seven major
grains
% of total
grain exports
by weightct
41.4
33.9
9.9
7. 0
100. 0
Exports as
% of gross
harvest
17. 2
28.4
5.8
2.8
11.8
III
Gross marketing
(shipments) as 0/0
of gross harvest
49.8
25.0
17.0
15. 3
27.9
aOf 7 major gr ains
The gross marketing coefficient during 1903-13 (total sale of
grain gross of repurchases by rural population) for all grains was esti-
mated as high as 35 to 40%, but the data on domestic grain shipment of
seven major grains suggests that it was probably closer to 28%. 43
Third, relatively little grain was used as feed for livestock or
44poultry in pre -1914 Russia, although oats were fed to workstock.
Fourth, it is thought by many economic hi storians that the
peasants marketed fairly substantial shares of their output because of
the heavy fiscal, rent, and debt pressures on them.45 This hypothesis
is examined in Chapter XI.
43High estimate from Liashchenko-28, p. 203. Domestic
shipment as fraction of gros s harvest from Table III. 5. See Chapter XI.
44Timoshenko-32, p. 473, and Jasny-49, p. 188. Even by-
products of grain milling and oilseed pres sings were exported (Ibid. ).
All barley shipped by water or rail was exported during the period
1909-1913 (Table III. 6).
45Gerschenkron-65, pp. 125-131. Gerschenkron described
government policy in the 1890IS; "A central principle of governmental
policy was to impound a larger share of the peasants I output rather than
to take active steps to raise that output" (Gerschenkron-65, p. 126).
TABLE III.7
RUSSIAN HARVEST AND EXPORT OF WHEAT,
RYE, BARLEY AND OATS 1895 - 1913
(1000'smetric tons)
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Wheat R,e Barley Oats
Harvest Export Harvest Export Harvest Export Harvest Export
1892
1893
1894
1895 11250 3885 20350 1496 5510 1774 11310 1093
1896 11210 3597 20060 1299 5520 1337 11610 1106
1897 9260 3494 16620 1204 5200 1464 9630 714
1898 12500 2908 18730 1096 6680 1741 9980 414
1899 12360 1754 23160 994 4940 1220 14450 467
1900 11510 1915 23370 1527 5160 880 12390 1310
1901 11640 2270 19180 1355 5220 1271 9060 1315
1902 16530 3047 23340 1609 7360 1707 13510 1037
1903 16910 4175 23160 1346 7780 2385 11610 975
1904 18150 4601 25620 984 7540 2487 16320 886
1905 17320 4813 18730 978 7560 2265 13600 2085
1906 13840 3604 16940 1071 6860 2437 10350 7138
1907 13900 2321 20530 740 7740 2174 13170 428
1908 15410 1471 19870 408 8280 2644 13660 482
1909 21120 5152 22760 582 10380 3591 16610 1224
1910 21070 6136 22030 663 10090 4008 15180 1374
1911 13850 3940 19350 883 9020 4302 12460 1394
1912 14600 2637 26470 501 10190 2763 15500 849
1913 25920 3330 25420 647 12460 3926 17790 600
Source: Notes to Table III.7, Appendix B, p. 754.
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Last, Russian grain exports were extremely dependent on the
German market (due largely to tariff concessions), and Germany and
Netherlands together took one -third of Russian wheat exports, two-
thirds of its rye exports and three-fourths of its barley exports. The
rest of the wheat was exported to Italy, Great Britain and Greece, while
very little was exported to the Scandinavian countries whose grain trade
was not protected by protective tariff barriers and where Russian wheat
was not able to compete with North American and Argentinian wheat. 46
The major regions producing grain for export were those surrounding
the Black Sea (Southern steppe of Ukraine and Don, Northern Caucasus
and Trans -Dnieper). The Volga regions were important in supplying
domestic markets but they were also increasing their grain exports as
a fraction of total shipments. Little grain was exported from Siberia. 4
7
The structure of Rus sian imports
The structure of Rus sian imports (Soviet definition) for 1909-
13 is summarized below for comparison with Soviet trade in later
periods (from Table III. 8 as % of the value of average annual imports). 48
Producers' goods
Equipment
Raw materials
Semi -proc e s sed
Fuels
56. 7%
14.6
25.6
12. 1
4.4
Consumers' goods
Foodstuffs
Manufacturing
Other
(Unallocated)
43. 3%
19.7
21. 8
1.8
46Timoshenko-32, p. 483.
47Timoshenko-32, p. 377.
48See Notes to Table III. 8 and Appendix A, Technical Note 4
for de scription of classification system.
TABLE III. 8
STRUCTURE OF RUSSIAN IMPORTS 1909 - 1913 AND 1913
(millions of rubles, % of total imports)
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1909-1913 1 9 1 3
value % total value % total
Total Imports 1139.0 100.0 1374.0 100.0
Producers I goods 646.0 56.7 884.4 64.4
A. Equipment 166.7c 14. 6 - -
Industrial
"""
......
Boiler s - Machinery 88.4
a
7. 8
Apparatus
14.9
a
Electrical 1.3
Objects of Precise 6.7
a o. 6 172.4 12. 5
Mechanics
Transport
a
Autos, Motor cycle s 11. 9 1.0 II
Ships 3.7
a
0.3 J
Agricultural
Tractors } }3. 6Agric. Machinery 40. 5a 3~ 6 49.0
B. Raw Materials 291. 7d 25. 6 343. 1 25. 0
1. Cotton - raw 110.3 9. 7 114.0 8. 3
2. Wool - raw 51. 5 4. 5 60. 1 4.4
3. Rawhides 20. 7 1.8 25. 1 1.8
4. Rubber 33.2 2. 9 40.2 2.9
5. Non-Ferrous 30.4 2. 7 56. 1 4. 1
6. Ferrous - rough 8.4 0.7 56.4 4.1
7. Jute 8. 8 0.8 11. 1 O. 8
8. Silk 27. 0 2.4 31. 2 2. 3
9. Rags
a
1.8 O. 11..4 O. 1
C. Semi-P roce s sed 137. Ie 12. 1 212.4 15. 5
1. Lether - Tanned 19. 8 1.7 21. 2 1.6
2. Yarn - Wool 20.4 1.8 16. 8 1.2
3. Yarn - Cotton 11. 2 1.1 9.8 O. 7
4. Paper 25.6 2. 2 29. 5 2. 2
5. Chemicals 59.0 5. 2 66.0 4.8
6. Ferrous Metals
a
17.4 1.5 - -
Rolled (Article s)
TABLE III. 8 (continued)
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1909 - 1913 19 1 3
value % total value % total
C. (continued)
b7. Dyes 33.2
b 2. 9 15. 0 1. 18. Tanning Materials 6. 7 0.6 7.7 o. 6
D. Fuels 49.9 4.4 91. 2 6. 6
Consumers' goods [493] 43.3 489.6 35.6
A. Foodstuffs [244]f 19. 7 261. 3 19. 0
Tea 59.9 5. 3 62.2 4. 5
Herring 22.4 2.0 24.3 1.8
B. Manufactured 248. 8b,g 21. 8 130.7 9. 5
Woolen Cloth
,
16.0b 1.4 } }Cotton Cloth 14.8b 1.3 37. 1 2. 7
C. Other
Living Animals
a
1.0 }11. 8b 97.6 } 7. 1Unallocated 55.9 4.9
Source: Notes to Table III. 8, Appendix B, p. 754.
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Since large portions of the raw materials were used by the consumer
goods industry, imports during 1909-1913 were much more oriented
toward the personal consumption than implied by the Soviet definition. 49
Considering the end-use of raw and semi-processed materials, the
share of imports "oriented" toward consumer demand was about 75% of
total imports during 1909-1913.50
During the rapid industrial expansion (from 1886 to 1913) the
share of consumers' goods (Soviet definition) in total exports remained
relatively constant, fluctuating from 38. 3% to 46. 4% of total imports~
The share of equipment imports tended to rise during this period even
though the domestic machinery industry was expanding rapidly. The
share of raw materials fell during the 1886-1913 period as import sub-
stitution was pressed under the protection of tariffs (Table III. 9). As
a result of import substitution in raw and semi-processed materials
the share of consumer-oriented imports had fallen to 60% in 1913
(Table T -18).
The most important imports (other than equipment) during
1909-13 were the following (% of value of average annual imports): 51
---------------------_._-----,--~---------
49See Chapter V, pp. 200 ff, for a discussion of this alternative of
cIa s sifying imports and Note s to Table T -18.
50From Table III. 8 Share of consumer imports (Soviet defini-
tion) plus the share of raw cotton, raw wool, raw hides, rubber, silk,
leather, woolen and cotton yarn, paper, dyes and farming materials.
This still could understate the "consumer -orientation" of Russian im-
ports because some non-ferrous metals, copra, etc., were also used
by light industry.
5lTable III. 8.
TABLE 111.9
THE DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIAN IMPORTS 1886 - 1913
A. Value 1886-90 1891-95 1896-00 1901-05 1906-10 1911-13 1909-13 1 9 1 3
Total Imports 435.4 456.0 596.0 639.6 910.3 1253.8 1139.0 1374.0
I. a [368.0] [359.6] [487.9]Producer's goods [248.9] [272.9] 691. 0 646.0 884.4
A. Equipment 43.4 50.9 92.4 67. 2 100. 1 175. 5 166.7 -
Industrial 18. 3 32.4 67. 9 42.0 61. 0 101. 1 110.0
Transport
172.4
20.6 10. 7 14.6 3. 9 9. 1 21. 0 15.6
Agricultural 4.5 7. 8 9. 9 21. 3 30.0 54.4 40.5 49.0
B. Raw materials 135.4 143. 6 164.3 168.3 228.5 276.8 291. 7 343. 1
C. Semi-proce s sed 57.0 66.9 79. 7 103.8 132.0 186. 8 137.. r 212.4
D. Fuels 13. 1 11.5 31. 6 20.3 27.3 51. 9 49.9 91.2
II. Consumer goods 186. 5 183. 1 228.0 280.0 422.4 545.4 493 489.6
A. Foodstuffs 105. 5 103. 2 119. 2 144. 5 226.7 264. 5 244 261.3
B. Manufactured 81. 0 79.9 108. 8 135. 5 195. 7 280. 5 248.8 130.7
B. Percent
Total IITlports 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a [57.2] [59.8] [61. 7] [56. 2] [53.6] 55.9 56.7 64.4I. Producer's goods
TABLE 111.9 (continued)
B. Percent 1886-90 1891-95 1896-00 1901-05 1906-10 1911-13 1909-13 1 9 1 3
A. Equiprnent 10.0 11. 2 11. 5 10. 5 11. 1 14.4 14.6 -
Industrial 4.2 7. 1 11. 4 6. 6 6. 7 8.2 - 12. 5
Transport 4.7 2. 3 2.4 o. 6 1.0 1.7 .- -
Agricultural 1.0 1.7 1.7 3. 3 3. 3 4.4 3.6 3.6
B. Raw rnateria1s 31. 1 31. 5 27.6 26.3 25. 1 22.4 25.6 25.0
C. Serni-proce s s ed 13. 1 14. 5 13. 4 16. 2 14. 5 15. 1 12. 1 15.5
D. Fuels 3. 0 2. 5 5. 3 3. 2 3. 0 4.2 4.. -4 6.6
II. Consurner goods 42.8 40.2 38.3 43.8 46.4 44. 1 43.3 35.6
A. Foodstuffs 24.2 22. 6 20.0 22.6 24.9 21. 4 19.7 19.0
B. Manufactured 18. 6 17. 5 18. 3 21. 2 21. 5 22.7 21.8 9.5
a
Producers I goods estirnated as residual of total irnports rninus consurners I goods imports.
Source: Notes to Table III. 9 J Appendix B, p. 755.
cotton fiber and yarn .
woo 1 fib era nd yar n , .
tea , , , .
hide s and leather ........••......•.....
dyes and tanning material. .
silk (raw) .. , ,.' .
her r in g .
pap e r ....• , ...•..................•....
rubbe r ..• , ..........•....•....•.......
coal .
non-ferrous metals .
10.8%
6. 3
5. 3
3. 5
3. 5
2.4
2.0
2.2
2.9
4.4
2. 7
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Fer rous metals (2. 2%), cotton and woolen cloth (1. 4% and 1. 3%), grain
and sugar were relatively unimportant in the 1909-13 import structure;
in fact, Russia was a major exporter of cotton cloth, sugar, and grain.
All these goods, however" were to be imported by the Soviet government
in substantial quantities during the period of the "import goods interven-
tion" in 1924-26 (see Chapters VII and VIII).
Several classes of commodities were simultaneously imported
and exported; coarse wool, light leather and cheap cotton cloth were ex-
ported and fine wool, heavy leathers and better -quality cotton goods were
imported. The simultaneous export and import of grains, coal, and
iron ore was explained as being the result of locational factors, with
the Baltic port cities (including St. Petersburg) relying largely on
imported raw materials and fuels. 52 Several manufactured or processed
commodities were imported simultaneously with the export of the basic
raw material for these goods: the major examples were ferro-mangan-
ese and manganese ore, zinc and lead metal and zinc ore and lead ore,
52Ronimois-46, pp. 24-25. Iron ore and coal imports far ex-
ceed exports of these goods; grain was imported from Manchuria into
Asiatic Russia because of transportation costs. No attempt is made
here to study this issue; even today it seems that this factor would still
influence Soviet foreign trade.
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paper and pulp wood, processed furs and raw furs, and flax fiber and
linen. These somewhat limited examples were overemphasized by
Soviet writers as an illustration of the backward and exploited condition
of the pre -1914 Russian economy. 53 In quantitative importance, how-
ever, these examples of raw material exports in "exchange" for the
more highly processed product were relatively insignificant in Russian
foreign trade and must be considered along with the large Russian im-
ports of cotton fiber and the large Russian exports of cotton fabrics (a
characteristic also of industrial Great Britain). While Rus sian exports
consisted overwhelmingly of raw materials (mostly of agricultural ori-
gin), the composition of Russian imports did not consist entirely of
finished consumer goods and of machinery for the production of the raw
materials. On the contrary, raw materials and semi-processed ma-
terials made up almost 38% of annual average imports during 1909-1913.
The import pattern of pre-19l4 Russia bespoke more of an economy in
the process of industrialization rather than a stagnant exploited colony
of the Western industrialized nations--the image conjured up by Soviet
. 11' h' f' l' . 54wrIters exto Ing t e VIrtues 0 socIa 1St constructIon.
Import de~~ndence and import sub stitution
in pre -1914Russia
The pre-19l4 Russian economy was dependent on imports to
supply all or a large portion of several important raw and semi-pro-
cessed materials, selected types of machinery, and consumer goods.
53Liashchenko-49, pp. 642, 673, 737.
54Cf. Mishustin-38 and Liashchenko-49.
TABLE 111.10
RUSSIA: THE DEPENDENCE OF THE ECONOMY ON IMPORTS 1909 - 1913
(percent of total supply)
Basis of Russian Ernpire Soviet Ter ritory Other
com.par. "pr e -war" 1909-13 1913 pre-war 1913 Estim.ates
(1) (2) (3) (4) ( 5) (6)
Fibers
l. cotton fiber wt. 55.6 45.2 41. 0 [25%]
2. wool fiber wt. 20% 26. 1 16.8 26%
3. silk (raw fiber) wt. 88 66%
Non-fer rous Metals
4. copper wt. 20 29.1 18.2 19.8
5. zinc wt. 67 59.3 92 90.5
6. lead wt. 47.7 98.8 97.4 97.4
7. nickel wt. 100 100 100 100 100
8. tin wt. 100 100 100 100 100
9. alum.inum. wt. 100 100 100 100 100
Fe r rous Metals
10. pig iron wt. O. 3
II. rolled fer rous metals wt. 2.4
12. pipes and tub wt. 8.6
Paper
13. paper and cardboard
based on im.ports
(including pulp) wt. 40.8 59 .....
N
.....
TABLE 111.10 (continued)
N
Basis "pre-war'l 1909-1913 1913 pre-war L9l3 other
Paper (continued)
14. paper wt. 40
15. newsprint wt. 55.1
16. wrapping wtr. 26.8
17. cardboard wt. 39
18. wood pulp wt. 31. 8
19. wood pulp and cellulose wt. 22%
20. Rubber wt. 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
2l. Leather wt. "ExteI sive"
Chemicals
22. all chemicals value 27.3
23. all chemicals wt. 32. 3
24. acids, alkaloids,
salts value 30.0
25. individual chemicals
a. sulfuric acid wt. 1.2
b. hydrochloric acid wt. .2
c. soda ash wt. 1.0
d. copper sulphate wt. 46.4 49.0
e. aluminum sulphate wt. \ 3. 0 5.8
£. borax wt. 100.
g. superphosphate wt. 70. 0 81
h. Thomas slag,
ground phosphate wt. 85. 97
i. potash
.-..
wt. 100 100 N
TABLE 111.10 (continued)
N
l.V
Source: Notes to Table III. 10, Appendix B, p. 755.
Basis "pre-war tl 1909-13 1913 pre-war 1913 other
26. Dyes large
27. Analine wt. 20.5
28. Analine salts wt. 50. -
29. Pigments and varnishe s wt.
a. dying clay, ochre wt. 60.4
b. white lead wt. 5.3
c. white zinc wt. 41. 6
d. oil varnish wt. 1.6
e. spirit varnishes wt. 1.0
30. Coal tar wt. 50.8
31. Rosin wt. 77. -
32. Pharmaceutical prod. value 54.0
a. inorganic value 68.7
b. organic value 81. 3
c. phyto- chemical value 100.0
d. tabloids value 0.0
33. Soap . 5
34. Glycerine . 0
35. Tea 99.9
36. Cotton yarn 10%
37. Coffee [100% ]
38. Cocoa [100%]
39. Jute [100%]
40. Copra and palm oil,
coconut oil [100%]
41. Animal fats Itlarge)
42. Coal 19.6 17.5 I-'
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This dependence of the pre -1914 Rus sian economy on imports was a fre-
quent theme of Soviet leaders and economists during the inter-war
period. 55 Furthermore this import dependence inherited by the Soviet
NEP economy was to become a crucial factor in economic recovery and
further industrialization. Thus, we consider here the extent and nature
of this import dependence in pre -1914 Rus sia and analyse the pre -1914
trends in import substitution for comparison with similar trends in the
inter -war Soviet economy.
The share of imports in the total domestic consumption of
selected commodities (excluding machinery) in pre -1914 Rus sia is shown
in Table III. 10. These estimated ratios are approximations because for
any given year these ratios are influenced by both the domestic capacity
to produce these goods and the domestic demand. The period 1909-1913
was a period of strong economic expansion, so that the share of imports
would tend to be larger than during a rece s sion. The Rus sian economy,
like most industrial Western European economies, was completely
dependent on imports for its supply of rubber, tin, nickel, aluminum,
many ferro-alloys, many minor metals, jute, tea, cocoa, coffee, potash,
borax, and some low -volume chemicals and essential oils. The Rus sian
economy was larg_e]y dependent on import~ (50% or more of total supply)
for silk, zinc, lead, paper (especially newsprint), superphosphate, and
Thomas slag-phosphorite, aniline salts, dyeing clays and ochre, coal
tar rosin, several pharmaceutical products, and, most likely, dyes,
55Mishustin-38a (entire book), Kasianenko-64 (entire book).
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tanning materials, heavy raw hides (for large scale industry), citrus
f. h' d l' '1 56 Th R .rUlts, errlng an a lve 01 • e usslan economy relied on imports
for a significant part (20 -50%) of its total supply of cotton (45-50%),
wool (26-45%), copper (18-30%), cardboard (39%), wood pulp (32%),
acids, alkaloids, and salts (about 30%) including copper sulphate (46%),
ana line (20%), white zinc (42%) (all from Table III. 10).57 Domestic pro-
duction of several chemicals (and especially dyes) was based largely on
imported raw materials. The paper industry also used large amounts
of imported wood pulp (Table III. 10).
This "economic dependence" of Rus sia (and the USSR in the
1920's) on imports (especially from the more advanced industrial nations)
was thought by Marxist and Soviet economists to be an instrument of
"colonial exploitation" of Rus sia by the more advanced industrial nations
foreign capital. 58 This "economic dependence, " however, should be
56EIKSSSR, pp. 469-471, and ERSU, III, No. 10 (May 15, 1928),
pp. 175-178. It has not been possible to determine the share of imported
rawhide and leather in the total supply of leather in Russia before World
War 1. Russia exported small hides (skins) and imported heavy hides
(required for shoe sales, boots and leather belting).
57The dependence of the Russian woolen textile industry on
imported wool was much greater than indicated by a simple "import/
national supply ratio." First, it required higher quality wool than pro-
duced by domestic flocks. Second, much domestically produced wool
was not marketed but rather used on the farm or by local artisans.
Comparing the output of woolen yarn in the Russian empire in 1913 and
the imports of wool in 1913, we find that the weight of the imported wool
equalled one -half the weight of the factory yarn, implying an "import-
supply" ratio for large - scale industry for 1913 of around 50%. See
Table III. 13.
58Dobb-48, p. 38, and Liashchenko-49, p. 674.
TABLE III.11
IMPORT SUBSTITUTION IN RUSSIA 1876 - 1892, 1913
(% of consumption)
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1876 1885 1892 1893 1894 1895 1913
Cotton thread 24.9 7. 6 3.4 . . . .
Cotton cloth 9. 1 3. 1 1.4 . . . Net exports
Woolen yarn 77. 3 46.0 12. 7 . . . .
Woolen articles 20.7 6. 2 4. 3 . . . .
Linen thread 61. 4 1.4 0.8 . . . .
Linen cloth 20.0 28. 8 6. 7 . . . Net exports
China and
pottery 32.3 21. 3 15. 2 . . . .
Pig iron
(chugun) 12. 5 30. 9 7.4 14. 5 29. 2 32. 7 O. 3
Machinery 40.3 26. 2 30.8 . . . .
Sugar 4.0 O. 0 0.0 . . . Net exports
Wrought iron
(zhelezo) 36. 5 20. 5 9. 6 . . . .
Oil 20.0 0.3 0.0 . . . Net exports
Coal 44. I 30.0 29.4 18. 5 18. 5 17. 5 23. 6
Steel 90.4 3. 3 3. 3 3. 1 9. 7 5. 7 [ 2.4]
Copper 64.7 46.3 65. 3 . . . 9. 8
Source: Notes to Table Ill.11, Appendix B,p. 760.
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TABLE III.12
RUSSIA: ESTIMATES OF COTTON PRODUCTION
AND IMPORTS, 1900 - 1915
(metric tons)
Domestic Imported Total Supply Imports as %of Total
Prokrovskii Data (cotton fiber)
1903 93,336 201,513 294,850 68.3
1911/12 219,830 211,370 421,190 47.8
1912/13 214,600 177,570 392, 160 45.3
1913/14 232,670 221,550 454,220 48.8
SUA Data (cottonfiber)
1900 73,712
1906 141,511 154,648 296, 159 52
1908 134,173 212,275 346,448 61
1910 184, 117 177,663 362,828 49
1912 236,567 178,531 361,780 43
1913 209,867
1914 292,670 138,727 415,098 32
1915 302,925
Pasvo1sky Data cotton fiber)
1895 54,056 134,320 188,376 71.3
1900 95,007 168,719 263,726 64.0
1905 101,559 170,357 271,916 62.7
1910 173,633 198,204 371,837 53.3
1911 221,137 201,480 422,617 47.7
1912 234,241 180,186 414,427 43.5
Source: Notes to Table III.12, Appendix B, p. 760.
TABLE III.13
RUSSIA: PRE-1914 WOOL IMPORTS AND YARN OUTPUT
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Lar ye Scale Industry
Wool fiber Woolen yarn Implied dome stic Imports as
imports output supply to large % of yarn
scale industry output
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1909 43. 1 [72.0] 29.0 60
1910 50. 1 73.8 24.0 68
1911 47.3 75.4 28.0 63
1912 [45.1] 82.0 37.0 55
-'-'I'1913 55. 2 110.2 55. 0 50
Source: Notes to Table Ill.13, Appendix B, p. 760.
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put into its proper perspective, for with respect to several major raw
materials (cotton, lumber, most foodstuffs, silk, iron ore, coal, oil,
flax, manganese) the Russian economy ~~~-T~h l~~pe_~~nt ~~
imports than some Western European industrial economies. 59 Russia
was unique among European economies in being able to meet a large
fraction of its cotton fiber requirement from dome stic production. The
major difference was that the major producing areas were often eco-
nomically and politically dominated by industrial nations which, accord-
ing to the Marxist theory, would give the industrial nations cheaper
th d.. 60 R. h h h d f h daccess to ese commo Itles. USSla, on t e ot er an, o. ten a
to buy through foreign middlemen and imported large quantities of Aus-
tralian wool, Argentinian leather, Bolivian and Malayan tin, Malayan
rubber, American and Egyptian cotton, Indian tea from Germany and
Great Britain, where these commodities had been shipped for distribu-
tion. Furthermore "capitalist" control of sources was naturally to be
of more concern to a "socialist economy" in a hostile capitalist world
economy than it was to Tsarist Russia.
The Russian economy of 1913 differed considerably from the
present-day underdeveloped economies. Its fairly large machinery in-
dustry supplied a significant proportion of the agricultural, transport,
and electrical equipment for an expanding economy (Table III. 14). The
Russian iron and steel industry supplied almost the entire domestic
-------~-_ ..._~----------------~-
59Ger schenkron-4 7, p. 157.
60British control of India, Malaya, Egypt gave the British
access to cotton, tea, tin, rubber, and jute.
TABLE III. 14
RELA TIVE IMP ORTANCE OF IMPOR TED MACHINER Y IN
MACHINERY SUPPLY TO RUSSIA IN 1913
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% Supplied by Method
Date Type of Machine Domestic Imports of
Output Comparison
A. General
A.1 eve of war machines (mashiny) < 50 )50 ru ble value s
B. Metal-working
B. 1 eve of war lathes (stanki) ~33 -::::67 ruble value?
B.2 eve of war metal working ~33 ~67 ru ble value?
B.3 1913 metal-working machine ~33 -::::67 ru ble value s
tools
C. Electrical
C. 1 1913 all electrical article s 73 27 ruble value
C.2 1913? motors, transformers, 48 52 ruble value
parts
C.3 1913? cable and wire 94 6 ruble value
C.4 1913? incandescent lamps 26 74 ruble value
C.5 19l3? telegraphic and telephone 93 7 ruble value
apparatus
C.6 1913 electrical wiring material 21 79 ruble value
C.7 1913 carbon articles for 74 26 ruble value
electrical technicians
C.8 1913 electrical meter apparatus 7 93 ruble value
C.9 1913 sundry electric articles 60 40 ruble va lue
D. Miscellaneous Machinery
D.l 1912 wood working ~50 ~50 ruble value
D.2 1913 textile 77 23 ruble value
1908 textile 56 44 ruble value
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TABLE III. 14 (continued)
n
n
Date Type of Machine
Percent supplied bv Method
Domestic of
Output Imports Comparison
D.3 1913 paper-making ~63 ~ 37 ruble value
D.4 1913 printing ~2 ~ 98 ruble value
D.5 1910-12 optical, photographic, 12-20 80-88 ruble value
horological
D.6 1912-13 automobile s and trucks 0-3 97-100 ruble value
D.7 1912-13 motorcycles 8 92 ruble value
D.8 1912-13 bicycles 40 60 ruble value
D.9 1913 tractors 0 100 no productio
D.lO 1913 grain combines 0 100 no productio
D.ll pre-war chemical equipment 10 90 ruble value
D.12 pre-war railroad equipment 90 10
E. Mi s c ellane au s Metal Articles
E.l 1912-13 metal ropes and rigging [87-92] 8-13 ruble value
E.2 1912 card cloth 40 60 ruble value
Source: Notes to Table III. 14, Appendix B, p. 760.
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demand for ferrous products (with the exception of some special steels,
tinplate, and alloys). Russia occasionally exported pig iron when dom-
estic demand expanded rapidly in 1911-13.61 The coal industry, expand-
ing rapidly in the 1905-1913 period, still could not meet entirely the
growing demand for fuel (imports equalled about 23. 6% of consumption
in 1913). The copper, lead, and zinc industries were also expanding
rapidly in this period; the copper industry covered about 80% of total
consumption in 1913, the zinc industry about 40% (10% in USSR territory
alone) and the lead industry only 2 -3%. 62
The Russian chemical industry met most domestic demand for
basic industrial chemicals such as sulfuric acid, hydrochloric acid,
soda ash. It relied heavily, however, on imports of dyes and intermedi-
ate dye products (as did most economies except Germany, which held a
near-monopoly on dyes). 63 Imports also supplied a large share of (70-
80%) but not all of fertilizer demand. The Russian textile industry more
than covered domestic demand (except for several high-quality fabrics)
and provided an export surplus; the Russian sugar industry also supplied
a large export surplus. Similar examples have been found for other
less important industries. This is not the picture of a modern stagnant
export -dependent underdeveloped economy.
----- -.-.--------------------------------------------
61Table III. 10, Pokrovskii-47, p. 357. Pasvolsky-24, p. 118.
62Table III. 10. The lead industry stagnated after 1870 and
began to expand again just before Wor ld War I. The zinc industry boomed
in the four years preceding World War I; the copper industry expanded
rapidly from 1905 (Nutter-62, p. 411).
63Beer-59, p. 134.
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The Rus sian economy was indeed dependent on imports for its
supply of several important commodities (especially for industry, but
this import dependence was in some ways similar to the import depend-
ence of many industrial economies and was more the result of indus-
trialization than economic backwardness. The major difference was
that Russia was more dependent than some other industrialized nations
in the more technologically sophisticated fields of metallurgy, (ferro-
alloys, aluminum), newer fields of machine-building (automobiles, air-
planes, electronics, complex metal-working, and metallurgical equip-
ment, etc.) and in some fields of the chemical industry (especially dyes
and fertilizers). Import-consumption ratios alone, however, under-
state the dependence of the Russian economy on access to foreign tech-
nical per sonnel, management, and de sign, which accompanied foreign
capital investment, or was obtained directly by Rus sian industrialists
64and merchants.
The most important point about Rus sian import-dependence is
that it was concentrated basically in the supply of materials to the con-
sumer goods industry, in the supply of two important consumer good
for mas s consumption (herring and tea) and in the technologically newer
or technologically more sophisticated fields of heavy industry.
Import substitution in pre-l9l4 Russia. Import substitution in
pre-l9l3 Russia progressed rapidly in cotton, paper, copper, some
basic chemicals, pipes and tubing, as well as in several fields of
64Beable-l9 describes throughout his book the role of foreign
traders, managers and capital in various segments of the economy.
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machine -building (agricultural, railroad and electrical) (Table sIlL 11,
III. 12, and III. 13). 65 Thus the early and eventually complete substitu-
tion of dome stic production for imports of cotton, paper, agricultural,
railroad and electrical equipment and the later import substitution of
zinc, copper and selected types of machinery in the Soviet economy
might be interpreted as a continuation of a policy developed in pre-
Soviet Rus sia (Table T -21).
Domestic cotton fiber output, in Central Asia expanded rapidly
during the 1900-1913 period under a high protective tariff and the avail-
ability of cheap grain; considerable relative im20rt substitution had
occurred by 1913 (Table III. 12). 66 Cotton imports continued to grow
during the 1900-1913 period but at a declining rate, so that the share of
imported cotton fell from 68% in 1903 to 41% in 1913. The evidence for
import substitution of domestic wool for imported wool in the Russian
textile industry is much less conclusive (especially for establishing
long-term trends). Comparing wool imports to the weight of factory
spun woolen yarn, we found that the ratio of the weight of the wool
imports to the weight of the yarn declines in the 1909-1913 period
(Table III. 13). Against this evidence must be considered reports that
65See next section for discussion of machinery imports.
66Pokrovskii-4 7, p. 353 noted the following development of
tariffs on imported cotton (per pood): 1878, 40 kopecks; 1887, one ruble
to one ruble, 15 kopecks; 1892, one ruble, 40 kopecks to one ruble
65 kopecks; 1894, two rubles 10 kopecks; 1900, four rubles 15 kopecks
(net weight); 1913, four rubles (gross weight). SUA (Vol. V, No. 20
1926 , p. 27) attributed the rapid increase in cOTI'Onoutput to the avail-
ability of cheap grain and high fiber price s.
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the number of fine -haired sheep was declining before World War I be-
cause of the extension of grain growing in sheep-herding districts. 67
Absolute import substitution occurred in copper de spite rapidly increas-
. d d b hI' l' d 68 Th d d f . hlng eman y tee ectrlca ln ustry. e eman or Zinc, owever,
outpaced the rapidly growing domestic zinc output (9,610 m. t. in 1909,
19,360 m. t. in 1913) and the share of imports in total zinc consumption
rose from 54% in 1909 to 71% in 1913.69 Pipe production started in the
late 1890's and by 1913, only 14% of the total pipe supply was imported. 70
Similar examples of absolute or relative import substitution
could be cited for chemicals, paper output, and other fields. 71
Import substitution in Russia, according to Pokrovskii, had
been a continuing process from the 1870's on and he illustrated his hy-
pothesis with the data in Table III. 11.72 Pokrovskii wrote:
In the course of the XX century the process of further freeing
the Rus sian market from imports of foreign industrial goods
took place. Significant dependence remained only for machine s,
---------------------------------_._-----'-----
67Beable -19, p. 199. He suggested that the Russian woolen
textile industry was becoming more dependent on imported wool.
68Pokrovskii-4 7, p. 357. Nutter -62, p. 411. Imports fell from
20,300 m. t. in 1904 to 6,100 m. t. in 1913, while output rose from 9,840
m. t. in 1904 to 33,100 m. t. in 1913.
69Pokrovskii-47, p. 357, and Nutter -62, p. 411. A large part
of this zinc production was in Polish Russia.
70 Clark- 56, p. 302. Excluding cast iron pipe.
7lSee EIKSSSR, pp. 487 -489 for a discussion of pre -1914 chem-
ical imports and import substitution. See Pasvolsky-24, p. 120 for
coal.
72Pokrovskii-47, p. 353. We have added the data for 1913
based on Table III. 10.
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several non-ferrous metals (lead, zinc) and chemical products. 73
Machinery imports and output in
pre=r9M Rus sia 74 --' --
The dependence of the Russian economy on imported machinery
and the technical backwardness of the Russian machinery industry was
another theme of Soviet economists and leaders. 75 "Dependence" and
"backwardness" are relative terms, however, for the Russian machin-
ery industry and the Russian economy's dependence on imported ma-
chinery was compared to the machinery industries of Germany, Great
Britain, and the U. S. A. rather than to Denmark, Austria, Australia,
India, China, or Brazil. The Russian machinery industry was actually
quite large relative to the demand for machinery and quite sizable when
compared to the machinery industries even of the U. S. A., Great
Britain, and Germany. The "backwardness" of the Russian machinery
industry was chiefly a "technological lag" in production methods, pro-
duct assortment and product design rather than in over-all capacity and
growth rate, for under the spur of a general industrial boom (except
1900 -1908) and a protective tariff of 1891 and 1903 the domestic machin-
ery industry grew rapidly (often with the help of foreign capital,
-.----.----.--.---------.-------------.------------
73Pokrovskii -47, p. 353.
74The reader is referred to Rozenfeld-61, Chapters I-XI for a
Soviet history of machine building in Rus sia.
75Rosenfeld-61; Mishustin-38a, pp. 135-141; Stalin-28a in
Spu1ber-65, pp. 267-270; Pokrovskii-47, p. 358; Ioffe-38, p. 55; Bad-
mas-32, pp. 6-13; Liashchenko-49, pp. 673-674.
137
76management, and technology).
~pendenc~ on it;l~:!.~~achine ry. Estimation and interpre-
tation of import-consumption ratio for machinery is at best an impre-
cise art because of problems of methodology, valuation, comparability,
and fluctuating demand. 77 Thus, we find differing estimates of import-
consumption ratios of machinery in pre -1914 Russia - nevertheless,
~-----------------_._--_._------_._-----------
76Liashchenko-49, p. 667. For example, output of agricultural
equipment rose from 12.1 million rubles in 1900 to 60.5 million rubles
in 1913 (Bogdanov-28, pp. 16-20, cited in Elchibegoff - 55a, p. 18) Cf.
Dobb-48, pp. 36-38. See also Beable-19, pp. 161-264.
77Th ... f . de Import-consumptIon ratIos or any gIven year a not
always accurately represent the "normal" dependence of an economy on
imported machinery and raw materials because the demand can vary
sharply in boom and crisis. Newly developed products abroad also have
a similar effect.
The 1909-1913 period in Russia was a boom period with high
levels of investment, and rapid expansion of the machine -building indus-
try as well as rapid expansion of equipment imports, so that the high
estimates for the import-consumption ration in 1913must be judged
against rapidly expanding domestic output. Steel output increased 660/0
in the 1909-1913 period, cement and copper output more than doubled
(Nutter-62, pp. 411-413). The output of metal-working equipment in-
creased by more than 600/0in the 1910-1913 period, yet domestic produc-
tion covered only one -third of domestic demand (Rozenfe1d-61, p. 105).
The import-consumption ratio does measure the degree to
which the carrying out of a particular level of investment depends on
the ability to import machinery from abroad, for an attempt to invest
even greater amounts requires even larger imports and a higher import-
consumption ratio (at least in the short run). It was this limitation or
dependence of the level of inve stment on imported machinery which
worried the Soviet leadership.
The resolution of the 14th Party Congress in December 1925
emphasized that the Soviet Union become independent in the production
of machinery, not in cotton, wool, non-ferrous metals, tea or the other
items on wIiich the Soviet economy of that time was also highly depend-
ent on imports for supplies (Dobb -48, p. 192).
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these estimates give us some impressions of the capability of the Rus-
sian machining industry to supply its domestic market. We summar-
ize below the import-consumption ratios for the major branches of
ho b °ldo 78mac lne - Ul lng.
% supplied by
imports in 1913
or "before W. W. I"
Machinery for industry
Metalworking equipment
Electrical "article s"
Railroad equipment
Agricultural equipment
(excluding tractors)
Textile
Tractors, Automobiles,
Airplanes
Printing
Chemical Equipment
60%
67%
27%
20%
45%
23%
100%
98%
90%
We find that the Rus sian machinery industries supplied a large share of
machinery to basic economic sectors - agricultural, railroads, electri-
cal' textile and metalworking - even during these boom years. 79
On the other hand the Russian economy depended on imports
to supply 90-100 per cent of its automobiles, tractors, airplanes, print-
ing equipment, metallurgical equipment and chemical equipment and the
more complex and newer types of agricultural, mining, metal-cutting,
electrical and power, textile equipment, and precision apparatus (see
----.------------- ..---------------------------
78From Tables III. 14, III. 15, III. 16.
79Rozenfeld-61 (pp. 135-143) stated that in 1917Tsarist machine
building was well developed for railroad equipment, simple agricultural
equipment, diesel engines, low-pressure internal combustion engines,
steam engines, food-processing equipment, pump, boilers, some elec-
trical equipment, and simple machine -tools.
TABLE III. 15
RUSSIA: IMPORTS AND SALES OF
AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY
1900 -1913
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Year Imports Sales Import as Percent
(millions ruble s) (millions ruble s) of Total Sales
1900 15.5 27.3 56.8
1905 18.0 36.0 50.0
1910 42.0 85.9 48.9
1911 57.5 107.7 53.4
1912 63.5 116.3 54.6
1913 48.5 108. 7 44.6
Source: Notes to Table III. 15, Appendix B, p. 762.
\
TABLE 111.16 (continued)
(l) (2) (3 ) (4) ( 5) (6) (7)
Threshers Total 6, 516 14,297 20,813 31. 30 12. 74 22.93 18.34
inc. , Hand 2,464 f 173} 16,459 14.97 4.82 [ O.27}Horse-drawn 13, 822 22. 17
Stearn 3,665 213 3,878 94. 50 7. 17 0.34
Special 387 89 474 81.64 0.75 O. 14
Cleaning and Sorting Total 927 2,491 3,418 27. 12 1. 81 3.99 3.01
inc. , Winnowing and Sorting 2, 388 } { 3.83Sorting 927 33 3,418 27. 12 1. 81 0.05
Other machines 70 O. 11
Feed Grinders, Cutters,
and Crushers Total 534 1,352 1,886 28. 31 1. 04 2. 16 1. 66
Other Implements
inc., Spare parts 11,829 8,768 20,597 57.43 23. 14 14.06 18. 15
Moving Equipment Total
inc. , Stearn locomobiles [ 1,219} 10,610 68.47 14. 21 { 1. 95} 9.35Engine s of inte rnal 7,265 2, 126 3.41
combustion
GRAND TOTAL 51, 110 62,337 113,447 45.05
Source: Notes to Table III. 16, Appendix B, p. 763.
TABLE III. 17
MACHINER Y NOT PRODUCED IN TSARIST RUSSIA
142
Source
(1 )
(2)
(3 )
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
Item
Tractors
Grain combines
Water turbines and wheels
Coal cutting machine s
Excavators
Phonographs
High powe r steam turbine s
1,250 kwt
High-pressure turbines (30 atm)
Radia.1 bo ring
Milling
Universal grinder
Parts to textile machines
Automatic loom
Turbo-generator
.10,300 kwt
50,000 kwt
Hydro-generator
8,750
Transformer
2,000 kwt
Complex parts for telephones
Radio (vacuum tubes)
Ships (commercial)
5, 500 carrying capacity
Trucks .1 V4 tons (flat)
3 tons
Cars
Tractors
First Unit
1922/23
1929/30
[1924/25 J
1928/29
193.1
1929/30
1922/23
.1926/27
1920's
1926
.1924/25
1926
1926
1926?
before 1927
before 1927
1924
1925/26
1926/27
1924
Source
(16 )
(17)
(18 )
(19)
(20)
(21)
TABLE Ill. 17 (continued)
Item
Machine tools new type s
Modern boring machine
Universal turning lathe
Universal horizontal
Cincinnati type
milling machine
Semi-automatic turret
Revolving semi-automatic
turret
3-meter planers
Radial borers
Multi-tool lathe for mas s
production
Thread milling machines
Gear milling machines
Turbo-blower
Stationary turbines
25,000
(High pres sure)
50,000
Drills - mode rn
Taps - new types
Die s - new type s
Thread
Metallurgical equipment
Blooming mill
Printing equipment
First Unit
1932
1930?
1929/30
1931
1930 Is
1930
1931
1932
143
Source: Notes to Table III.l7, Appendix B, p. 763.
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Tables III. 14, III. 15, III. 16, and Table III. 17). 80 This latter group of
machinery products seems to have several common characteristics.
These products were "technologically new" in the sense of reaching
commercial technological maturity during the two decades before
World War I (and even later in Western Europe), so that to some extent
the underdeveloped state of these fields in Russia might be the result of
81a lag in the transfer of technology. Most of these products were pro-
duced on a commercial basis before World War I in Western Europe or
the U.S. 'A. '; the real growth, however, in industries such as automo-
biles, tractors, radio and airplanes was to occur after World War I. 82
Alternative hypotheses to explain the composition of machin-
ery output described in Tables III. 14 to III. 17 are readily available.
80Rozenfe1d-61 (pp. 135-143) stated that fields such as automo-
biles, tractors, airplanes, newer more complex types of electrical,
agricultural, textile, and metalwor~ing equipment, radios, and closely
allied field of ferro-alloys were very backward or non-existent in 1917.
Joffe-38 (p. 58) added glass-making, road building and heavy machine-
building to Rozenfeld Is list.
81See Kind1eberger -64 (pp. 124, ff.) for an analysis of compara-
tive advantage based on techno10gica11eadership. See Oliver-56 (pp. 460,
ff. ) for a discussion of the major technological developments in America
during the period 1900 to 1930. See Rolt-65 (pp. 192-243) for develop-
ments in metal-cutting from 1900-1950.
82For example, the automobiles, radio, tractor, airplane, pro-
duction grinding machine, automobile milling machinery, refrigerators,
automatic looms, electrification of railroad, rotary press (Oliver-56,
pp. 460 ff. especially pp. 478 -486, 548 -549). Germany and Great Brit-
ain dominated Rus sian machinery imports, which might partially explain
the lag in producing the more advanced models of machine tools and
agricultural equipment developed in the U. S.A.-- during the 1870 -1900
period (see Woodbury-60, pp. 44-91, Woodbury-59, pp. 51-133, pp.134
ff.). See Heady-60 (p. 78) for the development of mechanized agricul-
ture in the U. S. A.
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The little produced machinery in pre-19l4 Russia (Table III. 17) seemed
to be 1) less affected by the tariff on weights rather than value, 2) tech-
nologically more complex, 3) less demanded in Russia relative to older
and cheaper machinery and relative to other industrial countries. The
import tariff on most imported machinery in T sarist Rus sia was
assessed according to the weight of the machines rather than the value;
this type of tariff discriminated against the import of machines with
high weight to value -added ratios and material-cost ratios such as rail-
way and simple agricultural equipment and thus encouraged dome stic
production of this type of machinery. 83
From the large number of foreign technical personnel in the
machine -building plants of both foreign-owned firms and also Rus sian
firms, and the widespread use of foreign designs, we might infer the
technical personnel were relatively scarce to capital and labor (skilled
and unskilled) so that the building of technically complicated and new
types of machinery was more difficult and less profitable than concen-
trating resources on the simpler existing types of machinery which are
-----------------------------.-----------------
83See Table III. 16. Beable-19 (p. 239) also emphasized this
factor in Russian machinery imports. Rozenfeld-6l (p. 105) noted that
the tariff on general machinery imports in the 1890 I S was 28 rubles,
55 kopecks per 100 kg which protected only the very heavy uncompli-
cated types of machinery. Pokrovskii-47 (p. 358) noted that in 1915 the
tariff assessed on machinery in general (except copper machinery and
dynamo machinery) was twelve rubles, 90 kopecks to 25 rubles, 79 ko-
pecks per 100 kg and the tariff on agricultural machinery was four
rubles 60 kopecks per 100 kg. This tariff was less than assessed in
Germany during the same period. See Liashchenko-49 (p. 558) for a
dis cus sion of the evolution of the tariff s in the 1880 -1900 pe riod. See
Czechowicz-29 (pp. 2209-2215) for a comparison of the Russian tariff
of 1903 and the Soviet tariff system. Table T-47 summarizes the 1903
and Soviet tariff structure for most major commodities; it was adapted
from Czechowicz -29.
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produced on a relatively large scale and which require relatively little
technical per sonnel input.84 This scarcity of technical per sonnel would
have also impeded the transfer of new technologies and the new tech-
nologies were often introduced into Russia through branches of a lead-
ing foreign producer (who supplied their own technical staff; Singer,
A.E.G. Westinghouse, International Harvester, AGEA, SKF, MAN). 85
Both the tariff and the shortage of skilled engineer s and technicians
favored the domestic assembly of imported parts so that import-total
installation ratios understated the dependence of the Rus sian economy
on foreign machinery imports. Imported parts were important in the
production of sewing machine s (Singer), complex agricultural machine s
(International Harvester), some types of electrical equipment (A. E. G. ,
Siemens-Schuckert, Westinghouse, etc.), and some types of telephone
and telegraph equipment.86 Demand for newer products and more
84Rozenfeld-6l, pp. 103-110. This suggests that the compara-
tive advantage was not so much the result of a labor-capital ratio dif-
ference in factor endowment as it was the result of a technical personnel-
labor ratio difference and economies of scale, Russian machine-building
firms were, however, quite multi-purpose (Rozenfeld-6l, p. 114). Ger-
schenkron-65 (pp. 126-129, 135) discussed the scarcity of entrepreneurs
in pre-19l4 Russia and suggested that "the lack of managerial and entre-
preneurial personnel was compensated for by a scale of plant which made
it pos sible to spread a thin layer of available talent over a large part of
the industrial economy (Ibid., p. 129). Indire ct evidence of the scarcity
of technicians and engineers is implied in his statement that after 1905,
the reduction in the share of foreign engineers and foremen in factories
and mines tended to diminish friction in the labor force (Ibid., p. 137).
85Rozenfeld-6l, pp. 103-110.
86Balzak-49, p. 113; Rozenfeld-6l, pp. 105-112. Rozenfeld-6l
specifically noted the importance of the tariff in the composition of out-
put and imports of electrical items and domestic production was often
based on imported parts (Rozenfeld-6l, p. 107 and EIKSSSR, p. 17).
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expensive products was slow to develop (especially for complex agri-
cultural machinery. 87
Thus, tariff structure, the scarcity of technical personnel
and engineers, and the structure and level of demand would all favor
the importing the newer machine, the more highly fabricated machine,
and the low-volume machine, most of which characteristics fit the
description of the machines listed in Table III. 17. These factors also
tended to encourage domestic production of the simpler types of ma-
chinery which had repeat orders, which were heavy relative to the
degree of fabrication and value of materials, and which could be
assembled from imported parts.
Foreign patent rights may have been a barrier to the develop-
ment of new products, but as far as can be determined Tsarist Russia
was not a member of "Union for the Protection of Industrial Property"
which governed international patent rights from 1883 onward. 88 Thus,
direct legal barriers did not seem to offer a barrier to the transfer of
The tariff was also cited as the reason for the rapid development of
the production of large diesels (Rozenfeld-6l, p. 104). See Elchibegoff-
55 (p. 6) for International Harvester's operations in pre-19l4 Russia.
87See Liashchenko-49, p. 676. This hypothesis of small
demand is supported by the relative unimportance of these newer items
in total agricultural machinery consumption and in imports (Table III. 16)
even though tariffs actually favored the import of the more complicated
and expensive machines as compared to the simple machines.
88Lada-30, pp. 52, 62. Russia had several treaties dealing
with trademarks but not industrial patents or de signs in the 1810-1880
period. Russia was at the founding meeting of the "Union" in 1880, but
did not adhere to it (Ibi~:, pp. 79-93).
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technology although indirect pressures and representations to the
Tsarist government by foreign firms and governments may have been
effective.
In summary, the dependence of the Rus sian economy on ma-
chinery imports was significant especially for the "technologically
newer" types of machinery, but the Russian machinery industry was
expanding rapidly and was the major supplier of some types of equip-
ment. Import substitution had occurred in railroad, agricultural,
1 to 1 dOl b ° hO 89e ec rIca, an Interna com ushon mac Inery .
.Rus sian balance of ;eayments and foreign debt 90
Although Russia had a favorable balance of trade for all but
one year during 1892-1913, Russia had a balance of payments deficit
for most years since 1892, because of the large "invisible" expenditure s
on current account for servicing the large foreign debt, other services,
and tourism. 91 According to Pasvo1sky, "Russia was undoubtedly ex-
porting before the war to her maximum capacity, " so that this balance
89See Table III. 15. Import substitution was also occurring in
fields such as bicycles, motorcycle s, sewing machine s.
90The classic work on this subject is Pasvolsky-24. See also
Liaschenko-49, pp. 718-719 and Engeev-28b.
91It might be argued that the balance of payment deficit reflec-
ted the "transfer of real resources" as a consequence of foreign borrow-
ing by Russia. The fact was that the Russian government, against their
wishes, was forced into the international-capital marketTn order to
cover their current payments. As Pasvo1sky-24 (pp. 31-32) described
the problem: "In fact, there was not a single year between 1892 and
1905 when the trade balance was sufficient to meet the service charges
and the interest on the foreign indebtedness, and there were only three
years, at the most, during the entire period to 1914when resorting to
new borrowing was not necessary." Liaschenko-49 (pp. 717-718) also
noted the same problem of servicing the foreign debt and capital in the
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92of payments problem was not easy to solve.
The following e stima te of Rus sia Is balance on current interna-
tional accounts is striking because of the total absence of any Rus sian
"invisible item s exports" and the large Rus sian imports of invisible
items.
RUSSIA: BALANCE ON CURRENT ACCOUNTS93
(yearly average 1909-1913)
(million ruble s)
Merchandise Trade
Exports 150'0 Imports 1133
"Invisible Items"
Exports
negligible
Trade Surplus
Imports
Charges for banking,
etc.
Tourist & Official
Expenditure s
Inte rest on State Debt
Interest on Municipal
Debt
Interest on Guaranteed
Debt
Interest and Dividends
on Industrial Inve st-
ment
Invisible Items Deficit
Net Balance on Current Account-----------------
367
25
70
180
21
39
105
440
- 73 (deficit)
This virtual absence of any earnings from invisible items was to be a
major factor in the Soviet balance of payment difficulties during NEP.
----,~ ................. ...,--.............----.....,~--_..._----~ ..._--_.--_ .._-----
Tsarist balance of payments.
92Pasvolsky -24, p. 108.
93pasvolsky-24, pp. 31-32.
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The large foreign exchange requirements for servicing pre-
1914 debt - to say nothing of the large war debt - undoubtedly was an
important factor in the continual refusal of the Soviet government to
reconsider its repudiation of foreign debt except under extremely
favorable conditions. 94 According to the Engeev-28b data shown in
Table III. 18, the Russian servicing of foreign deb!,.and -0e interest
and dividends on foreign c~pital was E~e...::..!.hal2..!Ee import of fo~eign
capital into Rus sia during 1881-1897 and from 1898-1913 (Table III. 18).
"Confiscation of foreign assets" almost became a necessity after the
revolution. Furthermore Pasvolsky -24 predicted substantially reduced
exports from output restored to pre -1914 levels, so that much smaller
export surpluses would be inadequate to service existing debts. 95
Concentration in direction of Russian--~_._-~----------------foreign !,:ade
Pre -1914 Russian export trade was strongly dominated by Ger-
d ff d b .. ff 1"' 96 G b h d' 1many an a ecte y Its tarl po ICles. ermany oug t lrect y
94See Bronfenbrenner -55 for discussion of the advantages of
confiscation of foreign capital under various conditions.
95pasvolsky -24, p. 108. Pasvolsky -24 (p. 127) estimated ex-
ports from output at pre -war levels at 1150million rubles and irreduc-
ible minimum requirements for imports at 1033 million rubles in pre-
war prices. Pasvolsky in 1924 felt that Soviet Russia or even a cap-
italist Russia would simply not be able to service the Tsarist debt in
the near future (Pasvolsky-24, pp. 137-141).
96See Pokrovskii-4 7, pp. 365 -369 for an analysis of Germany's
role in Russian foreign trade.
Pokrovskii -47, p. 368, and other s noted that no other European
country was so dependent on one country for the sale of its exports and
the purchase of its imports as was Rus sia. He also noted that the Ger-
man tariff discriminated in favor of unprocessed raw material, which
Germany then proces sed and reexported to compete with similar pro-
ces sed products exported by Rus sia, and even in internal Russian
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TABLE III. 18
RUSSIA: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DURING 1881 - 1897
AND 1898 - 1913
(millions of ruble s)
Credit
Receipts from exports
Investment of foreign capital:
a) In industrial enterprises
b) In private railroad construction
c) In credit institutions
d) In municipal economy
Government loans
Other receipts
Balance
Debit
Payments for imports
Interests and dividends paid abroad
Redemption of securities:
a) Banking
b) Railway
Expenditures by Rus sians abroad
Othe r expenditure s
Increase of gold reserve
Balance
1881 - 1897
10,775
200
550
1,050
125
12,700
1881 - 1897
8,140
2,900
.1 00
1,000
287
273
12,700
1898 - 1913
17,435
1,500
350
375
2,000
240
21,900
1898 - 1913
13, 313
5,000
400
2,000
415
772
21, 900
Source: Notes to Table III. 18, Appendix B, p. 764.
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29.8 per cent of Russian exports and supplied 47. 5 per cent of Russian
imports in 1913. 97 The actual share of Russian exports to Germany
was larger than indicated of Russian statistics because of transit trade
through the Netherlands to Germany. The share of Germany in Russian
imports (and to a lesser extent, exports) expanded continuously in the
pre -1914 period as can be seen below:
ROLE OF GERMANY IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN TRADE98
1895-1898
1899-1902
1903-1906
1907-1910
191"1':1910
1912
1913
Share of
Rus sian Imports
From GermaEJ'_
33%
35
36
40.
45
45.4
47.4
Share of Rus sian
Exports to Germany
(Ge_rman Statistics)
n. a.
45%
43
48
46
The role of Germany as purchaser of important Russian export
goods was substantial but always not dominant.
-----,------------------......-..~---.....- .......................... ,.....--.-.. ......._ ............... --_ ....'--~.....,...,. .....
markets (fur, flax, platinum).
According to an index of concentration used by Hirschman (Hir-
schman-42, pp. 100-116) which is, in essence, the square root of the sum
of the squares of the per cent of a country Is exports (or imports) to each
country, Russian foreign trade (combining the Netherlands with Germany
because of its high transit trade) in 1913was among the most highly con-
centrated in all of Europe and wa s equal to many of the colonial and
Latin American countrie s; Ru s sia Is concentration index (for direction
of exports) was about 47, Great Britain about 22; only Jugoslavia, Den-
mark and the Netherlands were more concentrated (Hirschman-42,
pp. 102-103).
97VTSSSR-60.
98Pokrovskii-47, pp. 366-367. Exports based on German
statistics because of transit trade through the Netherlands.
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RUSSIAN EXPORTS TO GERMANY 191399
Grain
Barley
Oil Cake &
Oil Seed
Butter
Eggs
Flax
Timber
Oil
Furs
Hides
Per Cent of
Russian Exports
~. Ge:..'2:any~in 1913
'I
31
61. 5
40. 3
35
24
22.9
26
18.4
64. 3
41. 2
Per Cent of Rus sian
Exports to Germany &
Ne.!!:er1c;..~dsin 1913
52. 2
80.0
49. 1
36. 6
31. 4
22.9
41. 4
21
66.8
43. 1
Germany was more important as a supplier of raw materials
and machinery to the Russian economy in 1913~
IMPORTS FROM GERMANY AS PERCENTAGE OF ALL
RUSSIAN IMPORTS OF SELECTED COMMODITIES IN 1913100
Machinery
Wool
Cotton
Non-ferrous metals
Coal
65%
40
24
81
47
Ferrous metals
Leather and Hide s
Dyes
Chemicals
Rubber
75%
84
58
70
22
The dependence of Rus sian foreign trade on Germany and Ger-
man firms was also strengthened by the role of German firms and
middlemen in the development of Russian exports. 101
99VTSSSR-60. By weight.
100VTSSSR_60. By value.
101Pokrovskii-47, p. 367. Beable -19 mentioned the role of
German traders quite often in his study.
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DIRECTION OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN TRADE 1913102
Great Britain
We stern Europe
f.A.ustria:--Be1gium, Denmark,
Italy, Finland, France)
"East"
(India, China, Afghanistan,
Iran, Turkey, Japan)
U. 's. 'A.
0/0!9..!~~~rt
17.6
26. I
14
Ie s s than 10/0
12.6
13. 2
8. 3
5. 8
World War I and Russi~n Foreign Trade
Russian foreign trade during World War I and its inadequacies
in meeting national defense needs have be en extensively dis cus sed by Pok-
rovskii, Kutusov, Groman, Krasin, and others, so only those aspects re-
I d . d h 103event to our stu yare summarIze ere.
Exports fell abruptly (Table III. 19) not only because the Great
Powers took about 49 per cent of Russian exports but also because of
the blockade of major Russian ports, the disruption of the export firms
operated by Germans, and the disruption of foreign trade of the Allies
(especially France, Belgium, Italy, and Great Britain). 104 Imports
declined (Table III. 19) less because the drop in imports from the Great
l02STAT_36, pp. 694-698.
103Pokrovskii-47, pp. 385-395; Kutusov-28, pp. 9-13; Groman-
23, passim; Krasin-28; Ianson-34, pp. 43-45; Pasvolsky-24, pp. 41-46;
Baykov-46, pp. 5-6; Leites-22, pp. 25-37.
l04Kennan_61, pp. 66; Pokrovskii-47, pp. 386-389; and STAT-
36, p. 586; Bakov-46, p. 5.
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TABLE III. 19
FOREIGN TRADE OF RUSSIA AND THE USSR 1913 - 1924
(millions of rubles)
Paper Rubles Gold Rubles
current prices 1913 prices
Export Import Balance Export Import
Av. 1909-1913 1521 1140 +381
1913 1520 1374 +146 1520 1374
1914 956 1098 -142 885 1109
1915 402 1139 -402 274 870
1916 502 2488 -1986 237 862
1917 488 2449 -1961 137 802
1918 8 57
1919 0 I
1920 I 29
1921 20 210a
1922 82 270a
1923 206 144a
1924 311 228
aDoes not include imports for famine relief which equalled 22.4 million
rubles in 1912, 184.5 million rubles in 1922 and 35.1 million rubles
in 1923.
Source: Notes to Table Ill. 19, Appendix B, p. 764.
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Powers was replaced by imports of war materials and munitions from
the Allies. The huge trade deficit during 1914-1917was financed largely
by war loans from the Allies and only to a sJna11 extent by bullion ex-
porta .. Russian foreign indebtedness about doubled during the war. 105
The dependence of the Russian economy on imported raw ma-
teria1s, equipment, and armaments became painfully obvious as the war
proceeded, and the inadequate armaments (and transport systems) are
often cited as an important factor in the poor military performance of
the Russian army and of the Russian economy in general (especially in
1915).106 Even these inadequate armaments depended significantly on
imports and according to one estimate, imports provided 40. 5% of the
rifles, 60. 6% of the machine guns, 22. 80/0of the field guns, 20. 8% of
the cartridges, and 22.6% of the artillery shells as well as trucks,
107planes, motors, and motorcycles. In addition, large quantities of
ferrous, non-ferrous metals, and machine tools were imported for the
Rus sian armaments industry; coal and other raw materials were espe-
cially short in northwestern regions, which had relied on imported
British coal (and coal from Russian Poland which was captured by the
_.~--_.,----------_ .._-----_._-,-------_.- ....'~--_._----,-----
105Pasvolsky-24, pp. 43 -44.
106L . f . d t' 1 t d d .arge portIons 0 Importe war ma erla s were s ran e In
Murmansk, Vladivostok, and Archangel because of inadequate transport
(Pokrovskii-47, p. 388 and Kennan-61, p. 67).
107Pokrovskii-47, pp. 391-392 citing a study by A. Manikovskii,
Voevoe snabzhenie russkoi armii 1914-1918 Vol. I-III, Moscow, 1920-192-8:---------------------
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Germans) and imported cotton. lOB
The disastrous experience of Tsarist Russia with its depend-
ence on imports for even inadequate provision of the military forces,
and for the retooling of industry was an example often cited by Soviet
writers and was undoubtedly an important factor in their decision to
industrialize and to emphasize heavy industry and machine -building
d. d . 1 . 1 109an In ustrIa raw materIa s.
By 1928 economic factors, however, also made the develop-
ment of these industries an urgent economic as well as strategic mat-
ter. But as we shall see, neither the military nor the economic per-
spective as seen in 192B justified the degree of "economic autarky"
which was to be attained by 1935.
Loss of Baltic Territories and
Future Russian Foreign .~.~c:<!~
Territorial losses in formation of USSR. When the USSR was
formed (Soviet territory as of 1925), certain territories of the former
Russian empire - Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, the "Polish Provinces, "
Bessarabia to Rumania - were not included. This change in territorial
10BLiashchenko-49, pp. 762-764. The decline in cloth output,
the loss of the textile mills in Poland, and the increased allocation of
cloth to the military greatly reduced the supplies available for civilian
sales (especially to the peasant). Similarly, the supply of agricultural
machinery, metals, fuel, fertilizer, and other products to agriculture
were curtailed sharply and according to Liashchenko-49 (p. 467), the
peasant responded by cutting back production and marketing because of
the lack of incentives, and thereby caused a food crisis. Loss of draft
power, good seed, fertilizer, and eventually manpower also caused a
decline in agriculture.
109Stalin_2Ba, pp. 252-262, and Pokrovskii-47, pp. 393-395.
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coverage greatly complicates the interpretation of any comparison of
pre -1914 Rus sian foreign trade statistic s and Soviet foreign trade sta-
.. f th .. d 110 B 1 . h ff fhStlCS or e Inter-war perlo . e ow we summarIze tee ect 0
these territorial losses on output, supply of exports and the demand for
imports in the new Soviet economy as compared to the Russian Empire.
Then we examine briefly the Soviet adjustment for territorial losses in
estimating foreign trade in 1913.
The reduction in area of the USSR of 1925 as compared to the
Russian Empire (excluding Finland) in 1913was about 482,400 square
kilometers or about 2. 3 per cent of the area for the Russian Empire
excluding Finland (21, 713, 100 square kilometers). III The change in
population of 1913 due to territoria11oss is estimated at about 25.4 mil-
lion people, or 15. 3% of 165. 7 million in the Rus sian Empire in 1913.112
The shares of various industrial products produced in 1913 in
the Russian territories lost in the eventual formation of the USSR are
pre sented in Table s III. 20 and III. 21. In the pre -1914 period the separ-
ated territories produced a major part (above 40%) of the output of
--------------------.---------------.-.----
1l0Finland was also granted independence, but it was not con-
sidered here as part of Tsarist Russia. Pre-19l4 Russian foreign trade
statistics treated trade with Finland (part of the Russian Empire) as
trade with another country, and hence are included in Russian trade
statistics as a separate country rather than as part of the Russian
Empire (VTSSSR-60, p. 8).
111SUYB-25, pp. 18-19, and SUYB-36, p. 2.
112Stat-60, p. 3. May possibly include Finland with a popula-
tion of about 3 million in 1913 (SUYB -25, p. 19). Groman-28 (p. 224)
stated that the population of the territory detached from Tsarist Russia
excluding Bessarabia was 21. 3 million people of a total population of
Tsarist Russia of 167.6 million people.
TABLE 111.20
COMPARISON OF INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT OF SELECTED COMMODITIES IN TERRITORY OF
RUSSIA AND TERRITORY OF THE USSR IN 1913
Series Ou tp u t in % loss to R e c 0 v e r y to 1 9 1 3
number
It e m Name Un its USSR Russian separated Output levels
Territory ETIlpire erritories USSR Russ. ETIlP.
207.3 copper ore 1000 m. t. 880.6 1108 20. 52 29/30 19 3 1
204. 1 blister copper 1000 TIl. t. 31. 1 34.5 9.85 27/28 28/29
303. 1 coal 1000 TIl. t. 29. 1 36.0 19. 16 26/27 27/28
403. 5 hydrochloric acid 1000 m. t. 58.0 72.3 19.77 28/29 19 3 1
408.6 superphosphate 1000 m. t. 63.0 115. 0 45.21 24/25 27/28
415. 1 synthetic dyes m. t. 4286 8500 49. 57 (25/26) 25/26
419.5 copper sulphate m. t. 668 742 7.40 22/23 22/23
421.5 sodium bicarbonate 1000 TIl. t. 7.2 8. 14 11. 54 22/23 25/26
425.4 crude coat tar 1000 m. t. 39. 5 (26/27)
427.5 aluminuTIl sulphate 1000 m. t. 8. 3 15. 8 47.46 24/25 27/28
430. 5 ferrous sulphate 1000 m. t. 1. 01 1. 70 40. 58 1921 25/26
448.6 paper and paperboard 1000 m. t. 217 400 45. 75 23/24 28/29
451. 5 all wood pulp 1000 m. t. 96 232 58.62 24/25 28/29
702. 1 plywood 1000 TIl3 130 180 27.77 26/27 27/28
706. 5 bricks TIlillions 2144 3090 30.61 28/29 29/30
803. 1 motor-vehicle tires thousands 19.2 234.0 91. 79 (27/28) 29/30
812. 3 stearn locomotives units 609 609 00.00 29/30 29/30
904. 5 horse-drawn plows thousands 671. 1 739. 3 9.22 24/25 25/26
906. 5 horse-powered thousands 35. 1 45.3 22. 51 24/25 25/26
threshers
908. 5 horse-drawn harrows thousands 97.4 127.4 23.54 23/24 23/24
910.5 horse-drawn drills thousands 67.8 68.4 0.87 25/26 25/26
TABLE 111.20 (continued)
Series Output in % loss to Recovery to 1 9 1 3Ite m Name Uni t s USSR Russian separated Output levels
number Territory Empire territories USSR Russ. Emp
915. 5 horse-drawn winnowers thousands 45.0 81. 9 45.05 24/25 25/26
919. 5 scythes thousands 78. 0 1134. 5 93. 12 1919 24/25
1001. 3 stearn boilers 1000 m 2 19 54 64.81 (25/26) 26/27
1009. 1 machine tools units 1,490 2,280 34. 64 26/27 27/28
1110.5 butter 1000 m. t. 104 134 22.38 1933 1934
1116. 1 sugar, granulated 1000 m. t. 1, 487 1,638 9. 21 29/30 1935
1118, 5 starch and syrup 1000 m. t. 115. 0 125. 0 8.00 1933 1933
1125. 1 matches crates 3,757 4, 158 9.64 25/26 26/27
1202. 6 boots and shoe s mil. pairs 8. 35 9.17 8.94 24/25 25/26
1205. 1 cotton fabrics mil. meter s 2,582 3,488 25.97 (26/27) 1937
1208. 6 cotton yarn 1000 m. t. 271. 0 365.8 25. 91 26/27 28/29
1217. 5 woolen yarn 1000 m. t. 46.5 110.2 57.80 26/27 not as of1936
Source: Notes to Table III. 20, Appendix B, p.764.
......
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TABLE III. 21
RUSSIA: SHARE OF OUTPUT IN 1913 LOCATED IN
SEPARATED TERRITORIES
161
Item Product Loss of Capacity Source
I. Iron 9% capacity EIKSSSR, p. 363
2. Steel 14% capacity EIKSSSR, p. 363
3. Rolling Mills 13% capacity EIKSSSR, p. 363
4. Zinc 75% capacity EIKSSSR, p. 369
5. Steel Wire & Rigging 37% to Poland EIKSSSR, p. 381
6. Welded Pipe 35% to Poland EIKSSSR, p. 385
7. Drawn Pipe 90% to Poland EIKSSSR, p. 385
8. Precise Metal Wares 40% located in Poland EIKSSSR, p. 397
9. Paper 350/0of paper industry EIKSSSR, p. 357
10. Glass 40 from 225 glass works SUYB-26, p. 146
II. Electrical Equipm't 14% of value of output EIKSSSR, p. 421
12. Woolen Spinning 64% of all spindles (mostly EIKSSSR, p. 447
to Poland)
13. Woolen Weaving 59% of all looms (mostly EIKSSSR, p. 447
to Poland)
14. Textile Machine ry 38% of output value EIKSSSR, p. 379
15. Precision instrument 40% of output value (large- EIKSSSR, p. 399
Optical 1y to Poland)
16. Automobile Assembly 100% EIKSSSR, p. 321
17. Looms in Cotton 16. 6% of number of looms Becker- 55, p. 43
Textiles
Source: Notes to Table 111.21, Appendix B, p. 764.
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woolen yarn, zinc, drawn pipe, precision metal wares, paper, wood
pulp, superphosphate, dyes, several types of machinery (steam boil-
ers, scythes, horse-drawn winnowers), and rubber tires, and between
20 and 40 per cent of the copper ore, plywood, threshers, harrowers,
machine -tools, bricks, butter, cotton yarn, and cotton fabrics. On
the other hand, more than 80 per cent of iron, petroleum, coal, several
important chemicals, copper, locomotives, plows, and other important
types of machinery, sugar, boots, electrical equipment, and so forth,
were produced in the territory destined to become the USSR.
Losses in sown area for specific crops and in the output of
selected agricultural goods are shown in Table III. 22. From the view-
point of agricultural exports, the most serious losses to the separat ed
territory were barley (13.5%), corn (35.4%), rye (8.5%), and flax
(19.2%), eggs (14.4%), and butter (220/0).113 The impact of the territor-
ialloss on agricultural exports is difficult to gauge, for although the
percent loss in output is less than the decline in population, these areas
were oriented toward export (particularly for flax, butter, eggs, barley,
and corn).
Soviet estimate s o~ pre -1914 foreign trade on S.£Yi~!..!~Eritort.:
Soviet statisticians recalculated pre -1914 Rus sian foreign trade for 1925
Soviet territory; these estimates are presented in Tables III. 23 and
III. 24. Little is known about the methodology of these adjustments, but
,----------_.~---
113From Table III. 22, all refer to sown areas except eggs and
butter. Actual comparisons are for 1913 output of the post-1945 terri-
tory of the USSR (which roughly approximates the 1913Russian Empire)
e specially for agricultural products. See STAT -60, p. 3.
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TABLE III. 22
RUSSIA: SHARE OF SOWN AREA AND AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT
IN 1913 LOCATED IN THE SEPARATED TERRITORIES
SOWN AREA
Russian Soviet % in separated
Emoire Territorv territory
Grain - Total 104. 6 94.4 9.2
Spring wheat 24. 7 24.3 1.6
Winter wheat 8.3 7. 8 6.0
Rye 28.2 25.8 8. 5
Millet, buckwheat 7.3 7. 2 1.4
Oats 19. 1 16. 9 11. 5
Barley 13. 3 11. 5 13. 5
Corn 2. 2 1.4 36.4
Industrial Crops 4.9 4. 5 7. 3
Sunflower 0.98 0.97 1.0
Sugar beet 0.68 0.65 4.4
Cotton o. 69 0.69 0.0
Flax for fiber 1. 25 1. 02 19. 2
Potatoes 4.2 3. 06 27. 1
Output and
Eggs (net output)
Flax (net output)
Wool (net output)
Milk (gross output)
Cows (1916)
Livestock.
% in separated territory
14.4
9. 5
6. 0
8.4
13. 5
a
Comparison of 1951 boundaries to pre-1939 boundaries for output.
Present boundaries are similar to boundaries of Russian Empire and
lack part of western area of Western Polish Russia. Compare Fullard-
61, p. 8.
Source: Notes to Table III. 22, Appendix B, p. 765.
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apparently the Soviet statisticians corrected only for the trade of the
separated territories with foreign countries and not for trade with
h f R
.. 114
t e rest 0 USSla.
This Soviet method of adjusling Rus sian foreign trade sta-
tistics for territorial loss - that is, excluding the trade of the separ-
ated territories with the rest of Russia - vitiates the usefulness of the
Soviet corrections in estimating the net effect of the territorial loss
in the USSR IS capacity to export and the USSR IS demand for imports
during NEP as compared to pre-19l4 Russia. This problem is ex-
amined below.
According to Soviet estimates, exports of the Russian Empire
should be reduced by 11.1% for the 1909 -1913 period and by 14. 5% for
1913 to adjust for the loss of territory (Tables III. 23 and III. 24). Flax,
timber, and grain exports were most affected by the territorial loss
(especially of the Baltic states), and although no specific information
has been located, butter, cloth, and crude alcohol exports must have
115also been affected (Tables III. 23 and III. 24).
According to Soviet statistics, imports for 1909-13 should be
reduced by 26. 7% - much more than the adjustment for exports - to
adjust for the territorial loss (Table III. 24). A large part of this re-
duction can be attributed to the imports of coal, cotton, wool, dyes,
-------- .......~--------,----_......
114Birmingham -3Ia, p. 10.
115Tables III. 21 and III. 22. Table III. 24 indicated that a large
portion of manufactured product such as cloth exports (Brussels class-
ification) were from the lost territories. Similarly for foodstuffs (eggs,
butter, and grain).
TABLE 111.23
EXPORTS OF SELECTED PRODUCTS IN 1913 FROM THE TERRITORY
OF RUSSIA AND FROM THE FUTURE TERRITORY OF THE USSR
Value: millions ruble s Yearly Average 1909 - 1913 1913
Weight: 1000 Ism. t. R us sian Empire Soviet Territory Russian Empire Soviet TerritoryWeight Value Weight Value Weight Value Weight Value
Total Exports 1487 1321 lS20.0a 1300. Oa
d 10S6aAgricultural Exports
12, 792b
1127 b
a 69SaGrain (1000 m. t. ) 736.S 11,302
Flaxc 283
a
na 209a na
Flax, Butter, Eggs, Furs 240
e 210a
Agricultural excluding lS1£ lSl a
Grain, Flax, Butter,
Eggs, Furs
Industrial Exports 360
h 26Sg
Timber 7,042 145 4,226 87 7,600 165 4,590 100
Sources and explanatory notes: Notes to Table III. 23, Appendix B, p. 763.
TABLE III. 24
OFFICIAL SOVIET ESTIMATES OF FOREIGN TRADE IN .19.13
FOR RUSSIA AND FUTURE TERRITORY OF USSR
(millions of rub.1es in current prices)
166
Trade Classified According Tsarist Rus sia USSR Territory
All European (of 1925)to Brussels Convention
Frontiers Borders All Frontiers
Exports
Animals 34.3 33.0 30.0
Foodstuffs 869.6 807.2 741.2
Raw Materials and Semi-Mfg. 531.4 550.3 506.3
Manufactured Goods 89.8 30.5 27.4
T ota1 Expo rts 1520 . .1 1420.9 .1305. 0
Imports
Animals 17.6 3.1 2.0
Foodstuffs 237.9 163. 0 134. 9
Raw Materials and Semi-Mfg. 668.0 662.5 513.6
Manufactured Goods 450.5 431.9 356.5
Total Imports 1374. 0 1220.5 1007.0
Balance of Trade 146. 1 200.4 298. 0
Source: Notes to Table III. 24, Appendix B, p. 763.
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rubber, etc. into the Polish and other Baltic industrial centers
(Table III. 24). The Soviet estimates also attributed a large portion of
foodstuff (tea, herring?) imports and manufactured goods (luxury art-
. 1 h'?) . h 1 .. 116IC es, mac Inery. Imports to t e ost terrItorIes.
Soviet estimates and the actual effect of territorial loss on
capacity to export and demand for imports. For reasons discussed
below, the Soviet method of adjusting pre -1914 Rus sian foreign trade
data for territorial loss - and hence Soviet estimates - overstated the
reduction in the Soviet capacity to export and in the Soviet demand for
imports relative to pre -1914 Russia. As a result, the relevant esti-
mates of pre -1914 exports and imports for use in evaluating the re-
covery of foreign trade on Soviet territory are open to considerable
debate.
The basic problem is that the Soviet method of adjusting pre-
1914foreign trade for territorial los s did not take into account the very
considerable interregional trade in pre -1914 Russia between the separ-
ated territories and the rest of Russia, and this "interregional trade"
would become "international trade" after the separation of the ter ri-
torie s.
As far as can be determined, the separated provinces imported
grain, cotton, wool, petroleuln products, sugar, several ores, and
possibly other foodstuffs, iron, some types of machinery, and several
chemicals from the rest of Russia - several of these products were
116Table III. 24. Foodstuff and manufactured goods classified
according to Brus se1s Convent:ion.
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also important export products of pre-1914 Russia, while cotton was
an important import product. 117 The most impo rtant fact about this
interregional trade from tire' yiewpoint of USSR's capacity to export
grain is that the ~arated territories were net importers of grain (net
imports of about O. 5 - 1. 0 million m. t.), i. e., they imported more
grain (wheat) from the rest of Russia than they exported to foreign
countries.118 Thus, the loss of territory probably affected the remain-
ing territory's (USSR) capacity to export much less than suggested by
the Soviet estimates. It would have changed the composition of ex-
ports towards grain, sugar, foodstuffs, etc., and also changed the
composition of imports (less cotton and wool).
The separated territories, also supplied products to the rest
of Rus sia, which hypothetically would have to be replaced by imported
goods; these included: paper, possibly sawn timber, dyes, zinc, rub-
ber products, machine tools, pipe, some types of agricultural ma-
chinery, cotton fabr~c, woolen fabric, and yarn. 119 Thus, the net
effect on import demand of the remaining territory due to the loss of
Baltic territories is difficult to determine; industrial materials and
117Liashchenko-49, pp. 538, 541, 612.
118Groman-28, pp. 224 -237, described extensively the grain
trade of the detached provinces (except Bessarabia); the detached pro-
vinces were net importers of grain (especially wheat) from the rest of
Russia (Ibi~., p. 225).
119Based on Tables III. 20 and III. 22, which are estimates of
the share of production in T sarist Russia in 1913 located in territories
not included in the formation of the USSR. Large portions of the chem-
ical, textile, paper, and metallurgy and metal-working industries were
located in the separated provinces.
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fuel imports of the remaining territory would be reduced relative to
pre-1914 Russia, but semi-processed and finished product imports
would have to be increased to compensate for the loss of finished pro-
d f h B lOt ° ° 12°ucts rom tea tIC errltorles.
Thus, the actual pre-1914 "foreign trade" of the territories
destined to become the USSR is not known. It was probably less than
the foreign trade of the Russian Empire, but considerably greater than
the Soviet economists' reduction in pre -1914 Rus sian foreign trade sta-
tistics for territorial loss would have us believe. In fact, we should
not rule out the possibility that the separation of these provinces
actually increased aggregate import demand and aggregate export cap-
acity.
In summary, comparisons of the recovery of Soviet foreign
trade with the recovery of other sector s in the economy should be made
with the above caveat about the actual impact of the territoria110ss on
the measurement of the recovery of foreign trade during NEP.
Throughout this study, we generally compared Soviet foreign
trade with Tsarist Russian foreign trade without territorial correction
unless otherwise noted in the text or table.
120ThO ° • 1 d k ° • fIS Interreglona tra e ma es per capIta comparIsons 0
pre -1913 and NEP supply more difficult. For example, to estimate the
per capita supply of cotton am.d" woolen textile in the Soviet territory on
the basis of imports (negligible or net exports) and output on Soviet
territory alone understates the per capita supply in 1913.
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CHAPTER IV
COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION OF SOVIET FOREIGN
TRADE IN THE EARLY YEARS 1917 - 1922/23
Nationalization, intervention, blockade, War Communism
and the collapse of forei~n trade
The revolution and subsequent nationalization of the economy and
annulment of foreign debts brought about the collapse of foreign trade in
1918 and complete cessation of foreign trade in 1919, for neither the Allies
nor the Germans desired to trade with the new Soviet regime. 1 The
Brest-Litvosk Treaty ceded most major ports (except Leningrad) and
the major export areas (Ukraine, Baltic states) to German or non-Soviet
control and called for large shipments of Russian gold and commodities
as part of the repatriation payments. 2 The Allied governments in re-
sponse to the Brest-Litvosk Treaty ceased trade with the Soviet govern-
ment and a de facto economic blockade came into effect partly as a de-
liberate policy of the Entente, partly as a result of the military situation
and loss of major ports and export regions, and partly as a response by
foreign commercial and financial firms, and foreign governments to the
nationalization of foreign firms and the annulment of foreign debt by the
Soviet government. The economic blockade was ended formally on
1Kennan-6l, pp. 67-69. Kaufman-29d, pp. 6-7.
2Shapiro-50, pp. 4-31. Trade with the Central Powers was
permitted (Ibi~., p. 7).
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January 16, 1920, but an almo st total financial blockade against Rus sian
gold and exchange, both official and unofficial, continued until March
1921 and still continued in various forms through 1929. 3
Soviet foreign trade was put under strict licensing regulations
in November 1917 and was completely nationalized on April 22, 1918.4
The nationalization of the economy (including foreign trading firms) and
the persecution of both domestic and foreign capitalists and management
staff within Soviet Rus sia completed the destruction of the foreign trade
network (and especially the export trade) and many experienced person-
nel in these areas left the country.5 Foreign commercial contacts were
broken and Soviet Russia had no credit standing whatsoever abroad.
During the initial steps toward restoration of foreign trade during 1921-
24, the Soviet trade mission had difficulty in placing any orders for
imports and even then were often forced to deposit gold or foreign ex-
change in a foreign bank or to prepay. Thus, while the Soviet govern-
ment freed itself of the heavy burden of interest payments and profit
repatriation by annulling the foreign debt and nationalizing foreign
3SUYB-28, pp. 530-5330 According to Krasin-28 (p. 399)
Soviet gold could not be sold at any price in the early months; the in-
itial discount was 30%; on order of England in October 1920 it was
16-20%, 15-20% in March 1921, 4% in following months and 0-2% by
June, 1922. The USA actually blocked entry of Soviet gold as late as
1928. No formal declaration of a blockade against Soviet Russia has
been located, although the Entente Powers declared a blockade against
the Baltic states when they entered peace negotiations with the Soviet
government in October, 1919 (SUYB-28, p. 529).
4Cherviakov-58, p. 5.
5Gerschenkron-47, p. 159.
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firms and banks, it also closed - at least temporarily - the doors to
future large -scale financial credits, loans and long -term capital in-
flow, and wrecked commercial relations with many important commer-
cial and industrial firms (and nations) in the world. 6 The effect of
these events is dramatically illustrated in Table III. 19. Cessation of
trade during 1918-20 contributed to the disorganization of the economy.
Rebuilding of soviet foreign trade relations_1920 -1923
The development of Soviet foreign trade during the period 1920-
71923 is discussed in detail by Kaufman, Kutusov, Groman, and others.
Only a brief summary is given here.
fO.rg?-nization and initial ope ra tional principle s of
drelgn trade during NEP
A Commissariat of Foreign Trade (NKVT) was established in
1920 under the guidance of L. Krasin, who took personal charge of re-
establishing the foreign commercial relationships of Soviet Russia with-
in a new framework - namely, the Soviet government Is monopoly of
foreign trade. 8
6The long -run economic cost of nationalization by the Soviet
government is open to debate, for the servicing of the debt required
most or more than the painfully achieved export surplus (Pasvolsky-24,
p. 32). See Bronfenbrenner-55 for the benefits and costs of confisca-
tion.
7Kaufman-23, pp. 258-271; Kaufman-25a; Kutusov-28, pp. 16-
30; Groman-23; Kaufman-29d, pp. 6-8; Baykov-46, pp. 6-12, 41-45;
EIKSSSR, passim; and Krasin-28.
8Leonid Krasin was generally considered the architect of the
Soviet foreign trade apparatus and an important defender of the prin-
ciple of the State monopoly of foreign trade. His major article s are
collected in Krasin-28. See Stomoniakov-28 (pp. 1-14) for a short bio-
graphy of Krasin.
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Initially the foreign trade apparatus was highly centralized
with all trade planning and commercial operations (purchase, ship-
ment, sale) under the direct control of NKVT and its trade delegations
abroad.9 A lack of personnel skilled in management and foreign trade
operations in specific areas in NKVT, bureaucracy and a conflict of
interests between domestic producers and NKVT encumbered the re-
covery of foreign trade. 10 Because of this, the issue of free trade
(especially importing) versus a state monopoly of foreign trade was
heatedly debated within the Party from the very beginnings of NEP, but
Leninr s support of the organizational form of a state monopoly kept
h b ... 1. t 11 Th t. 1 bl ht e aS1Cprlnclp e lntac •. ese opera lona pro ems, owever,
9Kaufman-29d, pp. 25-27, Krasin-28, pp. 111-116, and Baykov-
46, p. 9.
10Mishustin-38b, pp. 58-60. See Krasin-28 (pp. 103-121) for
his analysis of the organization problems.
HCarr-58, p. 445. Lenin supported the organizational form
of the State monopoly of foreign trade as compared to a protective
tariff system for he believed a tariff system would be inadequate pro-
tection for Soviet industry against industrial imports from industrial
nations, which would subsidize their exports in an attempt to destroy
Soviet industry. He was not directly concerned about the relation-
ship between tariffs, price levels, and balance of payments equilib-
rium.
In Stalinist history, Stalin was portrayed as a staunch defender
of the principle of the foreign trade monopoly, but in recent Soviet his-
tory his reputation on this point has tarnished considerably. Compare
Varga-32, pp. 5-24, and Kasrianenko-64, pp. 42-43. Some Soviet
economists such as Bukharin and Preobrazhenskii believed that the
development of domestic industry would be impos sible without the
foreign state monopoly, but that the foreign trade monopoly would be
unnecessary when Russian industry had been completely "modernized"
(for Bukharint s view, see Knirsch-59, p. 213).
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resulted in the entire foreign trade apparatus being decentralized the
spring of 1922.12 The principle of the foreign trade monopoly was main-
tained by a licensing system, tariff and custom control at the border,
and its trade delegations abroad, but the actual conduct and the initiative
of foreign trade operations was granted to many various agencies, who
were supposed to be motivated by "self-interest" (i. e., profitability). 13
State trade operations were to be carried out by Gostorg (State Import-
Export Offices) under the general guidance of NKVT; the cooperative
societies (Centrosoiuz) were also permitted (and expected) to engage in
foreign trade operations. In order to mobilize existing skilled personnel
at home and abroad, permission was also granted to other state agencie s,
to foreign firms, and mixed Soviet-foreign firms (in the form of conces-
sions) and to private firms and traders - all with the expectation that
self-interest would lead them to expand exports (as well as imports). 14
Foreign personnel were used extensively in trade delegations and Soviet
" 1 f" b d d h "f R" 1 15commerCIa Irms a roa ue to t e scarCIty 0 usslan personne .
---------_._-----------,_-.........--.~ .............. '------_._-----
12Krasin-28, pp. 103-121, and Carr-58a, pp. 445-447.
13See Carr-52 (pp. 303-309) for the evolution during 1921-23 of
"commercial principles" into "profits II and Khozraschet ("economic
accounting") as a basis for commercial decisions of the Soviet firm or
trusts during 1922 -1927.
14Mishustin-38b, p. 59. The nature of the concession in foreign
trade was export-oriented and imports were kept under tighter state con-
trol (Krasin-28, p. 112). See SUYB-25 (pp. 161-167, 267-278) for a dis-
cussion of the organization of foreign trade in 1923-25. See also Kaufman-
23, p. 265; Kutusov-28, pp. 187-191; SUYB-25, pp. 275, 283-287; Bay-
kov-46, pp. 9-15; and Kaufman-28d, pp. 28-34.
15They even gave special courses to train personnel (Krasin-28,
p. 411). The leading trade delegations and firms were in Germany
(trade delegation), Great Britain (Arcos, a Soviet firm), and the U. S.'
(Amtorg, s Soviet firm). Occasionally, Soviet foreign commercial
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The important ramification of this decentralization of the in-
itiative was that the profits of the import -export operation remained
by and large with the trading organization for their use rather than
accruing to the State. Thus, the government established a system of
import and export duties, which were intended 1) to discourage imports
of goods which could be produced within the USSR and 2) to prevent the
entire profit from import operations (which were very profitable) from
.. 1 h f. 16accruIng entIre y to t e Irm.
The tasks of the foreign trade monopoly as exercised by NKVT
consisted of implementing the planned character of export operations,
to ensure the organized performance of all the export agencies on the
foreign markets (i. e., exercise of monopoly power) so as to prevent
competition and the lack of co -ordination among them, and to attract
f .. l.f .bl 17orelgn capIta 1 pOSSI e.
That is, the principle of the NEP - restoration of trade and
the economy on the base of market relations and the self -interest of
its participants - was also extended to foreign trade, but to a much
more limited sphere of operation, and the policy of permitting other
economic agencies to take the initiative in foreign trade was not
enterprises were built on the framework of institutions remaining from
the Tsarist period, such as the Moscow Narodyni Bank and Centrosoiuz
in Great Britain (SUYB-26, p. 412).
l6See Table T -47 for import tariffs. The 1922 export tariff
was intended to encourage the processing of raw materials and to
divert profit from flax, timber, fur, and similar high profit items
into the State budget (Arvatov-28, p. l7l).
17Krasin-28, p. 114.
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regarded by Krasin as a breach in the foreign trade monopoly. 18
Recovery of f<:>reigntrade 1920 - 1922/23
Foreign trade was the most disrupted sector of the economy
and it recovered more slowly than the rest of the economy, although
this was to be expected because of the initial nature of Soviet export
policy - namely, the export of "exportable surpluses" (Table IV. 1). 19
Expansion of exports was also retarded by the inexperience
and scarcity of personnel within both the domestic and foreign branches
of export network and the inaccessibility of foreign markets for com-
. 1 d' l' 20 I d d h f hmerCIa or IP omahc reasons. mports expan e muc aster t an
exports because of a need for foodstuffs and clothing to combat the
famine of 1921/22, raw materials for industry, and railroad equipment
to restore the transport network. But imports were still insignificant
with re spect to the needs of the economy. Foreign contributions of food
and clothing considerably supplemented government purchases (especially
l8Ibid. , p. 113.
19Krasin-28, p. 173. Its rate of recovery from the almost zero
levels was fastest. But the absolute level of recovery lagged behind the
rest of the economy. Many of the bourgeois traders fled during the Re-
volution, more or less completing the destruction of the foreign trade
network which had begun with the confiscation or expulsion of the German
traders in Russia during World War I (Beable-19, passim).
20
Exports consisted chiefly of hides, furs, flax, timber, and
to a certain degree were based on previously accumulated stocks (Kutu-
sov-28, p. 16). The economic blockade was formally lifted on Janu-
ary 16, 1920 but little significant trade occurred until the signing of
treaties first with the Baltic states in 1920 and then with Great Britain
on March 16, 1921 and with Turkey, Italy, Germany and other countries.
On April 18, 1920 the first imports crossed the Estonian border (Kauf-
man-28d, p. 25).
TABLE IV. 1
177
USSR: RECOVER Y OF THE ECONOMY AND OF FOREIGN TRADE,
1920 - 1924/25
(Percent of 1913)
Index of Index of Index of
Foreign Trade Indexes
Agricultural Agricultural Industrial
(1913 prices)
Exports I ImportsProduction Market Production
( at prices)
(unadjusted for
pre-war territorial losses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1913 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1920 . . 14.6 O. 1 2. 1
1921/22 50. 6 42. 1 21. 6 4. 1 19. 7
1922/23 70.3 61. 7 32.3 8. 8 10. 8
1923/24 73.8 65. 6 44.6 24. 5 17.0
1924/25 73.9 69.2 72.0 24.4 30.7
Source: Notes to Table IV. 1, Appendix B, p. 765.
178
in 1922). 21 These imports were paid for largely with exports of gold and
precious metals and by the end of 1922, the Soviet Union faced its first
foreign reserve crisis due to the impending exhaustion of gold reserves.
The original stock of gold of 1292 million rubles inherited by the Soviet
government in November 1917had been depleted to less than 300 million
22rubles by January 1, 1923. As a consequence, imports were sharply
reduced in 1922/23 (Table IV. 1).23
Foreign trade planning. The foreign trade sector was among
the first sectors of the Soviet economy to be subjected at operational
levels to the principles of central economic planning at both the aggre-
gate and firm levels. This early application of planning in the foreign
trade sector was caused by 1) the ear.ly rapid depletion of Soviet foreign
exchange reserves and slow recovery of export receipts as compared
to the recognized needs of the economy, and 2) the relative ease of con-
trolling the flow of commodities across Soviet borders. The basic prob-
lems of centralized foreign planning were 1) projecting an optimal level
of exports for each commodity, 2) finding means of carrying out the
21Kutusov-28, pp. 13-30. See Carr-52 (pp. 284-285) for de-
scription of the great famine of 1921/22, when the crop failed (espe-
cially in the Volga basin). See League -28a (p. 694) for value of "famine
relief imports in 1921-23.
22Table T -17 and Appendixes D and E.
230ther important factors in the reduction of imports in 1923
were the good harvests in 1922 and 1923 and the initial successes in ex-
panding the output and sale of domestic industrial goods in the fall of
1922. Imports of raw materials increased sharply in 1923 (Kutusov-28,
pp. 24-25). Domestic monetary considerations became an important
factor towards the end of 1923 (Krasin-28, pp. 144-149).
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projected exports, and 3) selecting among the many proposals for
imports - all problems which would be solved otherwise by the market.
Establishing the criteria and finding operable solutions to these ques-
tions were to be continually an overvalued exchange rate and an infla-
tionary budget and monetary policy throughout most of NEP. Despite
the fairly simple requirements to physically restrict the movements
of commodities through the monopoly of foreign trade, the foreign
trade sector was the sector least suitable for economic planning for
the U. S. 'S."R.' due to the uncertainties of world market conditions and
the problems of projecting exports based largely on the output and
marketing of a peasant -dominated, weather - sensitive agricultu re. The
marked economic responses of the peasants to relative prices and vary-
ing incomes complicated the task of planning. The Soviet experience
with foreign trade planning during NEP was not wholly succes sful, e spe-
cially with respect to restoring foreign trade to pre -war levels - but
this lack of success was due to economic factors outside the control of
the foreign trade personnel and foreign trade planners. Indeed, by
1926/27, the planners were relatively successful in drawing up and ful-
filling foreign trade plans. Table T -1 summarizes this evolution of the
annual foreign trade plan for each year and compares actual trade with
planned trade for the pe riod 1922/23 -1927/28.
Foreign Trade Planning 1~..!.:1923
The first foreign trade "plans" drawn up in late 1921 and 1922
were only of an "approximate indicative character" and were based on
existing export stocks and the occasional collection of exports, while
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the import plan was based on submitted lists without any "mutual agree-
ment or connection with the rest of the economy. ,,24 These early
"plans" lacked the essential aspects of planning - namely systematic
estimates of future demands and supplies within the economy - and
served chiefly as a guide for current operations. Only part of the regu-
latory system for enforcing the plan was existant in this period - the
customs houses and licensing system inherited from the previous govern-
ment - but a trade network to take the initiative and the responsibility
for carrying out the plans was still in the process of being reconstructed.
Plan and foreign trade in 1922/23
The major factors affecting foreign trade in 1922/23 was the
moderately good harvest, the continuing recovery or industry and trans-
port, and the exhaustion of foreign reserves - the last was instrumental
in the planned cutback in imports.
The export plan for 1922/23 was set at 228 million ruble s in
current prices, which was more than double the exports of 1921/22.
25
24Sobolev-26a, p. 65 and Kaufman-29g, pp. 11and 12. Kauf-
man -2 9g (p. 12, n. 1 and n. 2) noted that the "fir st import -export plan"
(turnover? imports? exports?) was drawn up by the "Committee for
Foreign Trade" for 809 million rubles in 1921; later on this plan was re-
duced and according to the final draft, purchases were limited to the
level of 330 million rubles. "The export plan for 1920-21 was set at
110million rubles. It had been decreed to release to NKVT export goods
for this sum, but the plan turned out to be exaggerated, for the goods
for export during the year turned out to be only 16 million rubles. "
Krasin-28 (p. 398) also discus se s the early import plans.
25Krasin-28, pp. 141-142. Krasin-28 (p. 173) also referred to
an export plan of 208 million rubles for 1922/23 and noted that it was
exceeded by 1. 1%.
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The import plan was set at 162 million rubles in current prices so that
a trade surplus of about 66 million rubles was planned. 26
Actual exports (European borders only) were roughly 210 mil-
lion rubles in current prices so that the export plan (for European
borders) was roughly 92% fulfilled. 27 Exports of individual items de-
viated considerably from the plan; some grain exports were already
made toward the end of 1922 in order to stem the fall in grain prices
and to build up the foreign currency reserves of the State Bank. 28 In
1922/23 exports - especially flax - were extremely profitable from
the viewpoint of the exporting firm when the export receipts in foreign
exchange were converted into rubles at the current exchange rate. 29
That is, in 1922/23 exports were commercially profitable for the ex-
porting agency - the importance of commercial profitability of export,
as a criteria and motivating force for export operations is discus sed
below. Imports were almost cut in half but exceeded the import plan
by 15% so that the trade surplus was only 23 million rubles instead of
66 million ruble s.
As seen in Table IV. 1, foreign trade lagged far behind the re st
of the economy in 1922/23.
26
Engeev-27b, p. 119.
27 h "dSee footnote above, however, for ot er eVl ence.
28Carr-54, p. 7.
29Aizenberg -62, pp. 241-42.
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CHAPTER V
THE FIRST GOOD YEAR 1923/24: GRAIN EXPORTS
Factors influencing the 1923/24 foreign trade plan
The 1923/24 foreign trade plan was strongly influenced by a
good 1923 harvest in Russia, the "scissors crisis, " and the need for a
trade surplus to accumulate foreign reserves for the monetary reform. 1
The grain export plan and the "scissors crisis. " The 1923
grain harvest exceeded the 1922 grain harvest by about 33%. The har-
vest was considered sufficiently large to resume large -scale grain ex-
ports, even though the 1923 harvest was still below 1913 levels (Table T-
8). In fact, the favorable harvest had further accelerated the decline
of domestic grain prices. The widening "scissors" between low agricul-
tural prices and high industrial prices during the summer and autumn of
of 1923 was threatening the recovery of agriculture, for the peasants
reduced grain marketings and re stricted the expansion of sown area. 2
lThe Soviet term "scissors" is based on the graph of falling
agricultural prices and the graph of rising individual prices relative to
their 1913 relationship during 1922-1923 (see next note). The term "scis-
Sor s" referred to the shift of terms of trade of agricultural products
sold by the peasant for manufactured or industrial products from their
relatively favorable relationship in 1922 to a very unfavorable relation-
ship by September 1923. See text below. An "opening of the scissors"
referred to a worsening of the terms of trade for agricultural products
relative to manufactured products. See references in next footnote.
2Dobb -28, pp. 222 -245, especially p. 233 and the chart on page
222 which is based on figures estimated by S. Strumilin, Na khoziaist-
vennom fronte, nd. Discussion here centers only on the relatlonsnlp-
between the T'scissors crisis" and foreign trade policy. The "scissors
crisis" and its cause 5 have been thoroughly discus sed by Carr -54,
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The resumption of grain exports was planned in part because it would
help raise the grain prices (a policy advocated by Krasin and Kondra-
tiev). 3 Furthermore, resuming grain exports would greatly expand
total exports and would permit an otherwise impossible increase in
imports of consumer goods which could be used to compete down the
prices of domestically manufactured consumer goods (i. e., a policy
of "imported goods intervention. ") Grain exports would therefore be
a means to close the "scissors" from both sides. The important aspect
of the "scissors crisis of 1923, " however, was that the high industrial
prices were not caused by excess demand - in fact, inventories were
growing - but rather by a cost-push on prices (from labor) and an in-
creasing exercise of monopolistic power of the syndicates trying to
maximize profits. 4 Thus, the additional demand from higher grain
pp. 3-118, Dobb-28, pp. 222-272, and Baykov-47, p. 56.
3The large margin between domestic and foreign grain prices
in the fall of 1923 would permit an increase in domestic prices without
impairing the commercial profitability of grain exports (Table T -43).
Krasin described the perspective grain exports for 1923/24 in
a long article published in the August-October 1923, issue of Sotsiali?ti-
~heskoe khoziaistvo reprinted in Krasin-28, pp. 184-196. He emphasized
the importance of resuming grain exports as a means of increasing dom-
estic grain prices, and strengthening the smychka (link) between the
peasantry and workers (Krasin-28, p. 185). He also mentioned that the
abnormally high overhead expenditures would have to be cut in order to
permit an increase in domestic prices and that all grain should be sold
through a grain monopoly (Eksportkhleb) to prevent competition on
foreign markets by the many gram-collecting organizations in operation
in 1923/24 (Krasin-28, p. 192). See Dobb-28, pp. 233 and 241 for Kon-
dratiev reference.
4The causes of rising industrial prices were widely debated by
Soviet economists (Dobb -28, pp. 221-225). A distinctive feature of the
"scissors crisis" was a sales crisis in September of 1923 when domestic
enterprises were unable to dispose of their stocks at the high prices and
stocks began to accumulate (Dobb-28, pp. 234-239, p. 270). Thus,
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prices would not result in further inflationary pressure. This "accumu-
1ation of inventories" distinguishes the "scissors crisis of 1923" from
the reopening of the "scissors" during the "goods famines" which pre-
vailed during 1925-28. For while the symptoms were similar, the
causes were not.
The trade surplus and the monetary reform of 1922 -24. The
forcing of a trade surplus was an important constraint in drawing up
the foreign trade plan in 1922/23 and 1923/24 because an accumulation of
gold and other foreign reserves was presumed to be essential for the
monetary reform of 1922 -24, which wa s being dire cted by Sokolnikov,
Commissar of Finance. 5 The main pillars of his monetary stabilization
policy we;re balancing the budget, re strictive credit policy, and the ac-
cumulation of foreign reserves to serve as "firm cover" for the issue of
various economists, such as Ossinsky and Piatakov, advocated a policy
of "limited goods intervention, " "partial importation from abroad of
goods which we lack and of those of which the price has particularly in-
creased" (Dobb-28, p. 255 reporting Ossinsky's position at the end of
1923). It was the threat of competition from imports as well as the pre-
sence of imports on domestic markets which would affect domestic prices.
Rykov agreed that the goods unavailable domestically should be imported,
but he disagreed with the policy of importing goods which were stocked
in warehouses and instead he proposed other means for lowering indus-
trial price s (Dobb -28, p. 270).
5EIKSSSR, pp. 43 -45. Krasin-28 (p. 145) argued that the mone-
tary reform required foreign reserves in the hands of the State Bank and
that this was only possible through an active trade balance. See Krasin's
article "The Monetary Reform and the Trade Balance" in Vneshniaia
TorgovliaJNo. 9-10 (March 19, 1924), reprinted in Krasin-28, pp. 144-
155. See Arnold-36 (pp. 200-243) for a discussion of the monetary re-
form and Carr-52 (pp. 350-359) for discussion of this monetary reform
based on traditional early twentieth century monetary theory.
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6chervonets currency. A large trade surplus, it was thought, at the
time, would stabilize the chervonets on the domestic foreign exchange-------
markets and facilitate the hoped-for introduction of the chervonets on
foreign money markets and the attraction of foreign loans and capital. 7
Soko1nikov's proposals for monetary reform were attached by
the so-called "opposition, " which included Trotsky, Piatakov, Ossinsky,
and Preobrazhensky. The policy of a trade surplus was especially con-
demned by Ossinsky in December, 1923 who thought it was wrong for
Russia to "allow herself the luxury of spending means for the transition
from banknotes to metal currency." Such resources should be used for
"productive purposes" and the abstract slogan of a "positive trade bal-
ance" should be replaced by a policy of "goods intervention. ,,8 It was
6See Appendix A, Technical Note 1, pp. 701 ff.
7Engeev-27b (pp. 119-120) referred to a directive to NKVT at
the end of 1922 to achieve a favorable trade balance for the accumulation
of foreign reserves for the monetary reform. The export receipts in ex-
cess of expenditure were to be used to import large quantities of silver
and silver coinage from abroad.
The chervonets is sued by the State Bank first in the fall of 1922
was to be backed by at least 25% "firm cover" of gold, silver, platinum,
and stable foreign currency. Although it was inifially accepted by the
peasant and others, by the end of 1923 its purchasing power was beginning
to decline; it was also quoted at a discount on the domestic "free exchange
market." The proposals for stabilizing the chervonets were traditional
monetary orthodoxy - balance the budget, reStrIct credits, and run a
trade surplus to accumulate gold. The orthodoxy went so far as to con-
sider the re -establishment of the ruble on foreign money markets as a
desirable goal and actually took steps to introduce and support t~e cher ____
vonets on foreign money markets (Aizenberg -62, p. 31 and KrasIn-ZS"; p.
150). The final conversion from the rapidly depreciating Soviet cur-
rency (Sovznak) to the stabilized chervonets was effected in the spring
of 1924 fArnoId-36, pp. 211-220). -----
8Adapted from Dobb-28, p. 256.
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under similar circumstances in January, 1924 that Piatakov made his
famous remark about the "active trade balance policy" of the Com-
missariat of Finance: "we need not gold but the quickening of our indus-
try, and this we cannot do by piling up gold in the hands of comrades
Sokolnikov and Sheinman. ,,9 Their argument against a trade surplus
was valid, for increasing imports would exert a downward pressure
on prices by increasing aggregate supply and competing in specific
areas. 10 Neither Piatakov and as sinsky, however, seemed to under-
stand that a trade surplus was also inflationary from a monetary policy
viewpoint, because under the traditional rules of banking adopted for
the Soviet State Bank, expansion of the "firm cover" would allow an
expansion of the note issue and of credit unless action was taken to
affect the monetary impact of gold imports. In this particular period
of Soviet monetary history, however, it can be strongly argued that the
accumulation of foreign reserves as backing for the new note issue had
a very important deflationary effect'because of the psychological effect
of a trade surplus, issue of silver coins, and increases in the gold
stock on the willingness of the peasant and trader to hold and hoard
larger amounts of paper currency. In addition, these traditional signs
of fiscal responsibility (a trade surplus and a balanced budget) might
encourage foreign capital ists to inve st in Soviet concessions and to
finance Soviet foreign trade operations. Both these factors would have
---.--------------.-------. ,------.----,----------
9Adapted from Dobb -28, p. 258.
10Recall that industrial firms and trusts were by and large cut
off the government budget and were instructed to make a "profit" opera-
ting in a market place, so that these firms were relatively autonomous
from government in production and price - setting.
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had a deflationary influence. 11 Arnold's discussion of the monetary re-
form suggests that Soviet monetary authorities placed great importance
on the symbolic value of the "firm cover" requirement in winning recog-
nition of the chervonets_ as well as in its eventual role in preventing ex-
ces sive expansion of the money supply to finance budget deficits. 12
The gold parity of the chevronets. 13 The gold parity of the cher-
vonets ruble was set equal to the gold parity of the Tsarist ruble and the
parity exchange rates calculated accordingly. 14 On the basis of relative
wholesale prices in 1923, the re-establishment of the ruble at pre-19l4
parity probably did not initially overvalue the ruble, for Soviet wholesale
prices (especially of agricultural goods) stood considerably lower than
those of major industrial countries and exports of Soviet products were
profitable in 1923/24.15
llAccording to Strumilin, the velocity of the circulation of the
sovznaks (Soviet paper currency) was four times as high as the chervon-
ets (Ekon. Zhizn., March 30, 1924 as cited in Arnold-36, p. 2f2~---
Krasin was a particularly staunch proponent of the concessions policy
and in January, 1924 advocated liberalizing the concessions policy and
sought to get a 300 -500 million ruble foreign loan (Dobb -28, pp. 257-
258). See also Krasin's 1925 brochure on the necessity of foreign loans
reprinted in Krasin-28, pp. 354-373.
l2Arnold-36, pp. 200-243.
l3See Aizenberg-62, Chapter IV, for a discussion of the gold
parity of the ruble.
l4Appendix A, Technical Note 1.
15Compare Tables T - 37, and T -43 through T -46. The tables
in Aizenberg-62 (p. 236) illustrated this point. The term "overvalued"
is used loosely in this context and I do not mean to imply that the ex-
change rate established in 1922 and 1923 was an "equilibrium exchange
rate" which would have re suited in a balance of payments equilibrium
under free trade. The ruble was not overvalued only in the sense that
most if not all of the traditional Russian exports were profitable at the
new exchange rate.
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The 1923/24 foreign trade plan
The foreign trade plan drawn up by Gosplan and NKVT for 1923/
24 was based directly on the proj ected exportable commodity surpluses
and amount of trade surplus required for the monetary reform; the import
plan, influenced strongly by raw material requirements of industry, was
drawn up within these constraints. The original plan was approved on
September 7, 1923 (i. e. , before the beginning of the economic year) and
projected exports at greater than 500 million rubles, or about two and
one -half times 1922/23 exports.
Imports were projected at between 300 and 350 million rubles
which implied a trade surplus of 150-200 million rubles. 16 The foreign
trade plan, however, was twice revised and reapproved (February 15,
1924 and June 2, 1924); the final revised export plan was set at 429 mil-
lion rubles, more than double 1922/23 exports, but lower than the orig-
inal projections for exports. Imports were set at 334 million rubles,
about 80% above 1922/23 levels. The projected trade surplus was about
94 million rubles.
The structure of the 1923/24 export plan in current price s
(shown in Table V. 1)was remarkably similar to the pre-1914 exports.
According to Sobolev, both the estimates of the supply, marketing and
dome stic demand for exportable products (i. e. the "exportable surplus-
es")' and also the projected export structure relied heavily on pre-1914
----.--------.--.---------------.----.-----
16Kutusov-28 (p. 38) implied that the proj ected trade surplus
of the first plan was 122 million rubles, while in the second plan, the
plan surplus was reduced to 94 million rubles.
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TABLE V. 1
USSR: EXPOR T PLAN AND EXPOR TS ACROSS
ALL BORDERS, 1923/24
(thousands of rubles)
Plan Fulfillment Structure
Name of Value Value Percent % of total
Commodity [000 rubles 1000 rubles fulfillment exp~rts
G roup current current according 1923/24
prices prices to value Plan Actual
I. agricultural products 243,200 248,839 102.3 56.7 47.6
(including grain,
flax, hemp)
II. timbe r and wood 57,000 71,322 125.1 13. 3 13. 6
distillation
products
III. fur s and fish 37,000 53,867 145. 6 8. 6 10. 3
products
IV. animal and poultry 23,200 49,971 215. 3 5. 4 9. 6
products
V. foodstuffs and 11, 150 12,446 111.6 2. 6 2.4
confectionary
VI. mining products 37,074 54,212 143.3 8. 6 10.4
(including oil
products, man-
ganese ore)
II. manufactur ed 9,890 9,538 96.3 2. 3 1.8
articles
III. other products 10,236 22,440 219.2 2.4 4.3
TOTAL EXPOR TS 428,750 522,635 121.9 00.0 100. 0
v
V
Source: Notes to Table V.l, Appendix B, p. 766.
190
experience.17 More than 70% of total planned exports consisted of the
so-called "agricultural exports" (including furs and fish) and over half
were accounted for by the major export crops - grain, flax, hemp
(compare Tables V. land T-4). 18 The most noticeable changes were
the larger share of fur exports (due to relatively higher prices) and
oil exports. Krasin reported an intere sting comparison of what appear s
to be the estimated "exportable surpluses," output, and the actual exports
for 1923/24 (Table V. 2). The shares of "exportable surplus" (export
resources) in 1923/24 output of major export goods as calculated by
Soviet economists were below the pre-l9l4 shares (except for butter),
but this is not surprising because output in 1923/24 was below pre-1914
levels for most major export goods (Column 6 of Table V. 2). As far
as can be determined, the relationship between foreign and domestic
prices had little influence on the 1923/24 export plan which was based
largely on these estimates of the exportable surplus of the traditional
Russian exports. It was implicitly assumed both that exports would be
sufficiently profitable to encourage the fulfillment of the plan and that
the export plan could be fulfilled without undesired inflationary impact
on individual commodity markets. Judging from actual 1923/24 imports,
the 1923/24 import plan resembled the pre -1914 structure much less than
---_._-----,---------
17Sobolev-26a, p. 66. The Soviet concept of "exportable sur-
plus" and its role in early export planning are discussed in Chapter VII,
p. 228.
l8See Appendix A, Technical Note 4 for Soviet definitions of
agricultural products and industrial products during this period.
TABLE V. 2
USSR: ESTIMATED EXPOR TABLE SURPLUSES AND
ACTUAL EXPORTS IN 1923/24
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domestic surplus actual export export
Commodity units output demand (export export as % as %resource 1923/24 resourcE output
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
grain products 1000rn t. 45,898 42,638 3,260 3,096 95.0 6. 7
flax 1000m. t 139 100 39 34 87.5 24.4
fur 1000rbl. 983 98 885 819 92.6 83.3
timber OOOrn t. 2,031 2,031 2,031 100.0 [100.0]
(export)
oil OOOm. t. 5,995 4,783 1,245 713 57. 2 11.9
butter 1000m.t. 32.76 13.10 19.66 19.62 99.8 59.9
(export)
eggs millions 3,300 2,880 420 349 83. 1 10.6
bristles m. t. 118 12 106 77 72.3 65. 3
horsehair ffi. t. 139 8 131 139 106.3 106. 1
average % 88.2
average % 92. 1
(without oil)
Source: Notes to Table V. 2, Appendix B, p. 766.
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the export plan (Table T -7). Imports of raw materials for the consum-
ers I goods industrie s - cotton, wool, leather, dyes, tanning materials -
predominated. The share of consumer goods for mas s consumption -
despite the announced policy of "limited goods intervention" - were insig-
nificant. Import of transport equipment for the re storation of the ra il-
roads continued (because of the lag between ordering and delivery) but
imports of luxury goods (because of official policy) and industrial equip-
ment (because of excess capacity) were relatively smalL
Criteria for import planning. During NEP and the interwar
period, the demand for imports continually exceeded the import capacity
of the USSR (as determined by available export receipts and credits).
After meeting several obvious early priorities for imports (restoration
of the railway system and food imports during the 1921-22 famine), the
economic criteria for choosing among the many competing demands for
imports became less clear. With the exception of restricting the import
of luxury goods for social purposes, no distinct sectoral prioritie shad
emerged by mid-NEP on the political level and the economic advisers
were expecting a full recovery of all sectors; thus, the "priority-sector"
decision criteria for selecting imports had not yet evolved. One charac-
teristic of Soviet import demand during NEP, however, became quite
pronounced from the very beginning. Namely, Soviet firms and trading
agencies tried to order many foreign products because of lower prices
at the official exchange rate (even including tariffs) and because of qual-
ity difference s, even though similar products could be produced with
domestic raw materials in domestic factories with excess capacity.
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Given the excess demand for imports, which indicated the exchange rate
was overvalued from the viewpoints of establishing a balance of payments
equilibrium, Krasin in the NKVT established a policy of discouraging
imports of products which could be produced using dome stic raw materials
in (existing?) domestic factor s, so as to permit larger imports of those
products, especially raw materials, for which no alternative sources
were immediately available. 19 This was not a rejection of the theory of
comparative costs but a re sponse to an overvalued exchange rate and to
what was hopefully a short-run disequilibrium. Krasin implied that
searching out domestic production possibilities for requested imports
was a more rational way of restricting imports than an acros s -the -board
cut in imports, and at the time (1924), this policy of NKVT was not
d' l' d 'fl " t d 0 0 20 Tho I' flrect yalme at In uenclng Inve stmen eClslons. IS po ICY0
19Krasin-28, p. 214. The alternative policy of raising import
tariffs across the board could have been used, and, indeed, tariffs were
raised several times during the NEP, but the increase was never suffi-
cient to completely choke off excess demand for imports. The disadvant-
ages of across-the -board tariff increases from the Soviet viewpoint was
that some Soviet industries required more tariff protection than others
(heavy industry) which simple non-discriminating tariff increases would
not provide. Furthermore, overt tariff increases caused difficulties in
negotiating foreign commercial treaties. Selective issuance of import
licenses quietly as sured protection - but only at the cost of disrupting
the information and rationing functions of the price system. On the other
hand, my impression is that Soviet import demand, especially for so-
called "producers' goods, " was rather price inelastic even in the early
NEP and became even less price -elastic as the NEP proceeded because
of the perpetual shortage of finished goods and increasing emphasis on
output rather than profit.
20Krasin-28, p. 214. Indirectly it influenced investment deci-
sion in the long run by reducing excess capacity in various industries and
possibly influencing the return on capital. (especially in heavy industry
which had always relied on tariff protection in pre -1914 Rus sian). In
1924, excess capacity existed so that it was a matter of using the capital
stock more intensely, that is, moving out toward the edge of the produc-
tion possibility curves, rather than moving along it or shifting it outward.
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"discovering domestic possibilities" within the existing productive cap-
acity became an important criteria of import planning. The emphasis
on developing new types or additional productive capacity to satisfy the
demand for imported products began to emerge only in 1925.
Fulfillment of the 1923/24 foreign trade plan21
The 1923/24 export plan was fulfilled satisfactorily in most
major aspects. The final revised (lower) export plan was exceeded by
22% and even the initial-higher export plan was exceeded by a consid-
erable margin. Despite efforts to hold down imports to the planned
levels, the revised import plan was exceeded by 23%. Because of the
overfulfillment of the export plan, however, a large trade surplus of
84 million rubles achieved, which permitted a large increase in foreign
exchange holdings and substantial imports of gold and silver (Table T -16).
Actual exports are compared to planned exports in Table V. 1.
The export plan was exceeded for non-crop products (furs, timber, oil
products, butter, and eggs) whose actual exports (in value) exceeded
planned exports by 25 -155% because of higher than expected foreign
prices (especially for furs, animal products, and oil products) and the
rapid recovery of the output of butter and eggs. The relationship of
actual exports to estimated export reserves is shown in Table V. 2. The
outstanding aspect of this table is that actual exports - with the excep-
tion of oil products - were close to estimated export reserves.
--------_._--_..........--.~.,----~-----..............-......--- ..................... ---........---------
2lPlan fulfillment figures in this section are from Table T-1.
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Kutusov described exports as returning to their "normal struc-
ture" in 1923/24 - that is, to the pre-19l4 structures. 22 The success in
expanding exports (much faster than the rest of the economy in 1923/24)
and the realization of a large trade surplus almost according to plan
raised expectations about quickly re storing foreign trade to pre -1914
levels and structure and strongly influenced the five -year plan for foreign
trade (drawn up in early 1924) and subsequent annual plans.
The structure of Soviet exports. Soviet statisticians usually
classified exports as originating either in agriculture or in industry,
but their classification system was inadequate for some purposes. Agri-
cultural products included fur and fish as well as most crop products.
Sugar and other so-called processed food products, however, were con-
sidered to be industrial goods. 23 According to this Soviet definition,
agricultural exports made 69.7 of total exports in 1923/24 as compared
to 74. 0% in 1913 (Table T -4). An alternative analytical c1as sification is
agricultural products (excluding fur and fish, but including sugar and
vegetable oil), fur and fish industries, timber and minerals and "other"
(manufacturing). In this adjusted clas sification scheme, agricultural ex-
ports strictly defined equalled 61. 9%, as compared to 750/0in 1913. This
alternative clas sification of agricultural-dependent exports is presented
22Kutusov-28, pp. 30, 35.
23See Appendix A, Technical Note 4.
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in Table T -19. 24
Grain exports in 1923/24.25 The most striking development in
1923/24 was the resumption of moderately large -scale grain exports on
the basis of only a fair -to-good harvest of 1923 just two years after the
famine of 1920-22. 26 Exports of grain products were 2. 7 million ffi. t.
in 1923/24 as compared to average annual exports of 12 million m. t. in
1909-1913 (Table T _9).27 This resumption of grain exports accounted
for a large part of the increase in total exports over 1922/23 levels and
equalled about 37% of exports in 1923/24 (and about 39% in 1913).
The level of grain export is surprising, because the 1923 gross
harvest and the per capita harvest was only 80% of the average harvest
in 1909-13 (Table T-8). 28 In 1909-13 about 12% of the average annual
24Another clas sification of Soviet exports considered for this
study was "exports produced or dependent on peasant labor. These would
include all agricultural products or agricultural-based products, all fur
(hunting or fur -breeding was done by peasants), much fish products
(during the NEP at least) and some timber (timber was often hauled from
the forests by the peasants). This classification would emphasize even
more the dependence of Soviet export on peasant labor.
25See Appendix A, Technical Note 6 for a precise description
of the terminology used in analyzing Soviet grain exports; the four major
bread grains (wheat, oats, rye, barley); cereal grains; ~rain-1?r~Eucts
(including cereal grain, flour, prans, lentils); and grain and relatecrpro-
ducts (including oil seed, oil cake).
26Already in late 1922 grain exports were resumed on an experi-
mental basis (see above).
27Unadjusted for territorial change, but recall from Chapter III
that the separated territories were net importers of 'grain from the rest
of Russia.
28The population in 1923/24 and 1909-13 was roughly the same,
so that per capita output of grains in 1923 was also roughly 80% of 1909-
13 per capita output of grains (Table T -48).
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gros s harve st was exported, so that according to an "exportable sur-
plus" theory of export planning insignificant grain exports would be
expected. Nevertheless, 4% of the crop and 27% of total marketed
grain was exported in 1923/24.
Why were Soviet grain exports resumed in 1923/ 24? First,
the resumption of grain exports was a deliberate effort to increase
domestic grain prices in 1923/24, and about 50% of procurements by
"planned agencies" were exported during the 1923/24 (AY) - in subse-
quent years, the official policy was aimed at restraining the increase
in prices. 29 Second, grain deficit areas and towns were supplied with
grain by both the state I'planned" agencies, private traders, and others,
so that the state was operationally responsible for grain supply only to
the military. Third, the demand for livestock feed for livestock was
less because of the loss of livestock (especially horses) (Table T-49).
These factors were absent in subsequent years.
The recovery of grain exports with only a moderately good
harvest caused great optimism about the recovery of grain exports in
the near future. For example, Oganovskii, writing in early 1925 pre-
dieted that grain product exports would reach 3-4 million tons in 1925/
26 and not less than 5 million tons in 1926/27 under favorable harvest
and market conditions and 70% of pre-19l4 levels within five years. 30
29Kutusov-28, p. 31.
300ganovskii-25, p. 77. Grain product exports were about 12
million m. t. in 1909-13. It is not clear from context if Oganovskii IS
prediction of 115years for the restoration of grain export" was from
1923/24 or 1925.
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But this level of 1923/24 grain product exports - either in vol-
ume or value - was not reached again during the NEP, even though
both harvests and marketing exceeded 1923/24 levels (Tables T-8 and
T-3). This failure of grain exports to recover to pre-19l4 levels was
to be a major problem in foreign trade during NEP (Chapter XI).
Price and profitability. The operation of foreign trade during
the mid-twenties initially relied partially on the initiative of profit-
seeking economic enterprises - from Gostorg and the co-operatives
(Centrosoiuz, etc.) to the foreign concessions in timber, mining, and
trade. These organizations were supposed to cover their costs and
to make a profit rather than to rely on budget subsidies. That is - the
system was not to rely directly or indirectly on export subsidies.
Furthermore, because many of these enterprises had the right to sell
on both domestic and foreign markets, the decision to export depended
not only on the relationship between domestic costs and foreign prices,
but also on the relationship between domestic and foreign sale prices
because of the "opportunity costs" to the firm of shipping to the les s
profitable market. 31
Exports remained profitable both with respect to cost and
domestic price despite increases in domestic procurement prices of
major export products during 1923/24 (Tables T-43 - T-46). In the
case of flax and furs the profit margin was sufficient to require export
31See SUYB-25 (pp. 276-277) for a description of "organiza-
tions conducting foreign trade in the USSR. 'I See EIKSSSR, pp. 631-
659 for a description of the operation of foreign trade before November,
1925. See EIKSSSR, pp. 561-563 for a description of the profitability
of foreign trading concessions in 1924-25.
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tariffs and export quotas to prevent glutting foreign markets and to
d t 1 t th d t"" d 32ensure an a equa e supp y 0 e omes 1C1n ustry. This tradi-
tional concept that exports should be commercially profitable (at
least compared to cost) at the current exchange rates - even if at
the moment they were not - persisted throughout the mid-1920's as
part of the prevailing views about the desirability of price stability
and procurement price policy decisions made on the basis of main-
taining export profitability exerted additional downard pressure on
agricultural prices and severely retarded the growth of exports of
" d 33certaln pro ucts.
Imports
The excessive fulfillment of the 1923/24 import plan by almost
one-third was only the first of many "excessive fulfillments" of import
plans during the 1920Is. The reasons for exceeding the import plan in
1923/24 have not been determined. Above-plan issuances of licenses
were probably permitted when the magnitude of the overfulfillment of
the export plan became known. Increases in the price of major Soviet
import items in 1923/24 - cotton, wool, leather -may have contributed.
There is little evidence that the policy of large-scale goods interven-
tion was responsible for the above-plan imports, for imports of con-
sumers' and agricultural producers' goods were still relatively ilisig-
nificant in 1923/24 (Table T-7).
32
Arvatov-28, p. 171 and EIKSSSR, pp. 235 and 352/70-81.
33See below, Chapter VIII, p. 297 ff.
200
Structure of Soviet imports. According to the then conventional
Soviet classification, 83% of total imports were "producers' goods" and
only 14%were consumers' goods (Table T -7). 34 Similar figures for 1913
were 64% for producers' goods, and 28% for consumers' goods (7% un-
allocated), so that the 1923/24 import structure emphasized producers'
goods more heavily than before 1914. This heavy emphasis on producers'
goods was regarded by Soviet economists as a more rational and socially-
desirable use of export receipts for it indicated (to them) that more of
the processing was done within Russia and that little roskosh (luxury
items) were imported (which indicated to them that the benefits of
imports were accruing to all of society rather than to the wealthy
classes). 35 The reduced importance of machinery imports in 1923/24
was recognized as being the result of much excess capacity existing in
this period. Soviet imports in 1923/24 were simply dominated by raw
material imports (70%) required to restore import -dependent industries
(textile, leather, non-ferrous).
The concept of "consumption-oriented imports. An alternative
method of classifying imports would be according to their final use as
determined through an input-output table. This would enable us to deter-
mine to what extent imports were used directly or indirectly to satisfy
34Appendix A, Technical Note 4 describe s the conventional
classification of imports and exports used for planning in the 1920's.
35In 1913 a large amount (both in value and share) of common
goods consisted of items purchased by and large by the wealthier urban
classes and landlords and included items such as fur pieces, silks and
fine cloth, wines, mineral water, jewelry, etc.
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the needs of the consumer, or investment, or government. A simpli-
fied version of this classification method has been attempted here -
a distribution of imports simply between "consumer -oriented use s"
and "other uses" (including investment) on the basis of rough estimates
of the final use of the product produced by the industries receiving the
imported raw material or semi-processed good. Basically, cotton and
wool fibers, leather, hides, dyes, tanning agents, manufactured consumer
goods and foodstuffs were clas sified as consumers I goods. All machin-
ery, most ferrous products, and fuels were classified as "other" goods.
Rubber and some non-ferrous metals could be classified partly as con-
sumers' goods and partly as "other" goods. The reclassification of
Soviet imports according to "final use" is presented in Table T -18. The
most interesting result of this reclassification is that most imports
during NEP were destined either directly or indirectly for the use of the
consumer. In 1923/24, 670/0of imports were indirectly or directly des-
tined for the consumer as compared to 600/0in 1913. In fact, imports
of raw materials and semi-processed materials for light industry domin-
ated imports during NEP. In contrast, the Soviet method of classifying
imports into producer's goods (goods used for further processing or in-
vestment) and consumers' goods (foodstuffs and manufactured consumers'
goods) does not reveal this rather remarkable orientation of Soviet
imports to consumer demand during most of NEP, when imports of con-
sumer s' goods per ~ (foodstuffs and manufactured consumer goods)
were rather small (especially in 1923/24 and 1926/27).
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Terms of trade
Soviet trade statistics were entered only in 1913prices in 1923/
24 so price indexes (based on unit values) could not be extended back to
1923/24. 36 All indications are that the terms of trade for the basket of
goods bought in 1923/24 were less favorable than before 1914.37
Balance of payments favorable in 1923/24. No estimates are
available for the Soviet balance of payments for 1923/24. It was prob-
able, however, that invisible trade imports (interest, technical aid,
repatriation of conces sionary profits) were quite insignificant, so that
the trade surplus of 94 million rubles also resulted in a balance of pay-
ment surplus - the only balance of payment surplus during 1923/24-1930/
31. 38 Foreign reserve holdings (as of January 1, 1925) rose to 445-
540 million rubles - the highest point during the NEP - and much gold
and silver was imported in 1924 (Tables T-14, T-16, and T-17).
Foreign commercial trade credits were also becoming available
on a modest scale so that 78 million rubles of very short-term debt had
been accumulated by October 1, 1924 (Table T -15).
3~Appendix A, Technical Note 2 and Appendix F.
37Based on comparisons of the ratio of the value of exports in
current and 1913prices to the ratio of the value of imports in current
and 1913prices as presented in Table T-13.
38T able T -14.
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CHAPTER VI
FIRST PERSPECTIVE PLAN FOR FOREIGN TRADE
1923/24 - 1927/28
Perspective Plan for recovery of Soviet
foreign trade 1923/24 - 1927/28
In early 1924 Gosplan under the guidance of Groman drew up the
first perspective five-year plan for foreign trade during 1923/24-1927/
28. 1 This perspective plan showed that Gosplan in 1924 expected to re-
construct Soviet foreign trade (particularly exports) along pre-l9l4 pat-
terns. The vast difference between planned and actual developments in
foreign trade during NEP suggests that the actual developments in foreign
trade during the "restoration period 1923/24 - 1927/28" influenced the
design of the 1st FYP (1928/29-1932/33) and was partly responsible for
the 1st FYP's emphasis on planned import substitution, on industrializa-
tion, and on planned export expansion in non-agricultural sectors.
The export plan for 1923/24 -1927/28 wa s ba sed on the principle
of restoring exports along the pattern of pre-19l4 Russian exports and
in the maximum variant, Soviet exports were to attain pre-1914 levels
of 1928. 2
1Varga-32, p. 99. The following discussion is largely based on
Baksht-28.
2Baksht-28 didn't mention if the projection was in "constant II
pre -1914 prices or in current prices.
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As for the 1923/24 plan, estimates of exports for the perspec-
tive plan (and especially for agricultural exports) relied heavily on pre-
1914 economic relationships (especially marketing ratios and domestic
demand).3 As a result, the planned export structure for the entire
five-year period was similar to the structure of exports for Tsarist
Russia during 1909-1913 (Table VI. 1). In particular, the planned share
of total exports attributed to grain products in the period 1923/24-1927/
28 was almost identical (49%) to the share of grain products in pre -1914
exports. Some important changes in export structure were projected -
a decrease in the proposed share of lum.ber, sugar, and "other"
(butter, eggs, bacon, etc.), and an increase in the share of oil pro-
ducts, flax, and furs relative to 1909-13. This export structure and
its modifications merely reflected the export structures evolving in
1923 and early 1924 in which furs and oil exports already exceeded pre-
1914 levels in value, while forest products and sugar exports lagged far
4behind the general recovery.
In line with the ideological climate of 1932, R. Anders (in
Varga-32, p. 94) denounced this plan of "mechanically restoring ex-
ports according to the structure of the foreign trade in Tsarist Russia"
as a "counter -revolutionary" attempt by Groman which utterly failed.
The plan was drawn up in a maximum and minimum variant.
Little is known about the details of the yearly plans making up this per-
spective plan.
3Sobolev-26a, p. 66. Baksht-28, p. 31 criticized these
authors for failing to take into account the basic socio-economic
changes produced by the revolution when estimating peasant and urban
consum.ption.
4Anders (in Varga-32, p. 99) in 1932 unjustly accused Gosplan
of projecting "unbelievable levels" of timber, butter, and flax exports,
and of underestimating the importance of fur, oil, and "secondary ex-
ports. "
TABLE VI. 1
USSR: GOSPLAN I S FIVE YEAR PLAN FOR EXPOR TS 1923/24 - 1927/28
(minimum variant)
Annual Averages Five Year Totals 1923/24
-
1927/28
Actual Plan Actual Percent
Yearly Av. 0/0 Total 1923/24to 0/0 Total 1923/24 to 0/0 Total Plan
1909-1913 Exports 1927/28 Exports 1927/28 Exports
Total Exports (millions ruble s) 1,501. 4 100.0 3,165.4 100.0 3,293.9 100.0 104. 1
Grain products (millions rubles) 751. 2 50.0 1,553.0 49.0 811. 7 24.5 52.4
grain products (1000 tons) 11, 900. 0 24,816.0 10,031.0 40.4
Forest products (millions rubles) 289. 5 19. 3 456.5 14.4 369.3 11. 2 80.9
forest products (1000 tons) 7,042.0 14,283.0 9,592.0 67.2
Flax and Hemp (millions rubles) 101.3 6. 7 240.0 7. 5 157.4 4.7 65. 6
flax and hemp (1000 tons) 360.0 393.0 233.0 59.2
Fur s (millions of ruble s) 16. 6 1.1 175.0 5. 5 354.8 10. 7 202. 7
Oil pr oducts (m.illions ruble s) 36.7 2.4 290.0 9. 1 373.2 11.3 128. 7
oil products (1000 tons) 947.0 6,740.0
Sugar (million rubles) 57.4 3. 9 58.0 1.8 108. 3 3.2 186. 7
sugar (1000 tons) 139.0 131. 0 349.0 266.3
Iron are (millions rubles) 4.2 O. 3 3. 3 O. 1 11. 7 O. 3 335. 5
iron ore (1000 tons) 470.0 540.0 1,135.0 210.0
Other (millions rubles) est. 244. 5 16. 2 389. 6 12. 3 1,108.1 33.6 284.4
Source: Note s to Table VI. 1, Appendix B, p. 766.
N
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A trade surplus was indicated for every year of the perspective
five -year plan for foreign trade and would approach a total of 1400 mil-
lion rubles over the five years - roughly 400/0of export receipts. This
proposed trade surplus seemed high but there was considerable pres sure
for large trade surpluses because foreign exchange was needed to pay
for invisible items on current account, to supply the additional legal re-
serves (firm cover) required by Gosbank to permit expansion of the
money supply, and to rebuild Soviet foreign reserves which had declined
from 1, 200 million ruble s in 1917 to 360 -415 million ruble s at the end of
1923 (Table T-17). Furthermore, a stable currency and growing foreign
reserves (through the accumulation of gold) were thought to be an impor-
tant prerequisite to attracting foreign loans and direct foreign investment
- a policy similar to the accumulation of gold by Russia during the 1890's
prior to Rus sia' s accession to the gold standard. 5
Because of this pressure for a trade surplus, imports were to
be restricted to levels significantly below average 1909-13 levels by
restricting consumers' imports (Table VI. 2). The planned import
structure was similar to the actual import structure of 1923/24 and the
perspective plan stressed producers' imports (Soviet definition) much
more heavily than 1909-1913 imports (85% versus 55%). Raw materials
and semi-processed goods dominated the perspective import plan. Rela-
tively large imports of industrial machinery were also planned. In con-
trast, planned imports of agricultural machinery and fertilizers were
negligible (Table VI. 2). Instead agriculture was to be supplied with
5Carr-54, pp. 134-35 and Arnold-36, p. 13.
TABLE VI.2
USSR: GOSPLAN'S FIVE YEAR PLAN FOR IMPORTS 1923/24 - 1927/28
(m.illions of rubles at current prices)
Annual Average Five - Year Totals 1923/24 - 1927/28
Actual Plan Actual Actual
~ 911-~913 % total 1923/24 % total 1923/24- % total as %
Yrly avo imports -1927/28 imports 1927/28 imports. plan
Total Im.po rts (m.illions ruble s) 1235. 8 100.0 1769.0 100. 0 3578.2 202.2
Total Imports (excluding special
im.ports of grain and consumer 3246.4 100.0 183. 5
goods)
Producer's Im.ports 690.8 55. 8 1470.9 83. 1 2762.3 85.0 187.3
Equipment for industry and transport 122. 1 9.8 342.5 19. 3 553. 5 17. 0 161. 7
Raw m.aterials and sem.i-processed 515.3 41. 6 1080. 7 61. 0 1984.2 61. 1 183. 6
Agricultural machinery and 54.4 4.4 47. 7 2. 6 190. 5 5. 8 399.4
fertilizer, etc.
Other 34. 1 1.0
Consum.er's Im.port 545.4 44. 1 298. 1 16. 8 484. 1 14. 9 162.4
Goods for m.as s consum.ption 175. 0 9. 8 430.3 13.2 245.9
(excluding grains and m.anufacturing)
Medical and health 105. 9 5. 9 44. 5 1.3 42.0
Other 9.3 0.2
Source: Notes to Table VI. 2, Appendix B, p. 766. No
-..]
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domestically produced machinery (including tractors). 6
Actual foreign trade versus Perspective Plan
The minimum export plan was fulfilled according to value but
significantly underfulfilled on the basis of volume, for export prices
rose during this period. 7 The maximum variant was badly underful-
filled in both respects. Exports in 1927/28 fell far short of 1909-13
levels even if valued in the higher prices of the 1920 's and using Soviet
adjustments for territorial 10ss. The most important error in Gos-
plan's perspective export plan was their estimate of expected grain
6Baksht-28, p. 22. In 1909-13 imports supplied 45% by value
of total agricultural machinery (Table III. 16). There wa s considerable
excess capacity in agricultural machine building in 1924 and sales suf-
fered because of high prices and the shortage of long-term credits
(SUYB-25, pp. 99-100 and Elchibegoff-55a, pp. 29-30). Considerable
import substitution was achieved during NEP in producing new types of
equipment as well as in overall volume (Elchibegoff-55a, pp. 43-46).
Again it is interesting to note that Anders (in Varga-32, p. 99)
criticized Gosplan for not going far enough in estimating the demand for
imported machinery and also for underestimating agricultural machin-
ery imports by a factor of four. The plan, in Ander's opinion, was a
deliberate attempt to slow down industrialization and the reconstruction
of agriculture.
7Rough estimates of expected and actual prices can be derived
using planned value and planned quantity for selected goods in Table VI. I.
Ruble s Price per Metric Ton
Grain
Forest products
Flax and Hemp
Sugar
Iron ore
Expected
630
320
610
440
6
Actual
810
390
680
310
10
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exports. The grain export plan in the minimum variant of the export
plan was only 40% fulfilled in terms of weight {and this included the
large grain exports in 1923/24}. But after the success in resuming
grain exports in 1923/24, nobody in early 1924 foresaw the deteriora-
tion on the "grain export front" which was to occur during 1924-1929. 8
Flax and fore st product exports - two important exports in
1909-13 and in the persepctive plan - also failed to achieve levels pro-
jected in the minimum variant. The failure of these four exports -
grain, timber, flax, and hemp, which made up 76% of 1909-1913 ex-
ports - had a catastrophic effect on the recovery of imports during
NEP and total exports for the five years 1923/24 - 1927/28 barely
equalled (in terms of total value) average annual exports during 1909-
13 (Table V.l). The reasons for the failure of grain, flax, and timber
exports and the impact of this failure on industrialization policy and
foreign trade are examined in the rest of the study. 9
Some isolated successes did occur. The plan for fur exports,
projected at more than double the 1909-1913 levels, was exceeded in
value largely because of higher prices {Table T-29}. Oil exports ex-
ceeded the plan in value (and in quantity) on the basis of added output
from additional investment and in the face of falling foreign prices. 10
The plan for sugar exports was excessively pessimistic and was also
8See Oganovskii-25 and Chapter XI.
9Chapter XI is devoted entirely to the "grain export problem. If
10See Chapter X~ p. 208.
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far exceeded in quantity and also in value, even though foreign sugar
prices fell. And the plan for "other products" - consisting largely of
eggs, butter, rawhide, and cloth in 1909-13 - was also exceeded signi-
ficantly in value. 11 But these isolated successes for several export
goods could not compensate for the Soviet government's inability to
restore grain, timber, flax and hemp exports to pre -1914 levels, and
the continued success in expanding even the more successful exports
was constrained by domestic agricultural problems, by conflicts with
domestic users, by limited productive capacity and by limited foreign
12markets.
Bad miscalculations about imports
Gosplan failed completely in their attempt to project imports -
actual imports were twice planned imports (Table VI. 2). 13 Imports ex-
ceeded plan by large ma rgins (60 - 3850/0)for all categorie s (except the
relatively small category, "cultural and medical goods "). Agricultural
producers' goods and consumers' goods imports were most underesti-
mated by Gosplan. With respect to agricultural producers' goods, Gos-
plan's assumptions about the expansion of domestic output was correct,
but it considerably underestimated the demand for modern agricultural
llAnders (in Varga-32, p. 99) implied that the butter export
plan was underfulfilled.
12
See Chapter X, p. 481.
l3Baksht-28 excluded the so-called "above -plan" and "special"
imports of consumers' goods in 1924/25 and 1925/26 in his discussion
of the perspective plan. With these exclusions, imports exceeded plan
by 830/0.
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machinery and tractors. Consumers' goods imports (Soviet definition)
including "above-plan and special imports" exceed the plan by 290%.14
If we exclude "special imports" of grain, sugar, cloth, etc. consumers f
goods imports, nevertheless, exceeded the plan by 145%.15 It should be
pointed out that projections of consumers f goods imports were inherently
Ie s s accurate because a large share of Soviet consumer s' goods import s
came across Asiatic borders where trade was less strictly planned and
controlled during the NEP. 16 Furthermore, if we exclude the special
export of consumer goods, then the relative contribution of above -plan
consumers r goods imports to the total overfulfillment of the import plan
(row 2 of Table VI. 2) was small because consumers' imports were a re-
latively small share of total imports.
More than half the excess of imports can be attributed to imports
of raw and semi-processed materials (actual imports of these items were
184% of plan and 61%of total imports during 1923/24-1927/28 The appar-
ent underestimation of the demand for industrial materials might have
been caused by an unforeseen upward drift in import prices. It seems
more likely however, that Gosplan simply underestimated the demand
for imported materials. Unless considerable growth of output of import
14
Notes to Table VI. 2, Appendix B, p. 766.
15Table VI. 2. The USSR imported grain in 1924/25 and again in
1928. See below Chapter VII and Chapter X. See Chapters VII and VIII
for de scription of "above plan and special imports. "
l6Tea imports, being such an important foodstuffs item, were
carefully planned (and limited), probably because it required cash pay-
ment in sterling.
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substitutes was planned to proceed side -by-side with restoration of in-
dustrial output, the recovery of industry implied much larger imports
of materials than projected in the perspective import plan. In the per-
spective plan, the value of annual average planned imports of raw and
semi-processed materials (in 1924 prices) were set at only 21%of the
value of annual import of similar goods (in pre-19l4 prices) during 1909-
13. The 1909-13 prices were significantly lower than 1924 prices. Thus,
the plan was unrealistic because of the inherited dependence of Russian
light industries on imported materials. 17 The magnitude of Gosplan's
error is evident in the continued scarcity of imported raw materials
during NEP even though raw materials were imported in greater quanti-
tie s than planned.
The development of imports during the NEP is discus sed in
following chapters.
Trade Balance during 1923/24 - 1927/28
Instead of the anticipated 1, 406 million ruble trade surplus,
imports exceeded exports by 284 million rubles. Furthermore "invis-
ible trade items imports" on current account continued to grow (see
Table T -14), so that the balance of payments deficit was much worse than
indicated by the balance of trade. The Soviet government was forced to
l7Anders' (in Varga-32, p. 99) criticism of Gosplan's efforts
seemed to have missed this point. Adjustment of import demand for in-
dustrial materials for loss of territory could account for only a rela-
tively small part of this low proj ection.
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draw down their foreign reserves by roughly 50 -100 million rubles and
to accumulate 370 million rubles in short-term foreign debts. 18
This unfavorable experience with the perspective plan for 1923/
24-1927/28 was destined to be repeated in similar ways with the foreign
19trade plan for the 1st FYP.
l8Drawing-down of reserves from January 1, 1924 to January 1,
1929 from Table T -17. The decline in reserves from January 1, 1925 to
January 1, 1929 was 130-210 million rubes (Table T -17). Outstanding
foreign debt on October 1, 1928. from Table T-15.
19Chapter XIII and XIV.
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CHAPTER VII
THE FIRST SETBACK IN 1924/25: AND UNPLANNED GRAIN IMPORTS
Economic factors in the 1924/25 foreign !.rade plan_
The partial failure of the 1924 grain harve st and the accompany-
ing failure of grain marketing in 1924/25 were perhaps the most pressing
problem affecting economic policy and foreign trade policy in 1924/25
(Tables T -8 and T -3). The output of flax, hemp, sugar beets, and most
other crops had increased and could partially compensate for the inevit-
able cutback in grain exports. Furthermore, prospects for oil exports
in 1924/25 seemed limited only by the foreign demand,for 1923/24 was a
year of "over-production" relative to sales in the domestic market.
The recovery of light industry and metal-working continued to
increase the demand for imported industrial materials, but this growth
in import demand was partially offset by the rapid recovery of domestic
1cotton output.
Goal of price stability. When the parity of the chervonets
rubles had been fixed in the autumn of 1922 the USSR held an advantage
in relative price levels. 2 But the overall price level as measured by
Gosplan's wholesale price index (1913 = 100) had risen from 96 in Janu-
ary 1923 fo' 193 in March 1924 and by the autumn of 1924, the USSR's
lDiamond-55, p. 73.
2Aizenberg -62, p. 244.
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wholesale price index stood significantly higher than those of major in-
dustrial countries (Tables T -31 and T - 37). This erosion of the purchas-
ing power of the chervonets ruble worried the Soviet government for
several reasons. First, the rise in prices threatened the acceptability
of the new currency by the peasants and the private sector. Second,
rising prices, and rising agricultural prices in particular threatened
the profitability of some exports and as a consequence exports would
be voluntarily reduced or would require export subsidies or the "forcing
of exports." Third, rising prices (relative to other countries) encour-
aged the expansion of imports (legal, licensed, smuggled, or parcels).
In particular, it increased the volume of requests for import license s
and made the task of deciding among these requests more difficult.
(The Soviet government responded initially to the change in Soviet and
foreignprice levels by increasing import tariffs in 1924). 3 Fourth, it
encouraged the export of chervonets currency to sell on both legal and
black markets abroad thus depre ssing the chervonets on the se markets
and requiring direct intervention by the Commis sariat of Finance to
support the rate of the ruble.
Government policies to stabilize prices were to affect the de-
velopment of foreign trade during 1924/25 in several important ways.
1924/25 foreign trade plan
The 1924/25 foreign trade plan was confirmed first on Septem-
ber 29, 1924 and was based on the knowledge of the grain crop failure
3Table T-47.
TABLE VII. 1
USSR: EXPORT PLAN AND EXPORTS 1924/25
(millions of rubles, current prices)
Planned Exports Actual Exoorts ( all borders)
(Eurooean Borders) 1924/25 Structure
Plan % Structure Exports of Exports PercentCommodity Plan Exports as % of 1924/25 Fulfillment
1924/25 Actua123/~ of Plan 1923/24 % of Total of Plan(all borders) % Total Exports Exports
Total Exports 503. 90 96.4 100.0 558.63 106.9 100.0 nO.9
Agricultural 292.40 80.2 58.0 342.43 94.0 61. 3 117. I
Grain, related products 72.18 32.3 14.3 102.87 46.0 18.4 142.5
(1000 m. t. ) (819) ( 26.8) (H22 ) ( 36. 7) (136. 9)
including Grain products 26.48 13. 8 5.3 52.46 27.3 9.4 198. I
Oil cake 19.50 93.7 3.9 26.45 127.0 4.7 135.6
Oil seed 26.20 244.1 5.2 23.96 223.2 4". 2 91. 4
Butter 35.00 132.1 6.9 27.58 104.1 4.9 78.8
(1000 m. t. ) (28.7) (127.7) (24. 5) (109.0) (85. 4)
Eggs 22.00 164.1 4.4 25.66 191. 4 4.6 116.6
(1000 wagons) (3.70) (152.6) (4.90) (202.0) (132. 4)
Flax 51. 00 219.1 10.1 52.45 225. 3 9.3 102.8
(1000 m.. t. ) ( 54. 1) (154.4) (55.6) (158. 7) (102.8)
Hemp 4.00 197.5 . 8 3.87 191. 2 . 7 96.8
N
.-.
TABLE VII. 1 (continued)
Planned Exports Actual Exports ( all borders)
(European Borders) 1924/25 Structure
Plan Plan % Structure Exports of Exports PercentCom.:modity
1924/25 Actual of Plan Exports as % of 1924/25 Fulfill:ment
~923/24 (all % Total 1923/24 % of Total of Plan
borders) Exports Exports
Bristles 13.50 350. 0 2.7 15.28 396.1 2.7 113.2
Furs 55.00 .110.6 10.9 67.83 136.4 12.1 123.3
Secondary Agricultural 57.30 11. 4 47.55 216.1 8.5 83.0
Industrial 211. 50 133.4 42.0 216. 31 136.9 38.7 102.3
Till1ber 75.00 106.5 14.9 72.70 97.1 13.0 97. 1
Oil products 64.00 171. 4 12.7 66.61 178.4 H. 9 104.1
Manganese ores 20.88 145.3 4.1 17.89 124.5 3.2 85.7
Other Industrial 51. 60 142.9 12.0 59.01 163.5 10.6 114.4
Source: Notes to Table VII. 1, Appendix B, p. 767.
N
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in 1924. 4 The plan was unusual in several ways.
First, no expansion of exports over 1923/24 levels was planned
for 1924/25 because of the projected reduction in grain exports. The
success of grain exports from the 1923 harvest and the increase in sown
area in 1924 had led to initial optimistic predictions in early 1924 of
exporting from 4. 1 to 6. 6 million m. t. of grain from the 1924 harvest. 5
The drought during the summer of 1924, however, caused a partial
crop failure and quickly shattered any hopes of grain exports from the
61924 harvest. In late August, 1924, all grain exports were suspended.
As a consequence of the suspension of grain exports, total exports for
1924/25 were projected at slightly less than 1923/24 levels (Table T-l).
Second, imports were to be increased from 439 million rubles
in 1923/24 to 577 million rubles in the 1924/25 import plan despite the
7slight reduction projected for exports.
Third, the 1924/25 foreign trade plan specifically projected a
large trade deficit of 70 million rubles. 8 The trade plan was revised
4Sobolev-26a, p. 67.
5Cited by Carr-58a, p. 189, from "Sotsialisticheskoe Khozia-
istvo, No.3, 1924, pp. 34-37 and L. Kamenev, Stat'i i Rechi, Vol. X
(1927), p. 274,"
6Cited by Carr -58a, p. 190 from A. 1. Rykov, Sochineniia,
Vol. III (1929), pp. 185-187.
7Since we have not for certain identified the original foreign
trade plan for 1924/25, we do not know what other revisions were made.
The NKVT plan A for 1924/25 may be either the original plan or the re-
vised plan confirmed in March; the source, EIKSSSR (p. 45) does not
specify.
8Most likely this trade deficit was expected to be partially
financed through foreign credits, for credit conditions continued to
improve through 1924 as many European countries recognized the USSR
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twice during the year, once in March 1925, and again for the "final"
time in June 1925.9 The import target was revised upward to 659 mil-
lion ruble s during the year while the export plan was lowered some-
what, and these revisions of the plan resulted in even larger planned
balance of trade deficits. After the "final" revision in June, still
another "above quota" plan for consumers' goods imports was adopted
in August, 1925 for the purpose of "immediate satisfaction of peasant
demand so as to insure the correct commodity turnover in the country-
side" at the time of the harvest. 10 According to Krasin, these above-
plan imports were to be financed almost entirely through foreign cre-
dits, part of which were granted by a German banking group in the
form of a 50 million mark (about 24 million rubles) short-term credit
to Gosbank, ostensibly to finance grain exports. 11
de jure. See SUYB -28.
9It was confirmed for the final time on June 17, 1925. <Sobolev-
26a, p. 67.) The March revision was probably made when it was decided
to import grain in the spring of 1925. The June revision was probably
made to adjust for the planned increase of manufactured consumers'
goods imports to mitigate the growing goods famine.
10Sobolev -26a, p. 73.
llSUA, Vol. V, No. 13, p. 6, and Krasin-28, p. 222. These
special import plans were not only for manufactured consumers' goods,
but also for raw materials - cotton, wool, leather. NKVT could only
pay for 10-15% of these special imports with cash (Krasin-28, p. 222).
See Shenkman-3l (pp. 127-128) about German credits. The credits were
for 4 to 5 months with deferred repayment dates in January and Febru-
ary. Sobolev-26b (p. 35) stated that these special plans increased the
annual import plan by 200 million rubles and was the chief reason for
the large trade deficit. Apparently, these special plans were partially
incorporated into the revised import plan (with the exception of the
August special plan). We know the import plan was revised upward at
least once by 80 million rubles, and that this upward revision was ex-
ceeded by 70 million rubles. That actual imports were not even hi.gher
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Several improvements in the foreign trade planning methods
were introduced during 1925. The practice of drafting quarterly plans
was begun; these quarterly plans "took into account all the current
world and dome stic conditions, making proper cor rections in the quar-
terly shares of the quotas which might be necessary due to market
conditions. ,,12 A balance of payments plan (valuta plan) was also drawn
up for 1924/25 in order to accurately estimate the pattern of receipts
and expenditures of foreign exchange. The problems and methods of
drawing a valuta plan were discussed in Shanin-26a, Engeev-27a, -27b,
and -28a.
The export plan 1924/25.' The projected 1924/25 export targets
for selected commoditie s are supplied in Table VII. 1. The value of
grain product export (excluding oil seed, etc.) for 1924/25 were pro-
jected to be only about 14% of 1923/24 grain product exports (Table VII. 1).
Recall that grain product exports in 1923/24 accounted for 37% of total
exports. If other exports could not be expanded to compensate for the
cutback in grain, 1924/25 exports would have had to be projected at only
357 instead of 504 million rubles - and 357 million ruble s of raw
was probably due to the problems in getting prompt delivery of goods
for the August special plan (Krasin-28, p. 222). The 1925/26 plan was
presented in July and confirmed on July 31, 1925, while still another
"special plan" for imports for 1924/25 was adopted in August, 1925 after
the adoption of the 1925/26 plan. These decisions were influenced by
the very favorable projections for 1925/26 grain exports, the overful-
fillment of the export plan in August and a worsening goods famine in
the countryside which was hampering the grain procurement campaign
(SUA, Vol. V, Nos. 1-2, pp. 77 -83).
12Sobolev-26a, p. 67.
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materials and semi-processed goods alone were imported in 1924/25.
According to the export plan, however, the planned reduction in grain
exports was to be offset by large increases in the export of flax, oil
seed, egg s, butter, oil products, and most other important exports
except timber and oil cake exports.
Import structure. No information has been located on the pro-
posed structure of imports, although in light of the rapid increase in
domestic cotton procurements it is likely that little or no increase in
cotton imports was originally planned. 13 Most important, in light of
subsequent events, was that no large-scale grain imports were projected
in the original1924/25 import plan.
Fulfillment of the 1924/25 foreign trade p1an_
The 1924/25 export plan was moderately overfulfilled in value
(by 10%), and even exceeded 1923/24 levels de spite the sharp drop in
grain exports. The import plan for 1924/25 as originally drawn-up was
excessively fulfilled by a large margin (250/0)chiefly because of the large
unforeseen imports of grain and flour in the spring of 1925.14 Even the
(larger) final revised import plan was exceeded by about 10%. As a
result the actual trade deficit wa s 164. 6 million ruble s or about twice
13Kutusov-28, p. 44.
l4Because of the foreign exchange shortage, we describe actual
exports about planned exports as overfulfillment, and actual imports
above planned imports as excessive fulfillment, because export targets
under most circumstances were minimums and imports targets were
maximums. Import targets could be modified by unexpected changes in
the availability of credits.
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the original planned deficit and 8% more than the revised planned deficit.
This very large deficit was financed by a reduction in Soviet balances
held in foreign banks (about 62 million rubles), the shipment of about
50 million rubles in gold and platinum, and an increase in foreign
short-term credit of about 70 million rubles. 15 The balance of invis-
ibles items on current account was also deficit (Table T -14).
Evaluating success in plan fulfillment quite clearly depends on
which plan is being considered, and also the interrelationship between
the increase in credits and the upward revision of the import plan. For
example, Krasin, Commissar of Foreign Trade, felt that the 1924/25
foreign trade plan was successfully fulfilled, primarily because of
NKVT's success in expanding total exports after a complete reversal
. h . 16ln t e graln export prospects.
Exports and imports of grain in 1924/25
As expected, grain exports collapsed to negligible amounts
17from October to June 1924/25. The value of grain product exports
l5Table T -15. The credits received from Great Britain and
Germany were interpreted by the Soviet government as an important
break in the capitalist financial blockade and as a sign of increasing
confidence of foreign capital in the USSR (Kutusov-28, pp. 53- 54).
The increased availability of credit caused considerable dis cus sion
within Soviet circles about the proper amount of credit to be used by
the Soviet Union at any given moment. See Sobolev-26a, Sobolev-26b,
Shanin-26a, and Krasin-28.
16Krasin-28, p. 160.
17The eventual overfulfillment of the low 1924/25 targets for
grain product exports was achieved almost entirely with grain ex-
ported in July-September, 1925 from procurement made from the
favorable 1925 harvest (Table T ~10). Comparison of grain exports for
the agricultural year (July I-June 30) better illustrates the virtual
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in 1924/25 (EY) was about 140 million rubles less than in 1923/24 (EY).
The impact of the grain crop failure on the balance of trade, however,
was much greater than indicated merely by the decline in the export
earnings from grain. In early 1925, large -scale grain and £lour imports
(about 1/2 million m. t. ) were authorized in order to halt the rapid in£la-
Hon of breadstuff prices in cities and grain deficit areas. 18 The whole-
sale price of wheat and rye had doubled between November 1924 and
April 1925 so that by May 1925 the total whole sale price index peaked
again at almost double the 1913 levels. 19 The expenditure of 112million
rubles - 15. 5% of total imports - on grain imports at a time when famine
was not a threat was indicative of the Soviet government's great concern
over rising grain prices. Thus, the crop failure, ceteris paribus, re-
duced foreign exchange available for purchase of other imports by 233
million rubles as compared to 1923/24 or about 450/0of total imports in
1923/24. The cutback in grain exports and these large grain in1.ports
in the spring were sufficient (about 2. 7 million tons) to offset the de-
cline in purchases by planned agencies (from 6. 5 to 4.6 million metric
tons), so that the supply by the planned agencies to the cities possibly
cessation of grain exports during 1924/25 (EY) as compared to 1923/24
(EY) and 1925/26 (EY) (Table T-8). The preliminary plan for exports
of grain and related products was set at 72.2 million rubles, more than
60% of which was to consist of oil seeds and oil cake (Table VII. 1).
18Darr-58a, p. 193, from PI~. Khoz., No.1, 1925, p. 47.
19Tables T-38, T-39, and T-31. Kutusov-28 (p. 40) asserted
that the upward price movement was caused by the private traders.
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increased (Table T -8). 20 Grain prices started to decline after May,
1925, but this decline could have been caused by either the favorable
reports about the 1925 crop or by the increased supply made possible
by grain imports (Table s T - 38 - T -40). 21
Compensating expansion of non-grain exports. The planned
expansion of non-grain exports, intended to offset the decline in grain
exports, was remarkably well achieved not only as to the aggregate
levels of exports, but also for the individual items (Table VII. 1). The
export of oil seed, flax, bristles, hemp, eggs, and "secondary exports"
almo st doubled.
Oil exports - destined to become a major item in Soviet exports
as compared to pre -1914 Russian exports - doubled because of increased
output and large stocks remaining from overproduction of "exportable
20The value of grain imports exceeded the value of grain ex-
ports and the quantity of grain product imports almost equalled the quan-
tity of exports in 1924/25 (EY). Some grain was imported in late 1927/28
for similar reasons, but exports early in that year offset those imports.
Excluding the war years, net imports of grain products by the USSR were
not to occur again until the early 1960's despite more severe shortages
and widespread famine.
21Kutusov -28, p. 40. The official price ceiling for State pur-
chases of grain and agricultural raw materials was unenforceable as
long as private traders competed freely with State procurement agencie s
and the market clearing price was above the price ceiling (as it was and
still is today); thus the authorities by late 1925 began increasingly to
restrict the freedom of the private trader and coordinated the State and
"planned" procurement agencies to prevent competition (often by giving
them a local monopsony). See Baykov-47, pp. 60 -6 3. See Balaban-28
(pp. 210-214) for a description of grain procurements, exports, imports,
and the price policy of "limiting prices" (price ceilings) in 1924/25. See
Carr-58a (p. 192) for discussion of problems in enforcing this price
ceiling for grain purchases.
225
petroleum products" in the previous year. 22 Oil exports already by
1924/25 exceeded 1913 oil exports. 23
Ever since nationalization in 1920, despite apparent excess
capacity at times, considerable resources were devoted to restoring
and expanding the oil industry lar gely for the purpose of export. 24 The
development of oil exports had several advantages over the development
of agricultural and other industrial exports. These advantages included
growing world demand, low wage expenditures relative to export value
(thereby reducing the expansionary effect of exports on consumers I
demand) and close State control of production and allocation of output
between deomestic and foreign markets. Oil product exports were in-
itially very profitable at the beginning of NEP and insofar as the ex-
change rate was overvalued in 1925, the profitability of expanding the
Soviet oil industry was understated. Investment in the oil industry
during NEP, however, was largely undertaken because of its inherent
ease of rapidly expanding exports from domestic production - (once a
distribution network was established) - rather than "profitability" ~
see
22SUA, Vol. V, No. 1-2, pp. 6-7 and No.4, pp. 22-23.
23The oil blockade by major international oil companies was
gradually being ended during 1925 as major oil companies began to buy
cheap Soviet oil products for sale through the companies I distribution
network. This made the expansion of Soviet oil product exports depend-
ent on the demand of these major companies, so that Soviet exports of
oil products were less than the NKVT wanted in 1923-25. Fischer-26,
pp. 109-113 and Krasin-29, p. 174.
24SUYB_25, pp. 107-110. See Chapter XII, pp. 495 ff.
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Only timber and butter failed to show large gains and the ex-
port plans for these latter two were underfulled by 3% and 15%. The
increase in the value of 1924/25 exports including grain exports was
7.9%; the increase excluding grain product exports was 53% (Table T-2).
Price policy, world prices, and "exportable surplus"
The domestic demand for the traditional export goods increased
sharply in 1924/25 because of growing urban demand for better food-
stuffs (butter, eggs) and growing demand for industrial materials (flax,
hemp, leather, wool}.25 The combination of increased demand and
higher grain prices caused a rise in prices for several major agricul-
tural products - especially flax, eggs, and butter and also furs - and
there arose a conflict between NKVT and other purchasers over the
policy of "limiting prices" or "procurement price c:eilings" which were
b b d b t t h .. 26 F 1 hto e 0 serve y s a e purc aSIng agencIes. or examp e, t ere was
disagreement between the domestic linen industry and the NKVT about
the price of flax because of the large margin between domestic prices
and foreign prices; they also fought over the export of the "flax' sur-
plus" and the export quota was eventually lowered in order to divert flax
fiber to domestic users.27 On the other hand, even though the increased
25
Kutus ov - 28, p. 41.
26Balaban-28, p. 212. Exports of oil seed and secondary
grains in 1924/25 which were very profitable at the current foreign and
domestic prices. Exports of the major grains, however, were ex-
tremely unprofitable in the spring of 1925 (Tables T-38 and T-39) if
marketing costs are considered (Table T-43).
27Kr a sin - 28, p. 174.
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prices of butter and eggs rendered exports "commercially unprofit-
able, " Kutusov-28 stated that the exports of eggs and butter would
have been increased if more could have been procured by state trad-
.. 28Ing agencIes.
Such commercial los ses for some exports concerned some
persons in NKVT, but the importance of "export profitability" in the
adoption of a policy of "price limits" for state procurement agencies
in 1924/25 has not been determined. 29 The need to earn foreign ex-
change, however, already began to lead to the policy of "forcing ex-
ports If de spite commercial los se s which occurred at the stabilized
30(parity) exchange rates. These losses were often "paper losses"
which disappeared when considered within the context of a combined
purchase-export-import-sale operation, such as occurred in the
trading agencies, Gostorg and Centrosoiuz. 31
28According to Kutusov-28 (p. 42), low prices retarded the
output of eggs by the peasants. On the other hand, the egg export plan
was exceeded (Table VII. I). The price of eggs rose 500/0at the begin-
ning of the season and egg exports were unprofitable. This "unfavor-
able price relationship" retarded exports (Kaufman-26c, p. 13).
Krasin-28 (p. 174) noted that the competion between exports
and rising urban demand caused the price s to rise sufficiently to make
butter exports unprofitable. NKVT's adherence to price limits pre-
vented them from successfully bidding against private traders who sup-
plied the city (Kutusov-28, p. 42).
29Kutusov-28 (p. 42) wrote, "With the purpose of maintaining
the stability of valuta [emphasis added] ... the policy of limits was
established. "
30Bakov-47, p. 75.
3lThat is, the "comrnerciallosses" incurred in exporting at
the current overvalued exchange rate were often made up by the high
profit margin (including tariff) on the role of imported goods at market-
clearing prices.
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Soviet concept of exportable surplus. The concept of a "sur-
plus available for export" is frequently encountered in the literature
on Soviet for eign trade during the NEP and the e stima tion of such sur-
pluses often formed the basis for planning exports (as was discussed
32Chapter V). For example, Kutusov asserted that only "surpluses"
were exported in 1924/25 and were not exported at the expense of dom-
estic consumption, (which rose for butter and eggs). 33 "Surplus,"
however, is an undefined term in this context, for, as a Soviet eco-
nomist stated in 1927, "We export for the most part goods which also
serve our own use. For this reason we have at our disposal in most
34
cases only relative and not absolute surpluses.
The Soviet process for planning the coming ye ar 's exports
remained at a fairly rudimentary level - although modern developing
economies still use basically the same method, albeit with some more
sophisticated estimating procedures. Estimating the quantity of "~
portable surplus" of a particular good for the coming year involves
32Supra, pp. 140.ff~ .. Krasin-28 (p. 175) wrote that this
estimate of export surpluses represented the maximum exports, and
that the export plan was drawn up with considerations of the foreign
market conditions, available capital, etc. EIKSSSR (p. 42) also
stated "... the planning system adopted by the Soviet Union permits
merely exports of surplus goods, i. e., of what remains after the fun-
damental need of the home trade has been met. Krasin-28 (p. 178)
commented on the unsatisfied demand for butter on the domestic market
in 1924/25.
33Kutusov-28, p. 40.
34War sha ve r -27, p. 59.
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basically projecting output, marketing (if agricultural good), and d_o_m_e_s_-
tic demand. But lurking behind each of these proj ections for each good
are important assumptions which, if not realistic, vitiate the entire pro-
jection. For example, estimating the "exportable surplus" of grain
depends on numerous factors over which the planner for foreign trade
(and even the planners for the entire economy) have either imperfect
knowledge (ignorance) or are confronted with uncertainties. In projecting
output of grain, the sown area could be estimated fairly well even in
Russia and the yields, given various types of weather and current tech-
niques are fairly predictable, but the great uncertainty is the actual
weather pattern right up to the moment of the harvest. Predicting mar-
keting from a given size crop becomes much more complicated and is
discussed in Chapter XI. The foreign trade planner trying to estimate
marketing of grain fo r a crop must know the distribution of the crop
among various classes of peasants (which also affects rural demand and
hence, net marketing), the response of the peasants to various sets of
prices of grain relative to other agricultural products and manufactured
goods, the real and money income, taxes, debts, rents, etc., of the
peasants, the peasants I demand for feed, and reserves, and the actual
prices of commodities beyond the control of the planner. Presuming
the planner gauged "marketing" correctly, he must then project domes-
tic demand for marketed grain, which involved estimating the demand
(at various prices) for grain in grain-deficient areas, flax-growing
areas, cotton-growing areas, urban areas, for industrial purposes,
and for reserve stocks. This demand for marketed grain in turn
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depended on the real disposable income of grain purchasers (which in
turn depended on wages, size and price of non-grain crop, etc.) and
the price of substitute foodstuffs and other goods, and size of popula-
tion. The point is that the planner - especially in the Commis sariat of
Foreign Trade - estimating the exportable surplus of grain must make
assumptions about important variables and behavioral patterns, about
which he had little knowledge or control over.
Assuming he has been successful in projecting the "exportable
surplus" (at a given set of prices, etc.), the planner then considered
the "capacity of the world market" to absorb this surplus (at commer-
cially profitable prices ?). And if the world market demand was less
than perfectly elastic, then the foreign trade monopoly might find it
better to export only part of the surplus (see Chapter II) and to divert
the rest to additional domestic uses (through lower domestic grain pur-
chase and sale prices). If he though, even with imperfect competition,
that additional grain exports would be useful - either "commercially
profitable" or necessary to finance additional imports - he had very
few instruments by which to increase grain exports. The major method
available at times to the NKVT was simply to buy more grain on the
open market - but this usually bid up prices and conflicted with the offi-
cial price ceilings. No other major policy instruments were made avail-
able to NKVT to increase exportable surpluses. Furthermore, persist-
ent exces s aggregate demand - as emerged during mid-NEP - tended
to eliminate "exportable surpluse s" in any operational sense when de-
cisions had to be made to export or to divert "exportable surplus" to
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domestic markets to stem rising prices and to mop up some excess
demand (See Chapter II for discussion of exports and "goods famine").
In a free market "exportable surpluses" can be estimated only within
the framework of assumed or desired prices.
The estimated "exportable surplus" was divided into quotas
and assigned to individual firms, trade agencies, etc. (by the end of
1924/25). The fulfillment of this export quota was eventually made
compulsory and underfulfi1lment resulted in a monetary fine. 35
Starting as early as 1924/25, declining "commercial profit-
ability" of export operations caused by rising dome stic prices or fa1l-
ing foreign prices led Soviet firms to avoid export operations - espe-
cially if domestic sales were more profitable. For example, unfavor-
able foreign price s for Soviet timber was cited as the major factor re-
tarding the expansion of Soviet timber export s in 1924/25. 36 Indeed,
the foreign timber concession working for exports - Russnovegoles,
Russhollanders, Russangloles, etc. - were granted special privileges
for 1924/25 in order to permit them to continue exports at a profit. 37
35EIKSSSR, p. 651, SUYB -25, p. 281.
36Kutusov-28, p. 43.
37EIKSSSR, p. 579. These privileges probably were a tax
holiday on stumpage fees. Foreign timber concessions supplied about
25% of timber exports from the Northern ports.
The concessions policy was oriented primarily at developing
exports, and the basis for attracting concessions was the possibility of
profit which wa s to be earned through the sale of goods abroad at foreign
prices converted at the (parity) exchange rate into rubles to cover their
expenses in rubles. EIKSSSR (pp. 559-569) discusses the terms of con-
cessions in 1925. See also Dohan-65 for a study of the role of conces-
sions in the Soviet economy during NEP.
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In summary, in 1924/25, some major exports at the parity
exchange rate were becoming "commercially unprofitable" because
of rising domestic prices or falling world prices and a conflict about
the allocation to exports of procurements and output and also about
price policy arose. This conflict between domestic interests and NKVT
was a contributing factor in combining the Commis sariat of Foreign
Trade with the Commissariat of Domestic Trade in November 1925.
38
Imports 1924/25
The value of imports increased more rapidly (650/0)than the
domestic economy because of I} the continuing expansion of consumers'
good output, 2} increased investment, (especially in agriculture), and
3} the government's policy decision to inte rvene on the dome stic mar-
kets with the import of breadstuffs and other consumers' goods.
Producers' goods imports rose only 10. 50/0in value because
fiber imports - the major component of this group - could be restricted
to levels slightly above 1923/24 levels due to the expansion of domestic
38Kaufman-28d, pp. 30-31 and Krasin-28, pp. 121-137. Carr-
58a (p. 45l) explained: "On November 18, 1925, a decree was issued
amalgamating the two trade commissariats into a single People's Com-
missariat of Foreign and Internal Trade (Narkomtorg). The official
explanation of the change dwelt on the growing importance of foreign
trade in the economy and on the need to coordinate the requirements of
foreign with those of internal trade. Lezhava, a former People's Com-
mis sar for Internal Trade, added that it was a safeguard against "ex-
port deviation" - - a determination to export at all costs regardles s of
the needs of the community." (Lezhava's statement appeared in Ekon.
Zhizn, November 21, 23, 1925). ---
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raw fiber output in 1924. 39 Other imports for light industry - dyes,
hides, paper, rubber, etc. - rose much more. Imports of agricultural
producers' goods expanded faster than all other imports and supplied
about one -third of the total agricultural machinery and 90% of the trac-
tors sold in 1924/25 (Table T-22). Industrial equipment imports were
still relatively unimportant in total imports and imports of transport
equipment were cut sharply.
"Imported goods intervention" in 1924/25_. Consumers goods
imports (Soviet definition) more than tripled in 1924/25 and dominated
import policy discussions: the share of consumers goods imports
(Soviet definition) equalled one -third of total imports - an all time high
during 1923/24-1938. This increase was largely the result of the mass-
ive increase in the import of foodstuffs (particularly grain, sugar, and
herring) for purposes of price stabilization of the foodstuffs market in
the spring of 1925.40 Bukharin was to advocate a similar policy in 1928 -
but in 1928 such a suggestion would be held up to ridicule by Stalin. 41
Imports of manufactured consumers' goods - especially cloth,
tin wares, and instruments - also increased significantly (70%), but the
full impact of the August, 1925, d"ecision to implement large -scale
39The value of fiber imports fell slightly (Table T - 5 and T -6).
By the late summer, however, textile output was being retarded by the
lack of raw materials and cotton imports were part of the "special
plan" imports undertaken in the summer of 1925 (Krasin-28, p. 222).
Imports of cotton and wool were 43% of total imports in 1923/24 and 25%
in 1924/25.
40 See above, pp. 221 ff.
41See Chapter X, p. 404.
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consumers I goods imports was to be felt only in the September -October
quarter of the 1925/26 economic year. This "special plan" called for
imports of cloth, leather, cotton, and wool fiber, domestic household
goods, tableware, and instruments to be used by NKVT for the "planned
transfer of scarce industrial goods" to agricultural areas during the 1925
harvest and procurement campaigns, because the worsening "goods
famine" (tovarnye golod) threatened to dis rupt the procurement campaign
and export program. 42 The policy of "goods intervention" both in the
urban grain markets in the spring, and in rural retail markets for manu-
factured goods in the autumn was costly in terms of foreign reserves and
committed near -term exports to payoff expensive short-term foreign
debts.
Unles s the policy of "goods intervention" led to an expansion of
exports requiring a smaller increment in total purchasing power than the
increment in the sales value of the imported goods made possible by these
added exports - and we explained why this might not be the result in
Chapter II - expanded imports of foodstuffs and manufactured consumer
goods as a major solution to the "goods famine" was not feasible in the
42Krasin-28, p. 222; Kutusov-28, p. 44; Baykov-47, p. 63;
EIKSSSR-26, p. 49. In 1925 these imports made only an insignificant
contribution to the total supply of cotton cloth (about 1% Table T -21 ).
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10ng_run.43 Without additional exports the USSR could not continue
this policy without cutting back some other types of imports, or in-
creasing its-foreign debt. Imports, however, destined directly or
indire ctly for the consum er and agricultural producer's goods equalled
81%of total imports in 1924/25, so that there was only a small margin
for the reduction of non-consumers' goods oriented imports, namely
machinery and selected raw materials for heavy industry which could
be reduced
Economic policy, price stability and
foreign tra c:rer:rlI 924 /25
Orthodox economics dominated foreign trade policy in 1924/25
as Soviet authorities tried to pre serve price stability.45 The task of
price stability was complicated by a bad harvest in 1924, and a growing
"goods famine" in the country.46 Normally a bad grain harvest would
result in higher grain prices (barring any offsetting grain imports) and
could possibly raise the peasants' total money income (assuming inelas-
tic demand curve for grain and an upward shift in the supply curve) which
could further aggravate the "goods famine. ,,47 Higher ~train prices
43See above, pp.64. The cost and stability of the credit flow to
the USSR were too uncertain to rely on, and foreign reserves were too
small to permit continual depletion.
44
Tables T -7 and T -18. Agricultural producers' goods import
also helped to absorb purchasing power in the countryside and helped
convert savings, which might otherwise be held as grain, into invest-
ment goods.
45Carr-58a, p. 456 ff.
46Arnold-36, p. 242.
47If the workers' money incomes remain constant, and they
have an absolutely inelastic demand for grain products, then expenditures
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would raise the cost of living in the city and increase the cost of agri-
cultural materials to industry. 48 Higher living costs would cause
demands for higher money wages by the workers, for wages were
tied to the purchasing power of the ruble. As Rykov reported to the
Sixth Trade Union Congress in November 1924:
An unlimited increase in grain price s would mean the collapse
of our budget, since it would entail an increase in wages and
an increase in the prices of manufactured goods and the break-
down of our whole price policy and of the struggle with the
"scissors. "49
Higher wages meant higher costs and this would reduce profits (and
funds for investment and taxes) or result in higher prices for indus-
trial goods. But this in turn reopened the "scissors" against the
peasant and might result in reduced offering of grain (assuming an
elastic demand curve for manufactured goods by the grain
on grain products rise, increasing the peasants money income; whether
or not the prices of the manufactured goods fall - is not certain. If the
peasant saves part of his money income, and the worker reduces his ex-
penditures on consumer goods by the amount he increases his expendi-
tures on grain products, total demand for manufactured consumers'
goods falls and their prices will probably fall. Rising grain prices and
falling manufactured goods price s would be precisely the configuration
of price changes which would increase the confidence of the peasant in
the new currency.
48Th 'nfl' . f .... , R . de I atlonary rmpact 0 rISIng graIn prIces In ussla ur-
ing the NEP was widespread, for rising living costs were quickly re-
flected in increased wages, and increased prices of inputs for light in-
dustry - such as cotton, flax, oil seed, etc., which were sensitive to
the price of grain relative to the price of industrial crops. See Carr-
58a, pp. 191-195.
49Cited by Carr-58a, p. 193, from Shestoi Sezd Pr~E~3si~~
nykh Soiuzov SSSR (1925), p. 246.
50The cycle is perpetuated largely because of market imperfec-
tions in the wage-setting mechanism and other parts of the economy
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Foreign trade policy in 1924/25 was deliberately aimed at
stabilizing prices by ceasing grain exports and importing grain to
attempt to keep grain price increases within reasonable limits in the
early part of 1925. The decis ion to have special imports of consumers
goods was to restrain price increases of manufactured goods in the
countryside. The combined effect of flour, grain, and industrial goods
imports was to help close the scissors at a lower general price level
rather than at a higher price level. Soviet foreign trade policy in 1924/
25 reflected the now conventional deflationary policy of running a large
trade deficit which would reduce aggregate demand relative to aggre-
gate supply. On the face of it, the foreign trade policy for 1924/25 -
the "goods intervention" - seemed to be a victory for as sinsky and
Piatakov, but large imports of foodstuffs and consumers goods were
not precisely what the Left had in mind. They were referring rather
to the import of machinery and raw materials.
Foreign re serve s and dome stic moneta::.y policy. 51 In the
face of the se inflationary pre s sure s, the State Bank did attempt to
restrict the expansion of credit and the chervonets ruble issue in cir-
culation were reduced in February to June, but after June 1925 the
currency supply expanded rapidly - even though Soviet holdings of
(especially budgetary and monetary policy).
51See Arnold-36, pp. 226 ff., and Carr-58, pp. 456-489 for
discussion of financial and monetary policy during this period.
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foreign reserves were declining after 1925.52
In general, currency issue expanded rapidly during 1924/25
despite the outflow of foreign reserve holdings during 1925 which seemed
contrary to the "gold-exchange standard" monetary system the Com-
missariat of Finance and State Bank were trying to develop - i. e., 25%
"firm cover of foreign reserves" for the State Bank note issue, and offi-
cial support of ruble in terms of gold on domestic and foreign ex-
53
changes. This expansion of currency issue in the face of declining
foreign reserve was possible because the total foreign reserves - which
could serve as firm cover (held by both the State Bank and the Commis-
sariat of Finance) were far in exces s of the legal requirements for the
outstanding currency of the State Bank's Issue Department in the begin-
ning of 1924/25.54
Foreign exchange rates and foreign reserv;:~
The official exchange rate of the chervonets more or less
matched the fluctuations on the free Moscow market during the initial
months of the monetary reform, but by April 1924, the chervonets ex-
changes were quoted to (licensed) buyers and sellers at strictly parity
------------.-----.-------------.----,----
52EIKSSSR, p. 49; Arnold-36, p. 226; and Carr-58a, pp. 472-
478. The traditional pattern of note issue in pre-19l4 Russia was a con-
traction after the harve st in the winter month and an expansion during
the late summer and autumn (Carr-58, p. 476).
53
Carr -58a, pp. 476 and 479.
540n the 1st of October, 1924 foreign reserves assigned to the
Issue Department of the State Bank were equal to 46% of outstanding
chevronets currency (Kaufman-25a, p. 187).
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rates (Table VIII. 3). The State Bank interevened through purchase and
sale of gold and foreign currency on the free exchange market to peg
those rates at the parity rate too. They succeeded in holding these free
market rates at close to parity from April 1924 until January 1926 de-
spite the large trade deficit during 1924/25. 55 Ten-ruble gold pieces
were also quoted on the free market at par value in terms of chervonets
56
rubles.
During 1924/25 the chervonets began to be quoted on foreign ex-
changes, especially in the Far East where trade was more or less un-
licensed (Harbin, Teheran, Constantinople) and in the Baltic States
(Riga, Reval, Kovno Kaunas and Rome Table VIII. 4 The quoted
rates fluctuated closely around parity, but this is not surprising, for the
free import and export of chervonets notes was permitted until July 9,
1926, and thus arbitrage was possible between Moscow markets and the
above foreign markets. 57
55Table VIII. 3. See Carr-58a, pp. 479-482.
56Domestic demand for foreign currency was primarily for pur-
poses of hoarding or smuggling over the Asian border - foreign trade
operations were strictly licensed over the European border and licensed
operations could purchase foreign currency at the quoted rates (and had
to sell at quoted rates) (Carr-58a, p. 479.).
57Aizenburg -62, p. 235. The rate s cited by the League of
Nations for chervonets in New York were most likely the official rates
cited by corresponaenrbanks (Chase Manhattan) of the State Bank which
were the so-called "official rate" of the Funds Department of the Moscow
Commodity Exchange. See Chapter VIII for abandonment of the Soviet
attempt to establish a gold-based currency.
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The shipment of precious metals presented an interesting pic-
ture during 1924/25. Gold was returned to the USSR during the first two
quarters of 1924/25 as a result of the 1923/24 trade surplus and monetary
reform, but even larger quantities were shipped out in the second half of
the year 1924/25 as the trade deficit rose sharply in the April-June quar-
ter of 1925 because of grain purchases. 58
Net gold exports were roughly 42 million rubles in 1924/25
Table T-16). Gold reserves fell only slightly during 1925 as domestic
gold production furnished increasing amounts of gold to the State Bank
(Table T-17). 59 In addition, large quantities of silver (30 million rubles)
were imported both in bullion for use in minting the new silver coins and
in the form of minted Soviet coinage from British firms (Table T _16).60
Platinum exports rose (19 million rubles). The net export of all pre-
cious metals were only 24 million rubles despite the huge trade deficit
of 164 million rubles - the balance was covered by credits and the use of
cash reserves abroad (Table T-14). Total foreign reserves, however,
probably declined about 100 million rubles or about 20% of total foreign
reserves held at the end of 1923/24 (Tables T-16 and T-14).
58Appendix A, Technical Note 1, Table A. lb.
59See Appendix E, Table E. 1 for estimate of gold output in 1925.
60Spasskii-62, p. 212.
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Dependence of Soviet economy on foreign trade
during NEP
Import-supply ratios and export-output ratios are a rough
indication of the dependence of various sectors and industries of the
f .' d 61economy on orelgn tra e.
Rough estimates for the ratios of net exports to output (based
on physical quantities) for selected major exports and export-oriented
commodities during the NEP are presented in Table T-20. In 1924/25
we see that exports accounted for a significant portion of the output (or
marketing) of oil seed and products, timber, eggs, flax, oil products,
manganese ore, and asbestos, furs, and several other products - but
in almost all cases, these export-output ratios were below pre-1914
levels. Several major pre-1914 Russian exports - sugar, cloth, and
major grains - were conspicuously absent from the export list and,
in fact, imports of sugar, cloth and wheat were greater than exports
and made a significant contribution to the total domestic supply of these
products in 1925/25 (20% for sugar).
The ratios of net imports to the total supply (output or procure-
ments plus net imports) for selected commodities during NEP are pre-
sented in Table T-21. The dependence of light industry for imported
materials in 1924/25 is the important conclusion here: cotton (57%),
wool (53.1%), leather, tanning materials (70%), all non-ferrous metals
(90-100%) except copper (10%), paper products (60%), rubber (100%).
61See above, Chapter ill, pp. 137, n. 77.
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Heavy industry was relatively independent from imported ferrous metals
(with the exception of ferroalloys). This pattern is not surprising for it
is very similar to the pre-1914 pattern (Table III. 10). One major change
by 1924/25 was that the USSR became a net exporter of coal (2.1% of total
output) as compared to a large net importer before 1913 (18%of total sup-
62
ply).
Soviet marketing :e.~gcy abroad and terms of trade
Russia was a major supplier of several raw materials to West-
ern Europe and the world - manganese ore, platinum, furs, timbers,
oil, flax, eggs, butter, and grains. Foreign prices for most major Rus-
sian exports had risen substantially during and after World War I and in
some cases, new producers had entered the industry or the world mar-
ket wa s controlled by an international cartel. Soviet tactic s in their
attempt to re -enter foreign markets during the NEP varied from product
to product. With respect to goods sold on organized commodity mar-
kets - eggs, butter, grains - the NKVT simply offered its~'exportable
surplus" or export quota for sale at the best possible price. Platinum,
however, was marketed through a foreign syndicate. 63 Oil was sold
initially to foreign oil companies (both independent and the major syndi-
cates (Shell and Standard) and to foreign navies (French, British, Italian,
and Greek). The Soviet Oil Syndicate willingly cut price s to expand sales
to such buyers. By the end of 1924, the Soviet Oil Syndicate began to set
62Table T -20.
63ERSU, Vol. II, #13 (July 1, 1927) and SUA, Vol. VII, No.4
(1928) p. 32-. -- --
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up retail outlets in England (Russian Oil Products or R. O. P. ) and pro-
ceeded to sell oil products at substantial price cuts below the major oil
companies in an aggressive effort to expand their market share held by
their own distributors, and thereby freei.ng Soviet oil exports from the
limited market offered by the major international oil companies. 64
The Soviet policy with respect to flax prices was also interest-
ing. Initially prices were cut sharply in order to enter the markets and
to drive out the new entrants. Krasin in 1925 felt that foreign flax prices
were still too high with respect to the purpose of stimulating sales, and
that Soviet prices might profitably be cut. On the other hand, measures
were taken in 1925 to enforce a "unified sales policy for Soviet flax
abroad, " i. e., to exercise Soviet monopoly power by setting up a Cen-
tral Flax Bureau in the NKVT which had to confirm the conditions of
flax sale contracts made by various organizations having the right to sell
flax abroad. 65
Terms of trade. Since Soviet foreign trade data in current
prices is available only from 1924/25, it has not been possible to calcu-
late unit-value price indexes for imports and exports. However, com-
paring the terms of trade in 1913 and 1924/25 we found that the commodity
terms of trade in 1924/25 were, if anything, slightly better than in 1913
(Table T-28).
----------.-. ..............--.--------------.-.-----
64Fischer-26, p. 119. SUYB-25, p. 259.
65EIKSSSR, pp. 352/79-352/81. Flax exports were among the
most profitable export products in 1923-25. Five agencies apparently
competed with one another in 1925 to the detriment of realized prices
(Krasin-28, p. 180). He asserted that the USSR by 1925 was in a posi-
tion to lead their own price policy, i. e. to exercise monopoly power.
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CHAPTER VIII
THE YEAR OF MISCALCULATION 1925/261
CRISIS IN A GOOD YEAR
The year 1925/26 turned out to be the pivotal year in the Soviet
attempt to restore foreign trade on the basis of NEP agriculture. Soviet
foreign trade simply failed to develop at all as planned. This failure
forced the Soviet leader ship to reconsider the relationship between
Soviet economic growth and the world economy, and to reconsider the
entire process of the recovery of foreign trade and its method of opera-
tion within the NEP economy.
Factors influencing the foreign trade plan of 1925/26
Several factors strongly influenced the 1925/26 foreign trade
plan including 1) Gosplan's optimism stemming from the successful
stabilization of the currency, and the expansion of exports in 1924/25
despite a bad crop, 2) the expectation of an extremely favorable 1925
harvest, 3) a worsening "goods famine" (tovarnye golod) during 1925,
and 4) rapidly increasing demand for materials and equipment for indus-
2try.
ISo described by N. Chernobaev in ENSOVIM (p. 20).
2Krasin-28, p. 159 and Carr-58, pp. 444-445.
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The Commissariat of Finance also pressed energetically for a
large increase of exports and for the "activization of the payments bal-
ance, ,,3 because the previous year's deficit and the expansion of the
chervonetz currency issue had sharply reduced "free reserves" avail-
4able for further expansion of the money supply.
Domestic price policy and world price levels..: Domestic price
policy and price levels projected by Gosplan were strongly influenced by
the relationship between world prices and dome stic price s and their in-
fluence on the expansion of exports (and the demand for imports). Be-
cause of the subsequent price policy measures during 1925/26 and their
impact on agriculture, we quote at length from the "Control Figures for
the Economy for 1925/26" about the influence of world price s on the eco-
nomy.
The level of world prices may be considered another "limit"
having independent and general significance. As long as our eco-
nomy, by virtue of the circumstances which arose in the early
years of the revolution, represented the purest example of "aut-
arky, " the system of dynamic equilibrium of our internal economic
3Sokolnikov, of the Commissariat of Finance, for example, con-
tinued to press for an active trade balance to replenish the depleted gold
reserves even after it was clear that the whole 1925/26 export plan was
overly ambitious (Carr-58, p. 445 citing G. Sokolnikov, Finansovaia
Politika Revoliutsii, Hi (1928), pp. 19, 41-42). -
Sobolev-26 (pp. 67, 69-71) was emphatic about the necessity
of creating a gold reserve, but largely by achieving an active trade bal-
ance rather than through foreign borrowing. Dzerzhinskii-26a (p. 14)
argued that "... the prerequisite of a healthy development of the eco-
nomy is the stability of our currency and - since the export of gold is a
bad basis for this stability - as much as pos sible, an active trade bal-
ance. See Krasin-28, pp. 156-161.
4Gosplan-25 in Spulber-64, p. 396.
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relationships was not appreciably influenced by the world market.
At pre sent, with export -import operations intensively expanding
and amounting to a re spectable figure of the order of two billion
rubles on the prospective balance sheet for the coming year, the
world market is far from being a matter of indifference to us and
in our domestic price policy levels.
This consideration, in conjunction with dome stic market
sales conditions deriving from specific characteristics of the year
ahead (large harvest, abatement of the goods famine given attain-
ment of the expected rate of development for industry), has impel-
led the Commis sion to adopt a rather significantly lowered general
index of commodity prices in its tentative formulations. 5
Most Soviet economists still considered the relationship between domes-
tic and foreign prices (at the current exchange rate) to be a criteria for
export and import op.erations under normal circumstances and for most
industries (except heavy industry). For example, Preobrazhensky, in
his discussion of the "law of value" in price formation in the USSR during
the mid-1920's also wrote:
The maximum barrier '[for domestic prices] where export
crops like flax and hemp, a:n'd import crops like cotton, soft wool
... are involved, is the average price on the world market.
There is no point in the state's buying, for example, cotton within
the country at a price higher than the world market price, unless
it is compelled to do so by the lack of import potential as a result
of insufficiency of foreign exchange. In exactly the same way the
state will avoid buying flax .... for export at price s which, together
with expenditure on transport and other overhead, will exceed the
selling price on the European market .
• . . . the limits of the domain of the state planning prin"ciple in
price policy are set by the world market prices on the one hand,
and on the other by the prices which bring one to the verge of
cessation in the growing of a given crop. 6
5Cosplan-25 in Spulber -64, pp. 397 -398.
6Preobrazhensky -26, pp. 171-172.
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The 1925/26 Foreign Trade Plans
The 1925/26 Export-Import Plan: 1st Variants 7
The original foreign trade plan for 1925/26 was drawn up as
part of Gosplan's "Control Figures for the National Economy for 1925/
26" and suffered from (and contributed to) the great optimism pervading
Gosplan in the summer of 1925. Go splan' s original control figure s pre-
dicted exports of 1200 million rubles, or more than double 1924/25 ex-
ports. Imports were to be increased to 1010 million rubles, or almost
40% greater than 1924/25. A trade surplus of 190 million rubles was
projected to replenish foreign reserves depleted by the 165 million ruble
balance of trade deficit in 1924/25.
In July 1925 NKVT was only slightly less optimistic than Gosplan
and submitted an export plan of 1105. 2 million rubles, an import plan of
1009. 7 million rubles and a projected trade surplus of only 95 million
rubles. This preliminary variant of the foreign trade plan was confirmed
8by STO and Gosplan on July 31, 1926. Output, investment and internal
trade plans were drawn up on the basis of import quotas established with-
in the limits of this confirmed import plan and NKVT immediately began
to issue import licenses to the authorized economic agencies and firms,
who then proceeded to produce on the basis of these original import
7All plan figures from Table T -1. Several articles were written
about the 1925/26 foreign trade plan: Sobblev-26a, Sobolev-26b, Kaktyn-
26a, EIKSSSR, p. 55££, Ekon. Zhisn, September 1, 1926, Eventov-26a.
8EIKSSSR, p. 57, and Sobolev -26a, p. 72. Expected trends in
domestic and world prices were not explicitly mentioned.
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quotas. A foreign exchange plan (valuta plan) and quarterly foreign
trade plans were also drawn up to guide Gosbank and the Commis sariat
of Finance in the receipt and disbursement of foreign exchange. 9
Structure of the 1925/26 Foreign Trade Plan (1st variant). The
success of the 1925/26 foreign trade plan depended largely on the govern-
ment's success in procuring and exporting grain. Exports of grain and
related products were projected at 500 million rubles and were to account
for 400 of the 546 million ruble increase projected for exports (Table
VIII. 1). Grain and related products would make up 45% of total exports
planned for 1925/26 (Table VIII. 1).
The structure of the export plan in its 1st variant was again
similar to the pre -1914 structure (Table T -4) - - a fact not mis sed by the
critics of NKVT and Gosplan in later year s. Since negligible grain
imports were probably planned for 1925/26, the improved grain harvest
would make an additional 500 million rubles of foreign exchange avail-
able for non-foodstuffs imports. Thus, the improvement in import cap-
acity was even more favorable than sugge sted by the planned increase in
imports of 250 million rubles, for the planned reduction in consumers'
goods resulted from the elimination of grain imports (made possible by
the good harvest) and concealed a planned increase in the imports of tea
and manufactured consume r goods.
Increased exports of non-grain agricultural products accounted
for about 70 million of the remaining 146 million ruble proj ected in-
crease in exports. Increased industrial exports accounted for about
9Sobo1ev-26a, p. 76.
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TABLE VIII. 1
USSR: FOREIGN TRADE AND FOREIGN TRADE PLAN 1925/26
(ORIENTATION FIGURES, JULY 31, 1925)
(millions rubles at current prices)
E xp 0 r t s
Actual Plan Actual Percent % change
1924/25 1925/26 1925/26 Fulfillmert
from
1924/25
Grain and related
products 103 ~ 500 198 39.6 +92.2
Animal and poultry 94 '> 150 97 64.6 + 3.2
Fur and fish 81 > 70 82 117.1 + 1. 2
Othe r agricultural
products 64 ~ 90 52 57.8 - 18. 8
Timber products 73 ') 100 58 58. 0 -20. 5
Othe r (industrial)
products 144 < 195 189 96.9 +31. 3
Total Exports 559 1105 677 61. 2 +21. 1
Imports
Actual Plan Actual Percent % changefrom
1924/25 1925/26 1925/26 Fulfillmert 1924/25
Raw materials 244 363 273 75.2 +11.8
Semi-proce s sed
materials 113 173 146 84.3 +29.2
Industrial equipm't 50 116 }84 J 65.6 J +68.0Electrical equipm't - 12
Transport equipm't 21 14 23 164.2 + 9. 5
Producer's goods
for agriculture 42 103 59 57.2 +40.4
Consumer's goods 240 ~ 192 154 80.2 -35.9
Other imports and
reserves 13 ~ 36 17 47.2 +30.7
Total Imports 724 1010 756 74.8 + 4.4
Source: Notes to Table VIII. 1, Appendix B, p. 767.
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only 75 million ruble s so that almost the entire burden of expanding ex-
ports rested with agriculture (Table VIII. 1). 10 The share of exports in
agricultural marketing would increase from 7.1% in the poor harvest
year 1924/25 (9.7% in 1923/24) to 15.3% in 1925/2611 and about 40-45%
of the increase in marketing was to be exported. 12
The ambitious targets for exports were undoubtedly a re sponse
to the heavy demands for imports by industry and dome stic trade and the
"Control Figures for 1925/26" revealed the growing dependence of fur-
ther growth of the economy on the successful expansion of foreign trade.
In 1925/26 industrial output was expected to reach 93.5% of 1913 levels,
while foreign trade turnover - even with this ambitious 1925/26 foreign
10According to Krasin-28 (pp. 156 -159), the agricultural export
plan was based on the assumption of a 250/0increase in agricultural out-
put (1913 prices) and a 280/0increase in agricultural marketing (1913
prices), and 137% increase in agricultural exports (1925 prices).
llKrasin-28, p. 158.
12Based on coefficient of marketing of agricultural products,
the share of agricultural goods exported, and gros s agricultural output.
Cited in Krasin-28, p. 156.
Value of % of agric. Marketing Agric. Agric.
agric. output % of 1'913' exports exports 0/0
output marketed marketing % average 1913 agric.
1913 pro marketing exports
1913 12.8 33.6 100.0 27. 6 100.0
1922/23 8.2 30. 1 57.4 4.2 8. 7
1923/24 8.8 30..4 62.2 9. 7 21. 9
1924/25 9. 1 31. 2 66. 0 7. 1 17. 0
Plan '25/26 11. 4 31. 8 84. 3 15. 3 46. 7
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trade plan - was expected to attain only 44% of pre -1914 exports. 13 In
some industries such as the rubber, leather, and textile industrie s,
shortages of imported raw materials (hide s, tanning materials, rubber,
wool) were the barriers to increased output. 14 Strong efforts were being
made to increase cotton output - the largest item in Soviet imports - and
no significant increase in cotton or wool imports was planned for 1925/26
because of the excellent cotton harvest projected for 1925.15 Neverthe-
less, imports of raw and semi-processed materials were to be increased
50% and the production plans of the import-dependent industries were
closely tied to the confirmed import plans. In turn, the domestic trade
plan for the supply of manufactured goods to the countryside (e specially
to the grain surplus areas) to alleviate the deepening goods famine re-
lied on both the timely fulfillment of dome stic production plans and the
implementation of the special import plans for manufactured consumer
goods (cloth, tea, herring, spices and artisans instruments). Spending
scarce foreign exchange on finished consumer goods when domestic in-
dustrial output was restricted by the lack of imported materials and
b S .. t 16equipment caused considerable de ate among OVlet economlS s.
l3Krasin-28, p. 156. Not certain about territorial basis of
comparison.
l4Lack of capital equipment was cited as a limiting factor only
for paper, starch, and molasses, and agricultural machinery industries.
Market capacity was thought to be the limiting factor in the output of
metal and tobacco industries. (Gosplan-25 in Spulber-64, p. 346).
15Krasin-28, p. 208.
16In general, those associated with the Right supported the
policy of "goods intervention, " but the Left was split. Preobrazhenskii-
27a (in Spulber -64, pp. 156-157) opposed advancing funds for consumer
goods imports from the general import fund. Smigla, however, suppor-
ted the policy (Dobb-48, pp. 200-201).
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Because of excess industrial capacity in early NEP, little
industrial investment had been undertaken (Table T -50). But by the
beginning of 1925/26, pressure for investment in industry grew as the
inherited capital stock depreciated without replacement and output was
approaching plant capacity in several industries. Investment projected
for state industry was more than twice 1924/25 levels. 17 This increased
investment program depended to some extent on the planned expansion of
"d "1 h" " 18In ustrIa mac Inery Imports.
In summary, the achievement of the plan targets established
in the first set of Control Figures for 1925/26, the increases in output,
the realization of investment plans, and the restoration of equilibrium
in the rural markets for manufactured consumers I goods were thought
to be dependent on the implementation of the original import plan adopted
for 1925/26. The implementation of this import plan in turn depended on
the realization of the export plan, which in turn depended largely on grain
exports.
17See "Note s to Table T - 50" for a discus sian of se ctora1 divi-
sion of the economy in Soviet statistics. Based on Rykov-26a (p. 11)
which cited one billion rubles inve stment in state industry a s the ori-
ginal investment target in 1925/26, and T-50 for actual investment in
current prices of 481 million rubles in 1924/25.
l8proj ected industrial machinery imports were 156%greater
than 1924/25 machinery imports (Table VIII. 2). Recall from Chapter III
that the Rus sian economy relied more on imports to supply machinery
to some industrial sectors (such as paper -making, chemical, metal-
lurgical, and textile machinery) than others (simple metal-working ma-
chinery, electrical equipment).
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Downward revision of the 1925/26
foreign trade plan
The state procurement agencies encountered severe difficulties
in purchasing the planned quantities of grain in August and September of
1925, and large foreign contracts made in anticipation of the large wheat
exports were filled only at the cost of driving up domestic wheat prices
in September (T _38).19 Furthermore, foreign grain prices (and export
prices in general) dipped sharply in late summer of 1925 (Tables T-38,
T-39, T-40). By October, 1925, it was clear that the original export
plan was utterly unrealistic and impos sible to fulfill. Export receipts
fell far short of the original quarterly export plan (and probably also of
the lower revised export plan) for October-December, 1925.20 As a
consequence, a large balance of trade deficit was incurred in the first
quarter of 1925/26 instead of the expected "normal" trade surplus that
was to come from the surge of grain exports. 21 It was imperative that
both the export plan and the import plan be revised downward to real-
istic levels if a catastrophic trade deficit was to be avoided. 22
19The grain export plan for July-September, 1925 was poorly
fulfilled. See below, p.263, for discussion of this plan and
poor plan fulfillment.
20Ekon. Zhisn February 24, 1927, noted that actual exports
(181.6 million ruble s) fell short of planned export s (207 million ruble s)
by 25.4 million rubles, for the September-December 1925/26. This
quarterly plan referred most likely to a revised plan rather than the
original plan, for exports were normally largest in the autumn quarter,
so that the quarterly plan for the original plan was probably set at 250-
300 million rubles.
2lSee Tables A. lb and A. lc. Deliveries of consumer goods
ordered in August of 1925 swelled imports during this quarter.
22The difference between the value of actual exports and the
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Revision of 1925/26 foreign trade plan. Reducing the overall
import target required a reduction of the original import quotas, and
since the original targets of import-dependent industries and the in-
vestment plan were based on these import quotas, reducing these
quotas would also require reducing the original output, inve stment, and
domestic trade plans. This complex task was begun in October 1925 by
the "highest organs of the national economy" (presumably STO or VSNKh)
and the "final" revision was completed only at the end of January 26 -
after the 14th Party Congress in December. 23
In the final revised plan for 1925/26, the export target was re-
duced 35% to 720 million rubles, and the import targets were reduced
32% to 685 million rubles; the trade surplus was set at a mere 35 mil-
lion rubles (compared to the 190 million rubles surplus originally pro-
jected by Gosplan). 24 Cash payments for imports were projected at 550
million and the rest to be financed through short-term foreign credits.
The difference between cash receipts and cash payments for imports was
t f" 'bl d' d f' 2
5
o payor InVlSl e tra e Items an to augment orelgn reserves.
original import plan in 1925/26 was 333 million rubles. To have in-
curred such a deficit would have endangered their ability to get credits
abroad and to maintain the "legal" firm cover for the chervonetz issue.
Soviet foreign reserves on January 1, 1926, were about 400 million
rubles (Table T-17).
23Sobolev-26a, p. 73. An interim revision of the export plan
to 800 million rubles had already been made by the end of November.
See Carr -58a, p. 445, n. 4.
24Table T -1, Plan A 1925/26 and Plan C 1925/26.
25Sobolev-26a, p. 73. It should be noted that several tempor-
ary revisions were apparently rnade between October, 1925 and Jan~ary,
1926, and possibly again after January. Sobolev-26b (p. 30) wrote In
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By the beginning of the summer 1926, however, the supply of
several industrial materials provided largely by imports were running
low and by September 2, 1926 three "above -quota plans" had been
adopted at the urging of VSNKh (54 million rubles, 73. 5 million rubles,
and 170 million rubles). 26 The above-quota plan for 170 million rubles
was probably for the equipment imports to be financed by the medium-
term 300 million mark credit (135 million rubles) which was guaran-
teed by the German government. This credit was negotiated during
the spring and summer of 1926, and the equipment imports would ex-
27tend over several years.
VSNKh argued that these "above-quota" plans were necessary
to take advantage of seasonal fluctuation in world prices for raw
November 1926 that the export plan for 1925/26 was 753 million rubles
and the import plan was 685, which suggests that the export plan may
have been revised upward in the July-September quarter as the new
grain crop came in.
26Ekon. Zhizh September 1, 1926. Sobo1ev-26b (p. 35) stated
that "above -estimate " plans for 1925/26 added "more than 130 million
rubles" to the basic plan of 1925/26 which is much 1es s than the 300 mil-
lion rubles mentioned in the text. The first two plans alone came to
about 130 million rubles. This difference probably arose because these
above -e stimate plans we re to be carried out during both the end of the
1925/26 and during the 1926/27 economic years. Payment for these
above -quota plans were to fall due largely in the early part of 1926/27
and a smaller part in 1927/28 and 1928/29.
27Some references to the "300 million mark" German credit
are the following: Julius Lengyel, "Die Kreditaktion, II SUA, Vol. V,
No. 13 (1926), pp. 5-9; "Zur Abwicklung des Deutschen ""Gti'arantiekre-
dUs," SUA, VoL VII, No. 8/9 (1928), pp. 18-20; "Die Ausnutzung des
Garantiekredits, " SUA, VoL V, No. 18 (1926), pp. 10-13.
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materials ("plan for seasonal purchase s "), and to import materials,
whose supply had been exhausted; some industries would have been
forced to shut down for part of the summer if additional imports were
not made available. 28
Fulfillment of the 1925/26 foreign trade plan
Despite favorable crops and continuing economic recovery the
year 1925/26 was a crisis year for the Soviet economy in general and for
foreign trade in particular. The sluggish growth of foreign trade and its
adverse effect on the national economy bode ill for the restoration of
foreign trade to a leading sector in economic growth of the USSR - and
for the industrialization strategy of the Right. 29 Foreign trade grew
much less than the original foreign trade plan (and the plans for other
28In addition to the se "above -quota" plans, some small non-
planned imports of buses, railway cars, rubber, and agricultural ma-
chinery were permitted.
Sobolev-26b, p. 35. Sobolev disapproved strongly of the "plan
for seasonal" purchases on the ground that it was merely an excuse to
raise the "import quotas of these industries and a break in the planning
front." He interpreted the plan for emergency imports only slightly
more favorably and suggested that the enterprise adjust production to
the planned supply of imported raw materials, confirmed at the beginning
of the year, rather than expending them rapidly at the beginning of the
plan period and then requesting extra imports (Sobolev-26b, pp. 35-37).
Sobolev ignored the fact that imports of raw materials were destined
largely for the consumer goods sector during this period, and it would
almost undoubtedly conserve foreign exchange to import raw materials
rather than the finished product a s was one in the fall of 1925. A large
supply of consumer goods was most important just before and during the
harvest season; cutting back output to levels of available (imported) raw
materials could aggravate the goods famine and possibly reduce market-
ing and exports.
29Chapter II, pp. 74 ff.
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included oil products, sugar, manganese are} grew according to plan. 30
Imports. Imports of all commodity groups (except foodstuffs)
increased over 1924/25 levels (Tables VIII. 1 and T -5). 31 Actual imports
in 1925/26 were nevertheless below the original planned import targets
for most goods including raw materials (75% of plan), industrial equip-
ment (65% of plan) and producer's goods for agriculture (570/0of plan),
semi-processed materials (84. 30/0of plan), and consumers' goods (80.2%
of plan (Table VIII. 1). The excessive fulfillment of the lower revised
import plan, however, suggests that the cutbacks in import targets made
after October 1925 were even lower than those actually achieved. Imp1e-
menting the decision to keep import at levels far below the original plan
target was hindered by poor timing and control over the distribution of
import licenses. For example, by the end of the second quarter, licen-
ses had already been issued for 109% of the yearly import quota for agri-
cultural producers' goods (presumably of the revised import plan), 94.1%
for consumers' goods, 116.5% for motorcycles, 79.80/0 for equipment and
91%for raw materials. 32 Apparently import licenses for 1925/26 were
30Table VIII. 1. Exports of furs exceeded the plan in value be-
cause of a sharp price rise; quantity actually fell (Tables T -26 and T -29).
31 . 1 . d' 1 t' t' th .Most raw materIa s were lmporte In arger quan lIes an In
1924/25 although the value of some imports fell because of price declines
(Table T -27). Declines in cotton and wool prices were particularly large
and had a significant affect on the import price index in 1925/26 because
of the importance of cotton and wool in Soviet imports in this period
(14.5% and 6.6% of 1924/25 and 15.6% and 5.5% of 1925/26 imports). The
increase in raw material imports evaluated in 1925/26 prices was about
300/0.
32Ekon. Zhizn, September 1, 1926.
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already being issued during August-October 1925 on the basis of the
.. 1 h h. h . t t. f. 33 h . b k.orlglna muc Ig er orlen a Ion Igures, so t at cuttIng ac Imports
became quite difficult (e specially if it required cancelling foreign order s
or revising the production targets of import-dependent industries). The
imports of consumer goods in exce s s of plan (113%for cloth, 109% for
tea, 34 136% for herring and 148% for shoe leather) also suggests inade-
quate control over the issuing of licenses. 35 Cutting imports back to
the revised plan was hindered further by the adoption of above -quota
plans for raw material imports, but this was a willful breach in the
import plan made by VSNKh, which was unwilling to permit interruption
of production for the lack of raw materials. 36
33A. Potiaev in Vneshnaia Torgovlia, (January, 1926) cited in
Kon-26, p. 128.
34The import quota for tea was cut from 24'million rubles to
19 million rubles. Actual imports were 22.1 million rubles in 1925/26
(ST, Vol. I, No. 11, p. 47).
35Ekon. Zhizn, September 1, 1926.
36Apparently, the "above quota plans" were not completely car-
ried out during the economic year 1925/26, for imports exceeded the
revised plan by 71 million rubles rather than the 130 (or 300) million
rubles stipulated in the "above -quota plans." The lag in effecting deliv-
ery is the basic reason for this "underfulfillment" of these plans. Pre-
sumably the undelivered portion of these above -quota plans were incor-
porated in the 1926/27 plan.
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Critical report of the worker -peasant
inspectorate (NKRKI) 3 ~
According to a highly critical report by the NKRKI, the under-
fulfillment of the (revised) foreign trade plan was due to faulty planning
and poor administration by NKT (Commis sariat of Trade). 38 NKT' s
alleged shortcomings included deficiencie s in allocation of quotas among
export organizations, the absence of a firm procurement plan, poor con-
trol of plan fulfillment by the separate organizations, and inadequate use
of the world price cycle in the export of several grains. The losses and
low profitability was ascribed to high marketing costs, high-cost foreign
export credits, rruncoordinated" activities of export organizations on
foreign markets, unskillful market maneuvering, and last, "unfavorable"
relationships between domestic and foreign prices. 39
NKRKI's report seemed to avoid the more salient causes of the
export problems during 1925/26, namely the procure~ent and export
problems caused by the goods famine, the official (low) procurement
price policy, and the commercial losses resulting largely from a de-
cline in world prices. 40 Furthermore, NKRKI's recommendations
37Ekon. Zhizn, September 1, 1926.
38Recall that the Commissariat of Foreign Trade (NKVT) and
the Commis sariat of Internal Trade were merged into the Commissar-
iat of Trade (NKT) in November, 1925.
39Ekon. Zhizn, September 1, 1926. "Uncoordinated activities
of export or ganizatiorlS' , referred to competitive selling on the same
market by different Soviet export agencies, for NKRKI recommended
"measures to reduce unhealthy competition on foreign markets between
separate organizations." That is, they recommended the use of what-
ever monopoly power they had in a given market.
40See below "Profitability of Exports. "
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(stricter control of plan fulfillment of export quotas by domestic agen-
cies and measures to lower procurement prices and overhead costs)
completely avoided the basic problems of the peasant's unwillingness
to market at the pric es desired by the government and an overvalued
41exchange rate.
With respect to import operations, NKRKI criticized both the
actual allocation of import quotas and the entire system for granting
import licenses. 42 NKRKI r,ecommended 1) to not permit overfulfill-
ment of the import plan for consumers' goods at the expense of pro-
ducer's goods (raw materials, and machinery), and 2} to "give to VSNKh
the deciding right in questions of allocation of import quotas for pro-
ducer's goods as regards the approval of the specific issue of licenses
41Ekon. Zhizn, September 1, 1926. The basic recommenda-
tions for improving exports were I} to establish strict controls on the
fulfillment of the plan by organizations, 2} to allocate specific areas
the procurement of export goods among procurement agencies, 3) to
review the procurement price policy to as sure the profitability of ex-
ports, 4} to allocate specific quotas of the export plan to exporters,
5} to take measures to reduce unhealthy competition on foreign markets
between various organizations, 6) to allocate areas of activities between
trade representatives of different countrie s, 7) to refrain from the sys-
tem of conferring monopoly rights to foreign firms for the sale of own
export goods, and 8) to export basic goods only on the basis of firm con-
tracts. NKRKI recommended the exploitation of the monopoly position
of the state on both side s of the market - as a monopolist in the sale
of exports abroad, and as a monopsonist in the purchases of goods
from the peasants.
42"The allocation of quotas by organizations as well as the
system for giving out licenses was unsatisfactory. A dispersion of
licenses and a lack of coordination led to unhealthy competition, high
overhead expenses for imported goods, inadequate efficiency in the
purchase of small batches.'" (Ekon. Zhizn, September 1, 1926).
262
and to the allocation of quotas among economic organizations, " i. e. ,
to transfer the right to issue licenses from NKT to a higher economic
body so that differences among various ministries and syndicates would
be resolved at the highest level. 43
Breakdown of the 1925/26 export
campaign: its cause s
Exports failed to grow as expected because of four interrelated
factors: 1) fundamentally inaccurate proj ections about the output of
export goods (especially for grain), 2) a decline in world prices for
major export goods, 3) difficulties in procuring agricultural products
caused by the government's purchasing and pricing policies (particu-
1ar1y for major export goods whose prices were lowered to maintain
their export profitability), and by the "goods famine" in rural areas,
and 4) increases in domestic demand and prices which diverted export
goods to domestic markets under the NEP system of markets, private
traders, and free contract by State enterprises.
This government's inability to fulfill its procurement and ex-
port plans under the NEP market system led to major changes in both
export policy and the government Is attitude toward the organization
and operation of the markets for various goods (especially with respect
43NKRKI failed to point out that the "above-quota plans" adopted
on the initiative of VSNKh at the end of the third quarter aggravated the
import deficit.
Other criticisms and recommendations by the NKRKI included
"schematic" foreign exchange plans and inadequate control of the deposit
and accounting of foreign exchange, inefficiency in administration of the
tariff system and the need to carefully calculate the cost of credits so
as to avoid using very high cost credits -- credit costs were apparently
as high as "40, 50, 100% per year" (Ekon. Zhizn., September 1, 1926).
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to the role of the private trader). For this reason we discuss in con-
siderable detail the development of exports in 1925/26.
Grain exports in 1925/26: plan and failuIle 44
Plan and inaccurate assumptions. The original plan for ex-
ports of grain and related products in the 1925/26 (EY) was based on
the export of roughly 6.0 - 6.4 million m. t. of grain and related pro-
ducts (about 500 million rubles). 45
The ambitiousness of the projected recovery of grain exports
for 1925/26 is best seen by comparing the 1925/26 grain export plan to
grain exports before 1914 and during 1923/24 and 1924/25 (Table T -11).
44Chapter XI analyzes the causes of the grain marketing prob-
lem during the NEP.
45Sobolev-26a, p. 72. See Technical Note 6 in Appendix A
for a definition of grain and related products. My estimate for the
planned quantity of grain exports based on the planned export of grain
products for the agricultural year of 1925/26 from Balaban-28 (p. 216).
Rykov-26 (p. 8) also cited an export plan figure for the agricultural
year of 6. 2 million tons. The agricultural year ran from July 1 to
June 30 and the economic year ran from October 1 to September 30.
Thus, the use of the agricultural year export plan as a basis for esti-
mating the economic year export plan assumed that the July -September
quarterly export plan for 1925 for the agricultural year was identical
to the July-September quarterly export plan for 1926 for the economic
year. This assumption seems to be conservative. Oilseed and oil-
cake export plan was assumed to be identical to actual 1925/26 (EY)
exports, thereby giving us a rough estimate of the planned volume of
grain exports.
Carr -58 (p. 291) cited an "early grain export plan" of 5. 7 -
6. 0 million m. t. from several sources including: Na Agrarnom
Fronte, No. 7-8 (1925), p. 52; Plan. Khoz. No.9 (1925), pp. 5-9,
and No. 10 (1925), pp. 47-48 and was repeated in a speech by Kamenev
as late as September 4, 1925 (Pravda, September 17, 18, 1925). Carr
does not specify if the export plan was for grain products alone or for
grain and related products, and for the economic year or agricultural
year.
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The planned quantity was about one-half of the average annual grain ex-
ports from Russia during 1909-1913 and more than double the exports of
grain and related products in the best NEP years 1923/24. Net grain
exports were negligible during 1924/25.46 This optimistic grain export
plan assumed the following. The harvest of grain products was forecast
at 75. 5 million m. t., only 4. 5 - 6.0 million m. t. below the average
harvest in the same territory during 1909-1913, and 470/0larger than the
1924 harvest of 51.4 million tons. 47 Expected per capita output would
be only 920/0of 1913per capita output.48 The procurement for planned
agencies for 1925/26 (AY) was projected at 12.8 million m. t. of grain
products of which 6. 2 million m. t. were to be exported. 49 In compari-
son, purchases by planned agencies in 1924/25 (AY) were only 4.6 mil-
lion m. t. (Table T -8). According to the export plan, grain product
46Exports of grain and related products in 1924/25 consisted
about one -half oilseed and oilcake. Almost all the export of grain pro-
ducts in the economic year 1924/25 actually came from the initial pro-
curements of the 1925 harvest during the July-September quarter
(Table T -10).
47The actual harvest of grain products was estimated by Gos-
plan at 72. 5 tons (Balaban-28, p. 214 and Table T -8). SUA, (Vol. V,
No.5, p. 10) noted that the harvest for 1925 was somewliatless than
the estimates made in June and July. The amount of the overestimate
of the 1925 harvest was on the order of 3.2 million tons.
Carr-58a (p. 291) cited an early estimate of the 1925 harvest
of 65. 5 - 68.8 million m. t. See sources in footnote 45 on page 263
above.
48Expected harvest of 75.5 million m. t. divided by population
of 143. 7 million on January 1, 1926 and compared with per capita out-
put in 1913 (Table T-12).
49Rykov-26a, p. 8. "Planned agencies" refer to those agen-
cies, which receive definite procurement targets from the central
government. They were granted credits from the State Bank, were
allocated definite areas of operation, and were assigned certain grain
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exports would be 8.2% of the gross harvest in 1925/26 as compared
to 11.8% of the gross harvests during 1909-13 (Table III. 5).
The "total marketing of grain products" to all buyers (state,
cooperative and private) was probably projected at about 15-17 million
m. t. in the original grain plan for 1925/26 (AY). 50 "Earlier estimates"
of total (gross?) grain marketing in 1925/26 (EY or AY not defined) ran
as high as 19.6 m. t. 51 In contrast, total marketing was 8.6 million
supply tasks. Furthermore, their purchase prices were more strictly
controlled by the central government.
50The definition of "grain marketing" as used in Soviet litera-
ture of the period is imprecise (Karcz -67, p. 409 ff) for a number of
reasons including 1) definition of "grain, " 2) imprecise specification
of agricultural year or economic year and 3) the problem of sale and
repurchase by the rural population.
Three definitions of grain marketing are used in this study,
gross grain marketing, total grain marketin~ and !let grain marketing.
Gross grain marketing refers to total sales by the rural population
without any deduction for repurchases by the ]:ural population. Net
grain marketing refers to total sales by the rural population minus the
purchases of grain by the rural population. The term "total grain
marketing" is used in this study to refer to the term "marketing" as
used by Balaban-28, and elsewhere in Soviet literature of the period;
the term has no precise definition, but by comparing the figures for
"total grain marketing" cited in Balaban-28 (p. 214) for 1925/26, and
the figures for gross and net marketing cited by Karcz-67 (p. 408)
for 1925/26, we see that the term "total marketing" must refer to some
definition between gross and net marketing (unless the difference is ex-
plained entirely by the first two factors mentioned at the beginning of
this note). Possibly "total grain marketing" does not include resale
to the rural population in the immediate vicinity of the original pur-
chase of the grain.
51
Carr -58a (p. 291) cited an early estimate of total (gros s?)
grain marketing of 19. 6 million m. t., of which Sokolnikov estimated
that 13.1 - 14. 7 million m. t. would be collected by the state. See
sources in footnote 45 on page 263. Sokolnikov's estimate is from
Sotsialisticheskoe Khoziaistvo, No.4, 1925, p. 5.
Our figure for the preliminary estimate of total marketing is
based on the assumption that the share of the private trader in grain
purchases would decline in 1925/26 (AY), but that the quantity of grain
products purchased by the private trader (and non-planned agencies)
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m. t. in 1924/25 (AY) and 10 million m. t. (including tax-in-kind) in
1923/24 (AY) (Table T -8).
The proj ected "total ma rketing coefficient" (tovarnost' or total
grain marketing as percentage of gross harvest) implied in the above
data was about 20 -22. 5% of the gros s grain product harve st; this was
significantly higher than the "total marketing coefficient" in 1923/24
(15.2%) when marketing was stimulated by a tax-in-kind, and in 1924/25
(16.7%) when the crop failed. 52 The marketing plan for1925/26 (AY)
assumed high margina1-propensity-to-market grain (about 40% based
on actual total marketing in 1923/24 and total marketing predicted for
would be the same as in 1924/25, i. e., about 3 to 4 million m. t.
(Table T -8). The evidence that private traders would be allowed to
continue to function in the grain markets in 1925/26 (AY) as they func-
tioned in 1924/25 (AY) is that the effective measures to restrict the
private trader's activity were taken hastily at the end of the first
half of 1925/26 (AY) procurement campaign (See below, p. 268, n. 58).
52The projected "total marketing coefficient" for 1925/26 (AY)
was, however, still considerably below the "average ratio of shipments
of grain products to gross harvest of grain products" (27.9%) during
1909-13 (Table III. 5). This latter ratio is a rough approximation to the
"total marketing coefficient. "
Figures for 1923/24 and 1924/25 based on data in Table T -8.
Balaban-28 (p. 214) presented total marketing coefficients differing
from those cited in the text.
1923/24 1924/25 1925/26 (actual)
Harve st: (rriillions m. t. ) 58.2 53. 0 72.4
Marketed Grain
(millions m. t.) 10.0 8. 7 12.2
Marketed Grain as
(% of Harve st) 17.1% 16.4% 16. 9%
The difference between Balaban's estimates and my estimates resulted
from different figure s for the harve sts.
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1925/26 (Table T-8). The marketing experience, however, during
1923/24 and 1924/25 did not support the planner's assumption of high
marginal propensities to market- -especially when considering the
depletion of peasant's grain stocks, from the poor 1924 harvest.
Failure of the grain export campaign 1925/26. Early August
rains cut the crop estimates by about 3. 7 million m. t. and according to
Carr, this led to a hasty reduction in grain export targets from 5.7-6. a
.. 53
to 3.8 -4. 3 million m. t. - -still a respectable graIn export program.
The increasing difficulties in fulfilling procurement and ex-
port plans at the official procurement prices (which were at the time
influenced by foreign prices) in the July-September quarter of 1925
led to a downward revision in the grain plan. 54 According to Rykov,
53Carr-58a, p. 291, citing Plan. Khoz. No. 10, 1925, p. 54,
and No.1, 1926, pp. 41-42.
54Sobolev-26a, p. 73. Dzershenzkii-26, p. 14. Rykov-26a,
p. 8.
The grain procurement and export plans for July-September
1925 was underfulfilled. According to SUA (Vol. V, No. 12 [1926]
pp. 77-88), the procurement plan for July-September 1925 was set at
2. 7 million tons of all grains (983 thousand tons for exports, 1, 785
thousand tons for domestic use). Wheat was to be about 42% of July-
September exports, and rye only about 50/0.
Only 720, 000 tons were procured for export (73. 30/0of plan)
but 1,884, 000 tons were procured for domestic consumption (105% of
plan). The overall procurement plan was 940/0fulfilled. Four unfavor-
able trends appear during the July-September quarter. First, plans
for domestic consumption were overfulfilled at the cost of the export
plans; i. e., domestic demands were satisfied first, and in essence,
exports were a residual. Second, the export procurement plan for
wheat, the most profitable and highest priced export grain, lagged
below plan, while barley, the cheapest grain on foreign markets, was
procured in above plan quantities. This change in the composition of
grain exports further depressed export earnings from grain. Third,
domestic agricultural prices did not fall as much as expected, and
began to rise sharply in the September-February period. Fourth,
foreign market prices dipped sharply in the summer of 1925.
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the procurement plan for planned agencies was reduced from 12. 8 to
9. 8 million m. t. and led to a reduction in grain export plan. 55
Grain procurements and grain exports fell far short of all the
plans described above. Exports of grain and related products were
only 2.6 million m. t. in 1925/26 (EY) instead of the originally projec-
ted 6. 0 - 6. 5 million m. t. (and revised export program of 3. 8 - 4. 3
million m. t. ) while the value of exports of grain and related products
reached only 198 million rubles or 39. 6% of the original plan for grain
exports. 56 The ratio of exports to gross harvest for grain products
fell to about 2. 7% (instead of rising to planned 8. 2%). 57
Actual procurements by planned agencies during 1925/26 (AY)
were 8.44 million m. t. or 86% of the lower revised plan (and 65% of
the original plan). Even this smaller quantity of grain was obtained
only by restricting the grain purchases of the private traders through
prohibitive railroad rates and other restrictive measures adopted during
the winter and spring of 1925/26. 58
55Rykov-26a, p. 18. See Sobolev-26a, p. 73, and Dzerzhenski-
26, p. 14.
56Table T -11. The grain export plan for the agricultural year
1925/26 (6.2 million m. t. ) was only 32.7% fulfilled (2.03 million m. t. ).
If oilseed and oilcake are included, it was 42. 7% fulfilled (Balaban-28,
p. 216).
57Balaban-28, p. 216. In 1923/24 this ratio was about 4%.
58The Soviet government adopted strong restrictive measures
against the private grain trader toward the end of the October -December
quarter because competition from private traders was forcing prices
above the official procurement price thereby capturing a larger part of
the grain sales at the expense of plan realization of planned agencies.
The differential between private grain purchase prices and official pro-
curement purchases is shown in Table T-36; private purchase prices
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The reduced purchases by the private traders were not offset
by increased purchases by planned agencies. 59 Total marketing of
grain increased only 3.6 million m. t. (to 12.2 million m. t. in 1925/26
(AY), instead of to the planned 15 - 17 million m. t.) Since the 1925
harvest was 21 million m. t. higher than 1924, the incremental market-
ing coefficient was only about 17% rather than the predicted 40%.
averaged between 14% to 25% higher than official procurement price in
1925/26.
The measures to restrict the private grain trade included the
prohibition of state agencies from procuring through private traders,
limitation on the milling of private grain in state and cooperative mills,
increasing railway tariffs for private grain, effectively barring rain
from city markets, etc., so that in the second half of the grain cam-
paign, private shipments fell off to 20% of previous levels (Balaban-28,
p. 214).
For further discussion of the measures against private grain
traders, see Haensel-30 (pp. 68-69). See Timoshenko-32 (pp. 441-452)
for a discus sion of the gradual evolution of the grain monopoly during
1925-1928. The effect of these restrictions on the share of the private
trader in the grain market is seen in the figures below.
Percentage of Total Shipments
at Ra i1r oad Contr 01 Point s
September 1925
October 1925
September 1926
October 1926
Non-planned State Private Planned
& Co-op Agencies Traders Agencies
18.4 22. 7 58.9
20. 1 21. 4 58.4
12. 3 6. 5 81. 2
10.8 2.8 86.4
Source: SUA, Vol. V, No. 22 (1926), p. 18
59The reduction in private grain shipments (according to Ba1-
aban-28, p. 214) led to inadequate supplie s in grain-deficit regions and
a reduction of stocks. Balaban attributed this to inadequate supplie s
in grain-deficit regions and a reduction of stocks. Balaban attributed
this to inadequate organization of the procurement agencies. He noted
that demand was not "exhaustively satisfied" in 1925/26 because of the
"general growth of city demand, inequa1 regional distribution of grain
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The superficial reasons for the poor fulfillment of the grain
export plan were clear. First, the domestic planned procurement
agencies were simply unable to procure enough grain to supply both
the urban and grain deficit areas, to meet their export commitments
to Eksportkhleb (who sold their grain on commission abroad) and, at
the same time, observe the official grain price policy and maintain
price stability in urban and grain deficit areas. Furthermore, although
the spread between domestic and foreign grain prices increased after
June 1925 (compared to the negligible spread during the spring of 1925)
grain exports remained commercially unprofitable during most of
1925/26 and the domestic grain procurement agencies tended to ship to
60
profitable domestic markets rather than to fulfill their export quotas.
Second, contrary to plan, the composition of the exported grain was
weighted more with barley (a cheap grain) rather than wheat (the more
harvest, unfavorable weather in the autumn of 1925 [rOain]which affected
the timing of the harvest, and the preliminary planning assumptions
estimating a record harvest, which resulted in an exaggerated demand
by the procurement agencies -- all the above circumstances created
conditions disrupting the normal relationship between supply and demand,
creating a strained condition on the grain market. "
60Tables T - 38 - T -40 and Table T -43 compare domestic and
foreign grain prices. Average marketing costs per 100 kilogram of grain
sold abroad in 1925/26 (AY) was 3.84 rubles (Table 1-43). The evidence
of the unwillingness of domestic agencies is indirect -- namely, the
criticism of the NKRKI about poor control of fulfillment of export obli-
gations plus the overfulfillment of the urban supply plan in the July-
September quarter of 1925 (see text above and footnote 54 on
All grain exports were under the control of the grain export
monopoly, Eksportkhleb, which did not purchase directly from the
peasant, but acted as a commission agent in the sale of grain shipped
by the domestic planned agencies on the basis of their export quotas
allocated to each agency (EIKSSSR, p. 135).
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expensive grain) so that the export receipts were even less than ex-
pected. Third, world prices unexpectedly fell sharply during the late
summer of 1925 just as Soviet grain exports were peaking. 61
Breakdown of the grain procurement plan: its causes
The failure of grain marketing to recover to pre -1914 levels
during the NEP is analyzed in Chapter XI. Here we focus only on the
problems particular to the 1925/26 grain procurement campaign.
The explanations for the failure of the 1925/26 grain procure-
ment campaign cente r on four reenforcing factor s - - a smaller -than-
predicted harvest, basic conceptual errors in estimating the peasants'
on-farm demand for grain and the marketing coefficients, inept formu-
lation and operation of the grain procurement plan and other economic
policy variables influencing grain marketing, and last, the goods fain-
ine and unfavorable market prices for grain relative to other products.
The 1925 crop was roughly 4% less than predicted and further-
more it was delayed three weeks by bad weather, but this overestirna-
tion of the crop explained only a small part of the underfulfillment of
the procurement and export plans (unless a marketing coefficient of
100%was assumed for increments in the crop). 62
Sobolev, Dzerzhinski and others argued that basic conceptual
errors were made in estimating the peasants 'on-farm demand for grain
6lTables T -38 - T -40. Foreign prices of barley and rye fell
quite markedly in the early summer of 1925 and failed to recover during
1925/26 (AY).
62Table T -8 and SUA, Vol. V, No.5, p. 10. The actual crop
was 72. 5 million m. t. instead of 75. 5 million m. t.
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and in estimating their propensity to market grain because the planners
63relied excessively on pre-1914 norms. Why were pre-1914 norms no
longer applicable to the peasant during NEP? Some economists argued
that the observed decline in the average propensity to market was caused
by the high income -elasticity of demand for grain and other agricultural
products by the poorer peasants who benefited from the redistribution
of the landlords' estates and rich peasants' holdings - - an argument
later used by Stalin to defend his program for collectivization. 64 Others
pointed out that the Soviet peasant of 1925 had fewer monetary obligations
that his pre-19l4 counterpart -- and it was argued that these monetary
obligations forced the Russian peasant to market his grain each fall
regardless of price. 65 As Preobrazhenskii noted in his book in 1926:
... we must also take into account the very important fact that
our peasants, as a result of the sharp reduction in their tax
burden, as compared with before the war, and also as a result
of the abolition of the payment of rent for landlords' land, are
faced to a much smaller extent with the n~ed to make forced
sales than was the case before the war. 66 ---
Several other non-price factors probably affected the marketing
behavior of the Russian peasant - - lower per capita output in both all of
63Sobolev-26b, p. 28; Dzerzhinskii-26a, p. 14, Balaban-28a,
p. 218.
64Sobolev-26b, p. 28. This argument is carefully analyzed
in Chapter XI.
65Dzerzhinskii-26a (p. 12) and Kaktyn-26a (p. 8) cited this as
an important factor for the marketing problems in 1925/26. In fact,
the lower the price of grain, the greater the quantity the peasant had
to market to meet his obligations.
66preobrazhensky -26, p. 180. His footnote to this passage
refers to his article on the goods famine in Pravda, 15 December, 1925.
273
Russia and in the grain surplus region alone, the demand for live-
stock feed, and existing stocks of grain. In 1925/26 all these factors
tended to reduce marketings and are analyzed in Chapter XI.
The "Scis sor s" and "Goods Famine"
The most widely discussed explanation for the grain procure-
ment problems in the fall and winter of 1925/26 was the "deepening
goods famine II and the resulting deterioration of grain procurement
prices paid to the peasants by planned agencies relative to the prices
paid by the peasant for manufactured goods ("opening of the scissorsll).67
The terms of trade of agricultural goods for manufactured
consumer goods are presented in Table T -35. The terms of trade for
agriculture were computed using retail price indexe s of manufactured
goods sold by private traders and using several price indices for agri-
cultural goods (retail, whole sale, agricultural procurement price s, and
grain procurement prices). The relevant measurement (from the peas-
ants I viewpoint) of the change in terms of trade for peasant agriculture
during NEP would be based on the relationship between the retail price
index of manufactures (both consumer and investment goods) sold in the
village to the index of the prices received by the peasant for his produce.
Available data, however, forced us to use the retail price index of man-
ufactured consumers I goods (sold in cities?) and the agricultural pro-
curement price index using fixed weights for 1924-1926 and changing
67The "goods famine II in the countryside was pinpointed at
being a major factor in the procurement difficulties. Cf, Rykov-26a,
pp. 9-10; Balaban-28, p. Z15; Dzerzhinskii-Z6a, p. 14; Kutusov-Z8,
p. 53; Ge11er-Z6a, pp. 33, 37; Kaktyn-26a, p. 8, etc.
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weights for the years 1926-1928 (Table T-35).
Table T - 35 indeed reveals that 1) the term s -of -trade for grain
were declining rapidly during the summer and early fall of 1925 and
were considerably below 1913parity levels. This decline was caused
by both falling grain prices and a rapid increase in the prices of man-
ufactured goods.
Grain prices and government policy
The policy of fixed grain price s (price ceilings) attempted in
1924 was abandoned for a policy of "directive prices, " which were in-
itially thought to be needed as price supports to prevent an excessive
decline in grain prices. As late as September, 1925, Kamenev was
still able to state:
The task of price regulation in 1925... has consisted in not allow-
ing the price of grain to fall below a given level. In connection
with this, the policy of so-called directive prices has been adopted
in 1925, 1. e., a system of mass state purchasing, which should
guarantee the peasantry a definite equitable price consistent with
its interests and with the interests of the consumer of grain -- of
the worker and of the peasant who buys grain. If we see that
prices are beginning to fall, we must increase the demand on the
spot and thus raise prices. If prices soar too high, we must call
off purchasers. 68
Domestic grain prices were expected to drop sharply as the good crop
was harvested and brought to market. The authorities were worried
that the terms of trade of grain relative to other goods might deterior-
ate so fast and so much as to result in a grain marketing crisis and a
68Kamenev's speech of September 4 was published in Pravda,
September 17, 18, 1925, and was cited in Carr-58, p. 292. Carr-58
(p. 293) discussed the setting of directive prices for grain.
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reduction in winter sowing. 69 Thus, plans were made and credits were
granted for the planned agencie s to enter the grain market immediately
at the beginning of the harvest (July and August) to prevent an excessive
decline in grain prices and to maintain order in the grain market. The
quotas and timing of the purchase were based on the higher preliminary
crop estimates made before the rains. Some decline in grain prices,
of course, was necessary in order for grain exports to be "commercially
profitable" but this decline in grain prices was to be offset by the pro-
jected decline in the prices of manufactured goods, and in an "abatement
of the 'goods famine' through increased domestic output of consumer
70goods. " Memories of the "scissors crisis of 1923" dominated the
Party leadership's thoughts because it seemed to demonstrate the high
e1asticity of the Rus sian pea sant' s willingne s s to produce and market
grain as a function of the price of grain relative to manufactured con-
surners' goods -- thus, they became almost preoccupied with the policy
goal of reducing retail prices of manufactured consumer goods in
1925/26.71
Grain prices did begin to fall rapidly in the mid-summer of
1925 as the peasants and private traders became aware of the good size
69Ba1aban-28, pp. 214-215. See Carr-58 (p. 292) for discus-
sion of the Party leadership's fear of an excessive fall in grain prices.
70Gosp1an-25 in Spulber-64, p. 378. Recall from above that
Gosplan was attempting to lower the general price level of the economy,
but it had to be done without an excessive "opening of the scissors. "
71 ..
See above, pp. 245-246.
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of the crop, so that grain procurement price s at the beginning of the
harvest (July and August) were 25 to 500/0below their April-May highs.
A similar decline in the purchasing power of grain occurred for the
retail prices of manufactured goods changed very little from April-May
to July and August (Tables T - 35, T - 38, T - 39, T -40). The liberally
financed planned agencies (and private traders) accelerated grain pur-
chases in July and August. This purchasing policy combined with inept
fiscal policy in the fall of 1925 turned out to be one of the major eco-
nomic policy mistakes during NEP.'
The rush to purchase grain by the planned agencie s so early
in the harvest slowed and then reversed the fall in domestic grain prices
(especially of wheat) at levels significantly above the prices in the
autumn of 1924 (when the crop was much worse). Wheat prices started
rising in September and rye started to rise in the wholesale market in
October, so that by the end of September, it was clear that the planned
agencies' procurement plans were not being fulfilled at the official
directive prices -- even when "directive prices" were raised. 72 The
problem of the planned agencies and the government in 1925/26 turned
out to be a problem of reducing grain prices rather than supporting
grain prices.
72Tables T-38 - T-40, and Carr-58a, p. 293 ff.
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Grain purchases, aggregate demand, and the goods famine
Not only did the large early purchases of grain reverse the
decline in grain prices, but they also immediately aggravated the
"goods famine. "
The peasants' sale of larger quantities of grain and other agri-
cultural products early in the harvest season at prices significantly
above the previous autumn's prices (combined with a reduction in the
agricultural tax) increased the purchasing power in the hands of the
peasantry much more rapidly than the flow of manufactured goods to
rural markets. This was cited as the major cause of the goods famine
in the second half of 1925.73
The purchasing power of grain and other agricultural produce
(in terms of manufactured goods) was still higher in the late -summer
and autumn of 1925 than in 1924 so that the peasants both paid their
(lower) tax bills and bought more manufactured consumer products at
a lower price in terms of grain than in either 1923/24 or in 1924/25
(Table T-35). Urban income was also being increased by the large
wage increases granted during July-September 1925 and by the increase
73Dzerzhinskii-26a (p. 12) noted that according to the control
figures by Gosplan, the peasants sold 200 million rubles in grain, 36
million rubles in cotton, and 45 million rubles in flax in the July 1 -
January 1 period of 1924/25 and paid 238 million rubles in tax during
the same period leaving 43 million rubles free for purchasing. In
1925/26, however, the peasant sold during July 1 - January 1 period
415 million rubles of grain, 83 million rubles of cotton, and 130 mil-
lion rubles of flax, and paid a lower tax of 118million rubles, leaving
the peasant with 510million rubles. This was a major cause of the
goods famine, according to Dzerzhinski-26a (p. 12).
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of employment. 74 The retail prices of manufactured goods began to
move upward - 1%in July, 2.7% in August, 5.40/0 in September, 2.5%
in October, 2. 4% in November - instead of declining as predicted by
Gosplan (Table T -32). 75 Contrary to Gosplan's predictions, by Sep-
tember both the aggregate retail and the aggregate wholesale price
index began a steady rise (due primarily to an increase in the prices
of manufactured goods) which halted only in the late spring of 1926. A
simple demand pull-inflation. 76 The inflation - - revealed or repres-
sed -- was worse in the rural areas than in urban centers because urban
centers tended to be favored in the distribution of manufactured con-
sumer goods (and also in exportable foodstuffs). 77 To some extent,
74See Baykov-48 (pp. 147-148) for the number of workers and
wage increases. Baykov cited wage increases in excess of labor pro-
ductivity increases between the period 1924/25 to 1926/27 as one of the
causes of the goods famine. Rykov-26a, (p. 10) cited large wage in-
creases in July-September 1925, as an important cause of the extra-
ordinary demand in the city and he noted that much of the increase in
the wage bill was for heavy industry which did not result in a corres-
ponding increase in the supply of consume r goods.
75These retail price indexes were still calculated in 1925/26
on the basis of prices in the private trade and reflected in general the
cost of manufactured goods to the peasant. Thus, the "goods famine"
was reflected in higher prices unlike in the coming years when the
price indexes included state and cooperative stores whose prices were
more closely controlled by the state. See Chapter II, pp. 84 and
Chapters IX, and X, and Notes to Table T-32 and T-33.
76
See above, p. 245 for Gosplan IS pr oje ctions. See Chapter
XI, p. 442, for agricultural tax collection. See Tables T-3l and T-32
for retail and wholesale prices.
7'kykov-26a, p. 10, noted this preference for the city. Accord-
ing to Kaktyn-26a, pp. 9-10, the goods in greatest excess demand during
the summer 1925 were manufactured consumers' goods, metals, leather,
sugar, and makhorka .. By autumn sugar and makhorka were adequately
supplied, but construction material, wood, and agricultural machine s
became "scarce. "
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the goods famine and accelerated inflation in the fall of 1925 was caused
by a policy error -- namely the heavy initial demand for grain by the
planned agencies in the July-October period and a reduction of taxes on
the peasant increased aggregate demand much more rapidly than aggre-
78gate supply. More evenly distributed demand in the latter half of
1925 (coupled with higher taxes and stricter crediting of private traders)
would have resulted in a better balance of demand and supply for manu-
factured' consumer goods and would have reduced the strong inflationary
pressures in the fall of 1925. A better balance might have resulted in
greater grain sales because of lower grain prices and higher real tax
liability and because of greater stability of peasants' price expectations
for both grain prices and consumers' goods prices. 79 Unfortunately,
it was difficult to even out the temporal distribution of grain purchases
because the NKT had already become committed to early purchases for
export to repay the short-term credit granted by German banks to the
78Ba1aban-28, p. 214. See discussion in Carr-58a (pp. 249-
265) about the arguments for reducing the agricultural tax from an
assessed 570 million rubles (including local taxes) to 300 million (p. 253).
The main problems were the incidence of the tax and the disincentive
effect of the tax on the accumulation of capital live stock and land, be-
cause the tax was nominally an income tax, where the estimate of "in-
come" depended on the amount of sown land and livestock (weighted aver-
age) (p. 250). During the discussion about agrarian tax reform, pro-
posals were made to tax the peasants' true income and to tax the rental
value of the land - - both were rejected primarily because of the diffi-
culties in estimating income of peasants and the absence s of a cadastral
survey (pp. 252-254).
79Dzerzhenskii-26a, p. 14. This policy would have required
shifting of grain exports to later months so as to maintain a supply of
grain to urban areas and grain deficit areas sufficient to stabilize the
wholesale grain prices and to prevent the private traders from thwart-
ing the price policy.
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State Bank in August 1925, which was used in theory to finance grain
exports but actually paid for the emergency imports of consumer goods
and materials for light industry; this loan had to be repaid in January
80or February 1926.
Grain marketing and the changing nature of the goods famine
The expression "goods famine" or tovarnye golod was loosely
used by Soviet economists during the mid- and late-1920's to describe
the presence of excess demand. Most often it referred to excess demand
for numerous processed consumer goods in the countryside; one might
describe it as "excess aggregate demand for manufactured goods by the
rural population,!' and it could result in either rising prices for this
class of goods in general if the market forces were permitted to oper-
ate or it could result in the absence of these goods from the market at
the fixed prices and in the queues of buyers or other means of ration-
ing. Both phenomenon were observed during NEP. In 1925/26, however,
the goods famine was still reflected largely in rising prices of manu-
factured goods sold by the private traders (whose prices were still not
restricted by resale price limits by the state) and to a lesser extent by
the absence of some of these goods sold at the lower less flexible
.. th .. d t 81prIces In e cooperatIve an state sores.
80~UA, Vol. V, No. 13 (1926), p. 6.
81See Carr-58, pp. 420-441 for discussion of domestic trade
and particularly the relative role of private traders and state and co-
operative trade outlets in the retail trade, the distribution of manu-
factured goods between urban and rural areas, and the government's
efforts to control prices (particularly in 1925/26). See below,p. 289.
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Carr assigned little role to the "goods famine" as a cause of
the grain marketing difficu1tie s in the fall of 1925 - - although the goods
famine did undoubtedly affect grain marketing in areas where goods were
not available at any price. 82 The important que stion was whether or not
the private traders' prices were "market clearing prices, "for if they
were, then presumably goods would be available at these higher prices.
Then, the problem for the planners would be the elasticity of the peas-
ants' demand for these manufactured goods in terms of grain in 1925/26
rather than the effect of the total absence of goods from the market
place. Most Soviet economists and leaders believed - - and made major
policy decisions on the assumption - - that higher grain prices relative
to manufactured goods would stimulate grain output and marketing in
the long-.run -- and most modern studies about the supply response of
peasant agriculture tends to support this hypothesis. 83
But the immediate policy problem in 1925/26 wa s short -run
price policy (with respect to grain prices and prices of manufactured
goods) and the proper level of government demand for grain during
1925/26 before the next growing season.
With respect to government demand for grain, the initial re-
suIt (planned or unplanned) was that planned agencies purchased 1ess
in the October -December quarter than in the July-September quarter
82Carr-58a, pp. 293 and 317. The output of consumer goods
had increased greatly in 1925 as compared to 1924 (see Nutter-62,
pp. 454 -470). In addition, consumer goods were imported to supply
the countryside and supplied about 3% of the total cotton textile goods
(See Table T -20).
83See Chapter XI-:
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of 1925 (usually grain marketing was greatest in the October -December
quarter) (Table T-IO). Furthermore, wheat export sales were tempor-
arily halted in September because of the rising wheat prices and in
December the Politburo decided to suspend all grain exports. 84 As
Carr so adeptly described the event:
The vision of industrial expansion on a broad front financed on
the proceeds of ample grain surpluses faded away.
But the slight cutback in government demand did not prevent wholesale
prices of grain in surplus regions from rising continually from October
to March (Table T-38 - T-40).
The policy of directive prices for planned agencies was ineffec-
tive in the fall of 1925 because the private grain merchants increasingly
outbid the planned agencies and increased their share in total grain pur-
chases in the fall as compared to late summer. Private grain purchase
prices were above the prices offered by planned agencies, whose price
policy was less flexible (for reasons discussed below). 85
84SUA, Vol. V, No. 12 (1926), pp. 71-88. Carr-58 (p. 295)
cited the Politburo decision.
85Table T-36 and Carr-58a, pp. 293-294. Many sources dis-
cuss competition between the private grain traders and the planned pro-
curement agencies and among the planned procurement agencies them-
selves. Private traders shipped grain to the city and grain deficit
areas, and compensated for and took advantage of the inefficiencies in
the planned procurement agencies. Rykov-26a (p. 8) noted that the
prices for grain varied widely from region to region and that the Soviet
state still did not know how to buy grain and how to sell grain. This
would be the expected result if various regions were allocated to separ-
ate monopsonistic procurement agencies, with different quotas to pro-
cure relative to supply, and different availabilities of manufactured
goods .. Private traders could no longer arbitrage after spring 1926.
This arbitrage was regarded as adding to the accumulation of the pri':-"
vate capitalist, who could get grain at slightly above official procure-
ment prices, and sell for much higher prices. See Rykov-26a, p. 9, and
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Why didn't the government simPly increase their procurement
prices sufficiently to induce the peasant to 1) market more grain, and
2) market more grain to the planned agencies rather than to the private
trader who benefited by outbidding the planned agency's relatively low
prices and then selling at the market clearing prices. By raising
prices and possibly increasing the total grain marketing, the govern-
ment would squeeze the profit margins of the private trader and possibly
lower the market clearing price of grain (because of the increased
supply).
Initally, the government during the October -December quarter
of 1925 and in January and February, 1926 permitted (unavoidable) in-
creases in the procurement prices of grains. When the government in-
creased its monopsony power by restricting the operations of the pri-
vate trader, however, this policy was reversed after February 1926
and procurement prices were forced down during a period when grain
prices would normally be rising (Tables T -38 - T-40 and Figures
VIII. 1 - VIII. 3).
Which policy was correct - - rising prices for grain products
or reduced prices for grain products - - and why did the government
Zalkind 26a, p. 5.
The existence of the private trader s also thwarts any attempt
to estimate the short -run price -elasticity of total grain marketing
during the fall of 1925 because of the inavailability of monthly data on
total grain marketing during 1925/26. Otherwise, the relationship be-
tween increased procurement prices and procurements (shown in
Figures VIlLI and VIII. 2) would suggest that there was some short-run
elasticity of supply. But this apparent short -run price elasticity was
most likely the re sult in the shifts in the sale s from planned agencie s
to private traders and back.
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FIGURE VIII. 1
USSR: FOREIGN PRICES, PROCUREMENT PRICES AND
PROCUREMENTS OF WHEAT BY MONTH 1925 - 1929
1300 kopecks per 100 kilograms
1200
1100
1000
900
800
700
600
domestic
procurement
price of
wheat
500
1925 1926 1927 1928
Whe'at.,. rocurement b
1926
<,,
192819271925
300
700
500 .
100
900
FIGURE VII. 2
USSR: FOREIGN PRICES, PROCUREMENT PRICES, AND
PROCUREMENT OF RYE BY MONTH 1925-29
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FIGURE VIII.3
USSR: FOREIGN PRICES, PROCUREMENT PRICES AND PROCURE-
MENTS OF BARLEY BY MONTH, 1925 - 1929
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decide to reduce grain prices? Three important factors restricted the
monetary price paid to the peasant for his grain: 1.) the effect of grain
prices on the cost of living for the urban population, and for grain-
purchasing peasants; 2) the commercial profitability of grain exports;
and 3) the impact of grain prices on aggregate demand for manufactured
goods available for sale in the countryside.
Rising retail prices for grain affected three groups - - the
urban population, the peasant, who produced insufficient grain because
he grew technical crops or raised livestock, and the poor peasant, who
was unable to produce sufficient grain to meet his needs and hired him-
86self out. The government preferred to sell grain to these groups at
lower rather than higher prices for' several reasons. Rising grain
prices increased the cost of living of the urban'worker, and in the past
such increases resulted in increased monetary wages. For example,
after the rapid increase in grain prices in the spring of 1925, the labor
unrest over the low real wages led to unexpected wage increases during
March-September 1925.87 High grain prices also tended to affect prices,
output, and marketing of non-grain agricultural products (especially of
crops compe.tiilg with grain in the use of resources such as flax, cotton,
88oil seed), and, in general, pushed up the prices of these products.
86In 1924/25 "inter-peasant purchases of grain amounted to
8. 6 million m. t. or 63. 6% of all marketed grain, according to figures
cited by Preobrazhenskii-26 (p. 182). He as serted that it was mostly
poor peasants who purchased grain.
87See Carr-58a, pp. 390-395.
88See below, p. 492.
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The government's desire to lower grain prices for the poor peasant
was political and ideologically motivated.
Raising grain prices by 10-50% during the period October 1925
to February 1926 increased monetary aggregate demand for manufac-
tured consumer goods and was partially responsible for rising retail
prices of manufactured consumer goods during this period. The
demand-pull nature of this inflation was reflected by the fact that for
retail prices rose much more than wholesale prices (increasing retail
mark-ups).89 The specter of rising grain prices and runaway inf1a-
tion of an undesired redistribution of income to the rich kulak and pri-
vate trader from the rest of the Soviet population, and of increasing
commercial los se s incurred in grain exports finally convinced the
government that they must control the prices in the grain market by
eliminating the competition of the private trader and among various
state agencie s.
The government therefore restricted the private trader and
reduced grain procurement prices during a period when these prices
normally would ?e rising. Grain procurements also declined, but
this decline cannot be definitely attributed to the reduction in procure-
ment prices because procurements normally declined during this
89The purchasing power of wheat, rye and barley in terms of
manufactured goods rose from October 1925 to February 1926, accord-
ing to Table T -35. The volume of sales (both private and planned
agencies) and the supply of manufactured consumer goods must also
be consider.ed -- the above is offerred as a hypothesis. See ST,
Vol. I, No. 11, (1926), p. 63 and ST, Vol. II, No. 43 (1927), p-:-69.
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Price policy for manufactured goods. Here the Soviet govern-
ment probably made its second major policy mistake during 1925/26.
The Party leadership worried about the effects of the "reopening of the
scissors" on grain marketing and future grain production which would
result from falling (relative) grain prices. Thus, in the midst of the
"goods famine, " the government tried to reduce the retail prices of
manufactured consumer goods through three policies: 1) reduction in
the wholesale prices of manufactured consumer goods; 2) initiation of
a policy to limit the resale price of goods sold by state industry to
private trade; and 3) a directive to state and cooperative retail stores
to attempt to lower list prices. The current state and cooperative re-
tail prices, which were lower than the private traders I prices, did not
clear the market and there was excess demand at these lower prices. 91
As shown in Chapter II, this policy was clearly erroneous at the time
and if anything, aggravated the goods famine and resulted in higher
prices in the private trade. 92 Yet, the government persisted in pur-
suing this policy of "decreed price reduction of manufactured goods"
throughout the next three years even though the goods famine continued
in various degrees of severity. This policy revealed the basic lack of
90See above, p. 268, for restticti¥emeasures and Table T-38 -
T -40 and Figure VIII. 1 - VIII. 3.
9lSee Zalkind-26a, pp. 4-6 for a discussion .of the problems
encountered in reducing retail prices in 1925/26.
92 '
Pages 84 ff.
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understanding of a market price system by its advocates among the
Party leader ship.
Preobrazhenskii's criticism of the official price policy in
1925/26 showed perhaps the greatest:understanding of the perverse
economic effect of such a policy under conditions existing in 1925/26.
Preobrazhenskii's theory of price policy was much misunderstood by
his critics, who interpreted this policy of "primitive socialist accumu-
lation" and the transfer of "surplus value" through his (non-equivalent
exchange) price policy to the socialist sector as a threat to the smychka
(political and economic link) between the workers and the peasantry. 93
But his policy recommendations for manufactures" prices and
his criticism s of the official policy of price reductions in the face of
the goods f arriinewere probably the correct policy from the viewpoint
of restoring equilibrium in the market place and from the viewpoint of
"accumulation in the socialist sector. "Preobrazhenskii ',correct~y
perceived that much of the reduction in prices would accure to the pri-
vate trader rather than the peasant, and would simply transfer "mil-
lions of rubles" unnecessarily from the socialist sector to the private
sector. We quote at length:
But let us suppose that ... the state does not expand production
in accordance with the growth of effective demand. What shall
we have then? We shall then have, on the one hand, an acute
increase in retaih'prices in the branches where the goods fam-
ine is being strongly felt, along the whole line of private trade,
that is, an actual increase of 40 ,per cent in the total retail
turnover, if we take the examph~'of 1925. On the other hand,
the co-operatives, under the pressure of market forces, will
93S~e Preobrazhensky-26 (pp. 224-305) for his reply to his
critics. Preobrazhenskii's political association with Trotsky also
caused much maligning of his theories.
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inevitably retreat along the line of least resistance, that is, will
go beyond the authorized retail additions to the state's wholesale
prices. Thus, the law of value will modify the state's policy of
firm, planned prices at this point, too. Reduction of the trusts'
selling prices in the branches where an acute goods famine exists,
since it would not achieve a reduction in retail prices, would be
quite meaningless from the practical standpoint, as well as illi-
terate from that of economic theory ... ,
At this point Preobrazhenskii added the following footnote:
I remind the reader what hail of objections, misunderstanding
and distortion had to be endured by the author of lines .in this
sense, written in the chapter of this book dealing with social-
ist accumulation. Now, of course, there will be no objections,
after the state has had to pay tens of millions, if not more, for
an experience of the opposite policy. But there will be no pub-
lic admission of their mistakes by those who objected.
Preobrazhenskii contined in the text: .
By and large, we should have, as we had in fact in 1925, an
operation of the law of value not carried through to comple-
tion ... because the law would be capable of bringing about an
increase of retail prices, but incapable of causing, through this
instrument of increased prices, a redistribution of the country's
productive forces in the direction of more rapid industrializa-
tion as it would have in a competitive system ... Private trad-
ing capital would rake in hundreds of millions, but this would
have almost no influence on production. 94
His major point in 1925 was that reduction of wholesale prices was eco-
nomic nonsense during the "goods famine" - - he was not advocating a
return to the 1923 scissors policy of monopolistic pricing.
The second error in the policy of attempting to reduce retail
prices of manufactured goods was the failure to .consider the income
and wealth effects which would be created by reducing prices of manu-
factured goods immediately after the peasant marketed large quantities
94preobrazhensky-26, pp. 175-178. See also pp. 250 -253 and
especially the footnote on p. 252.
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of grain at relatively high prices. The subsequent reductions in con-
sumers' goods prices would increase the peasant's real income and
wealth and enabled them to satisfy more of his immediate demands for
these goods from his cash on hand (or from smaller grain sales) there-
by weakening his (immediate) desire to market grain in exchange for
industrial goods, even though he might sow and market more grain in
the coming season. 95 The official price policy implicitly assumed
that the substitution effects of improved terms -of-trade for agriculture
were greater in the short-run than the income effects and the wealth
effects.
Furthermore, this price policy, successful in the crisis of
1923, seemed to disregard that the cause of the scissors in 1925/
26/ was different than the cause of the scissor crisis of 1923. In 1925/
26 it was caused by a shortage of goods (and an unwillingness to greatly
increase direct taxes)rather than the monopolistic pricing policy of the
state industries (as it was in 1923), so that artificial "decreed" reduc-
tion in prices had different effects. Measures were also taken to ship
additional goods to grain surplus areas to be sold through cooperatives
at low prices and there was occasional mention by the Right of continu-
ing imports of consumer goods (goods intervention) which had been
95The important point here is that afte r the harve st is in, the
peasants maximize their utility-by adjusting the composition of his
consumption on the basis of current (and expected) price and his given
stock of grain (and other assets). In the short run, the peasant has
little opportunity to vary labor input (and grain output).: Thus~\ the ~sub-
stitutabilitybetwe:en grain and other produc.ts might be very low in the
short-ru~ The substitutability of leisure and real income, where the
price of leisure is the marginal revenue product of producing more
grain divided by the price index for consumer goods, might be much
larger in the long-run.
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resumed in the fall of 1925.96 In addition, tax collections were accel-
erated (and raised) and a restrictive monetary policy was foHowed --
but these measures were too late and too little to reduce aggregate
demand and industrial retail prices. 97
Commercially unprofitable grain exports. The third constraint
on domestic grain prices was thought to be foreign grain prices. 98 The
crop failure of 1924drove up dome stic grain prices and made grain ex-
ports (especially wheat) commecially unprofitable during the first half
of 1925. Domestic grain prices were expected to fall enough in the
summer of 1925to make exports again commercially profitable. But
a sudden drop in world grain prices, unexpectedly high domestic grain
prices, and continued high marketing costs made grain exports commer-
ciallyunprofitable for most of 1925/26. 99 Commercial losses in grain
exports in 1925/26 amounted to about 14million rubles. 100
The commercial losses on grain exports had two effects on
the domestic economy. First, losses from grain exports initially
depressed official procurement prices and prevented planned procure-
ment agencies from competing with the private grain trader who supplied
97Rykov-26a, p. 9.
98See Preobrazhensky-26, pp. 180-181, 270.
99Marketing costs incurred from time of purchase from the
peasant to delivery to sale abroad in 1926 (1925/26) were (for 100kilo-
grams) 4. 09 rubles for wheat, 3. 91 rubles for rye and 3. 54 rubles for
barley (Kaufman-26e, pp. 1-2). Comparison of the difference between
aom-estic procurement prices for these grains and the quoted price for
Russian grain abroad (Tables T-38 to T-40) with these marketing
costs revealed that those grains were exported at a commercial loss
for most of 1925/26 (AY).
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only the domestic market (at much higher internal wholesale prices
relative to overhead costs). 101
Second, state and cooperative trading agencies were operated
according to the profit maximization principle (or at least "cost-cover-
ing principle "), and as noted above evidence sugge sts that these agen-
cies diverted grain to profitable domestic markets rather than fulfill-
. h .. 11 102Ing t eIr export quotas at a commerCIa oss.
The basic recommendation to increase the profitability of grain
exports emphasized the reduction of marketing costs which were much
higher than before 1914,103for reducing these expenditures increased
the profitability of grain exports without reducing domestic procurement
prices.l04 But the higher costs during NEP resulted largely from sta-
tutory increases in the costs of inputs (railway rates, insurance costs,
101Wholesale prices of some grains in the grain surplus regions
approached and occasionally exceeded the average sale price of Russian
grain abroad. See Tables T -38 - T -40.
102See above, p.
is implied by NKRKI's recommendation that export quotas be allocated
to agencies and that the fulfillment of these export quotas be strictly con-
trolled (Ekon. Zhisn, September 1, 1926). The underfulfillment of the
grain export plan, however, was officially explained as being the inten-
tional result of "the government regulation of grain exports on the prin-
ciple of preferential satisfaction of the demand on internal markets"
(Balaban-28, p. 217).
103Ekon. Zhisn, September 1, 1926; Geller-26a, p. 38. It
was pointed out that the peasant in 1913received a larger portion of the
foreign sale price of grain because of these smaller margins (Feifets-
28a, pp. 334-340 and Fe'ifets-28b, pp. 149-162).
104Kaufman-26e, p. 1.
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shipping costs, port charges, and wages) so that there was little
opportunity for the trading agencies to reduce marketing costs through
t d t. 'thO,,,th '0 105cos re uc Ion WI In e agencIes.
The path to increased profitability of grain exports clearly was
the reduction of procurement prices. Facilitated by increased monop-
sony power of the state grain pur chasing agencies and accelerated by
the prospects of another harvest, procurement prices were reduced
in early 1926.. Grain exports were again commercially profitable at
official procurement prices by mid-1926, but not at private grain trade
. 106prIces.
Poor growth of non-grain exports
The export catastrophe was further aggravated by extremely
poor growth of other major export products (animal and poultry pro-
ducts, flax, and timber). Whereas the export plan projected a 98 mil-
lion ruble increase, exports of animal and poultry products, other agri-
~,:ltural products and timber actually declined 54 million rubles in 1925/
. 107
26 (Table VIII. 1). Only the petroleum and mining products, sugar,
105Kaufman-26e, p. 1. See Table T -43.
106See Tables T -38 to T -40 and footnote 99 of this chapter,
p. 293 ST, Vol. I, No. 2 (1926), p. 17. The planned agencies almost
stopped £lie new grain campaign.
107Soviet exports excluding grain products actually declined in
value. Other industrial exports included oil products, manganese ore,
sugar, cotton cloth, and coal, all of which were exported in larger quan-
tities (and value) in 1925/26 than in 1924/25, even though cotton cloth and
coal were in short supply on domestic markets at current prices in
1925/26.
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cloth a"ndfur exports increased significantly in 1925/26. 108 .
The causes for the unexpected decline in non-grain exports
were similar to the causes for the underfulfillment of the grain export
plan. In the case of these products, however, the interdependence of
the factors leading to poor export performance -- namely, lower world
prices, increased domestic demand, reduced commercial profitability
of exports, and a decline in procurement prices and procurements --
is more clearly evident. Furthermore, examination of the export prob-
lems of non-grain agricultural products in 1925/26 already reveals the
high elasticity of state procurements to procurement prices. While
the factors resulting in high procurement price elasticity varied from
product to product, they could be divided into three basic types: 1) high
price elasticity of on-farm consumption because of the luxury nature of
the product or the substitutability of these products for purchased pro-
ducts, 2) inability of the government to establish an effective monopsony
through economic regulation (other than an outright ban on private
traders) and 3) high mobility of inputs among various products (either
directly through shifting of land, labor, and capital or indirectly through
shifting the use of grain among many uses. 109 The continuing problems
108The control of the output of petroleum, minerals, sugar (in
one trust) was more centralized than the collection and distribution of
agricultura.l produce, and of the output of timber. See SUYB-26, pp. 152
-153. Sugar, oil, and textiles trusts were united into syndicates, while
timber trusts were still not in 1925/26. Some timber firms were for-~
eign concessions. This may have been a significant factor in the suc-
cess of increasing the @~portsof oil,., sugar~ and textiles as compared
to agricultural.productsand it'imber .•
109These arguments are developed more fully in Chapter XII,
pp.492.
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of the USSR today in supplying animal products and vegetables (even
within the system of collectivized agriculture) can probably be traded
to similar causes.
The problems in fulfilling the 1925/26 export plan based on
Soviet estimates of exportable surpluses and at commercial profitable
prices (not only absolutely but relatively) forced the Soviet government
to reevaluate the usefulness of "commercial profitability" as an incen-
tive to Soviet firm s to expand exports and to reevaluate the relevance
of "commercial profitability" as a guide to export. planning and in oper-
ational decisions of determining the procurement price, the level of
purchases and the disposition of procured products between domestic
and foreign markets. Needless to say, the events of 1925/26 were a
major factor in further isolation of the Soviet price system and Soviet
price levels from world market price s.
What were these events in 1925/26? A combination of falling
foreign prices and rising domestic (at the retail and wholesale levels)
eventually made sale s to foreign markets either unprofitable or at least
less profitable than shipping to domestic markets (for numerous export
products including flax, butter, eggs, bristles and hemp, and timber
and manganese ore). The unprofitability of export sales led the govern-
ment to reduce procurement prices of several ggricultural export pro-
ducts during the winter and spring of 1925/26. 110 The planned agencies
110Geller -26a, p. 34. The domestic wholesa:le agricultural
price index (1913 = 100) rose from 161 in UilJy-September 1925 to 181 in
October-December, 1925 and was at 182 in January-March 1926. In
April-June 1926 it dropped to 160 as the government applied restrictions
against the private trader and lowered procurement prices. See Tables
T -31 and T -34.
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had difficulty in fulfilling their procurement plans (especially for ex-
ports) particularly after procurement prices were reduced and exports
of these products fell compared to the same period in 1924/25. Lower
procurement prices for these animal products and technical crops
(which probably were superior goods at the peasants I standard of liv-
ing) further encouraged on- farm consumption and in 1925/26t peas-
111ants consumed1 an absolutely larger amount of flaxt hemp and eggs.
Furthermoret off-farm domestic demand for these export products rose
rapidly along with rising urban income s and increasing industrial out-
putt so that domestic consumption of these products also rose either as
a result of deliberate government policy (flax) or as a result of unplanned
diversion of exportable goods to urban and investment uses through the
operation of market forces (eggst buttert meat, and timber). 112 We
summarized briefly the developm ent of four maj or export product s -
flax, eggs, butter, and timber - for they provide us with four case
studies of the relationship between export policy and domestic economic
policy during mid-NEP.
Flax. By 1925 the output and export s of flax had made a good
recovery under the stimulus of very favorable prices (relative to other
crops) and special tax e~emptions. 113 Domestic flax prices had been
111
Geller -26a, p. 33.
112Geller -26at pp. 33-37. Geller emphasizes the importance
of increased urban and industrial consumption of flax, eggs, and butter.
113By 1925 flax acreage exceeded the flax acreage in the same
territory in 1913'(Diamond-55t p. 83). Index of flax prices and prices
of other agricultural products in Table T - 34.
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permitted to increase relative to other crop prices (compared to 1913)
largely because the tripling of foreign flax prices had made Soviet flax
exports extremely profitable - - so profitable that flax was one of few
Soviet export commodities subject to an export tariff. 114 After an in-
itial rise, dome stic flax price s were clos ely controlled by the govern-
ment through a purchasing monopsony and were held stable (at relative
high levels) from the beginning of 1924 to the end of '1925.115
The projected increase in flax exports in 1925/26 was 230/0
l14Data on foreign prices from STATJAHR-26, pp. 108-110.
See Table T -4l.SUYB-27, pp. 290-291, "Tariff Code of 1924." Other
Soviet products subjected to export duty were furs, caviar, horsehair,
and similar animal products.
115Table T -41 and ST Vol. I, No. 11, p. 37. See above, p.
See EIKSSSR, pp. 352/72-352/89 for an extensive discussion of the or-
ganization of the Soviet flax trade and its pricing policies.
116ST , Vol. I, No. 11, p. 37.
l17The value of flax exports fell 8.70/0in 1925/26. Foreign
prices fell for several reasons. First, Soviet flax exports supplied a
significant portion of the European flax industry, and in addition, com-
peted with increasing exports from the Baltic States (EIKSSSR, p. 352/
81). Foreign prices had been receding through most of 1925. Second,
the European flax industry and fibers markets in general were tempor-
arily depressed (because of a record U. S. cotton harvest). Latvia star-
ted cutting prices in November and by January, foreign flax prices had
fallen enough to make Soviet exports unprofitable at the previous pro-
curement price s.
The procurement price between January and October 1925
varied from 53. 7 to 58. 0 rubles per 100kg. (T'able T -41) and the aver-
age marketing cost for exported flax in 1925was 24 rubles per 100 kg.
Thus, the cost, delivered to foreign buyer, was 77.7-82.0 rubles per
100 kg. while the foreign price of Russian flax (per 100kg. ) fell from
88 rubles in October 1925 to 75 rubles in January, 1926 (Table T-4l).
See ST, Vol. I, No. 11, p. 3~.
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Flax exports were becoming commercially unprofitable and the procure - .
ment price of flax were neduced in December, January, and February
with the explicit purpose of maintaining the commercial profitability of
118flax exports. The reduction of procurement price s caused an imme-
diate decline in procurements (if only for several months), and a slight
reduction in the area sown to flax (which contrasts strongly with the
large increases in the previous years). 119 To the peasant, flax had lost
its former advantage relative to other crops and flax acreage and ex-
f h. 120ports were to stagnate or t e comIng two years.
Butter and eggs. The 1925/26 export plan projected a 60% in-
crease in the value of animal and poultry product exports, but the ex-
port value of these products rose only a few per cent. (Table VIII. 1).
Of the major products, the value of butter exports rose only 12%, and
the value of egg exports and bristle exports fell 12% and 330/0. Relatively
poor and declining commercial profitability was a major cause of poor
118ST, Vol. I, No. 11, p. 37.
ll9Ibid. See STAT-34 (p. 177) for sowings. Jasny-49 (p. 215)
and Gurevich (ST, Vol. I, No.6, p. 7) also emphasized the direct im-
pact of lower procurement prices on sown acreage. Geller -26a (pp. 33-
37) noted that Soviet textile industry used 114,000 m. t. on flax in 1925/
26 as compared to 95,000 m. t. in the same territory before the war,
and, according to EIKSSSR (p. 352/79) domestic industrial needs had
priority over exports in the allocation of procured flax between domes-
tic and foreign markets. This may have been true in 1925/26, but even-
tually the pressure to expand exports reversed this priority (see below,
p. 330 and p. 410.
l20ST, Vol. I, No. 11, p. 37 and Gurevich (ST, Vol. I, No.6,
p. 7). The 1m.mediate fall in procurements could beexplained either
by price expectations of the peasant or the immediate substitution of
flax for other products in on-farm consumption.
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plan fulfillment. 121
Why did butter exports not rise more? 122 Butter procure-
ments and exports increased in the October -December quarter of
1925/26, but domestic prices rose sharply, making butter exports
marginally unprofitable. 123 ForeIgn prices fell in December making
butter exports even more unprofitable and as a consequence the pro-
curement price of butter was deliberately reduced about 250/0so that
butter exports were again "profitable. ,,124
The butter procurements for exports declined markedly as
peasants consumed more on the farm and converted "export butter"
into boiled butter for selling in urban areas at '~l1igher prices. 125
Private traders outbid the planned agencies for export butter and
also diverted it to the cities, where price s and demand were much
h. h h h. 126 Th d .. b ttIg er tan t e preVIOUS year. e re uction In u erprocure-
ment price s re suIted in poor fulfillment of the butter export plan
(67% by weight) and the domestic supply plan by procurement (740/0)
l2lDifficulties in selling bristle at a profit on foreign markets
was the basic reason for the reduction of procurement prices and pro-
curements of bristles. (ST, Vol. I, No. 11, p. 41).
l22Total procurements of butter rose 150/0while butter exports
in quantity rose only 11%. (ST, Vol. I, No. 11, p. 34).
l23Feifets -28a, p. 158. Based on average selling costs of
34.8 rubles per 100 kg, average foreign prices of 151.1 and an aver-
age domestic procurement price of 128.8 per 100 kg (Table T-42).
l24ST, Vol. I, No. 11, p. 34.
125Ibid.
l26Ibid.
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in 1925/26.127 By July 1926, the government became fully aware of the
impact of the lower procurement prices on exports and the procurement
prices were increased slightly in subsequent months, even though for-
eign prices continued to decline (Table T_42).128 Butter exports were
again unprofitable at the end of 1925/26. 129 Sovietskaia Torgovlia con-
eluded that there would have to be government support of butter exports,
. t b .d. 1301. e., expor su Sl 1es.
26.
A similar history can be written for Soviet egg exports in 1925/
131Soviet egg exports were always at best only marginally profitable.
After record prices on both domestic and foreign markets in October
1925 foreign prices plunged in the winter of 1925/26 causing large com-
merciallosses in the January-March period. 132 The government in an
attempt to cut export "losses" slashed egg procurement prices by 22
rubles during the April-June quarter (from 51to .29. 0 rubles per box):
l27ST, Vol. II, No. 11, p. 6. The procurement plan for 1925/
26 was set at72, 000 m. t.; actual procurements were 51,000 m. t.
(72% of plan).
128 .
Sobolev-26 b, p. 28.
l29Marketing costs for butter in 1926 from purchase from the
peasant to delivery to foreign buyer were 34.19 rubles per 100 kg.
(Kaufman-26e,pp. 1-2). The difference between domestic and foreign
price was often less than this during 1925/26 (EY) (Table T-42, cols.
1 and 2)•.
130ST, Vol. I, No. 11, p. 35.
l3lFeifets -28a, p. 160. See next footnote.
l32Feifets-28a, p. 160; ST, Vol. I, No. 11, p. 36. Marketing
costs averaged 30. 7 rubles per box of 1440 eggs, while the differential
between foreign and domestic prices was less than eight rubles per
box. See Tables T-42 and T.46.
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this price cut caused an egg procurement crisis during the summer of
1926 and reduced egg exports during April-September 1926 to less than
half of those for the same period in 1925.133 The low procurement
prices also "cultivated" the growing taste for eggs, encouraged on-
farm consumption, -and permitted the private trade to divert eggs to
134urban areas. - The state was clearly not a monopsonist in the egg
(or the butter) trade and in late August the procurement price policy
was abruptly reversed- by raising egg procurement prices to a new
ho h 13519 .
Strong urban demand was considered by Geller to be another
major cause of underfulfillment of the butter and egg export plan. Not
only did private traders outbid the official procurement prices (which
were lowered because of commercial losses in exports) and shipped
these products to the city where prices were higher, but also state
trading agencies and the cooperatives diverted eggs and butter to the
urban areas (sometime s directly from stocks prepared for export),
in an attempt to lower urban prices and possibly to avoid the losses
° t dOh t to 136 AaSSOClae WIt expor opera Ions. pparcntly this was even more
l33Geller-26a, p. 34, Sobolev-26b, p. 28, Feifets-28a, pp. 159-
161. Ekon. Zhisn (#242, 1926) emphasized the importance of export
losses in motivating the government to lower procurement prices.
l34Cited by Kon-26a, pp. 141-142.
135ST, Vol. I, No. 11, p. 36. Preobrazhensky-26 (p. 143) also
points out thedifficulty of monopsonizing the trade in these products.
l36Ibid. Geller-26a,. pp. 34-35, 36. Also Ekon. Zhisn. No.
242, 1926; Geller-26a (p. 36) noted that export butter-was sold at lower
prices relative to other types of butter than before 1914, thereby encour-
aging it by raising it relative to other types of butter.
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true of fish and meats. As Kutusov summarized the problem:
For several goods, internal demand grew strongly, and as a re-
sult of this, the level of procurement prices was disrupted, the
direction of goods flow went in the direction of the domestic
trade. The disruption of the procurement for several commod-
ities resulted in a high level of overhead expenditures, and the
profitability for several goods fell sharply. As a result of
this, . exports could not develop at the anticipated tempo. 137
Timber. Timber exports also suffered because of heavy dom-
estic demand arising from the construction proj ected in the Control
Figures for 1925/26. Prices rose sharply on the domestic market,
while prices on German and English markets declined in the spring
of 1925/26.138 Timber exports had already been marginally unprofit-
able in the previous year and now the domestic market conditions of
1925/26 made selling in the domestic markets much more profitable
than export. Thus, timber trusts tried to reduce their export obliga-
tions in orde r to supply the dome stic market at a much higher pro-
fit.139 As a consequence, the volume of timber exports fell slightly
in 1925/26 instead of rising by the projected one-third. 140
137Kutusov-28, pp. 53-54.
l38Gosplan-29a, p. 503. Average annual domestic prices f~r
construction timber were 60-700/0higher in 1925/26 than in 1924/25.
The index of construction timber price in Germany (1913= 100) declined
from 151.7 in October to 130.9 in Apri11926, and recovered only to
141.2 by October 1926 (STATJAHR-26, p. 265).
139Sobolev-26b, p. 29.
l40VTSSSR-60. Kutusov-28 (p. 50) attributed the decline in
timber exports to the depression in foreign markets and the strike in
England. In view of the dome stic demand for timber and the p.igh dom-
estic prices, Sobolev's explanation seems more reasonable.
305
Summary. Thus Soviet authorities were compelled increas-
ingly to "force" exports which were commercially unprofitable (or
less profitable) for the exporting organization. Nevertheless, Soviet
leaders and economists in 1926were still concerned about the commer-
ciallosses from exports, and they thought that exports should be com-
mercially profitable in the long-run and that steps - - price reductions
and reduced overhead -- should be taken to improve the commercial
fOt bOlOt f So" -141pro 1.a 1 1Y 0 oVlet exports.
Effect of Import Restrictions on the Economy
The year 1925/26 was the first year that the inherited depend-
ence of the Soviet economy on imported machinery and materials clearly
restricted industrial growth. The reduction of imports by more than
250/0below the original plan compelled the reduction of output and inve st-
ment plans instate industry.
14lSee Report on Foreign Trade in 1925/26 by NKRKI in Ekon.
Zhisn., September 1, 1926. Dzerzhenski-26a (p. 15) stated: -
The complete fulfillment, and when pos sible the renewed ex-
pansion of the now current [revised] export plans remains
perhaps still our most important economic policy problem,
all the more because the purchasing power of the chervonetz-
ruble for industrial goods in foreign countries is larger than
in the Soviet Union. The financing of exports must be done
largely on the basis of domestic means, where, in addition
to budgetary allotment and income of industry itself, the lower-
ing of internal prices is above all an important aid .... The
lowering of prices of industrial goods would also be accom-
paniedby a reductiop in agricultural prices. This gives the
foundation for an expansion of exports and its profitability,
and the se exports again permit us to purchase abroad for our
industry.
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Dzerzhinski, speaking to the Trade Union Congres s in
February 1926 about the economic problem arising during the fall
of 1925 explained:
... These difficulties are exhibited above all in the area of ex-
ports and imports. It appears that at the current progress of
our export trade, it will be impossible to import producer's
goods in the volume that was assumed at the time of the draw-
ing up of the production plans. Because of this, the import plans
as well as the production plans had to be revised already in Nov-
ember, and had to be reduced to a cel"tain degree ...
Because of these difficulties, we have reduced the production
program for all industry a total of 450 million chervonetz-rubles,
that is about 7 per cent. Instead of originally predicted increase
of output of 49 per cent ... we will have an increase of 40 per
cent. Because the reduction of the program is chiefly concerned
with raw materials (cotton, wool, leather, non-ferrous metals)
it was necessary to reduce light industry more than heavy indus-
try the former by 8. 8 per cent and the latter only 4. 5 per
cent .
The.plans for general repairs, new equipment and new plans also
had to be reduced. 142
The investment plans for state industry were also reduced from
one billion rubles to 800 million rubles; this figure included the long-
term 50 million ruble credit newly granted by Germany, and other pay-
ments for imported industrial equipment. 143 Industrial equipment
l42Dzerzhinski -26a, p. 14.
143Rykov-26, (p. 10) noted:
. in the previous fall of 1925, several state agencies hoped to
invest close to one billion rubles in industry. These plans also
had to be forced downward along with all the other economic plans,
so that currently along with the use of long -term foreign credits
(50 million rubles) about 800 million rubles can be allocated to
industry. Maturing payments for industrial equipment imported
from abroad must also be paid for from this sum.
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imports, however, were to be expanded in the revised plan, perhaps
because of the inability of domestic industry to supply the planned
o 0 144quantItIes.
The depel1dence of Soviet industry on imported raw materials
in 1925/26 was not much different than that of pre-19l4 Russian indus-
try.145 How was the Soviet government dealing with the emerging con-
straints on the output, which were caused by the failure of foreign trade
to recover with the rest of the economy?
Cotton fiber imports were the largest single item in imports
during NEP (18.5 and 15.6% of total imports in 1924/25 and 1925/26
[Table T -4] ) •
Although cotton fiber imports supplied 45% of the cotton fiber
consumed in Russia in 1913/14; a large part of imported cotton fiber
was probably consumed in the separated territories, so that only about
260/0of the cotton consumed in 1913/24 within the Soviet borders of 1925
h d b 10 db" t 146 If b h "I " h"a to e supp Ie y Impor s. ot cotton text! e output WIt In
l44The metal-working plan for 1925/26 was fulfilled by only
90%and thi s wa s partly due to difficultie s in car rying out the import
plan (ST, Vol. I, No. 11, p. 53). According to Rykov-26a (p. 9), im-
port pl.ans for industrial equipment rose from 94, 000, 000 rubles in
the original plan to 110,000, 000 rubles in the revised plan adopted in
January. This figure for planned imports conflicts with the figures
cited for the confirmed foreign trade plan in Table VIII. 1.
l45Territorial changes did affect the supply and demand for
some raw materials such as zinc, pipe, woolen yarns. See p.lS?
ff.
l46The figure of "450/0"in Russia in 1913/14is from ST, Vol. I,
No. 11, p. 39. See also pp. 134 - 136 and Table III. 12 for diS'CUsion of
cotton imports in consumption in pre -1914Russia. If we as sume cotton
consumption proportional to the output of cotton yarn or cotton fiber,
and assume that the cotton output in the separated territories could be
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the Soviet borders and domestic botton fiber output were restored to
1913levels, the implied demand for cotton fiber 'would be 322, 000 m. t.
of which about 8,0" 000-90, 000 m. t. would be imported. 147 But cotton
fiber output in 1925~as only about 730/0of 1913levels, and cotton imports
in 1925 already exceeded 100,000 m. t. ; cotton fiber supplied to Soviet
cotton textile industry was about 83%of 19l31evels, so that further re-
covery of cotton textile output to 1913levels implied either additional
cotton fiber imports of increased dome stic output of about 57, 000 m. t. 148
Thus, cotton fiber output was an important area for import substitution
and the Soviet government took numerous steps to expand cotton fibe r
output by using a favorable price policy, tax concessions, and supplying
cheap grain so that the 1925 acreage approached 1913levels. 149
entirely produced from imported cotton, so that the entire domestic
plus the necessary imports supplied domestic industry, then the frac-
tion of imported cotton in the supply of dome stic cotton textile industry
in 1913/14within the Soviet borders would be about 260/0,because 740/0
of cotton textile output and 550/0of cotton fiber supplies were produced
within the Soviet border s in 1913.
l47Implied supply to Soviet territory in 1913was 322. 00 m. t.
(74%of 436, 000 m. t. supplied to Russia in 191'3[Tables III. 20 and XIV.ll]
supply to the USSRin 1925/26 was 265, 000 m.t. (Table XIV.ll). Forty-
two per cent of imported cotton fiber would have been required for the
output in Soviet territories and 197,000 m. t. were imported in 1913
Table T-6l. Restoring cotton textile output within the Soviet territory
to 19131eve1s still would not restore per-capita supply to 1913levels be-
cause the Soviet territory was probably a net importer of textiles from
the s'ep:arated territories.
148Diamond-55, p. 73. Table T-G and Table XIV.
149Diamond-55, po 70. The government, even in 1925/26 pre-
dicted'that lithe development of our cottong'r.owingJn Turkestan and in
the Caucasus will in the course of two or three years permit of fully
coverin'g our needs of the cotton industry of the Union by our own raw
material, II continuing the pre-war trend (EIKSSSR., pp. 438 -439).
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The 1925 cotton harvest was 54%higher than in 1924 so that
little increase in cotton imports was planned for 1925/26.150 Cotton
procurements had proceeded well the first half of 1925/26, but then
rising grain and clotJ:1,prices diverted cotton into the cottage industry
for processing and retarded the expansion of area sown to cotton in
1926 (in some areas grains even began to replace cotton.)~5l The pro-
curement plan was underful£illed in the second half of 1925/26 and it
was necessary to increase the import plan for cotton (above quota plans).
Despite these emergency imports, shortages of raw fiber were cited as
the most important cause for the decline of cotton textile output in the
/
,152second half of 1925 26.
Shortage of (imported) raw materials also restricted the growth
of woolen textile, leather goods and other industries. 153 In addition,
the foreign exchange crisis during the winter of 1925/26 caused a sharp
cut in 'chemical imports, and the re suIting shortage of imported chem-
icals - - including dyes and tanning materials - - threatened to halt pro-
duction in industries using these chemicals, so that additional1icenses
l50Krasin_28, ST, (.Vol. I, No. 11, p. 39) irnplied that cotton
imports were actually to be reduced in 1925/26. This cutback was prob-
ably made during the revision of the plan.
151
ST, Vol. I, No. 11"p. 39.
l52Ibid., p. 40.
l53Ibid., pp. 40 and 43. Procurement problems aggravated the
shortage. See SUYB-30 (p. 163) for description of shortage of hides
despite large imports in 1925/26.
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had to be issued in May 1926.154
The important point is that the output of these consumer goods
was restricted not by capital capacity or demand but rather by the short-
age of raw materials, which were largely (or could be) supplied by
imports both in 1913and in 1924/25 and 1925/26.
The import-dependence constraint on future industrial expan-
sionafter 1925/26 is evident in the fact that imports of raw materials
and semi-processed materials equalled about 500/0of total imports in
1924/25 and 56. 7%of total imports in 1925/26, yet the volume of these
imports in 1924/25 compared to 1913was only about 34%for raw ma-
terials and 380/0for semi-processed materials (42%and 600/0in 1925/
26).155 Thus, total imports would have to be increased about 500/0above
1925/26 levels for industrial materials alone if Soviet industry was to
continue to rely on imported materials at 1913levels of output as much
as Russian industry did before 1914.156 (Adjustments for territorial
change would reduce import demand for industrial materials and would
increase import demand for processed goods. )157 To this potential
import demand must be added machinery imports which were roughly
one -half 1913levels in 1925/26.158 Thus, to restore machinery and
154ST., Vol. I, No. 11, p. 57.
l55Tables T -7 and T-27 (unadjusted for territorial change).
l56Tables T -5 and T-27 (unadjusted for territorial change).
157See Chapter III, p. 157.
158Tables T-5 and T-27.
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materials imports to 1913levels (leaving other imports at 1925/26
levels) would require a 60-70% increase in imports over 1925/26
levels. Yet as major exports fields began to approach their 1913levels,
Soviet exports lagged far behind, so that the imports of even the limited
amounts of materials and machinery in 1925/26 caused severe balance
of payments porblems. This lack of import-capacity was to become
acute by 1927/28.
In summary, in 1925/26, the limited import capacity retarded
the growth of output and placed an additional constraint on the level of
investment (in addition to the constraint of saving and its distribution
among sectors of the economy both in supply of investment goods and
in the supply of materials for the additional capacity. 159 This restraint
imposed by imports' was considered to be a critical economic problem
in the mid and late 1920's. As summarized by Kutusov-28:
in 1925/26... the demand for imports could not be significantly
curtailed, for the basic consumer of imports was industry, whose
strong development is necessary for the equilibrium of the 'eco-
nomy.160
159S . 1 b ° dO 1aVlngs--persona ,. government, USlness --was lrect y
related to the problem of expanding exports because increasing agricul-
tural taxes ("government savings") forced the peasant to market, while
taxing the worker or imposing wage constraints reduced demand for
exportable products, such as butter and eggs.
160Kutusov_28, p. 54. Cutting cotton, wool, and other raw
material imports would reduce the output of just those goods in strong-
est demand during the goods famine.
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Terms of trade and prices
The price index of exports (1926/27 weights) fell 6. 50/0in 1925/26
and the price index of imports fell 4. 50/0so that the commodity terms of
trade shifted slightly (20/0)against the USSR (Table T-28). The price s of
most major Soviet export products fell with the exception of furs and
butter. 161 The import price index declined almost entirely because of
lower world prices of cotton, wool, and hides and it concealed higher
" f h " d"" 162prIces 0 ot er Important commo Itles.
While the underfulfi1lment of the export plan in value terms can
be accounted for to a limited extent by the decline in export prices, the
excess fulfillment of the import plan is even worse when corrected for
price change s. The minor shift in the terms of trade was only a minor
factor in the large t'rade deficit.
Balance of pa ents, gold shipments,
credits, an reserves
The USSRexperienced continual payments difficulties during
1925/26 and had particularly severe payments prob lems in the fall of
1925because of the unexpected large balance of trade deficit in the
October-December quarter of 1925/26.163 This bulge in imports in this
quarter resulted from the delivery of goods ordered in earlier quarters
l6lThe basic export price index which excluded furs and ma-
chinery declined 120/0with 1925/26 price weights but only 7. '70/0with
1926/27 weights (because of the reduced relative importance of flax and
bristles). See Tables T-29, T-38 - T-42 and Appendix F, Tables F. 3,
and F. 13.
162Rubber, paper, some non-ferrous alloys.
l63ST., Vol. I, No. 11, p. 25.
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(especially with the "above-quota" import plans adopted in August 1925)
and from the rush of orders under the new import licenses issued in
August and September 1925according to the original import plan. A
strict cutback in imports was ordered in early 1926, but imports con-
tinued to exceed exports nearly every month. 164 The directive to
"accumulate foreign exchange I was completely ineffectual and instead,
the 80 million ruble balance of trade deficit and net imports of invisible
trade items (estimated at about 60 million rubles) forced the USSRto
ship 72 million rubles of precious metals, to reduce their foreign cur-
rency holding by 15million ruble s, and to increase their outstanding
foreign short-term debt by 62 million rubles. 165 The reduction in total
foreign reserves holdings was much less than 87 million rubles because
of increasing platinum and gold production (estimated at roughly 50 mil-
lion rubles).
Demise of the goal of a convertible ruble. For the first time
in November 1925, the State Bank had to spend significant amounts of
gold and foreign exchange to stabilize the exchange rate of the chervonetz
ruble on both domestic and foreign exchange markets and there was con-
siderable debate both within the Commissariat of Finance and within the
Party about the correctne s s of this policy and also about the re striction
l64Ibid• '" and Table A. Ie in Appendix A.
l65ST Vol. I, No. 11, p. 25. See Table T-14 for estimates of
Soviet balance of payments in 1925/26 andT-l5 for estimates of Soviet
foreign debt.
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of credit to industry. 166 Preobrazhenskii sharply criticized the Com-
missariat of Finance's use of gold reserves to "engage in unnecessary
'gold interventions' at the loss to the state, permitting nepmen to ex-
change their paper chervontzy into gold" and he emphasized ''we need
gold only for balancing our accounts with foreign countries ... and not
for obtaining from the "black bourse" evidence of the trustworthiness
167of the chervonets. " Although the exchange rates were kept at about
parity from October until April, the demand for gold remained per-
sistent and the "transactions in the 'American market' more than
doubled in volume between October and December, .1926. ,,168 There
was considerable discussion about the pros and cons of devaluation and
finally a decision was apparently made to abandon the official policy of
supporting the gold exchange rate of the chervonetz on the free markets;
in March 1926, the government ceased to offer gold and foreign currency
at gold parity for the chervonetz, and the exchange rate of the chervon-
etz on the "free Moscow market (black market)" fell. 169 The official
de jure gold parity of the chervonetz was not abandoned, however, and
licensed buyers and sellers of foreign currency (for foreign trade
l66Carr_58,. p. 481 citing G. Sokolnikov; Finansovaya Politika
Revolyutsii, iii (1928), p. 235 and Plan. Khoz. No. "5, 1926, pp. 98-99.
l67preobrazhansky_26, pp. 216-217. The first passage was
taken from a paper read to the Communist Academy in January 1926
(Carr-58, p. 484, n. 3). '
168Rykov_26a, p. 9; Table VIII. 2 and Carr-58, p. 481 citing
Vestnik Finansov, No. 11-12, November-December 1925, pp. 175-178
and Ekon. Oboz., January 1925, p. 5.-- --
l69Tab1e VIII. 2 and Carr-58" pp. 486-487, which cited several
Soviet articles discussing devaluation of the ruble.
TABLE VIII. 2
USSR: OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE OF FOREIGN CURRENCY
AND EXCHANGE RATE OF FOREIGN CURRENCY ON THE
PRIVATE EXCHANGE MARKET 1923 - 1926
(in rubles)
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Official Exchange
ExchangeRate of th e Fund's Rate on Private
D e par t men t of the Exchange Market
:Moscow Commodity (Moscow? )
Exchange
English American English American Ten RublePound Dollar Pound Dollar Gold PieceSterling Sterling
gold parity 9.46 1, 945 9.46 1. 945 10. 00
1923
February 9.38 2.08 10.62 2.39 12. 73
March 8.85 1. 92 8.88 1. 93 11.63
April 8.56 1. 92 8.50 1. 92 13. 24
May 9.67 2.23 10. 15 2.40 15. 90
June 11.38 2.59 11. 53 2.77 17.37
July 9.80 2. 14 9.97 2.22 15. 23
August 9.65 2. 11 9.87 2. 12 13. 48
September 9.54 2.07 9.59 2.07 12. 14
October 9.39 2.05 9.39 2.05 12.44
November 9. 15 2.06 9.49 2.20 13.75
December 9.47 2. 18 9.45 2.20 13.50
1924
January 9.40 2.20 9.42 2.24 15. 40
April 8.36 1. 945 8. 10 1. 91 11.0
July 8.41 1. 945 8.41 1. 93 9.60
October 8.67 1. 945 8.65 1. 945 9.72
1925
January 9.20 1. 945 9.07 1. 9375 10. 10
April 9.295 1. 945 9.30 1. 94 9. 70
July 9.455 1. 945 9.465 1. 9425 9.98
October 9.42 1. 945 9.41 1. 9425 10. 0
..
TABLE VIII. 2 (continued)
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Official Exchange
Rate of the Fund's Exchange Rate on Pr ivate
De partment of the Exchange Market
Moscow Commodity (Moscow? )
Exchange \
English
American
English
American Ten Ruble
Pound Pound
Sterling Dollar Sterling
Dollar Gold Piece
gold parity 9.46 1. 945 9.46 1. 945 10.00
1926
January 9.435 1. 945 9.435 1. 9430 10. 12
April 9.445 1. 945 11.0 2.60 13.50
July 9.445 1. 945 2.10 12.0
October 9.445 1. 945 1. 97 13.50
December 9.445 1. 945 13.00
Source: Notes to Table VIII. 2, Appendix B,
TABLE VIII. 3
EXCHANGE RATE OF CHERVONETS ON FOREIGN EXCHANGES
(Quoted in gold rubles, calculated against dollars. Parity
exchange rate: one chervonets = ten gold rubles. )
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Riga a b Harbin c Teheran Rome
Constan-Reval Kovno
tinople
1924
Oct.
r [. I.Nov. ' , I,Dec. " . . -,' .. , .1925
Jan. Low 'Low I . Low Low
Feb.
Mar. 10.02 10.05 9.3?I 9.705
Apr.
May High High High High
June
July '10.10 10. i1 10.21 9.98~
Aug. 1 1 1 1SeptOct.
Nov.
bec.
1926
Jan. 998.2 995.2 1003.4 1011. 3 983.3 1001. 1 997.4
Feb. 1001. 7 995.2 1003.4 995.9 991. 5 1097.6 997.6
Mar, 1001. 5 995.2 1003.4 1002.9 992. 7 999.5 1001. 5 "im-:lli
Apr. 995. 8 1002. 8 982.8 1000.4 995. 7 999.5 1009. 7
May 981. 1 1002. 8 . 994. 5 1000. 5 999.4 1005. 3
June 1002.2 997.6 990.4 1001. 5 997.6 1001. 3 .
July 1000. 2 997.5 . 1001.6 997.2 999.8 .
Aug. 1001. 7 '. . 994.3 996.9 1004.2 .
Sept. 1001. 7 1007.0 . 998.8 995. 7 1001.4 ..
Oct. 1001. 3 • • 997.3 993. 1 .. .
Nov. 999.4 • . 984.3 1003. 9 . •
Dec. 1001.2 • ~ 983.3 1000.0 1002. 5 .
TABLE VIII. 3 (continued)
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Riga
a b
Harbin
c
Teheran Rome
Constan-
Reva1 Kovno
tinop1e
1927
Jan. 998.4 1031. 6 1012. 9
Feb. 999.4 1013.0 1010. 1
Mar. No more cited in so~rces.
a
Also known as Ta1lin.
b
Also known as Kaunas.
cAlso known as Kharbin.
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transactions) bought and sold at the official parity exchange rates.
The chervonetz exchange rate on foreign exchanges, however,
did not seem to reflect these difficulties--perhaps because the State Bank
continued to temporarily support the exchange rate abroad or because
these rates were largely nominal rates. 170 Apparently chervonetz were
being exported in large quantities for sale abroad (to finance illegal
imports among other things), and on July 9, 1926 the Soviet government
prohibited their unauthorized export and accepted no further obligations
to redeem them. 171 This prohibition of chervonetz currency exports
formally signified the end of the USSR's attempt to reestablish the ruble
on foreign markets, a ruble which had become increasingly overvalued
during 1925/26.
A large part of imports was financed through various types of
credits which amounted to about 209 million rubles on October 1, 1926.172
These were for the most part short-term credits with an average
maturity of 4 1/2 months in 1924/25 and about 9 months in 1925/'26.173
The short maturity of the se credits and the continual uncertainty of the
availability of credits for the USSRgreatly increased the risk of pay-
ments difficulties. In Spring 1926, however, a major improvement in
170Table VIII. 3. See Carr -58, p. 488.
171SUYB_28,p. 419, and Carr-58, p. 488.
l72Table T -IS.
l73ST., Vol. I, No. 11, p. 26. The average outstanding debt
according tofuis source was 109million rubles in 1924/25 and 150mi1-
lion rubles for the first three quarters of 1925/26.
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the credit conditions for the USSRwas achieved when the German
government agreed to guarantee credits on additional imports of
machinery, etc., by the USSRup to 300million marks (142million
rubles)'with a maturity of two and four years. 174 This credits'et
the stage for a rapid increase in machinery imports.
Summary and significance of 1925/26
in Soviet foreign trade
The original foreign trade plan badly overestimated export
possibilities and attempts to fulfill this export plan by state procurement
agencies in the fall of 1925/26 contributed to the existing excess demand
for agricultural products. The resultant price rise threatened renewed
inflationary spirals, and, combined with lower foreign prices, made
many exports commercially unprofitable. Commercial losses in export
operations led to the government r s decision to reduce the procurement
prices of grain, ,eggs, butter, flax, meat, etc., which, in turn, caused
a decline in procurements and exports. Higher industrial demand for
flax, and timber, higher urban demand for eggs, butter, meat and bread-
stuffs, and lower foreign pl'.icesialso affected the fulfillment of the export
plan. The underfulfillment of the export plan forced a large cutback in
planned imports, which in turn restricted the growth of investment and
industrial output. 175 The rising domestic prices and large unexpected
174See p. 2'55and footnote 27 onp. ,2:5:5. See also Kuczynski - 47,
pp.55-56.
175See Preobrazhensky-26 (pp. 13-14) for his example of "the
peasants plan" to market 200 million poods less of grain, and its effect
on exports, imports and industrial output--h,e was obviously referring
to the events of 1925/26. He also cited "insufficient import potential"
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balance of payments deficit re suIted in increased demand for gold on
the domestic money market and forced the Commissariat of Finance
to abandon their attempt to make the chervonetz a convertible currency
in domestic and foreign money markets.
The long-run impact of 1925/26 on
Soviet growth strategy
The debate over the proper domestic economic policy for indus-
trialization was in full swing in the middle of 1925, when the Control
Figures for 1925/26 and the foreign trade plan were submitted for ap-
proval. 176 The plans for 1925/26 reflected the views (and hopes) of
what was to come to be the "Right" faction of the Party, But the diffi-
culties in grain collections, difficulties in expanding non-grain agricul-
tural exports, and a' decline in world market prices in the fall of 1925,
dealt a devastating blow to the export plan, and thus to the import plan,
and as a consequence, to the industrial output plans and foreign reserves.
Thus, it was not surprising to see the shift in emphasis toward the de-
velopment of domestic industry (and especially the critical raw materials
and machinery industries) and relatively less reliance on imports --a
policy strongly reminiscent of the economic policy of Witte a:ndhis slic''''
cessors.
as an important obstacle to the growth of industrial output (Preobrazhen-
sky-26" p. 41).
176See Dobb-28, p. 319. See Chapter II, pp. 74 ff.
322
CHAPTER IX
A MIDDLINGGOODYEAR~ 1926/27 PAYMENTS SURPLUS
After the debacle of 1925/26, the foreign trade plan for 1926/27
was drawn up with greater caution. The dominating constraint was to
assure a large trade surplus to avoid the payments difficulties experi-
enced in 1925/26. VSNKhand STO issued a plan directive to plan
foreign trade to achieve a balance of payments surplus of more than 100
million rubles. 1
The prospects for expanding exports were favorable because of
the second good harvest in a row, larger grain surpluses in the hands of
the peasants and the government, a significant lessening of the "goods,
famine, " and significant reduction in inflationary pressure through
government regulation and economic measures. 2 The dark spots in the
export picture for 1926/27 were the cutbacks or stagnation in the sowing
of technical crops, sugar beets, corn, and rye; the reduced marketing
of butter, eggs, etc. caused by the reduction of procurement prices,
1
Kaufman-26a. Rykov-26b (p. 9) wrote that "the foreign trade
plan for 1926/27 counts on an accumulation of 75 million rubles of
foreign reserves so that the surplus in the balance of payments must
exceed 100million rubles." Sobolev-26b (p. 33) implied that the direc-
tive was to achieve a trade surplus of 100million rubles.
2
ST" Vol. 2, No. 43, p. 34; SUA., Vol. V, No. 6 (1927), p. 4.
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and the low marketing ~oefficients for grain and other products. 3
The major problem for the 1926/27 import plan was to assure
an adequate supply of imported raw materials for the expansion of in-
dustry and to supply machinery for the enlarged investment program. 4
The 300million mark credit from Germany was to finance a large part
of the increase in machinery imports. 5 The raw materials problem was
particularly critical for 1926/27 because of a large drop in cotton yields
in Central Asia and continuing procurement problems for hides and wool.
These were all inputs into the major consumers' goods industries which
were important for further reduction of the "goods famine" which per-
sisted in a more moderate form. 6 Raw material imports were to be
3Diamond-55.
4Rykov-26, p.9. The 1926/27 industrial investment plan (870
million rubles) was 12%greater than the 1925/26 plan and was intended
to provide sufficient capacity to expand industrial output about 10-120/0in
1927/28. The major fields of investment were metal industry (228 mil-
lion rubles), coal industry (116million rubles), the textile industry
(106million rubles), and the oil industry (132million rubles). Invest-
ment in the oil industry was for the purpose of expanding oil exports.
Investment in the timber industry, the other major export field was much
smaller (24 million) and was even less than investment in the paper in-
dustry (import substitution) (SUA, Vol. V, No. 27, pp. 30-31). The in-
dustrialization resolution of tneT4th Party Congress was not mentioned
as a guideline to economic policy on foreign trade planning at this point.
5
Kaufman-26a.' He pointed out that the availability of long-term
credits meant that any planned active payments balance could be
achieved with a smaller trade surplus and would permit greater imports
for any given level of exports.
6SUA-(Vol. VI, No. 6 (1927), p. 46) compared production and
shipment of manufactured goods to surplus regions. Rykov-26b (p. 10)
stated that during the autumn of 1926 demand exceeded supply for only
cotton cloth, wool cloth, leather goods, and staple metals (roofing iron,
nails).
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expanded by eliminating most im:rx>rtsof manufactured consumers' goods.
Some planners doubted the effectiveness of the large expenditures of
scarce foreign exchange for manufactured consumers' goods as a method
of supplying these goods in short supply as compared to the same expen-
diture on industrial materials for producing the se consumer goods dom-
estically. 7 For the availability of imported materials was considered
by Gosplan to be the major barrier to expanded industrial output and in-
Svestment.
The 1926/27 foreign trade plan
Foreign trade plans were drawn up by both NKT and Gosplan.
A slightly revised variant of NKT' s original plan was confirmed by the
government and fo~ the first time the confirmed plan remained the oper-
ative plan without revision throughout the entire year. 9
Gosplan's foreign trade plan and output targets. 10 The orienta-
tion figures first presented by Gosplan projected 1926/27 exports at
7Kaufman-26d, p. 9; Kaufman-26a; Ekon. Zhisn, February 24,
1927; and Rykov-26b, p. 9; Kaufman-27c,p. 1.
SFor example, in the introduction to the Control Figures for
1926/27, Gosplan noted: "despite ideally precise calculation of the share
of national accumulation which must be mobilized by the state in order
to expand industry, the production plan will flounder if the export -import
part of the general balance is out of line with what is actually feasible. "
Gosplan-26, in Spulber-64, p. 402.
9MB-27, p. 10.
lOPlan figures from Table T-1.
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820 million rubles. This was 22%greater than actual exports in 1925/26,
but far below Gosplan's initial orientation 1925/26 export plan. Gosplan
projected that imports would be at 745 million rubles (2.40/0 less than
acttia11925/26 imports). This was 9%above the drastically reduced re-
vised import plan adopted in January 1926 (but again far below Gosplan' s
initial import plan for 1925/26). Gosplan's orientation foreign trade plan
projected a trade surplus of 75 million ruble s. 11 The structure of the
export plan did not change much and again relied heavily on grain pro-
ducts and other agricultural products. 12 Planned imports of manufac-
tured consumers', goods were almost entirely eliminated. 13 Machinery
imports were to be increased by 500/0,and raw material imports--espe-
ciallycotton- -were to be raised to permit an expansion of consumers'
14goods output.
Sobolev criticized Gosplan' s export. orientation figure s a s being
again excessively optimistic with respect to major agricultural exports.
lISobolev-26b, p. 27, and Table T-l.
l2Grain 'exports, due to the larger harvest, were to be larger
than in 1925/26 (Rykov-26b, p. 10). See below "Grain Export and Plan
in 1926/27. "
l3Rykov-26b" p. 9. Kaufman-28c (p. 110)stated that, "the
import plan should primarily satisfy the current needs of industry and
capital construction." He noted that "imports of consumer goods should
be permitted only in minimal quantities in an effort to economize on
valuta" (Ibid., p. 113).
l4Rykov-26b, ,p. 10. The reduced cotton harvest required plan-
ning for an increase in cotton imports (Kaufman-28c, p. 113;Sobolev-26b,
pp. 27-28). Since machinery imports were to be on long-term credit,
and since finished consumers' goods were sold on short-term bills of
exchange, .the change in the composition of trade aided the balance of
payments. See Sobolev;'26b, ,pp. 33-35, for a discussion of the use of
credits to expand imports.
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On the basis of the grain procurement campaign in progress, he pre-
dicted that grain exports would be 30-40 million rubles lower than the
plan figures. 15 Furthermore, procurement problems in butter, eggs,
flax, and other important agricultural export products occurring during
the summer and early fall 1926beclouded the export outlook for these
products, while continuing low world prices continued to make exports
unprofitable for major agricultural products and for timber. 16 As a
consequence of the probable underfulfillment of Gosplan's export plan,
Sobolev predicted that there was little chance of the trade surplus plan
being fulfilled. Gosplan came to the same conclusion.
Gosplan used the 1926/27 control figures of SeNE [VSNKh1 .• The
critical verification of that projection consisted mainly of assess-
ing the tangibility of the re sources required for the rate of indus-
trial expansion which SCNE had assumed. For the current period
the point of greatest danger in this respect is the export-import
plan. After the unfavorable trade balance last year and over a num-
ber of months this year, it has become imperative that a favorable
balance of trade be planned for and achieved next year, in particu-
1ar, a favorable balance of payments, which would permit replenish-
ment of the foreign exchange reserves in the treasury. Having sub-
jected SCNE's export-import assumptions to detailed analysis from
this standpoint" the Gosplan came to the conclusion that they did
not guarantee the achievement of as large a favorable balance as
is required for the stability of the economy's equilibrium in the
coming year. As a result, the contemplated volume of imports was
reduced somewhat, which in turn necessitated cutting down the rate
of economic construction to a corre sponding degree and tracing the
effects of that reduction through the entire system of economic in-
terrelationships expressed by the Control Figures •.• When the
import quotas were cut, every effort was made to see to it that the
textile industry, and other branches of light industry in which the
15Sobolev-28b, pp. 27 and 33. The grain procurement campaign
for agricultural year 1926/27 lagged behind the previous year's campaign
pecause of a late harvest and a cautious attitude in procurements. See
Oehring -26a.
l6Ekon. Zhisn, February 24, 1927.
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rate of output growth could not be reduced without aggravating the
goods famine, were supplied with adequate quantities of raw ma-
terials •... The Commis sion on Control Figures tried as far
as possible not to cut back those capital construction projects
whose completion in the coming year is essential for production
to proceed normally in the next few years. 17
Gosplan issued revised figures of 800 million rubles for export,
~04 million ruble s for imports with a planned trade surplus of 96 million
rubles. 18 The 41million ruble reduction in planned imports required a
reduction in the output targets of import-dependent industries for the
second year ina row. The preliminary growth targets were revised
downward from 7. 50/0to 5. 50/0in the cotton textile industry, from 210/0to
170/0in the leather working industry, from 14%to 130/0in the metalwork-
ing industry, and from 8.5% to 5.50/0in the woolen textile industry. 19
Foreign trade - -import -dependence - -was again found to be a barrier to
economic recovery and further growth.
NKT r S foreign trade plan. NKT pre sented a more conservative
foreign trade plan, and projected 1926/27 exports at 780 million rubles,
15. 2%above actual 1925/26 exports; imports were projected at 680 mil-
lion rubles, 10.0% below 1925/26 levels. 20
NKT r s original foreign trade plan for 1926/27 was revised at
least once after the fall of 1926. The export plan was reduced slightly
17Gosplan:~26, as cited in Spulber -64, pp. 405-406.
18Sobolev-26b, p. 32.
19Ibid., Kaufman-28c" p. 110.
20Kaufman-26b.
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to 762. 9 million rubles, and the import plan was raised from 680 mil-
lion rubles to 699 million rubles which was not much below Gosplan's
revised import plan. 21 NKT' s revised plan gave a trade surplus of
only 63. 9 million rubles, as compared to the directive to achieve an
active payments balance of 100million rubles. Middle-term credits
for imports, however, may have accounted for part of the active pay-
22ments balance.
There was considerable discussion in 1926/27 over the p~oper
size of the trade balance and proper role and amounts of foreign credits
to expand imports. Kaufman, the chief economic planner for NKT,
stated:
The policy of the trade balance in the current year should be to
achieve a balanc~ between the interests of industry (for with the
policy of industrialization of the country, the main consumer of
imported ~oods is industry) and the intere st of the payments
balance. 2
He went on to note that an excessive accumulation offoreign exchange
slows the industrialization of the country; and only through the use of
long-term credits can foreign exchange be accumulated along'with a
simultaneous passive trade balance. Kaufman concluded.that for the
USSR, however, it is necessary to attempt to run a small trade surplus
along with the expansion of long-term credits. 24 Sobolev on the other
21Kaufman-28a, p. 7.
22Kaufman-26a discussed the role of long-term credits in the
payment balance.
23Ibid~
24Kaufman-26a. The USSR's deficit on the invisibles trade
items had become fairly large by 1926.
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hand war.ned about excessive accumulation of credits (especially short-
term) which might require a possible reduction of imports in the near
future if the credit situation changed drastically. 25
The export plan. 26 The final revised plan for 1926/27 projected
a 12.7%increase in agricultural exports over 1925/26. Grain exports
were still the pillar of the export plan (400/0)and were to be increased
50%in value and 39%in quantity. 27 Butter and eggs were to be increased
5. 5%and 39%in quantity above 1925/26. Flax exports on the other hand,
were to decline 18.9%in quantity (because of the reduced harve st) and
37%in value (because of lower world prices). Industrial exports were
projected to increase only 8. 50/0in value over 1925/26 levels and were
not to be an important source of export growth in 1926/27.28
25 .
The valuta plan for 1926/27 for example was burdened by large
repayments of short-term credit (and eased by long-term credits particu-
larly from Germany). The credit repayment burden was particularly
heavy in the first quarter (October -December 1926), and required imports
to be cut even below one -fourth of the yearly plan (Sobolev-26b, p. 35).
The yearly plan called for 699 million rubles of imports; one-fourth of
which is 174million rubles. The export plan, according to Ekon~.Zhisn,
February 24, 1926, projected exports at 188million rubles,. while planned
imports were less than 150million rubles, lower than imports for the
previous seven quarters. According to Sobolev-26b (p. 32), a decision
was made to limit imports in the first quarter to the foreign exchange
receipts from exports.
26From Table IX. 1.
270ehring-26a, p. 14, and footnote ,48 on p. 336.
28The relationship of quantity and value for flax exports implied
lower expected prices for 1926/27 for flax. The small increase in pro-
jected industrial exports may reflect lower expected prices for oil pro-
ducts, or the judgment of M. Kaufman, chief planner for foreign trade
in NKT, or simply a projection of the availability of Soviet industrial
exports in 1926/27.
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TABLE IX. 1
USSR: 1926/27 EXPOR T PLAN
(value in millions rubles, quantity in 1000Ism. t. )
Agricultural Exports
Actual1925/26
1925/26
Actual
Quantitv Value
677
Plan 1926/27
PIa n n e d 1926/2.7 Plan as
Export 0/01925/26Actual
Quantity Value Quantity Value
Part A
Total Exports
Grain and related
products
Butter (gro ss)
Eggs (wagons)
Flax
Other
Industrial Export
...2630
27.2
4. 1
70.9
429
198. 1
30.9
23.6
45.5
248
3500
28.7
5.7
57.5
763
494
300
28.7
269
116. 2
105.5
139
81. 1
112.7
115. 2
118.7
63.0
8.5
Part B
Actual 1926/27
Act u all 9 2 6 / 2 7 F u 1fill men t
Export % 1925/26 % Target
Quantitv Value Quantitv Value Quantitv Value
Total Exports
Agricultural Exports
Grain and related
products
Butter (gros s)
Eggs (wagons)
Flax
Other
Industrial Export
2638
30.3
5.9
43.0
771
471. 7
234.0
34.2
29.0
20. 1
299
100.4
111.4
143. 9
60.6
113. 9
110. 0
118. 1
110. 7
122. 9
44.2
120. 6
. 75
105. 5
102. 9
74.8
101.0
95.5
75
70.0
111.2
Source: Note s to Table IX. 1, Appendix B, p. 769.
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The agricultural part of NKTr s export plan was drawn up on
the basis of growth rates projected by Gosplan for various agricultural
products. These projections are compared with the actual growth
rates below:29
Agricultural Output .
Grains -Output
Technical Crops-
Output
Livestock-Output
Projected
Increase in 1926/27
+ 7.20/0
+ 9. l%
- 6. 00/0
+ 4. 9%
A.ctual
Increase in 1926/27
+ 4. 9%
+ 4. 90/0
- 8. 40/0
+ 3. 00/0
The marketing coefficients were also expected to increase. 30 Similar
figures are not available for industrial products.
In summary, the export plan, still based largely (65%)on agri-
culture, projected a "conservative" 12. 70/0 increase in exports. Con-
strained by the slow growth of exports and the need to achieve a large
trade surplus, the import plan projected a reduction in total imports
(in current prices) and was oriented almost entirely toward the supply
of materials to industry and machinery for inve stment.
Good.ftil£illment of the 1926/27 foreign trade plan
The development of Soviet foreign trade during 1926/27 was
considered to be quite satisfactory. For Soviet foreign trade in current
prices developed roughly according to NKTr s plan,partly because in-
creases in foreign prices offset unexpected shortfalls in agricultural
production and marketing and despite a. strong increase in the urban,
29Kaufman-28c, p. 106.
30Ibid.
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peasant, and industrial demand for major export commodities. 31 In
current prices exports rose 92 million rubles (15%)during 1926/27,
imports were reduced 44 million ruble s (-5. 80/0)and the trade surplus
was 66 million rubles as compared to the 80 million rubles trade de-
ficit in 1925/26. The value of exports (778 million rubles) was almost
identical to NKTr s original export plan and exceeded the revised export
plan by 2.1%. 32 The outlook for future expansion of exports, however,
was much Ie ss favorable than indicated by the developments of exports
during 1926/2il.
The import plan required a 7. 6% reduction in imports. Imports
valued at current prices were indeed reduced to 713million rubles and
exceeded the revised import plan by only 2. 50/0. Many Soviet economists
..
had continually urged stricter adherence to the import plan which had
been exceeded by significant margins during the previous three years, 33
31Kaufman-28b, pp. 7-9, Kaufman-28c, MB-27a, pp. 10-12.
32The revised export plan (if drawn up on the basis of constant
prices) projected a 12.7% increase in exports--1926/27 exports valued
in 1926/27 prices actually increased 17.70/0so that the export plan was
overfulfilled even more than indicated in current prices {Table T -24).
33The slight overfulfillment of the imporf plan w~s attributed
to deliveries made of goods purchased in the previous year and pre-
liminaryestimates placed purchases (as opposed to deliveries) at 694.4
million rubles--i. e. less than the final revised import plan; sales of
export goods equalled 743.6 million rubles as compared to shipments
of 779 million rubles, which implied either the accumulation of export
goods warehoused abroad, overvaluation of goods shipped before sale,
or delivery of goods purchased before the beginning of the economic
year (Kaufman-28c, p. 115).
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so that the succes s in fulfilling the foreign trade plan was considered
an important step in increasing the planned nature (planomost) in
foreign trade. 34 The reduction in the value of imports, however, came
from two sources, a planned cut of imports of manufactured consumers'
goods, agricultural machinery, and some semi-processed goods (paper,
dyes, worked leather), and an unexpected decline in the prices of major
imported commodities such as cotton, rubber, non-ferrous metals, pulp,
and wool which permitted the import of the stipulated quantity for less
expenditure of foreign exchange. 35 If imports are valued in constant
(1926/27) prices, imports did not decline at all but actually rose 4.1% so
that in constant prices, the revised 1926/27 import plan was overfulfilled
by 12.60/0.36 The unexpected decline in import prices permitted ~bove-
plan imports of raw materials so that imported raw materials were not
as scarce during 1926/27 as first projected by Gosplan. 37 But prices
34See Kutusov-28, p. 59. This planomostwas partly the result
(and purpose) of the new import firms, which monopolized the import of
important raw materials and which were under the direct control of the
trade delegation. Formerly, domestic syndicates and trusts received
either specific import license s or 'a general import license whichpe r-
mUted them to purchase directly on foreign markets. See A. Kaulin,
"Die Neuen Export-und Import Gesellschaften, "SUA, Vol. V, No. 19
(1926), pp. 5-9. -
35Some evidence suggests that the value of imports for a par-
ticularcommodity was planned, and if the world price of that commodity
declined, a larger quantity could (and would) be imported (Cf. Rykov-26b,
p. 10). Rykov implied that the value of cotton imports is determined by
the plan, for if foreign cotton price s fell, additional cotton would be
imported. See Kaufman-28c, also.
36Table T -25. The trade surplus would have been reduced to
about 10million rubles if prices had not changed in 1926/27.
37MB_27a, p. 10.
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which fall can also risel.
Both imports and exports still lagged far behind the rest of the
economy. By 1926/27, gross industrial output in1913 prices had reached
104%of 1913levels, gross agricultural output in 1913prices reached 102.40/0
of 1913levels (Soviet data)--but imports and exports in 1913prices had
recovered to only 440/0of their 19131evels. 38 Why?
Grain exports and plan in 1926/27 (AY)39
The grain export plan for 1926/27 (EY) was only 75%fulfilled
both in 'quantity and value. 40
The grain export plans. The export plan for grain and related
products for 1926/27 (AY)was set at 3. 55 million tons, (a 34%increase
over 1925/26 (AY) levels). 41 This "conservative" 1926/27 grain export
plan reflected the greater caution (and bitter experience) of the planning
authorities as compared to 1925/26 (AY)when the grain export plan was
set at 6.2 million m. t. 42 The grain export plan for 1926/27 (EY) was
38Adjusted for territorial change. Trade data from Kaufman-
28c, pp. 107 and 115. Data on gross output in 1913prices from SUYB-30,
p. 94.
~.
39Analysis of grain exports and plan fulfillment 'is complicated
by the existence of two grain export plans, one for the grain export
campaign during the agricultural year (July I-June 30) and a grain export
plan for the foreign trade plan for the economic year (October 1 - Septem-
ber 30). In some sources, the use of the term "grain export plan" was
ambiguous and therefore these plan figures should be used with caution.
40 '
MB-27a, p. 11. The grain export plan for 1926/27 (AY) was
fulfilled in terms of value but the plan was only 86%fulfilled in terms
of quantity (ST, Vol. 2, No. 28, p. 7 and Kaufman-28c).
41Balaban-38, p. 219. Also Kaufman-28c, p. 104.
42Balaban-28, p. 219.
335
roughly identical to the plan for 1926/27 (AY).43
The planned value of grain exports in 1926/27 (EY) was pro-
jected at about 300 million rubles, which was an increase of 50%(100
million rubles) over 1925/26 (EY) levels.44 This increase accounted
for more than the entire planned increase in agricultural exports, which
in turn accounted for 75%of the planned increase in total exports for
1926/27 (Ey).45
Assumptions behind the 1926/27 grain export plan. The pro-
jected increase in grain exports was based on the projections of a larger
grain harvest in 1926 and on an increase in both procurements and the
marketing coefficient of grain from the peasant.
The 1926harvest of grain products was projected at 79.6 mil-
lion m. t. or about 7."2 million m. t. (10%)higher than the 1925 harvest.46
The projected shift in planned exports toward wheat and away from
43MB_27a (p. 11)stated that the grain export plan for 1926/27
(EY) was three -quarters fulfilled. Exports of grain and related pro-
ducts in 1926/27 (EY) were 2. 64 million m. t. which implied a grain ex-
port plan of 3. 52 million m. t.
440ehring-26a, p. 14. This is indirectly confirmed byMB-27a
(p. 11)which stated that actual grain exports (valued at 235 million
rubles in 1926/27 (EY) were only three fourths of the yearly plan; the
implied export plan was 313million rubles.
45Flax exports were to decline somewhat in 1926/27 (EY), so
that part of the 100million ruble increase in grain exports was. offset
by this projected decline in flax exports (Table IX. 1). '
46Dubenezki-27a, ,p. 22. The 1925 harvest was .72.4 million
m. t., the projected 1926harvest was 79.6 million m. t. Rykov-26b;
explicitly noted that the harve stwould be 10%higher than last year and
that this increase was taken account of in the export plan.
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barley, oil seeds, and oil cake reflected the favorable outlook for the
wheat crop and the sharply reduced crop of oilseeds and barley. 47
Thus, the value of grain exports would rise more rapidly than the quan-
tity because of the larger share of the ~igher priced grains (wheat and
rye) the expected improvement in the quality of the exported grain and
higher world prices. 48
Total marketing of grain and related products was projected
to increase about 230/0 to 16.4 million'm.t. (as compared to about 13.4
million m.t. in 1925/26 (AY). The predicted marketing coefficient
(tovarnost') was to increase :at . 25%of the gross harvest as compared
to 16-17%in 1925/26.49 Planned agencies were expected to purchase
about!1. 55 million m. t. of grain and related products placed'on the mar-
ket so that the predicted share of private trade and non-planned agencie s
at ' 50was estimated at about 5 million m. t. (30-10) of total marketing.
Fulfillment of the grain procurement plan was based largely on
the increase in the marketing coefficient (tovarnost') of the grain pro-
ducer. Why did the planners predict this large increase in grain mar-
keting and in the grain marketing coefficient?
470ehring-26b, p. 12.
480ehring-26b, p. 12 and Oehring-26a, p. 14.
490ehring -26b (p. 14) for plan figures which include oilseed.
Actual marketing figures for 1925/26 (EY) are estimated on the basis of
actual (estimated) marketing of grain products to all purchasers and the
actual procurements of oilseeds (1. 15million m. t. ) in 1925/26 (Table T -8).
. 50Ibid., Balaban-28, .p. 214. The procurement plan of grain
products for planned agencies alone was set at 11.06 million m. t. for
1926/27 (AY) as compared to actual procurements of 8.44 million m. t.
in 1925/26 (AY) (Vinogradskii-27a, p. 11and ST, Vol. 43, p. 40).
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Many factors favored successful fulfillment of the 1926/27
grain campaign in addition to more careful formulation of the procure-
ment plan and a record harvest. !twas the second good harvest in a
row and both.peasants and the state held reasonably large stocks of
grain from the previous year. Second, the "goods famine" had been
alleviated in the countryside and there was a concerted campaign to
lower the price s of industrial goods and to increase the flow of goods to
grain surplus regions ona planned basis. 51 Third, the planned pro-
curement agencies and the procurement program was better organized
from the viewpoint of exercising monopsonistic power in the. purchase
of grain. A "compact" or "convention"among the main planned agen-
cies regulated the upper procurement prices and delineated areas of
operation. 52. In addition, better credit control was to be exercised
over the procurement agencie s to improve the central control and to
prevent the accumulation of excessive purchasing power in the country-
side (as occurred in the 1925/26 grain campaign). 53 The states' mon-
opsonisticpowerhad been further strengthened by additional restrictive
measures on the private trader which, in practice, were effective
5l0ehring-26b, pp. 11-16. Cf. Balaban-28, pp. 217-218. The
price cuts were to be made instate and cooperative stores at the retail
level, .and by the industri~l trusts at the wholesale level (ST, Vol. II,
No. 43, pp. 36-39). Private retail prices were to be reduced through
resale -price -agreements.
52 .
Oehring-26a,. p. 14. As the 1926/27 year progressed, the
apparatus .was further centralized when Gostorg's grain collectioh
system was eliminated (merged into the newly formed Khleboprodukt
while the cooperative purchasing network was centralized into Khlebot-
sentr (Balaban-28, p. 218)•.
53In addition, credit wa s in general re stricted (Oehring -26b,
p. 15)..
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enough to reduce the share of private trader to about 3%of total mar-
keting in 1926/27 as compared to 13%in the previous year. 54
Another factor considered favorable for the success of the
1926/27 grain campaign was the much lower initial procurement prices
in June and July 1926 as compared to the same period in 1925; grain
prices were 30 - 40% lower than in the previous year. 55 This drastic
cut in prices plus better foreign prices made grain exports again "com-
mercially profitable "- .a goal which' still was imagined to be important
insetting domestic procurement prices. In fact, among the several
principles guiding the 1926/27 grain procurement campaign were two
of direct interest to grain exports: "the establishment of a level of
procurement prices which would assure the profitability of exports and
low prices for bread in the consuming regions, " and the "provision of
exports with the maximum' quantity of grain products. ,,56 Low grain
prices and maximum grain exports turned out to be contradictory goals!
Underfulfillment of the grain export pl~n. In terms of'value,
the grain export plan for' the agricultural year was almo st 100%fulfilled,
but this concealed the important fact that in terms of quantity this export
plan was only 860/0fulfilled. 57 While this was much abov~ 1925/26 (AY)
54SUA, Vol. VI, No. 20, (1927). "Extra-plan" agencies pro-
curements Ofalocal nature also declined from 16.10/0in 1925/.26to 9.10/0
in 1926/27 (Ibid.).
550ehring-26b, p. 16 and Tables T-38 - T-40.
56 6Balaban-28, p. 217. Also see Oehring-28b, pp. 14 and 1 .'
57 I
Kaufman-28c, p. 104 and ST, Vol.- II, No. 28, p. 7. Only
3. 06 million m. t. of grain and relate<rproducts were exported in 1926/27
(AY) instead of the projected 3. 55 million m. t.
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grain exports, it barely exceeded the exports of grain and related
products from a much smaller crop during 1923/24 (AY).58 The value
(and volume weighted in constant prices) rose considerably more than
16.4%because of higher world prices and large increases in the export
of higher priced grains (wheat and rye). Barley and oil seed exports
fell. 59
Grain exports for 1926/26 (EY) (i. e. , for the 1926/27 foreign
.trade plan) fell much further below the plan targets and the grain export
plan was only 75%fulfilled (with respect to both quantity and value). 60
Furthermore, grain exports were far below the plan figures in the April-
June quarter and almost ceased in the July-September quarter of 1926/27
(EY). '
This underfulfillment of t~e 1926/27 grain export plan in quan-
titative terms' was symptomatic of more fundamentalforces affecting
the future of grain exports. 61
Procurements, exports, and problems. The gross 1926 grain
harvest was somewhat less (6. 6%)than predicted by the planners,
58 ... , .
TableT-8, and SUA, Vol. VI, No. 14(1927), ,p~ 19.
59 . '., ,
ST, Vol. II, No. 43, p. 40, and ST, Vol. II, No. 28, p. 28.
This changeTn the structure of exports moreor less reflected the change
in procurements by planned agencie s, which in turn reflectedthe change
in crops and relative prices, See above cited sources and footnote 62 of
this chapter.
60MB_27•
6lThe overfulfillment of the grain export plan even in the large st
quarter (October-December 1927) was due largely to higher prices for
bread grains and a change in the composition of grain exports; the quan-
tity of grain exports foreseen by the plan for the first quarter 'was not
exported (Loevetskii -27a).
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nevertheless, it was the best grain harvest since 1917.62
The grain procurement campaign for 1926/27 (AY)proceeded
satisfactorily (especially during the fir st half of the year); the procure -
ment plan was 94. 8%fulfilled and grain procurement prices for the
most part remained very stable through the entire campaign.63 Only
during the April-June quarter did the procurement plan run into severe
difficulties. These aggregate figures, however, did not reveal several
factors adversely affecting exports. First and most important was the
failure of total grain marketing to expand as predicted at the beginning
of the campaign. In 1926/27 (AY) total marketing rose to 14.0-14. 5 mil-
lionm. t. instead of the predicted 16.4 millionm. t. 64 The success of
planned procurements was largely at the cost of private grain traders.
The marketing coefficient of grain products rose insignificantly from
62Table T -8. The actual 1926harve st exceeded the 1925har-
vest by 6. 6% (4.75 million m. t.); the 1926/27 crop was distributed among
regions in an unfavorable manner with respect to exports with poor
harvest in the main export regions (the Ukraine and North Caucasus) and
good harvests in the more distant regions (Dubenezki-27, pp. 22-23).
The rye, wheat, and oats crops were 10, 13, and 28. 4%higher than in
1925/26, and the barley, buckwheat, corn, and millet crops were 3. 6,
3. 4, 26. 2, and 30. 90/0lower; of the four latter grains, only barley was
of direct major export significance. (Ibid., pp. 25-26.) The crop of
oil seeds (flax, cotton, sunflower). wereaIl lower than 'the previous year.
The changes in output were due largely to changes in sown'area rather
than to yield (except for barley) and that changes in the sown areas cor-
responded to the changes in the relative prices of the grains (wheat and
oats were favored) .. I.,
63 .
ST, Vol. II, No. 43, pp. 40 -4l.
64Table T -8. Total marketing of grain 'products plus procure-
ments of oil seed of 1. 15 and. 66 million m. t. in 1925/26 (AY) and
1926/27 (AY).
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16-17%to 17.4 -180/0instead of the predicted 25%.65 The failure of the
peasants to market a larger fraction of their grain was, perhaps, the
most important factor to be considered in the plans for the future of
Soviet foreign trade. 66
The second factor was that dome'stic requirements for mar-
keted grain were rising rapidly because of the increasing urban popula-
tion and because of the necessity to supply increasing quantities of grain
(at low prices) to the producers of technical crops (such as cotton, oil
67 'seed, flax). The success of these crops were an important element
in the supply of exports (oil seed and flax) and the demand for imports
(cotton).68 Thus, to deprive these areas of grain for the purpose of
increasing grain exports might not improve the foreign trade situation
at all, but this was a problem hardly considered by planners and Party
leaders, who were intent in increasing the output and export of all
products (without considering the trade-offs).
Third, the peasant was sensitive to relative prices between
various agricultural goods, so that low prices of one crop such as
65Table T -8. According to Kaufman-26c, (p. 99) stated that
the marketing coefficient of grain products rose from 16. 30/0 in 1925/26
to only. 16.6%in 1926/27. The marketing coefficient of oil seed fell
from 63. 80/0 in 1925/26 to 61.40/0.
66See Kaufman-28c, p. 100.
67Urban population grew 5. 60/0 from January 1, 1926 to January
1927. (ac'cording to Gosplan-29a,. p. 398) and 7. 8%according to Table
T -48 (also Soviet data).
68preobrazhensky-26 (p. 173)was very aware of the effect of
relative prices (for example) of cotton to grain in encouraging the
development of technical crops.
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barley, flax or oil seed relative to the price of another crop such as
wheat influenced the pea sants' marketing decisions in the short -run and
his production decisions in the long-run. In 1926/27, in particular, the
very low procurement prices for barley and oil seed relative to almost
all other prices sharply reduced marketing of barley and oil seeds so
that the procurements of these two important export products was about
half of 1925/26 levels and the procurement plans were roughly 200/0under-"
fulfilled, 69 causing an unexpected curtailment of exports and u~derful-
fil1ment of the export plan. Furthermore, the sown acreage of barley
fell in 1927.70
Grain exports peaked in the October -December quarter of 1926,
and then fell off from 1176.3 thousand m. t. in October.-December 1926
to 869 thousand m. t. in January-March 1927, and even further to 385
thousand m. t. in April-June 1927. Grain exports in July -September
1927were negligible, in contrast to the same period for 1925 and 1926
(Table T-10). 71 The co1lapse of grain exports in the last quarter (July-
September) of the economic year 1926/27 illustrated how the cycle of
69Table T -34 for procurement prices.
70ST,Vol. II, No. 43, p. 40. The procurement prices of these
products were raised several times during the year, while the procure-
ment prices of wheat, rye, and other cereals remained more or less
stable (Cf., Tables T-40 and T-38, T-39).
SUA, Vol. VI, No. 12 (1927), ,po 39, and Vinogradskii-27, p. 10,
and SUA,-vol. VI, No. 9 (1927), p. 33. Oil seeds include flax seed,
hemp seed" and sunflower seed; only the last type is raised for seed,
alone. According toV,inogradskii-2 7a (p. 10), such absolute stability
between fall and spring prices is not normal, for before the war there
normally occurred about a 10 kopeck/pood rise in grain prices because
of drying out (weight loss), ,interest charges, storage charges, etc.
71Procurements for July-September 1927 ran ahead of the pre-
vious year. SUA, Vol. VI, No. 20 (1927), pp. 34-36. The reduction
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the economic year complicates the problem of planning exports, for
exports must be proj ected not only from the current harvest, but also
from the first three months (July-September) of the next harvest.
These exports of the July-September quarter usually accounted for
about"20-25% of total grain exports for the economic year so that an
unfavorable crop arriving at the end of the economic year can result
insignificant underfulfillment of that ye ar' s foreign trade plan as it
did in 1926/27. When procurements fell sharply (to an abnormal
degree) in the spring of 1927, grain exports also fell off. The decline
in procurements during the spring was attributed to 1) a war scare
(the British raid on the Soviet trade delegation's premises (Arcos) on
May 12, and other international events) which increased both peasant
and urban demand for grain, and 2) the more favorable prices for
animal products which led peasants to sell animal products instead of
grain products to get money. 72 The abnormally -large decline inp~~-
curements can not be traced to any overt decline in grain prices or to
a change in the pU1rchasingpower of grains (Table T-25). Of rather
of exports in the July-September quarter is explained by the rebuilding
of state grain reserves which were depleted in the preceding quarter
(ST, Vol. II, No. 43, p. 40). Grain exports were partially restored
inthe October -December quarter of 1927.
72Vinogradskii -27, p. 11. Event s included Chinese police raids
on Soviet trade delegations on March 11and April 14; raid on Arca s in
England on May 12, and breaking relations between Great Britain and
the USSR; assassination of Soviet representative in Poland (SUYB-29,
p. 534). Relative price movements of grains and animal products are
in Table T-34. SUA (Vol. VI, No. 12 (1927), p. 38) specifically noted
that a particularrysIiarp drop in May's procurements occurred despite
the favorable conditions of the spring sowing. It also pointed out that
the 1926/27 seasonal pattern of procurements was more or less similar
to pre -1914marketing patterns.
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ominous significance was the fact that the purchasing power of grain
actually rose. Grain prices exhibited slight seasonal upward trends,
and industrial retail prices dropped from 189 in October -December
1926to 158in July-September 1927 (_16%).73 This is not conclusive
evidence that the peasant was re1ative~y insensitive to the terms of
trade of agriculture. It is likely that the offer curves shifted too.
In addition, although the official price index for manufactured goods
fell, the "goods famine" actually wor sened during the spring and
summer of 1927. Low prices manufactured consumers' goods prices,
74but empty shelves.
A desirable development, ,according to the Soviet press, was
the increasing comm'ercial profitability of Soviet grain exports during
1926/27, when exports were profitable for all grains except corn
throughout the year. 75 This increase in profitability is largely the
result of the reduction in the procurement costs (Table T -43); over-,
head costs fell slightly and foreign prices for Soviet grain were only
slightly higher (only rye prices moved significantly higher). 76 The
731913 = 100. Kaufman-28c, p. 100. See also Table T -35.
74ST, Vol. II, No. 43, pp. 34-37.
75Cf. Vinogradskii-27a, p. 12; Ba1aban-28, p. 219; Feifets-
28, pp. 153-154;Kowner-27, p. 28. See Oehring-26b,(p. 16) for im-
portance of procurement price in the export campaign. Kaufman-28c,
p. 104..
76See Tables T-38 - T-40 for foreign grain prices. The re-
duction of only 1. 6 to 2. 6 kopecks perpud from overhead costs of 62
or more kopecks per pud was considered unsatisfactory by some
Soviet writers (SUA, Vol. IV, No. 14 (1927), p. 19).
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1925/26 commercial loss of 11%of costs of delivered grain was changed
to a 7%profit on costs of delivered'grain (Table T-43). But foreign
grain prices were falling in the summer and fall of 1927.
In summary, the increase in the value of grain exports ac-
counted for' 50%of the increase in total exports during 1926/27 (EY).
Exports of grain and related products were stable in quantity and the
grain export plan for 1926/27 (EY) was only 750/0fulfilled. Urban
demand was rising, procurement problems were increasing, (during
the spring and summer of 1927),. and the "goods famine" was worsen-
ing. World grain prices were.falling during the same period. The
harvest forecast for 1927was less favorable than the previous year.
The prospect for expanded grain exports in 1927/28 was poor.
Decline in other agricultural exports
, .. 77
The value of other agricultural exports declined (2. 20/0)
for the second year in a row. But in constant 1926/27 prices, however,
the volume of these products actually rose about 90/0;78 fo~eign prices
of flax, wool, and eggs fell substantially in 1926/27 while the prices
of the other commodities remained roughly unchanged. 79 Thus, the
77Excluding grain and related products" furs ?-nd,fish, and
sugar.
78 .
Table T -26. "Other Agricultural Exports"adJusted for
the increase of sugar exports.
79The volume index weighted in 1927/28:prices and exclud-.
ing sugar rose 16.5%and the price index for these goods fell 17.60/0.
Table T-26 and T-29 •.
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combination of lower world prices and lower flax and wool exports
(by quantity) more than offset the increase in butter, eggs, bacon,
and tobac,co exports in 1926/27. The relative trends of the exports
of these products in 1926/27 reflected additional important factors
affecting the future developments of Soviet exports - -sensitivity to
procurement prices and the size of the harvest, lo\y marketing coeffi-
cients and limited size of foreign markets. We again present case
studie s of four agricultural exports because they illustrate the impor-
tance of these factors for the development of Soviet exports and re-
present a sequel to the case studies started in 1925/26.
Butter. Butter exports rose about 110/0and actually. exceeded
the butter export plan by 5. 50/0(Table IX. 1). In contrast, the procure-
ment of butter increased 540/0so that the share of exports in butter
procurements declined substantially (from 560/0in 1925/26 to 410/0in
1926/27).80
Consumption in urban areas grew rapidly and shipments to the
city in.1926/27 increased 450/0over 1925/26 levels. 81 .This increasing
domestic demand was viewed as an unfavorable factor for the future
expansion of butter exports, because it reduced the "eksportnostrr' of
butter, i. e., it reduced the exported fraction of markete4 butter. 82
80
Actual procurements of 75, 140m. t. exceeded the butter
procurement plan of 72, 600 m. t. The increase in the procurement
price of butterwas deliberately planned for 1926/27 to encourage
butter production (SUA, Vol. V, No. 23/24, p.5l,. and Table III. 32).
81Table T -20. ST, Vol. II, No. 43, p. 44.
82 .
Kaufman-28c, p. 101.
347
Procurements of butter were very sensitive to the procure-
ment'price.83 In October-December 1926, both procurements and
exports lagged behind the previous year's level and the 1926/27 plan
because of the continuing low procurement prices (which had been re-
duced in early 1926 because of the decline in foreign butter prices). 84
In mid-winter the government deliberately raised the price of all
types of butter in order to increase the marketing:o{ milk and to in-
crease the factory production of butter. 85 Prices'were raised to re-
cord levels during the January-March quarter; but only in May 'did
procurements really accelerate (because of the seasonal behavior of
milk output), and procurements in the April-June and July-September
quarter 6f 1927far exceeded the procurements'during the same period
in 1926. Exports followed. 86 The price of butter and all animal
products relative to other agricultural prices (and especially grain
prices) became much more favorable during 1926/27 (TableT-34)
and toward the end of the July -September quarter "peasants tended
83Loevetskii-27; ST , Vol. II, No. 43, pp. 43-44.
84Loevetskii-27 (ST, Vol. II, No. 43, p. 43). Low prices
. induced the peasant to convert his milk into butter on the farm or in
the village, rather than to sell his milk to factories (from which most
butter was procured by state agencies). This cottage industry butter
was then purchased by private traders.
85Ibid•
86Table IX. 1 and ST, Vol. II, No. 43, p. 45. The marketing
response to price increaseS-suggested that the peasants' offer curve
of butter was price-elastic, for the RSFSRprocurement prices were
raised 260/0and planned procurements increased 320/0(Ibid. ). But'
this may have been a shift of peasant sales from the private trader to
the state agencies.
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to fe ed low-p riced barley and cor n tot heir catt Ie rather than to mar-
ket thes e grains. 87
Butter prices had been raised in 1926/27 even though higher
domesti c prices made butter exports very unp rofita ble fr om a com-
m ercial vi ewpoint. 88 This defini te ,chang e in dome stic price policy
vi s-a-vis foreign prices wa s another step towar d the complete separ-
at ion of Soviet a nd foreign price 1evels and it was bro ught about by
th e pressing ,need to i ncrea se expor ts (and domestic supply). 89
Eggs. A s im ila r sequence of events occu rred with eggs.
A large increase in egg exports w,as planned -- egg exports increase d
49%and exceede d t he egg 'export plan by 2. 90/0 in quan tity. 90 Pr 0-
curements of eggs were very resp onsive to procure ment prices. and
prompted the gover nment to raise prices severa 1 times during the
summer and fall of 1926 with the expre ss purpo se of increasing
procure ments and exports (as well as in creas ing the, supply to the
87Ibi d. This wa s partly the result 0 fan i nadeq uate harves t
of fo dder gra ss and other fodder crops.
88Ta ble T-45. Average overhea d costs for expor ted butte r
ci ted by Kaufman-2 6e (pp. 1-2l} in August 1926wer e 34.19 rubles per
100 kilo grams. Ta ble T-42 show s that th e differe nce betw eenthe
procure ment price of exported butte r and the quoted price for
Siberian butter at London varied betwee n 9 and 24 ruble s per 100kg.
(Accord ing to Kutusov -28 '(po 209) th e average overhe ad expen dit ure
fo r exported butter wa s 23. 58 rub les per 100 kg. h See Feifets -28b,
p. 158 and Table T-45.
89SeeH 01zman-68.
90rable IX. 1 and Ta ble T-4. According to ST, Vol. II,
No. 43 (p. 45), egg expor ts estim ated accord ing to the number of
wago ns increase d 42. 4%.
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urban area s). 91 Proc urements by planned agencies almost doubled
in 1926/27 suggesting that the supply of eggs to planned procure-
mentagencies -- and hence for export --was price-elastic~ Since
domestic urban demand rose even fa ster, the "eksportnost" of eggs
decli ned from 58%of procur ements in 1925/26 to 440/0 of procure -
m ents in 1926/2 7. 92
The marketing coefficient of e ggsincreas ed onlyslig htl y
in 1926/27 (from 34.80/0 in 1925/26 to 37.40/0in 1926/27).93 Fur-
th ermor,e, the la rge increas e in egg expor ts during the April- June
and July-September had a marked depress ing effect on egg prices
of the cheape r sort in the Soviets' major egg export markets,. so
that the avera ge foreign sales price of Soviet eggs in1926/2 7 was
91Pr ocure ments of eggs fell c atastrophicallybelow expe c-
te d 1evels in the spring and early summer of 1926asa consequence
of a reduc tio n in procur ement prices which had been made to re-
duce the commercial loss es on egg expo rts. ST, V 01. I, No•. 11,
p. 36. See above, p. 300. -
ST, Vol. II, No. 43,. p. 45. The price was raised fr om
29 rubles per box in April-June 1926 to 56. 98 rubles per box in
October -D ecember 1926 to 40. 61 in Ap ril-June,. 1927. '
92ST, V01. II, No. 43, p. 45. Ka ufman-28c (p. 101) a ttr i-
butes th e i ncrea sed domestic demand to a 5. 7% increase in urban
pcpulation and a large increase in th e per -ca pit a consumption of
both the peasant and espe cially th e urban pop ulatio n above 1913
Ie vels. Si nce .output had not recovered to 1913 1evels, this increase
in per -cap ita 'consumption was re111ected by lower expor ts of eggs
and butt er and fl ax (Ib ide , p p. 101-102).
93Ka ufman-28c, p. 99.
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about 18% lower than in 1925/26. 94 Th e oversu pply of Soviet eggs
on fo reign markets cause d Kaufm an to suggest that the export of
eggs be cut back so as to be able to sell eggs at' a higher price -- a
clear indication of the Soviet planners' consciousness of the
I .. d . f f. k 95ImIt e capac Ity 0 0 reIgn mar ets.
Flax. The value of fla x exports in 1926/27 fe 11to less
than one-half of 1925/26 flax exports. A decline inthe value and
quantity of flax exp orts was planned fo r 1926/27 becaus e it was
known that 1)world prices in 1926/27 would be about 15-200/0lower
thanI925/26, 2) domestic demand would be larger, and 3) 'the area
sown' with fla x in the im portant marketing areas had bee n reduce d
as a result of th every unfavor'able procur'ement prices during early
and mid -1926. 96 Recall that p rices had been lowe red in order to
maintain the commercial profitability of flax exports. 97 Events
tu rned out to be wo rse than planned~ The fla x crop in 1926 wa s
12% lower than 1925, procurements in 1926/27 w.er e 310/0lower than
1925/26, and expor ts we re 360/0lower than 1925/26.98 The flax
94Ba sed on unit values from VTSSSR -60;; ST, Vol. II"
No. 43, p. 43; SUA, Vol. VI, No. 23,. p~ 41. .
95Kaufman-28c, p. 105.
96The quantity of flax exports wa s projected to fall from
70.9 million m. t. in 1925/26 to 57.5 million m. t. in 1926/27.
Value was to decline from 45. 5 million rubles to 28. 9 mi llionrub les.
Table IX. 1.
97ST, V01. I, No. 11,. pp. 37-38. See above, p. 299.
98 /ST, V01. II, No. 43, p. 46. SUA,Vol. V, No. 23 24,
p. 45. Th edomestic fla x-spinning industry was short on raw flax
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export plan was only. 70% fulfilled and even th is poor showing was
achieved only at the cost of the domesti c f lax in dustry which re-
ceived 22% less fiber than the previous year and 300/0less than
pi anned. 99 Exp ansion of a dome stic in dustry conflict ed dire ctly
with the expansion of an important export .produc t. 100
The pro curemen t price poli cywa s change d as the im pact
of th e low price on sowing and marketing became clear. (The mar-
keting coefficient fell from. 61. 50/0 to 53.70/0 of gross harvest in
1926/27. \)101 Th e VSNKh ordered an in creas e in the prices of flax
and f lax seed and a reduc tio n in t he prices of competi ng grains, oil
k d bl. 1 . h fl .. 102 Thca e, an vegeta e 01 s 1n t e. a~ grow1ng reg10ns. e pur-
chasing power of flax in t he spring of 1927, however, was st ill about
250/0 below the .fa vorab Ie prices whichhad encou ragedth'e expans ion
of flax, sowing up thro~gh 1925 - -and fl ax sowin gs continued to
f
(SUA, Vol. VI, No. II, p. 28). Th e procur ement pi an wa s revised
downward several times fr om 180.2 thousand m. t. to 139. 3 thou-
sand m. t. Even th is reduc ed target was not met (ST, Vol.. II, No.
43, p. 46). -
99ST, V01. II, No. 43, p. 46.
lOOThe domestic £lax~.industry use d 114,700 m. t. in 1926/27
as canp ared to 81,900 m. t. in 1913 (Kaufman-28c, p. 102).
10 lIb °d 99__1_., p..
102ST, Vo1. II, No 43, pp. 46 -47. Raising the procure -
m ent price STIghtly (50/0) had abso lut ely no ef fect 0n marketing in
the fall of 1926. Thu s, mare "ener getic measure s" w,ere taken
on March 8, 1927 (right before the sowing. sea son), wh ich in cluded
a 10%increas e in prices, redu ced grain prices, advance d contract-
ing' increased supp Iy of fertilizer at low prices.
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decline in 1927in favor of grain. 103
Low foreign f lax prices persisted through Jan uary1927, but
an in creas e in foreign demand and the unexp e cted cutback in Soviet
exports (and sowing) re"sulted"in rapid in creas e in f oreignprices
during 1927.Th us, fl ax expor ts we re profit able through "iIl1.ost6f
1926/27 despite the increas e in the procurement price. The influ-
ence of Soviet flax exp orts on foreign fl ax prices was quite notice-
able - - indeed, the Soviet authorit ies had ended sales compe tition on
forei gn markets among the five authorized expor ters of flax in the
previous fall so that th ey had more control over the wo rId price. 104
Oil seed prod ucts. The pro ducts of oil seed crop - - oil
seed, oil c akf1 vegetable oil -- were relat ively im portant in Soviet
exports in 1925/26 and equalled 6.80/0 of tot al expor ts. 105 Oil seed
product exports declined sharp lyin 1926/27 (320/0in weight and 39%
in value) a s a consequence of poor yields in the major oil seed pro-
ducing crops and a cutback in t he sown area. 106 Mar keting fe 11
103rh id. , p. 47.
104T he above" di scus s ion was bas ed on ST, V01. II, No. 43,
pp. 43, 46 -48, "and 72, and 81; Vo1. I, No. 11, p:- 38..
105See AppendiJ{A, Tech nical Note 6 f or a defi nit ion of
"oil see d." Oil seeds refer basically to sunflower seed, flax seed,
and cott on seed. Oil see d produc ts include oil cak e, oil seed, and
th e oils of oil seed. Data from VTSSSR-60.
106According to Kaufman-28c (p.99), the yield of oils eed
crops fell almost" 260/0, the sown area wa.s 7.4% less and the gross
harvestwa s 30.8% less than in the previous year. Th e sunflower
seed crop -- the major oil seed -- fell from 2.18m illion m. t. in
1925 to 1..49million m. t. in 1926 (Johnson-60, p. 235).
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m ore than the crop declined (th e marketing coeff ici ent fe 11from
63.80/0to 61.40/0)-- but thi s would be expected if output declined. 107
In order to encourage marketing (which was 200/0 below plan) and to
encoura ge the expansion of oil see d, the procure ment prices were
delib eratelyraised during 1926/27.108
Thes ef our prod ucts -- butt er, eggs, f lax, and oil seed
products -- made up a relati vely important. share of total exports,
21.60/0in 1925/26 and 13.90/0 in 1926/27. The volume of thes e ex-
ports la gged far behind 1913levels -- yet further expansion of ex-
ports in 1927/28 and future years for the products depended on the
successful solution to numerous problems -- output, marketing co-
efficients, proper price policy, "eksportnost'r''' competing domestic
demands, and th e capacity of fore ign markets.
Seconda ry agricultural e.xports. As th e export of maj or
agricult ural produc ts fai led' to increas e as rapidly 'as hoped, NKT
in creas ingly emphasized development of the so - called "second ary
agricult ural exports'fI-- hemp, horseha ir, brist les, guts~ tobacc 0,
herbs, hides, bacon, fruits, et c. 109 The major problems in expand-
in g second ary agricultural exports were marketing' dif fic ult ies
107Kaufman-28c, p. 'f). The "eksportnos t" of oil seed
products actually in creased. In 1925/26, 570, 000 m. t. oioil seed
products were expo rted and 1, 338, DOOm.t .wer e procured, so that
the "eksportnost"" of procured oil seed was 550/0.Similar'figures
fo r 1926/2 7 are 387, 000 m. t., 663, 000 m. t., 580/0 (5 T; Vol. II,
No. 43, p. 40). Expo rt data f rom VT~SSR-60. -
108T able T -34 and SUA, Vol. V, No. 23/ 24, p. 46.
109See Gurevich-27a, p. 4; Kaufman-28c, p. 105; Kovar-
skii - 27a, p. 5.
Agricultural second ary expo rts (e xcluding grains, oil seed,
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abroad.
Fur. Fur exports had become a most important export
item for the USSRand equalled 110/0 of total exports in 1926/27 (as
contrasted to 0.4% in 1913). The value of fur exports in 1926/27
was five times larger than the official value of fur exports in 1913,
but because the price level of furs had roughly tripled since 1913,
the volume did not quite reach 2 1/2 times 1913levels. 110
A reduction in fur exports had been planned for 1926/27
(as it had been planned for 1925/26) as a fur conservation meas-
ure.lll The value of fur export rose 19~60/0 in 1926/27 but this
oil cake, butter, eggs, flax, furs, fish) rose 34%(47.2 million
rubles and 6.9% total exports in 1925/26 to 63. 3 million rubles
and 8.1% total exports in 1926/27 [calculated as a residual). Kauf-
man-28c (p. 105)cited a 22. 70/0 gain in secondary agricultural ex-
ports (excluding fish and furs).
110Table T-29., Fur prices were used to deflate the value
of 1926/27 fur exports for comparison with the 1913level. The
actual volume of fur exports in 1913was much greater than recorded
in the official export statistics (see Appendix F). Thevolwne in-
dexes were constructed on the basis of semi-official estimates of
the actual volwne of fur exports in 1913. In constant prices, fur
exports in 1926/27 were about equal to 1913exports.
lllST, Vol. II, No. 42, p. 14. "K voprosu 0 sokhranenii
pushnog 0 zveria v SSSR". Cf. SUA, Vol. VI, No. 10 (l927), p. 47,
and SUA, Vol. V. No. 23/24 (19~ p. 46. Soviet fur exports were
a major factor in world fur supply, so that a cutback in exports
might affect world fur prices, but this was not discussed.'
The fur procurement plan for 1926/27 also stipulated a re-
duction in the volume of fur procurements; the value of procure- ,
ments for 1926/27 was projected at 32.5 million rubles ascompared
to actual procurements of 36 million rubles in 1925/26 and higher.
prices were to be paid to curtail pruchases by private traders.
(SUA, Vol. V, No. 20 (1926), p. 46). Measures were also to be
taken to 1) set up a fur export syndicate (monopoly) and a trade
organization to supply (regulate) the internal demand for fur, and
2) to prevent exhaustion of fur resources.
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was due partl y to i ncrea se s in export price s. A volume index of
fu r exports weighted in 1926/2 7 prices rose onlyabou t 80/0. (Table
T-26 ). The important point here is that the Soviet authorit ies fe ared
exhausting the wild animal stand as had occur red before 1914fo r
certain furs. Thus, the prosp ects f or further expans ion of Soviet
fur exports were poor 'and limited by the neces sity to conserve
this natural re sour ceo
112In dustrial expor ts .. e:xceeded plan
Industrial exports increased 20.70/0 in value in 1926/27 and
33%in volume, 113and.off set the underfulfillment of the agricultural
export plan (Table IX. 1). This in creas e was based almost entirely
on five pro duct groups -- oi 1p roduc ts, sugar, tim ber prod ucts,
manganese ore, and cotton cloth -- which made up 820/0 of indus-
trial exports (31.40/0 of all exports) in 1926/27. The se five indus-
tr ial exports we re one of th e three majorsourc es of growth in the
value of exports in 192h/27. The other two sources were grain and
fu r exports, but the in creas e in t he value of grain and fur exports
resulted 1arge1y from a change in the compositi on or becau se of
But the actual value of fur procur'ements for 1926/27 was
as hi gh as 71.4 million rubles or aIm ost double t he original plan
(possibly becaus e of higher prices). See Fei fet s-28b (pp. 156-157)
fo r a di scuss ion of overh ead costs and pro fitabi1ity of fu rexports.
112Theter'm "industrial exports" refers to the Soviet de-
finiti on.
ll3Table T-26. Unadjusted for changes in product cover -
age. In' 1925/26 prices (with much higher prices for oil) industrial
exports increase d 410/0.
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hi gher foreign prices and not from increas ed quantitie s of exports.
That is, th e value of fur and grain exports increase d without major
in creas es in the volume exported. Th us, by the end of 1926/27 a
m ajorquestionwas to what extent could industrialexpor ts be a
vehicle for restoring exports to pre -1914Ie vels i n-.place of.agricul-
tu ral exports? Theparti cularproblems and pro spects for expand ing
several im portant industrial expo rts is examined briefly below •
. Timber exports strong .. Th e value of timberexpor ts in-
creased 370/0in 1926/2 7 and equalled 10. 20/0of total exports in.
1926/27. Th e volume of timber exp orts stiliia gged iarbehind pre-
1914 levels.114 To a large extent, the failure of timber exports to
recover to the same extent astimbe r output (withi n t he Soviet te r-
ri tory) wa s that only 60%of the tim ber exports of Russia in 1913
came fr om within Soviet borde rs of 1925.115
The factors which had retarded timber exp orts in 1925/26.
-- hi gh dome stic demand a s a re suIt of the pI anned .in ve stment
l14The volume of timber exp orts in 1926/2 7 (valued in 1926/
27 prices) wa s about 3S% of 1913 timbe r produc t exports (unadjusted
for territorial change) (Table T-26). The increase in the value of
timber exp orts was due almost entirely to an in crea's ed quantity .ex~
ported (e spec ially of sawn lumber). The price index of expor ted
timber increa sed abou tone per cent (Table T -29) •... '..
lISE! KSSSR, .pp. 245- 247. Timber:exp orts -f rom Soviet
te rritory in 1913were roughly 4. 6 million m. t. Thewei ght of
timber pro duct exports in 1926/27 was 2. 4 8 million m . t., so that
timber exp orts had recovered to about 60% of th e 1913 Ie vel with
adjustm ents for territ orial losses. Ac cording to STAT- 34, (p. 126)
the output of sawn lumberi n 1926w as 91.30/0of 1913 levels but the
availability of unworked tim ber -- a major export item - - was not
in dicated.
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program and low fo reign demand -- were reversed during 1926/27 .
During the fir st half year, there was a domestic sales crisi s and
production excee ded sales, whi Ie foreign demand was much
st ronge r. 116 Thus, t he export plan wa s 950/0fu Ifilled. by weight
and 1000/0fulfi lIe d by value. The exp ort outlo ok for 1927/28, how-
ever, was more complicated, for alt hough fo reign demand was
stronger!: than before, th e domest ic lumber market; shifted from a
"sales crisis in lumber" to a sharp and sudden "excess demand for
lumber in the summer and fall of 1927. Th is increase in dom-
estic demand wa s att ribu ted to th e enlarged con struction program
fo r 1927, und erfulfillment of the pro curemen t plan fo r logs, and
a sharp ly increase d demand by peas ants, wh 0 were using the pro-
ceeds of th e harves t for construction. De spite the predicted 15-200/0
in.creas e in demand for 1927/28, the predicted increa se in output of
sawn lumber wa s only 70/0so that th e domestic.market situati on wa s
to be considerab ly wo rse in 1927/28. 117 Th e growth of ,domesti c
demand confli cted with th e expans ion of export s.
Oil p roduc t exports expa nd. Oil produ ct expor ts continued
th eir rapid expansion and rose 22. 10/0in valu~ and 440/0in volume in
116ST;V01. II, No. 43, pp. 56- 57, and ST, Vol. I, No. 11,
p. 49.. Th eactual distri bution of exports over ,the economi c year
is fr om October 1 to mid -D ecember, at which t im e the. ports freeze.
Shipping opens again in the spring to ful fill the contracts concluded
during t he winter.
117Theabove discus sion is based on ST, Vol.: II,: No. 43,
p. 58.
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1926/27 (Table T -26). 118 The outstanding feature of Soviet oil ex-
ports in 1926/27 was that the prices received for Soviet oil pro-
ducts abroad fell about 20% (1926/27wei ghts) (Table T -29). Prices
of gasoline and napthas fell almost 300/0from 1925/2 61 evels. 119 The
decline in prices was attributed to the over-productionof oil in
the USA, and the struggle:of the la rge oil Concer ns with i ndepe ndent
firms for European markets. Th e desire of the Soviet 0 il exp ort
syndicate to expand th eir market share al so induced"them to cut
price s and set up th eir own indepe ndent distri bution network s ( "D er-
uneft" for Ge rmany, Austri a, and Czecho slovakia; "Rus sian Oil
Prod ucts" for Great Brit ain; "Soviet Naptha Syndicate" repres enta-
120tives in Italy, BaIt ic States" and Tu rkey). By the end of 1926/
27, Soviet. oil products acco unted for si gnific ant parts of Briti sh and
Euro pean markets; about 500/0for the Ita lia n market, 18% of Fren ch,
15% of t he Spanish, 16. 50/00 f the German, ,17%of th e Belgian and
,118Yolume index we {ghted with 1926/27 prices. The total
weight of Soviet oil exports in 1926/27 increa sed by 38.40/0ove r
1925/26 levels, being led by kerosene (plus 43.50/0),gasoline and
napthas (pIus 47. 50/0),and fuel oil (plus 53. 5%). The quantity" of
oil p roductsexports' in general wa s twice the level of'19l3 ,(ex-
ports; k erose ne wa s aIm ost id entical, gasoline and fuel oil fa r
exceeding it, wh ile th e 1ubricating and heavy solar oi Is lagged
behind 1913 Ie vels (ERSU, Yol.' II I, No. 9 (1928), ;p. 160).
l19Unit values fr om YTSSSR-60. Ke rosene and fuel oil
unit exp ort values declined 2. 70/0and 3. 70/0;lu bricating oi Is fell
12• 20/0(SUYB-28, p. 263).
120
,:E; :ItSU, Yol. III, No. 9 (May, 1928), p. 160 and Solobev - ,
27a, pp. 7-9. Acc ording to the ERSU article,' about 150/0of oi 1 e x-
ports were so ld directly to retail customers throughdistributi on
apparatus, and another 150/0wholesale fr'om th eir st orage depots.
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about 5%of th e British market. 121
Oil output wa s one of the few pro ducts in 1926/27 whose
output exceeded the output 0 f 1913by a wide margin (160/0)and the
supply of 0 i1 pro ducts to the internal markets was re1ati ve1y favor-
able compare d to 1913.122 The simu1ta neous expansion of exports
and domestic consumptio n above 19131e ve1s was the result of re1a-
. 1 1 .. d d .. 123.tlve y . arge Investment programs orIente towar expo rt expan slone
Output of oil expanded 23.70/0in1926/27 and well exceeded :the orig-
in a1 output pI an (fo r both crude oil a nd refined produc ts) , 124and the
121ERSU, Vol. III, No.9 (May 1, 1928), p. 160. Sharp com-
petition occur red also for th e I ndian -and Egyptian markets. See ERSU,
Vol. III, No. 16-17 (1928), p. 283, and Com11y-35, pp. 92-93. These
market share s are considerably 1argerth an in 1925/26~ Cf. Solo-
bev-27a, pp. 8-9.
122ST, Vo1. II, No. 43, pp. 60 -61 and 70-7l.
123SUA, Vol. V, No. 22, p. 22•. SUA, Vol. VI, No. 18,
p. 9 and other-referen ces cited in th is section. See p. 494 for fraction
of in ve stment allocated to petroleum in dustry. In 1927, the Soviet
trade publications EconomicRe view of t he Soviet Union and Sowjet -
wirtschaft und Aussenhande I both repll ed to statemerts of Detering,
head of RoyaJ Dutch Shell about the shortage of oil pro duct s in Ru s-
si a,wh ich were interpreted as an attempt to di scred it the expan-
si on of Soviet oi 1 exports. Cf. Solobev -27a, p. 9; ERSU, Vol. I I,
No. 16-17 (Sept. 1, 1927), pp. 1 -2 and E RSU, Vo1. II,' No. 20 - 21
(Nov. 1, 1927),p. 8. ,---
124T he oil production plan for 1926/27 projected th e outplt
of 9. 30 mi llion m. t. of petroleum and gas, of which 8. 63 million m. t.
would be refined to produ ce 6.4 million m. t. of fin ished produ cts
(SUA, Vol. V, No. 22 (1926), p. 32). Cr ude oil 0 utput was,':10. 8
m illion m. t. in 1926/27; refined produc ts 6. 83 millio n m. t.
In comparison, cru de oil and gas output was 8. 24 million
m. t. in 1925/26, 9.23 in 1913, -and 11. 56 in 1901(STAT - 60, p. 275,
and ERSU, Vol. II, No. 16-17(1927». In 1925/26, 5.74 million
m. t. of finished products were prod uced (ERSU, \01. III, No. 14-15
(1928), p. 259). Figures fo r three trusts - - As neft, Gr ozneft, and
Embane ft). The 1926/27 output pIan fo r napthas, ker osene, and
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large increase of exports in 1926/27 was also accompanied by sig-
125nificant increas es in the domesti c sales of a 11oil products. Ex-
ports as a fracti on of tot al crude oi 1 in 1926/27 was:30%, f or gaso-
line and naphta about 88%, and for fu el oil about 13%. 126
Thus, the major 'problem fa cing Soviet oil exports in 1926/27
were limit ed expor t mar kets 'and.fal.lin g foreign prices rather than
the 1ack' of exportable surplus and in adequate domesti c output.
Manganese expo rts fa ced increased competition. 'Manganes'e
ore exports increas ed only 130/0in value 'and 16. 60/0in quantity wh ile
export unit value s wer e a bi t lower. Prices began to fall a s the
USSR at tempt ed to regain their pre -1914markets. 127
Cotton cloth and sugar exports toAsia~ Gott on cloth and
sugar were expo rted chiefly across the As iat ic borde rsto Pe rsia
and China during themid-19201 s, and equalled slightly less than
50%of exports across Asiatic borders and 6. 7%of total exports in
1926/27. Exports of cloth rose 42%in value and 730/0 by weight; the
unit export value of cloth fell sharply. These cloth exports were
only about 1.4% and 2.0% of total cotton cloth production in 1925/26
and 1926/27.128 Although some economists advocated strengthen-
ing exports across Asiatic borders, increasing the export of cloth
clearly conflicted with the official policy to increase domestic sup-
ply of cloth so as to mitigate the goods famine.
Sugar exports rose 64. 5%in value and 1460/0by weight.
Unit export ;yalue fell sharply from 417 rubles per m. t. in 1925/26
to 278 rubles per m.t. in 1926/27. The volume of sugar exports
increased despite a decline in the 1926 sugar beet harvest and sugar
production; gross sugar exports equalled 13. 5%of sugar output, as
. 129
compared to 4.3% of total sugar output in 1925/26.
The important development with respect to sugar and cloth
was that prices declined when the USSRattempted to regain tradi-
tional Rus sian markets and also attempted to irripJ1'Ovetheir balance
of trade with Asian countries (especially Persia); the price-cutting
, 130
became even sharper in the subsequent years. These
128See Table T-20.
l29SUYB_29, p. 140, and Table T-20. See Reingold-3l
(pp. 200-20l) fora discussion of sugar exports costs, and domestic
consumption. Peasant consumption and demand were relatively low
compared to urban inhabitants and other countries. Excise taxes
were not levied on exported sugar and cloth.
130See Conolly-28, pp. 56-63.
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commodities were genera lly not s'ent to Euro pean marke t s wh ich had
freely convertible excha nge,but rather to Asian'coun tri eswith un-
131certain excha nge rates and a forced balanc e of trad e. Further -
m ore, the expan sion of the s e exports depe nded directly 'on Soviet
agricult ure for'raw materials (or increas edim ports of cotton).
T.hus, the expan sion of thes e exports as a means for accumulating
fo reign excha nge and pur chasing machiner y wer e not particularly
favorable ..
Impo rts' and plan
Total impo rts in current prices were succ essfullyreduc ed
in 1926/27 according to import plan, but the individual components
of th e plan, wer e uneven ly fulfilled with machinery imports increas -
ing 1ess rapidly than planned, and raw materials in creas ing more
rapidly than planned.
Machinery fo r recons tructi on. Machineryimpo~s (exclud-
ing agricultural machinery) increased only 39. 80/0invaluein1926/27
as compared to a 50%increa se p roj ected in th e foreign trade plan'
(Table I X. 1). The lag in machinery impo rts was attributed to th e
longer thanexpe cted delivery times in machinery ordered in Ger; ....'
many, for value of machinery ordered exceede d by a. considerab Ie
132margin, the value of mac hinery delivered. The in! luence of th e
13 ])
Cf. Conol1y-33, p. 60.
The majorexpor ts of Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, Sin-
Kiang were fibers, hides, and teas. Conolly-33 discus sed Soviet
tr ade with th e Eas t.
132See below table in footnote 36 on p. 333. See also SUA,
Vol. VII, No. 7 (1928), p.2. Kaufman -28c, p. 115.
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1926 300 million mark credit (150millio n rubles) fr om German y
began to affect Soviet machinery imports as Ger many expanded it s
equipment exports by 25.6 million rubles, more than the entir e
expansion of machinery imports in 1926/27.133 The s hare of ma-
chinery in total imports expanded rapidly from 14.2% in 1925/26
to 21. 40/0in 1926/27 (Table T -7 ). 134
Kutusov emphasized the importance of imported machinery
in th e carrying out of the 1926/27 in vestment program- in industry,
and asserted that by value one -half th e machine ry installe din indus-
tr y was impo rted. 135 Many theoretical problems compli cate any
estimatIon of the share of impo rted machinery in to tal machinery
in stalle d on an aggreg ate basis as di scuss ed elsew here in this
136st udy. Th us, we found many diff ering estim ates of the sha re
of impo rted machinery in to tal in dust rial machinery install ed --
th e important point is that imported machinery was important in
133Excluding agricultural machinery, Ger man machinery
exports equalled 46. 50/0and 56. 50/0of tot a1 Soviet machinery impo rts
(e xcluding agricultural machinery) in 1925/26 and 1926/27 (VTSSSR-
60).
134Kutusov-2 8, pp. 57-58. As noted in Appe ndix A, Tech-
ni cal Note 4, the Soviet d efi nit ion of "machinery" her e included
pipes, wiring, etc. ,Using the SOVTC definition (VTSSSR-60) ma-
chinery expor ts (excluding agricultural machinery) increase d only
18. 50/0a nd equalled 18.40/0of to tal impo rts. See below
135Kutusov-28, p. 58. Kaufman-29b (p. 17) noted that
impo rts of in dustrial machinery alone {excluding agricultural equip-
m ent) equalled 27.2% of the total supply of mac hinery in 1927/28
and domestic output was list ed at 5l8million rub les. See also
Table T -22 and T -23.
136See pp. 137 in Chapter III and footnote 32 on page 391 in
Chapter X.
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1926/27 in achieving overall in vestment Ie vels as well as in vestment
in specific industries or projects. Kaufman, for example, reported
th at 25% 0 f the machinery instalhrl in industry, and 51%of the elec-
tr ical equipment wa s i mp:>rted. WhiIe noting th at the decli ne in the
share of impo rt in installed machinery would continue, Kaufm an
emphasized st rongly that the impo rts of machinery impo rts would
continue to increase in absolute terms.137 Other estimates for
1926/27 were 35-45% (by value) of the equipment installed was
impo rted - - but recall th at domestic ver sions of id entical p roduc t s
were usually mare expen sive in rubles or simply not obtainable
(Table T-22, T- 23).
Agricultural machinery imports were reduced fr om 44. 4
million rubles to 25.4 mi Ilion rub lese 138 Th is reduc tio n, Ku tusov
explained, wa s permitted by increas ed capability of the domestic
agricult ural machinery industry to supply dome stic demand. Imported
agricult ural machinery cove red 200/0of tot al marketed agricultural
machinery {which rose 41. 50/0from 1925/26 to 1926/27).139 But 880/0of
137Above discus sion based on Kaufm an-28 c, pp. 112-113.
138VTSSSR-60 data. Data in Kutusov -28 (pp. 51 and 58)
ci ted impo rts of agricult ural machinery and tractors of 48.4 million
rubles in 1925/26 and 23. 79 million rubles in 1926/27. Th ese
figures cannot be reconciled with either the figures from VTSSSR-
18-40 or from th e data in th e stat ist ical append ix of Kutusov-28 .
139Kutusov-2 8, p. 58.. Tab1e T -22. Fordeman d was based
on the peasant's purchasing power and demand, and on the finan-
ci al resou rces of t he state in supplying coop erctives with cred it.
Plans for the expan sion of a gricultural machine s and tractor prod uc-
tion had been under discuss ion si nce 1924, and actual produ cti on
was started on tractors and other complicated equipment as early as
1924. Rec all th at Ru ssia produc ed most of its own agr icultu ral
machinery (except for the newer and more complex types) in 1913 so
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th e tractors sup pli ed in 1926/27 were still impo rted (Ta ble T -22 ).
In dustrial material sand im port substit uti on. Raw ma-
te rial imports increas ed only 20. 1%in value from 1925/26 to 1926/2 7
but b ecaus e of substantial p rice declines, the volume of raw mate-
ri als imports actually in creas ed 530/0 (Table T - 25). Th e share of
raw materials in total impo rts in creas ed from 36. 2%"jn 1925/26 to
46.20/0 in 1926/27 and would have acc ounted for a much larger sha re
in 1925/26 pr ices. The three major raw materials' for,:consumers' '
goods -- cotton, wool, leather -- alone accounted for 31%of total
impo rt s in 1926/27 .
Cotton imports. Cotton fiber imports increa sed 58.20/0 in
weight in 1926/27 and equalled almost one-fifth of total imports in
1926/27 . Imported co tto n !iber supplied t he Soviet te xti Ie industry
with 39%0 f their total fiber requirements in 1925/26 and 450/0 in
1926/27 and expanding cotton textile output in 1926/27 was bas ed
entirely .on i ncrea sed imports of cotto n fiber (Ta ble T -21). Th e
demand for impo rted cott on wa s further increas ed by a decline in
th e harves t of c ott on (which was known) a ccompan ied by a much
la rgerdro pin t he marketing of c ott on (which was not expected). 140
In fa ct, th e unexpe ctedly la rge drop in marketing of cotton fiber
attri buted to low relative prices -- caused upwa rd revision of the
cotto n import pI an and contributed to th e strain on the impo rt pIa n
th at thi s was merely expan ding along its old lines.
14OKaufman-28c, p. 113. The crop was 1. 10/0less, procu re-
m ents 8. 70/0 less th an the previous year (SUA, Vol. VI, No. 10,
p. 48). --
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resultin g f rom the demand for raw materials. 141 Continued expan-
si on of cotton te xti Ie output on th e basis of incr eased cotto n fiber
impo rts, in view of th e shortage of foreign exch ange, would be
politically dif fic ult and, pos sibly, econ omically ir rational. Raw
material limited the expan sion of 0utput, so th at the expansion of
domesti c cott on fib er output would permit increase d textile output
and offe red the possibility of freeing su~stantial sums of foreign
exchang e f or other competing uses. Th erefore, by 1926 extensive
plans were made to resume the expansion of cott on acrea ge wh ich
had been proc eeding rapidly and had red uced both the share and abso-
lu te level of cotton impo rts in th e decade before World War I. In
1926, it was thought that?y 1930 the domestic cotton crop would
supply 90% of th e cott on fib er needs (which wou 1d be 240/0 greater
than in 1926) so thatc otton fib er imports would be reduced to one-
fourth the 1926 levels. 142
Wool impo rts in creas ed 380/0 (by wei ght) and expan ded it s
share in to tal impo rts to 7. 20/0 in 1926/27. 143 1mported wool' s
141Kaufman-28e, p. 113.
142
SUA, Vol. V, No. 20 (1926), pp. 26-29. See Table T-21
share of 1Ti1P'O rts in consumption. See Tab Ie XIW:11for import and
supply of c ott on.
143Net wo 01 im ports (impo rts minus exports) rose 45%
fr om 99,407 m. t. in 1925/26 to 28,180 m. t. in 1926/27 (unadjusted
fo r greasy versus sco ured wool). The USSR expor ted short fiber
wool and imported long fi ber fi ne wo 01 and an attempt was being
made to adapt th e cott on textile and woolens industries to use more
of th e coar se r inferior fiber. A subtle fo rm of impo rt substitu-
tion was being carried out by the upgrad ing of th e Soviet sheep breed-
in g stock t hroug h repeated imports of high quali ty sheep (ERSU,
Vol. II, No. 24 (1928), p. 11).
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share in th e supply to the st ate woolen Is industry fell slightl y from
59% in 1925/26 to 55% in 1926/27 as procurements in creas ed more
144than 500/0over 1925/26 levels, as a result of a 150/0increase in
average procure.ment prices of wool in 1926/27.
Raw hide s im ports rose 55% (by wei ght and value) and in-
creased th eir share in total impo rts to 5.4% in 1926/27. Th is
in creas e in raw hi des imports was actually t he result of conti nued
impo rt substitut ion by th e expans ion of th e leat her tanning industry,
fo r imports of worked Ie ather we re reduc ed 660/0(in value) and the
value of raw hides plus worked leather .actually fell sl ightly even
th ough the we ight 0 f leather and hide impo rts in creas ed 380/0.145
The USSR also expo rted small skins and hi des and these more than
tr ipl ed in 1926/27, reducing slightly th e i ncrea se in net im ports of
hi des and skins. It is di fficult to estimate the share of hide and
Ie ather im ports in tot al supply beca use of th e differe nt methods of
m easur ingprocure ments and produc tio n (by number) and measur ing
impo rts(by weight). Many hides and skins are use d in cottage and
home industry, while imports we re used almost entir e1y in state
fa ctories. 146 Impo rted hides and leather supplied roughly 20-30%
144Cf. ,~RSP, Vol. III, No. 10 (1968); ST, Vol. I, No. 11
(1926), p. 44, an~Voi. II, No. 43, p. 50.
145Kutusov-2 8. HOd d kO t 1 t 1 b1 es an s lns are no c omp e e y su -
st Uutable in use.
146ERSU (Vol. III, No. 13 (1928), p. 246) stated that large-
scale in dustry used 7, 350, 000 hides of domestic origi nand 52,400
m. t. of impo rted hides and leather in 1926/2 7. Reco rded imports
in 1926/27 were 52, 900 m. t. Th eaverag e weight of an im ported
large hide or skin was about 29-31 kilos which implies the import of
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of th e 1eather sold by the Leather Syndicate.
Rubb er im port s increas e d 500/0by weight in 1926/2 7 over
1925/26 Ie vels, but th e value of rubber impo rts actually decli ned
10% bec ause of rapidly fa lling prices. Imports supplied 1000/0of
raw rub ber until 1933 but roughly 240/0of the total rubber used came
fr om reclaim ed rubbe r. 147 Rubb er in 1926/27 was used largely (700/0)
148fo r Consum'.er goods. If we take 700/0of rubber imports by value,
we see that four classes of imported raw materials used primarily fo r
consumer goods produ cti on (cotto n, wo 01, Ie ather, rubb er) equalled
300/0of total value of imports in 1925/26, and 340/0of imports iri 1926/
... 149
27 (a nd much more in 1925/26 prices ).
Pere nnial shortage of non-ferrou s met also 1mports of all
non-ferrou s met als conti nued their rapid expans ion in 1926/27. 150
1,800,000 hides and skins in 1926/27 or about 200/0of total consump-
tion (by number) in state factorie s. Howe ver, the dependence of
state industry on imported hides or larger average usable area per
hi de) or Ie s s (because skins are not included in the above fi gure).
Aver age weight derived by dividing number of la rge hides and skins
impo rted (603,000 in 1924/25 and 1, 332,000 in 1925/26) int 0 the
weight of imported hides (21,200 m. t. in 1924/25 and 38,000 in 1925/
26) as cited in SUYB-29, p. 143 and Kutusov-28, p. 329. This prob-
ably under stated th e importance of imports.
147Marbur y-55, p. 68. Th ese increas es we re not used to
expand tire or galoshes prod uction, but rather "other pro ducts. "
Tire produ cti on actually fell (SUYB-29, p. 146).
148Marbur y -55, pp. 28 and 72. Of a to tal consumption of
crude natural rubbe r in 1926/2 7 (7, 610m. t.) 700/0was used in pro-
ducing rubber fo otwea r.
M9 .
Gross imports of c ott on, wool, 1eather (wor ked and un-
work ed) and 'iU% of rubbe r imports. Zinc and other raw material s
were al so used largely for "consumptio n goods" sold to peasa nts
and individuals. See also Table T -18.
15ONon-ferro us me tal impo rts were 540/0higher in value
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The domestic non-ferrou s metal industry (copper, zinc, lead) was
approac hing 1913 Ie vels but im ports of coppe r wer e tri pIe, alum-
in um double, and zinc sli ghtly above 1913 levels; lead and tin
impo rts were over half their 1913 levels, but never theless, non-
fe rrous metals supplies in 1926/27 were less than demand (espe-
ci all y for coppe r). 151 Imports acco unted for 100% of al uminum,
ni ckel, and ti n, 93%0f zinc, and 860/00f the lead, and 450/0of the
copper supplied in 1926/27.152 Already in 1926/27 it wa s clear that
rapid expansion of heavy industry (espec ially the el ectro -techn ical
and t ransp ortation industries) as we 11as cer tai n branch es of con.-
sumer -oriented industry (galvanized roo fin g, cookware) required
in creas ing amounts of non-ferrou s met als, which cur rently could
be supplied only by rapidly i ncrea sing imports .. Soviet discus sion
often centered on resuming the rapid expansion of domestic coppe r,
Ie ad, and zinc industries wh ich had been relatively and even abso-
lu tel y replacing im ports before 1913.153
and 680/0higher in volume (1926/27 prices) than in 1925/26 and 6.5%
of total impo rts in 1926/27.
l5lERSU, Vol. I II, No. 4(1 928), p. 61. NickeL,used prim-
arily as a steel alloy, was only a tenth of 1913 imports. Copper,
tin, .lead, and zi nc (in th at order) a ccoun ted fo r 850/0of non-ferrou s
metal imports in 1926/27 .
152
See Table T -20. "Supplied" im pli es "prod uction pI us
impo rts. "
153See ERSU, V01. III, No. 4 (1928), pp. 61-62. Pro duc-
tion of alumin um was also discuss ed by early 1928; conce ssions were
offered for all thes e metals. (SUYB-28, pp. 168 and 172).
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Impo rts supplied a very small par t 0 f the Soviet consump -
tion of unproc essed fe rrous metals in 1926/27 and equalled only
1 6af f t t 1 .. 154 AI. f h 1 f h. -/00 0 a Imports. arge por tlOnot e va ue 0 t ese
impo rts were fe rro-a lloys, which were prod uced in negligi ble
quantities in t he USSR in 1926/27. Fe rro-a lloys, an ess ential
material in the machinery-b uil ding and defense industries, was an-
ot her prod uct, which would contribute tot. he rapid growt h of import
demand as industrializ ati on accelera ted.
Impo rt substitut ion in paper. Pa per imports hi t a post-
1917 peak of 139, 560 m.t. in 1925/26 which was slightly below 1913
impo rts of 144, 510m. t. for Rus s ia. The share of paper in to tal
impo rts was 4. 1%in 1925/26. In 1926/27, ho we ver, pap er im ports
fell sha rp1y as domestic produ cti on, base d on early and extensive
re -equipping of its existi ng paper fa ctories, continued expa nding
output far bey ond the 1913 output with in the Soviet border s of 1925,
(which it h ad already reached in 1924/2 5). 155 Part of th is decline
in paper imports in 1926/27 was offset by a slight increase in pulp
154Unproc essed fer":rpJlf3.metal s excludes pipes, cylin ders,
cable, etc., and includes cast iron, ferro- alloys, rolled produ cts,
scrap and ingot. Total fe rrous metals including th ese semi-pro-
cessed pro ducts (as defin ed in VTSSSR-60) rose 60.6% by weight and
46.4% by value from 1925/26 to 1926/27. : The increa se came
la rge1y in tubing-pipe and other semi-processed fe rrous products.
155Imports fe 1122. 80/0by weight and 37. 3%by value (VTSSSR-
60). EIKSSSR, pp. 532- 537, Nutter-62, p. 426 (ou:put), ERSU,
Vol. III, No. 11(1928), pp. 194-195. The decline in price was due
la rge1y to a contract with Finland for news print, which was supplied
a1most entirely by im port sand equa lIe d roughly 0 ne -ha If of total
paper imports.
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impo rts -- a form of import substitut ion, which started very early
fo r paper in t he USSR. Fu rther im port - sub sti tut ion was being
planned. Numerous new paper plants wer e started in 1926, and
when th ese plants came into operation in 1929-1931, paper imports
were reduced quite rapidly to negligibl e 1evels by 1932.156
Impo rt substitut ion in chemicals. Of the remaining impor-
tant material s imports for industry, the value of chemicals and
dyestuff impo rts fe 11signifi cantly, and tanning mat erials rose
sl ightly . 157 Ab out 700/0of t he tanning mat erials were impo rted
during the NEP (Ta ble T -21).
Impo rt substitut ion was also being planned already in 1925/26
fo r many chemical products which were used ,extensively in Soviet
industry and esp ecially f or tanning mat erials and dyestuffs -- but
recall that thi s proces s had started before 1914.158
reduced to one-half of 1925/26 levels and equalled 11. 60/0of total
imports in 1926/27 as compared to 20.30/0 of total imports in 1925/26
(Table T-7). The decline in consumer Sl goods imports resulted
156T able XIV. 11•
157A 1 . f .. d 32Mctua 1mports 0 tannIng extracts 1ncrea se -/0.
158See ERSU, Vol. II, No. 22 (1927), p. 13 and ERSU,
Vol. II, No. 24 (f927~ p. 10. In 1925/26 700/00 f tann ing materials
(by weight) used in large scale Soviet in dustry were imported. Con-
cessions were offered for th e produc tio n of tann ing extracts (ERSU ,
Vol. III" No. 10 (1928), p. 176).
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fr om th e aIm ost complet e elimination of c ott on cloth, sugar, and
other manufactured consumer goods, which had been imported in
abnormally la rge quan titie s as part of the policy of "good sinter-
venti on in the countryside" in 1925/26. 159 The tradit ional expor ts
of cotto n cloth and sugar were resumed. Whywer e these imports
el im inated? Th e basic reason was that th e imIX>rt of process ed
consumer goods wa s at the exp ense of importing so -called "produ-
cer s goods ": cotto n, wo 01, Ie ather, dyes, tanning material, as
well as machinery (including machinery fo r manufacturing consumer
goods). Thes e imports of raw materials, et c. could be used to
produce a larger 'quan tity of consumer goo ds than could be purcha sed
fr om abroad for the same expenditure of fo reign excha nge. 160 Since
raw materials and not plant capac ity were th e output constraint
th en the rate of supplying these cons umer goods th rough domesti c
production would not lag far behind supp lyi ng them through imports.16l
159Reduction of cotton cloth and suga r imports accoun ted
fo r 44 million rubles of the 70. 6 million ruble decli ne in manufac-
tu red cons umer goods impo rts. Re duction of imports of four addi-
tiona 1 consumer goods -- habe rdashery, stationery, artisans r tools,
and woo len and silk cloth accounted for another 9. 6 million rubles.
160Kaufman-27c, pp. 1-2. Ka ufman noted th at "in th eory,
of course, it would be possible to ••• import goods, currentlyin-
adequate to satis fy the demand of the peasants. This wou ld increase
th e marketing of th e agriculture, and as a conse quenc e, to increase
exports, and this witl give us on fi nal account the possibil ity to in-
crease the im ports of equipment. But this proce ss would delay the
reali zation of in dustriali zation." (Kaufman-27c, p. 1). Kaufman and
th e NKT rejected this same theory as impractical just as Pr eobra z-
hensky had reJected it in 1925/26.
l6lThe 1925/26 experienc e of goods intervention prove d some-
what disillusioning 1)ecause of th e re~ativ ely 10ng delivery period and
th e inappr'opriateness of the imported goods for the bulk of the Rus-
si an peasa ntry or wor ker (Kaufm an-2 7 c, p. 1).
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Thus, the reduction of cotton cloth imports in 1926/27 did not represent
a major shift in priorities and must be considered along with the in-
crease in cotton, wool, and leather imports. The reduction in manu-
factured consumer goods imports (about 70 million rubles) and a decline
in foreign prices reduced the share (in current prices) of imports allo-
cated to consumer satisfaction. The share of "consumer -oriented
imports" in current prices declined from 65%in 1925/26 to 59%in 1926/
27 (Table T-18), but in constant 1925/26 prices, the share of consumer-
oriented imports probably increased because prices of cotton, wool and
hide had declined sharply.
cocoa,
Imports of some foodstuffs - - herring, salted fish, rice, tea,
dried fruit -- actually increased in value. 162 Tea and herring
imports were 3.9% and 0.5% of total imports in 1926/27, but the
quantities imported were far below 1913levels. If tea and herring
were imported in the 1913quantities in 1926/27 and at 1926/27 prices,
these two products alone would have equalled 13. 5%and 3.4% of
the total value of imports in 1926/27. 163 Restoring tea and herring
imports to 1913levels was a difficult task because of slowly
l62Rice, some tea, and dried fruits as well as many other of
the COnsumer goods came across the Asian border and were the almost
inevitable result of expanding trade with some Eastern border coun-
tries. Cf. Conolly-33.
l63If total imports were increased by the appropriate amount,
tea and herring imports would have equalled 11.7%and 3. 090/0. Tea
imports in 1913, 75,814 m. t. ; herring imports in 1913, 282, 694 m. t.
Unit values for tea and herring in 1926/27, 1,242 rubles per m. t. and
85.9 rubles per m. t. ; required expenditures for 1913amounts of tea
and herring imports in 1926/27, 94.09 and 24.28 million rubles; actual
imports in 1926/27, 27.93 million rubles and 3.15 million rubles.
Total difference between actual and 1913-lev~l imports was 87. 28 mil-
lion rubles in 1926/27 prices.
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developing expor ts and methods were sought to extend the cult ivatio n
of tea in Georgia, a project which had been started before 1917.164
Over valued ruble and a new im port tariff
The Soviet chrevonetz-ruble was overvalued (in te rms of
establishing a balance of payments equilibrium under free trade) soon
after its initicl parity was set in 1923, even though the relative whole-
sale price levels in 1923 sugge sted t hat it wa s not overvalued at that
time (Tables T -31 and T - 37). But after 1924/25 it wa s clear that
undercontempor ary domestic economic po lie y and with t he parity ex-
clnnge rate, the demand for im ports far exceede d exports rece ipt s
(even though exp orts wer e being "forced" to foreign markets desp ite
m ore profitable domestic marketing possibili ty). Fu rthermore,
during 1925-2 7, expor ts of major export produc ts we re carried out
in creas ingly at a "commercial 10s s" beca use of ri sing dome stic
costs (butt er, eggs, f lax, grains and falling foreign prices (oil, cott on
cloth, sugar) - - thi s was a clear indicatio n of an overva lued exchan ge
rate. The demand for im ports grew rapidly during NEP and exceede d
impo rt capac ity by an in creas ing de gree so that th e allo cation of
impo rt lie enses in respons e to growing number of requests from
enterprises and trading agen cies was eventually transferred to th e
hi ghest economi c,poli cy-making age ncies (STO and VSNKh). The
st ate m onopoly of foreign trade cou ld limit the supply of imports
164T ea and herr ing impo rts were not restricted as m uch;'as
ot her con'sumer goods because th ey we.re a source of revenue fr om
excise and im port duti es (SUYBo-26,pp. 327- 423 and Rei ngold- 31,
pp. 186-226, especially pp.202-203).
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and determine th e compositi on of im ports in order to "protect"
domesti c industry and to m aintai n a balance of payment equili brium.
Then, why did the USSR maintain and continue to increase tariffs
when th ey had the foreign trade monopo ly. Soviet im port tariffs
were in tended to reduce the demand for impo rted produc ts (requests
fo r import licen ses by domestic firms), to encour age domestic
enterprise to seek domes tic substitu tes fo r imported produ cts (i. e. ,
"protectionism ") without direct st ate in terference, and to reduce th e
profi tability of imports to th e importing enterprise and trading agen-
ci es (i. e., to di vert the monetary profits from im ports to the
) 165 A h ... d .governmen t . s t e press ure to In creas e Imports 1ncrea se In
1926 and 1927, the import ta riffs we re increase d quit e sharply in
early 1927 -- not only on consume r goods but also on raw materials
and equipment (Table T -47) in order to reduce the demand for im ports.
In theory, firms maxirni zing profits or at Ie ast covering costs would
te nd to reduc e their demand for imported machinery and raw mate-
ri als and this was the reaso n f or raising tariffs in 1924 and 1927. 166
Terms of trade and prices
The price index of exports moved slightl y lower in 1926/27
(4.40/0 in 1926/27 weights), but this concealed a diversity of impor-
ta nt price movements including la rge increas es in fur and grain
165R eingold-31, pp. 211-212.
166R eingold-3l, p. 211. Re ingo1d-3l (pp. 211-223) discusse s
th e rati onale of maint aining impo rt duties in th e USSR (at least
during the NEP). The 1927 import tariff is discussed and compared
with the 1924 im port tariff in an arti c1e by A. P oti aev "Novyi tamo-
zhennyi tarif, " ST, Vo 1. II, No. 9 (19?7), pp. 4-9. For tariff rates,
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prices and a sharp fall in flax, oi 1, sugar, and cloth prices. Tim-
ber and butter prices remained more or less stable. Alth ough the
impo rtance of commerical p rofita bil ity had been mentioned as an
importa nt consider ati on in att empti ng to maint ain low agr icul-
tu ral prices and in reduc ing marketing costs, it was clear to the NKT
that exports wouid have to be made regar dless of their temporary
commercial inpr ofi tability, i. e., expor t s wo uld have to be "forced. "
Both sugar, oil, and perhap s textile s wer e being "forced" expor ted
at "commercial losses" by the end of 1927, and direct gover nment
167special subsidies were given for t heir export.
The import price in dex (1926/2 7 weight) fe 1113. 50/0,la rgely
because of a decline in cott on fib er prices (-200/0)and rubber prices
(- 400/0).168 Price s of other raw materials also recl ined slig htl y~
Thus, the commodity terms of tr ade shift ed strongly (10. 50/0)in
fa vor of th e USSR. This impr ovement in the commodity te rms of
tr ade permitt ed im ports in constant prices to si gnific antly excee d
th e original import plan.
see SUYB-29, pp. 341-388.
167E vidence for losses on suga r exports was that the cos t 0 f
production at the fa ctory wa s 230 rubles per m. t. (Re ingold-3l,
p. 201), th e FOB unit value of sugar exported in 1926/27 was 256
rubles per m. t. (VTSSSR-60, SOVTC 84000-01): the ove rhead cost
fo r shipping tot he borde r, etc., is not know ii but "additions" to the
retai 1 p rice domestically (e xcluding excise tax) we re 137 rubles per
m. t. (Reingold-3l, p. 20l)~
The con tin uous dec lin e in foreign petroleum prices led to
commercial losses in petroleum products perhaps as early as 1926/27
and certainly by 1927/28. Reingold-3l (p. 210) and Haensel-30 (pp.
160-161) di scuss ed losses and State subsidies for the export of sugar,
oi 1, cotton cloth.
168T able T-30 and Ka ufman-28c, p. 114.
Balance of a ents,
fo relgn reser ves' 9
and
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The balanc e of payments positi on im prove d consider a bly
during 1926/2 7, but th e difficultie s of the pre vious year were not
complet ely overcome. The trade surplus was 66 million rubles (as
compared to the trade defici t of 80 million rubles in 1925/26), but
according to Shenkman th is surplus was m ore than off set by "i nvis-
ib les" so that a defici ton curren t a ccoun t was about 5 million rubles
(Table T-14).169 Outstanding "rea 1 fore ign debt" rose 41 mi Ilion
rubles to 252mi Ilion rub les in October, 1927, (about one-third the
value of exports in 1926/27, and more than one-half of available
foreign reserves at the end of 1927) (Table T -17). The net export
of precious metals (in cluding plat inum) equalle4 34 million rubles
(Table T-16), but fo reign currency holdings increas ed 33 million
rubles (Ta ble T-15). Th us, Soviet £ oreign rese rves cou Id have in-
creased by 80 million rubles if we cons ider dome stic gold and plat-
in urn production (46 million rubles) and the in creas e of real fo reign
debt of 41 mi Ilion rub lese 170 Our estimates of Soviet fore ign re-
serves show only betw een 0 and 35 million rubles increas e betwee n
January 1, 1927 and Janu ary 1, 1928 (Table T -17). Forei gn reserve s
at th e end of 1927wer e about 450 mi Ilion rub les (Table T -17). The
fo reign excha nge crisis was over for th e moment.
169The directive to th e CG>mi s sariat of Finance was to ac-
cumulat e gold and foreig'n rese rves, chiefly through gold purchases
(S T" Vol. II, No. 26, p. 2).
170(Tab les E. 3, E. 4 in App endix E). The tr ade balance ju st
about balanced the defi cit on th e invisible ite m s of current accou nt.
378
Credit conditions improved considerably during 1926/27 as to
both cost and availability. 171
Summary, the problem of exports
The apparent successful overall fulfillment of the foreign trade
plan concealed unfavorable developments with respect to the future ex-
pansion of exports and revealed the dependence of domestic industry on
imports for continued growth.
If the fulfillment of the quarterly export plan is examined, we
see that the fulfillment of these plans deteriorated from quarter to
quarter:
Per Cent
Export Fulfilled Tradea a (by value) a Balance aPlan Actual Import
October -December 188.0 229.1 121.9 151.2 +77.9
January-March 176.1 185.4 105.0 136.9 +48.5
April-June - 175.5 1'.63.8 93.3 218. 5 -54.5
July-September 223.3 200.9 90.0 205.9 - 5.0
762.9 779.0 102.0 713. 5 +66.9
amillions of rubles
This was attributed to a.combination of events which included the in-
creased domestic demand for export goods by both the consumer and
171ST, Vol. II, no. 43, pp. 14-16. Besides the middle-term
300 million ~k credit from Germany, signed in mid-1926, the Mid-
land Bank had also agreed on a 10million pound long-term credit but
this credit was never activated because of the rift in diplomatic rela-
tions over the Arcos Incident in early 1927.
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industry, limited foreign markets, by the unexpected unwillingness of
the peasant to increase his marketing (or share of output marketed),
and by a reappearance of the goods famine in the second half of the
172year.
It was recognized that the failure of exports to expand posed
a severe threat to the future growth of the economy because of the lack
of raw materials and equipment. Since agriculture was thought to still
be the major source of export reserves, the critical problem was to
restore the peasant IS willingne ss (and expand the output) of the major
agricultural products. 173 And according to official opinion, the best
policy to do this was to improve the peasants I real terms of trade for
agricultural output by lowering industrial prices and by increasing the
supply of goods to marketing regions.174 In addition, the development
l72Export plans and trade data from Gurevich-27a, p. 3.
Import data from Appendix A, Table A.lc. Many articles were written
about these problems during 1926/27. Cf. B. N. Kovarskii "Problema
eksports" ST, Vol. II, No. 12, pp. 3-5; A. Kovner, Predvaritel'nye
itogi kleboeksportnoi'kampanii, ST, Vol. II, No. 28, pp. 7-8; Kaufman,
Kontrol'nye tsifry; eksportno-importnyi ,plan, "ST, Vol. IT, No. 14,
pp. 1-3; M. B. IfItogivneshnei torgovlie za 1926727 g., ST, Vol. II,
No. 43, pp. 10-12; B. E. Gurevich, "Vynolnenie vneshnetorgoge plana, If
ST, Vol. II, No. 31, pp. 3-5; M. Kaufman, Eksport i narodnoe khoz-
iaistvo, ST, Vol. II, No. 31, pp. 1-3.
l73Kaufman-28c (p. 106)'emphasized that the export reserves
lay mostly in agriculture "with all the sifnificance of industrial exports,
and with all the effort in the forcing of their exports, industry is not in
the condition to give such export surpluses as could agriculture. "
l74Cf• Zalkind-27a. This policy is examined critically in
Chapter II and in Chapter XI.
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of export industries -- oil, timber, minerals, sugar, cloth -- was not
to be neglected, (in terms of capital investment, and export efforts)
for they do not "depend on the harvest. If The sale of these products
abroad, however, was more difficult. So ran the export strategy for
1927/28.175
l75See Kaufman-27c, pp. 1-3, Gurevich-27a, and Kaufman-
28c.
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CHAPTER X
STAGNATIONOF EXPORTS 1927/28:
CRISIS IN A BAD YEAR
••. industrialization in its first period of growth leads
to an intensification of iinports and to a retardation in
the growth of exports.
M. Kaufman, September, 19271
Outlook and goals for foreign trade in 1927/28
"Rapid industrialization" had become the officially accepted
policy by the beginning of 1927. 2 The unresolved policy issues centered
on the proper growth rate and the optimal investment strategy to assure
"crisis free expansion" of the socialist Soviet economy. 3 Discussion
of these issues --how they were influenced by the past and projected
developments in foreign trade, and how in turn the decisions on these
issues affected foreign trade - is deferred to Chapters XII-XIII.
Poor prospects of export expansion in 1927/28. The possi-
bilities for expanding exports during 1927/28 became extremely uncer-
tain during the summer of 1927 - in fact, a comprehensive foreign trade
plan for 1927/28 was probably not worked out until after the start of
the economic year. 4 By the fall of 1927 it was clear that chances for
1 Kaufman-27d, p. 1.
2 Krzhizhanovskii-27a, p. 432. For a one-sided account of the
debate on tempo and strategy and for a description of the evolution of
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increasing exports much above 1926/27 levels were poor - at a time
h. t d d .dl .. 5w en Impor eman was rapl y IncreasIng.
NKT's major problem was that grain exports, which had been
the major source of export expansion and equalled 260/0 of total exports
in 1926/27, would probably have to be reduced greatly in the coming
economic year because of a slightly lower harvest, unfavorable harvest
distribution, increasing demand by the urban and consuming regions, and
a strengthening of forc~s which depressed marketing (predicted worsen-
ing of the goods famine, unfavorable relative prices (to animal pro-
6ducts) and rumor of war}.
The possibilities for expanding flax exports (in value) were
mixed. The flax crop was lower in 1927, but foreign prices were
distinctly higher, - the higher foreign prices reflected, to some ex-
tent, the poor prospects for Soviet flax exports. 7 NKT also was con-
fronted with the conflict between exporting flax and supplying domestic
industry, whose output had been limited only by the shortages of raw
materials in 1926/27.
the planning process and plans during the period 1924-1929, see Strum-
lin-32, pp. 89-132, especially pp. 118-125.
3 Erlich- 60.
4 On September 15, 1927, Kaufman wrote an article entitled
"K kontrol'nym tsifram po vneshei torgovie" in ST, Vol. II, No. 35 pp.
1-2, in which he described the factors which should be considered in
drawing up the control figures for the economic year starting October 6,
1927 ("Na paroge novogo goda," ST, Vol. II, No. 38, pp. 1-3) although
it thoroughly discussed the problems and strategy for expanding exports
without grain. Little information has been loacted about the foreign trade
plan for 1927/28.
5 Kaufman-27d, p. 1. See below p. 390.
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The outlook for other agricultural exports was generally
favorable.8 The possibilities for expanding the quantity of animal
product exports - eggs, butter, meat, wool - were good because of the
elastic response of the peasants' output and marketing to state procure-
ment agencies for higher procurement prices, which had been increased
during the past year to specifically inc'r.;ease state procurem ents for
export (butter, eggs, coarse wool) and to supply domestic industry
(wool, leather).9 The favorable relative prices for animal products
and other technical crops, however, was depressing grain procure-
ments and hence grain exports. According to Zalkind, writing in July
6 The grain export problem of 1927/28 is analyzed in detail
in Chapter XI.
7 Flax output was 300, 000 m. t. in 1925, 270, 000 m. t. in
1926 and 240, 000 m. t. in 1927; both flax acreage and yields fell.
(Diamond-55, pp. 83-85 and Johnson-60, pp. 228, 232, 237). The
decline in sown area was attributed to unfavorable domestic flax prices
relative to grain, linen cloth, and other technical crops (ST, Vol. III,
No. 45.-46, pp. 30-31). Kaufman-27d (p. 2) expected higher foreign
prices in 1927/28 than in 1926/27.
8 .
Increased exports (volume) of sugar and oil-seed products
could be planned because of the record sugar beet and sunflower seed
crops. The improvements were att ributed to higher domestic prices
(SUA, Vol. VI, No. 15/16, (1927); pp. 21, 30; SUA, Vol. VI, No. 17
(1927), pp. 18, 23, 25, 32; and SUA, Vol. VII, No.1, (1928), pp.32-
33). --
9 ST, Vol. III, No. 45/46, pp. 30-31, and ST, Vol. III, No. 25,
p. 3. Kaufman-27d (p. 2) predicted increased exports of butter, eggs,
and wool.
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of 1927:
.•• our success in the livestock groups has turned out to be
not entirely favorable for stimulating the sale of grain pro-
ducts, thanks to the significantly increased break (in prices)
between the livestock groups and grains (see Figure X. 1).
The producer preferred to sell animal products before grain
products and he sold them in such quantities, which, because
of the total receipts, gave him the pos sibility to retain part
of the grain for himself. 10
Peasants also fed their livestock increased quantities of feed grains. 11
Zalkind recommended equalizing somewhat (and with great caution) the
relative prices of grains and livestock products by raising the grain
prices and lowering slightly (2-5%) the procurement price for meats
and possibly for butter. 12
Increasing butter and egg exports in 1927/28 threatened to be
at the cost of reducing grain exports. Increased procurements of eggs
and butter (from higher output and improved marketing coefficients)
would be somewhat offset by growing urban demand for these products
(more people consuming more per person) and lower foreign prices
were expected for eggs and butter (because of a limited foreign demand
for Soviet eggs), so that the value of butter and egg exports would
10 Zalkind-27a, p.3. A rational behavior on the part of the
peasant from the viewpoint of consumer theory. If the prices of agri-
cultural goods relative to industrial goods did not change, but the re-
1ative prices of animal products to grain prices did, as actually oc-
curred, this is the predicted behavior. See Zalkind-27b, p.2, and
Chapter XI.
11 See above, p. 341 and Chapter XI, pp. 438.
12 Zalkind-27b, p.2. The problem of determining the pro-
per relative prices among animal products was complex because of
the demand for wool, butter, and milk on the one hand and the demand
for meat and hides on the other (Zaikind-27c, p.2).
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. 1 h 13Increase ess t an procurements.
The important factor affecting the growth of agricultural
exports in 1927/28 was the willingnes s of the peasant to market his
14products, i. e., the peasants f "tovarnost'''. And in the NKT, which
had the task of regulating both internal and foreign trade, almost every-
body agreed that the most important factors in increasing the "tovar-
nost'lf (marketing coefficient) of agriculture was to increase the flow
of industrial goods to the agricultural surplus regions and to lower the
prices of these goods - that is, to inc rease the real terms of trade of
agriculture:
The maintenance of the equilibrium between the demand 6f the
peasant population for industrial goods and the offer of agri-
cultural goods, a favorable relationship between agricultural
and industrial prices, the proper regulation of market turnover
not only with respect to separate goods but also to regions with
consideration for the regional particularities - here are all
the areas in which measures appear to be necessary for the
development of tovarnost', and in its turn, appears to be the
precondition for increasing exports. 15
This w~s the rationale behind the official policy of the 1927 decree to
lower prices of manufactured goods by 10%. Its economic rationality
is re-examined in Chapter XI.
13 Zalkind-27b (p. 1) predicted an 8% increase in the urban
demand for agricultural goods. Kaufman-27d, p.l. Both Kaufman and
Zalkind emphasized the importance of pursuing the proper price policy
for animal products in order to incfease marketing and the marketing
coefficients.
14
Kaufman-27d, p.2.
15 Kaufman-27d. See also Zalkind-27a, p.4; ST,Vol. II,
No. 38, p.2; Mikoian-27a, p.2.
16 In constant prices, Zalkind-27b, pp. 1-2. Actual ou~put
and marketing from ST,Vol. III, No. 45/46 (pp. 1, 7-8, 14-15).
386
The predicted (and actual) growth of agriculturaJ output and
marketing on which NKT's projection about agricultural exports was
based was the following: 16
Output
% Increase Over
1926/27
Plan Actual
1927/28 1927/28
Gros s Agricultural
Output +4 -2.7
Technical Crops +25 +19 •2
Livestock-Foodstuffs +5
Livestock-Raw
Materials +6
Grain -2. 5 -5.8
Marketing
0/0Increase Over
1926/27
Plan Actual
1927/28 1927/28
+11 +9.0
+27.5
+10 +5.4
+11. 5
+5 -12.8
In contrast the projected increase in the value of manufactured retail
goods spld at prices projected for the coming year was 5-6% but the
actual volume (in constant prices) of goods supplied woti.ldbe larger
because retail and wholesale prices were to be lowered further in
1927/28. 17 Aggregate demand would increase faster than aggregate
supply thus increasing exces s demand in the countryside. 18 Despite
these uncertainties (especially about grain exports) Kaufman, the chief
planner of foreign trade for NKT, predicted that agricultural exports
17 Zalkind-27b, pp. 1-2. Increase 16 -170/0in constant prices,
but only 11 % in current wholesale prices.
18 Ibid.
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should be somewhat higher in 1927/28 than in 1926/27.19
Industrial exports. The volume of industrial exports were
easier to plan because they were independent of the harvest and the
peasant and were more closely controlled by the economic planners.
This important characteristic was specifically emphasized by planners
in NKT and a large increase in industrial exports was projected for
1927/28, especially for the traditional timber and oil products but
also for several less important mineral products. 20 The capabil~ty
for increasing the quantity of oil exports in 1927/28 was good because
of the large projected increase in output.21 But accurately projecting
the value of oil product exports for 1927/28 was more difficult because
foreign oil prices had been falling sharply in the second half of 1926/27,
partly because of the campaign against Soviet oil sales by major inter-
national oil concerns, but largely because of the glut on the world oil
markets resulting from American overproduction. 22
The expansion of timber exports projected for 1927/28, on
the other hand, conflicted directly with the increasing domestic demand
for at the end of 1926/27, demand exceeded supply by a significant mar-
19 Kaufman-27.
20
Kaufman-27d, p. 2; ST Vol. II, No. 38, p.2. Kaufman-27b
(p. 2) particularly emphasized the independence of industrial exports
from the harvest. See also Gurevich-27a, p.2.
21 Segal-28a, pp. 120, 130-131.
22 ST Vol. II, No. 43, p.61. See Chapter IX, p. 359.
gin.23 Foreign prices were expected to be slightly higher. 24
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Industrial exports (cotton, sugar, oil products) to the Eastern
countries were also to be expanded on the basis of a new treaty signed
with Persia - but the Eastern markets were limited and competition
between Soviet and other exporters was forcing prices down in these
markets. Although the Soviet expansion of textiles and sugar exports
was at the expense of supplying their domestic market (where there
was excess demand for these goods, especially cloth), the impact on
the aggregate supply of consumer goods was probably favorable because
it diversified the composition of the consumer goods supply and supplied
materials for light industry: imports over the Eastern borders in-
eluded cotton, wool, and hides and jute, as well as citrus fruits, rice,
dried fruit and tea.
Emergency diversification of exports. For the second time in
four years, Soviet foreign trade was thrown into crisis because of a
poor grain harvest. The reliance on grain exports - a perennial pro-
blem in pre -1914 Rus sian exports -was consider ed exces sive by Soviet
economists (although many underdeveloped countries today would envy
the export diversification of Russian and the 'USSR).25 As the extent
23 M. Safianov, "Regulirovanie rynka lesomaterialov i chas-
tnyi kapital" (ST, Vol. II, No. 50, p.5). According to ST, Vol. III,
No. 43 (p. 570he increase in output of sawn timber in 1927/28 (in
RSFSR) was projected at-7% compared to actual output in 1926/27 while
construction in 1927/28 was to increase not less than 15-20% over 1926/
27. See Gosplan-29a, p.489.
24 ST, Vol. III, No. 43, p.58.
25 "The share of exports concentrated on 6-7 commodities
now as well as before the war equalled 75-80% of total exports. Such
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of the 1927/28 grain export disaster became known, the neglected group
of export products - denoted by the term "secondary exports" - were
increasingly emphasized as being an important source of additional ex-
port revenue. 26 Sovetskaia Torgovlia noted in October 1927, that
the immediate outlook for basic agricultural exports was not favorable
for various reasons, so that "future growth of exports requires a com-
27plete reconstruction of the export fields of the economy. " But, it
continued, "in a series of basic export fields we, evidently, are not able
to move forward witho ut significant capital investment, without broad-
28ening the technical base for exports. " For the most part, expansion
of secondary exports; it was argued, could be accomplished with little
or no investment. The major problems in expanding were not neces-
sarily scarcity of the basic raw material, but rather marketing, pro-
curtn.ent, and processing problems, and also "commercial profitability
for the exporting firm. 29 But secondary exports were still relatively
unimportant in total exports - goods not in one of the ten basic export
groups equalled 210/0of total exports in 1926/27 while grain exports
an export structure is unfavorable, for inadequate growth of anyone
of these important commodities is reflected in the balance of trade.
Especially capricious in this respect are grain products. A crop fail-
ure immediately reduces our export resources by a significant sum,
which it is very difficult to compensate for in one year." (Kaufman
- 28a ). For list of country for which exports of one commodity equal-
led more than 500/0by value of total exports in 1928, see Kindleberger-
62, p.3l).
26 See "0 vtorostepennom eksporte", Kaufman-27e, pp. 1-2.
"Nashi zadachi po rashireniiu vtorostepennykh vidov eksports" Gurevich-
27b, pp. 1-3, and ST, Vol. III, No.4, p.l. Some of the more import-
ant secondary exports included coal, rags, fish, cement, samolin, guts,
seeds.
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alone were 26%of total exports by value in 1926/27.30
Despite all these problems plaguing Soviet exports the NKT
predicted an increase in agricultural and industrial exports for 1927/
28 •.
Import demand and industrialization
Twice in two years, the scarcity of export receipts had forced
restriction on the growth of output and investment. Again in 1927/28
the limited ability to import raw materials restricted the expansion of
output. Total equipment imports, financed on the German credits, were
more than adequate for the projected levels of investment in 1927/28,
although investment in particular branches may have been restricted
below desired levels, because of the inability to pUTchase appropriate
machinery (such as tractors for agriculture) on credit. The import
structure had been "industrialized" in the previous year so that it was
not pos sible to further reduce "consumer goods" imports to !.permit
increased imports of cotton, wool, and other industrial materials which
were constraining the growth of Soviet output. Thus, the increasing
demand for imported goods in 1927/28 could be supplied only by in-
creasing Soviet foreign debt and import substitution. 31
The projected increase in investment for 1927/28 was based to
a large extent on an increase in machinery imports. Chernobaev re-
27 ST, Vol. II, No. 41, p.l.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid. See also Gurevich-27b, pp. 2-3 and Kaufman-27e
for the measures recommended to expand these exports.
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ported that imports provided almost 45%of total machinery installed
in industry in 1926/27 and according to the plan :projections (Perspec-
tive Five Year Plan 1926/27 - 1930/31), imports,would continue to
supply about 40%of total machinery installed in industry through 1930/
31. 32 The demand for foreign machinery during NEP increased not
only because domestic machine-building capacity was limited but also
because domestic enterprises preferred foreign machinery over Soviet
machinery. They argued that foreign machinery was "cheaper" in
terms of rubles (at the parity rates of exchange) and higher quality than
domestic versions of the same machine. 33 Kaufman and others recom-
mended denial of licenses for imports of equipment which could be pro-
duced domestically. 34 The timing of machinery imports was to be
30 By value the ten groups are: grain products, flax, butter
eggs, furs, timber products, oil products, manganese ore, sugar,
cotton cloth. See Table T-4.
31
Kaufman-27c, pp. 1-2. Kaufman-27d, pp.2-3.
32 This continues our discussion of machinery imports and
investment from Chapter IX, pp. 362 ff • Chernobaev-28a, pp. 29-30.
Such estimates have to be treated with some caution for they tend to
understate the importance of imported machinery because they are
usually comparisons in current domestic and foreign prices. Domestic
prices for some types of comparable machinery were higher. In addi-
tion, there is the problem of estimating the hypothetical cost of a dom-
estic machine which is currently not produced, and which could not be
produced for technical reasons in a reasonably short time.
33 This was one reason for sharply raising the tariff on im-
ported machinery and selected raw materials (cotton, hides, wool) in
1927. Table T-47.
34 Kaufman-27d, p.2.
1926/27
delivered ordered
131.7 270.9
29.2 74.8
19.8 32. 2
~2.2 46.6
19..7 21. 0
3. 7 16. 0
4. 2 12.9
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more strictly controlled in order to prevent purchase and arrival of
machinery before the plant construction was completed.35 A large in-
crease projected machinery imports was expected in 1927/28 because of
the large backlog of undelivered machinery which had been ordered in
previous years; the value of industrial machinery imported in 1926/27
was about half the value of industrial machinery ordered in 1926/27. 36
But the impact of these increase machinery. imports on the balance of
payments would be offset to a significant extent by the use of medium -
term credits (2 - 4 years) for financing the import of German machin-
37ery. Actual machinery in 1927/28 imports are discussed below (p.
35 Ibid. Apparently, machinery was ordered and delivered
before construction was completed; this problem was to grow worse in
1927/28.
36 Imports of industrial machinery were about 180/0of total
imports in 1926/27.
USSR: Imports and orders of Industrial Machinery 1924/25 - 1927/28
(millions of ruble s)
1924/25 1925/26
delivered delivered
Total machinery 48. 6 84. 5
Metallurgical 4. 3 13. 2
Mining 3.1 9. 2
Oil Industry 2. 6 1O. 2
Textile 12.5 28. 0
Paper 0.9 3.4
Chemical 1. 1 1.8
Source: Chernobaev-28, p.30.
37 According to Chernobaev-28 (p.30) 166 million rubles of
the 271 million rubles of ind.1strial machinery ordered in 1926/27 was
financed through credits received in Germany and other countries. The
first repayments on the so-called "300 million mark credit" from Ger-
many were due, however, in March 1928 (SUA,Vol. VI, No. 8/9, p.l0
and SUA, Vol VIII, No.7, p.2).
393
412 }. ,'.
Expected raw materials shortage. Raw materials requirements
for light industry projected for 1927/28 increased faster than domestic
supply and the limited capacity to import more raw materials was cited
as the major cause for the continuing "goods famine" for cotton cloth,
woollen cloth, leather goods, and tea. In analyzing the reasons for the
predicted deficit (excess demand) in these goods, Zalkind concluded:
The basic cause for these deficits consists of a scarcity of
raw material for these fields. The increase in the price of
foreign raw materials, and also the impossibility of increasing
the allotment (of foreign exchange) for the purchase of foreign
raw materials do not give the pos sibility to develop to the nec-
essary degree those fields of light industry working on impor-
ted raw materials: cotton cloth, wool, leather. 38
NKT predicted::a fairly severe"goods famine" in 1927/28 on the basis of
proj ected output and aggregate demand and believed immediate addi-
tional raw materials would permit the necessary increases in output to
prevent it, but additional raw materials were available only through
imports purchased (normally) on a cash basis. The increase in mach-
inery imports projected for 1927/28 were almost entirely financed by
credits and ordered in advance so that, in the short-run, cutting back
machinery imports or orders would not greatly increase the supply of
foreign exchange which could be spent to import more raw materials in
1927/28.
The supply of.cotton textiles was expected to grow more slowly
in 1927/28 than demand, thereby aggravating the shortages occurring
during the summer of 1927. 39 The inadequate growth was due primar-
38 Zalkind-27b, p.3. This was the correct prediction and
reasoning. Of course, the multiple effects on aggregate demand of
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ily to the limitations of raw material (and possibly skilled labor), for
the cotton textile industry for the fir st time planned to convert signi-
ficant portions of the industry over to three shifts. 40 Planned price
reductions not only of cotton textiles but of other consumers r goods con-
tributed to the excess demand.4l The cotton textile production plan
for 1927/28 was based on a 14.50/0increase in the supply of cotton fiber
for 1927/28. 42 The predicted increase in domestic output and marketing
(+300/0)of cotton was sufficient to supply this increase and to permit a
cii~9a'ckin the quantity of imported cotton. 43 Furthermore, given the
limited iinport capacity, the quantity of cotton imports had to be reduced
in 1927/28 because of the great increase in the price of cotton. 44
producing goods with these additional raw materials were not considered.
39 Zalkind-27b, p.3, and ST, Vol. 2, No. 43 (1927) pp. 43-45.
40 ST, Vol III, No. 45-46 (1928, p. 38 and Mikoian-27a, p. 2.
41 .
ST, Vol, II, No. 49 (1927), p.49 and Zalkind-27b, p. 34.
42 SUA, Vol. VII, No.1, p. 32.
43 SUA, Vol. VI, No. 17, p. 32. According to STAT-35
(p. 193), 306:1f00m. t. of ginned cotton was consumed in 1926/27 of
which 168,600 m. t. was domestically produced. A 14. 50/0increase in
raw material requirements implied an expected demand of about 352, 000
m. t. and a 300/0increase in domestic .fiber would supply 218,000 m. t. so
that about 134,000 m. t. of imported cotton would be required in 1927/28
as compared to 163,000 m. t. of imported cotton in 1926/27.
44 Martin-37, pp. 152-154. American middling 7/8 inch rose.
steadily from the 13-14 cents per pound level which existed during the
period October 1926 to March 1927 to the 20-22 cents per pound during
the August-October 1927 period.
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(Cotton imports had expanded more than planned in 1926/27 because of
the unexpected decline in prices in early 1926/27. )45 In September
1927, however, prices were 55-600/0 higher than in the fall of 1926. To
have imported the same quantity of cotton in 1927/28 would have cost
about 210 million rubles in 1927/28 as compared to 132million rubles
in 1926/27. Rising world prices in the late summer of 1927, also re-
duced the USSRIS "real import capacity" to increas e the imports of
wool, tea, and hides - all in short domestic supply (prices trends for
other raw materials, toward the autumn of 1927 were mixed). 46
The policy of severely restricting consumer goods imports was
to be continued; only the goods of the greatest necessity and which
yielded significant tax revenues (tea) would be permitted. 47 The con-
tinuiilg rather high figure for consumers I goods imports (especially
foodstuffs) in light of this policy pronouncement, was to a large extent
the result of the less strictly controlled trade across Asian borders.
Other ways for economizing on foreign exchange expenditures
were sought including the substitution of lower quality raw materials
... 48 Using the price cyclesfor the better qualIty preVIously Imported.
for the purchase of raw materials was also advocated. 49
45 American middling 7/8 at New York (cited in Martin-37,
pp. 152-154) rose from 19 cents per pound in August 1926 to 13 cents
per pound in October 1926.
46 Jute was rising, non-ferrous metals declining (ST, Vol.
II, No. 43, p. 72).
47 Kaufman .. 27d, pp. 2-3.
48 Ibid.
49 ST, Vol. II, No. 38, p.2.
396
Break with Great Britain. The foreign trade picture was further
beclouded by the break in diplomatic relations with Great Britain in May
1927, for Great Britain was one of the USSR's major export markets
(270/0of total Soviet exports in 1926/27), and the USSRalways ran a
large trade surplus with Great Britain. The break also denied to the
USSRthe use of a hundred million ruble credit agreement signed with
the Midland's Bank Ltd., and temporarily worsened the terms and avail-
ability of credits for the USSR.50 Other international incidents also
seemed to emphasize the USSR's political isolation in 1927 and increased
the thr eat of war.
Foreign Trade Plan 1927/28
Little information was published about the 1927/28 foreign
trade plan.
The original projection for exports in 1927/28 predicted a
slight increase in agricultural exports and a strong increase in indus-
trial exports, 51 so that one might guess that in September 1927, the
increase in total exports was projected at about 5-100/0. The only evi-
dence about an over -all target for exports in 1927/28, however, were
statements about the fulfillment of an export plan. This plan was pre-
sum ably a revised plan adopted after the extent of the grain export
crisis was knO'Ml and was set at 754 million rubles or 25 million rubles
52below actual 1926/27 exports.
50 ST, Vol. II, No. 43, p. 15. Kaufman-27d, p. 3.
51 Kaufman-27d.
52 This figure is based on a fulfillment figure for the 1927/28
..
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The expected development of exports was discus sed above and
NKT projected significant increases in the export of eggs, butter, oil
products timber, and strong increase of "secondary exports". Although
grain exports were expected to decline in 1927/28, it was projected
that they would still be very substantial - or at least higher than they
turned out to be in 1927/28.53
Less information is available about the import plan for 1927/28,
but probably NKT expected the imports to be about 830-860 million
rubles in 1927/28.54 Imports would almost unavoidably increase sign-
ificantly over 1926/27 levels because of tie delivery of previously
ordered machinery purchased on credit. Imports of raw materials were
to be strictly limited - probably to about 1926/27 values. No grain im-
ports were planned! Of interest is the stated priorities in the import
plan:
The problems of raw material supply for industry for domestic
as well as foreign raw materials is becoming a very critical
issue, for in a number of light industrial branches, raw mat-
erials are the limit to further growth of output. In this connec-
tion raw materials to a certain degree determine the marketa~le
supply of a number of important industrial goods.
exports of 103. 7%cited in Kaufman-29d, p. 1 and an export figure of
779.4 million rubles excluding platinum (Table T-I). If platinum was
included in the estimate for plan fulfillment in 1927/28, this implied a
plan of 763.4 million rubles (VTSSSR-60 data) or 43.4 million rubles
below 1926/27 exports including platinum (Table A. 3, Apperidix:'A~'
Techn ical Note~ ~,. p. 728).
53 See below, p. 400.
54
Geller-28a (p. 45) stated that "expected imports for 1927/28
were 893. 1 million rubles. Actual imports were 944. 7 million rubles or
51.6 million rubles above "expected imports". Geller was probably
writing in mid-1928 when the emergency imports of grain of about 32
million rubles were made and already included in his estimates. Fur-
398
At the same time the interests of the consumer markets of in-
dustrial goods, for the most part, increasing the supply of
goods by the expansion of the import of foreign raw materials,
can pot avoid being subordinate in the cause of the immediate
future to the interest of the largest development of heavy in-
dustry. As a consequence, the problem of market equilibrium
will be settled primarily from the side of regulating demand.
October 192755
Even though a trade deficit was expected in 1927/28, the balance of
payments was to be favorable because of the credit financing of mach-
o 0 56Inery Imports.
Foreign trade in 1927/28
Soviet foreign trade went througH.crisis in 1927/28. The total
value of exports in 1927/28 in current prices was almost identical to
1926/27 exports while imports rose by almost a third and created a
huge balance of trade deficit of 163. 7 million rubles:
SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE: 1926/27 - 1927/2857
Current Prices Constant: 1926/27 Prices
{millions rubles} {millions rubles}
1926/27 1927/28 1926/27 1927/28
Exports 779.4 781.4 779 780
Imports 71J ...5 945.5 714 889
Balance +65.9 -163. 7 66 -109
thermore, the extra raw material imports of cotton fiber were author-
ized in December 1927 (see text). Compare TablesT-5,XIll. 2 for act-
ual imports in 1927/28 and "expected imports during 1927/28 as report-
ed in Geller-28a.
55 ST, Vol. II, No. 38, p.l.
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Exports. The development of Soviet exports during 1927/28
was described as a fundamental conversion of Soviet foreign trade from
reliance on grain exports toward emphasis on industrial exports. 58
Grain product exports collapsed almost completely - grain exports fell to
one-fifth of 1926/27 levels. The value of grain exports equalled 4.2% of
total exports in 1927/28 as compared to 26%in 1926/27 and 36%in 1913,
so that the share of agricultural products (not including fur and fish) fell
from 66.3% of total exports in 1913 to 45.2% in 1926/27 to 29.8% in
1927/28 (Tables T-4 and T-26). Thus the resources base for Soviet ex-
ports by 1927/28 had perfor ce been shifted from agriculture (grain) to
"industry" by the failure of agricultural exports, and the shift was at
the cost of reduced import capacity and reduced growth in light industry.
The one advantage was that the remaining exports were less dependent
on the harvest and on the willingnes s of the peasant to market.
Exports developed in 1927/28 almost as expected except that
grain exports probably fell more than initially projected in the fall of
1927. Two important trends in exports emerged during 1927/28. First
exports of some products were increased at the explicit cost of reducing
the domestic supply of commodities for which there was already expli-
citly recognized excess demand in domestic markets (butter, meat,
furs, timber, and coal). Second, the price trends of Soviet exports
were diverse, but those commodities exported in significantly higher
56 Kaufman-27d, p. 3.
57 Tables T-2, T-5. Value in 1926/27 prices based on volume
indexes from Tables T-24 and T-35.
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quantities in 1927/28 were sold at stable or lower prices than in 1926/27
(with the exception of furs and butter), and those commodities exported
in smaller quantities were sold at stable or higher prices than in 1926/
27. The inverse relationship between quantity and foreign price sugg-
ests that Soviet exports faced less than perfectly elastic demand curves
for its export, goods.
Collapse of grain exports
The prospects of grain exports for 1927/28 were confused
right up through the harvest. Writing in early July, Zalkind noted that
an overall "average" ljarvest was expected and that sown area was 1-2%
greater than in 1926, so that the harvest would be slightly less than the
1926harvest. 59 It would be the third consecutive average-to-good
harvest and could in no way be described as a crop failure. The crop
distribution was unfavorable for exports because grain su;Vplusregions
were located away from the normal export regions. 60 Grain procure-
ment targets were slightly higher than 1926/27 becaus e of an expected
increase in the marketing coefficient. This optimism was based on
three factors 'including larger surpluses in the peasants' possession,
lower industrial retail prices now and in the :~courseof 1927/28, and
the fact t~at this was the third average-to-good harvest - even if slight-
ly lower than the previous harvest. 61 On the other hand, peasants I
58 Kaufman-28f, p. 11.
59 Zalkind-27a, p. 4.
60 SUA, Vol. VI, No. 15/16, p. 30. Zalkind-27a, p. 4.
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on-farm demand was increasing because of increased rural population
and large livestock hers, the peasants had accumulated considerable
stock of cash, the "goods famine" was predicted to get worse in the
fall of 1927 and the prices of non-grain agricultural products were much
more favorable than grain prices compared to pr.e~~1914 relationships
(see Figure X. I). All these factors depressed the peasp.t1,ts I willingness
to market grain. 62 Furthermore, the demand for marketed grain pro-
ducts in 1927/28 was increasing because of a growing urban population,
increased sowing and marketing of technical crops, and the need to re-
plenish the State Grain Reserve Fund, which had been depleted during
the procurement problems in the spring of 1927. 63 Thus, the prospects
for maintaining grain exports simply were not favorable. Kaufman as-
sessed the outlook for grain exports for 1927/28:
The level of grain exports will depend on a series of factors
(in addition to the general conditions of "tovarnostl II noted
above); these include the outlook for the 1928 harvest, the
degree of insurance (grain reserves) with peasants in case of
crop failure, and also the influence of non-economic causes.
Of large significance will also be the transport conditions,
that is the supply of the internal market from non-export re,-:'
gions. For this year, the task should be the maximum devel-
opment of the export of the secondary grain exports ••• 64
The actual developments in grain exports were wor se than
anticipated:
61 SUA, Vol. Vi, No. 18, pp. 10-12, and SUA, Vol. VI, No.
15/16, pp. 20, 30 and 49.
62 Za1kind-27b, p. 4. See Chapter XI for a more detailed
description of the significance of each of these factors.
63 According to Gosplan-29a (p. 408), urban population grew
5.60/0 in 1926/27 and grew another 3.8% in 1927/28; overall population
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GROSS EXPORTS OF GRAIN PRODUCTS65
(1000's m.t.)
Quantity 1925/26 1926/27 1927/28
Grains-unprocessed 2,016 2,099 289
Grains -processed 1.3 14 35
Pulses (legumes) 50 78 55
Gross grain products exports 2,079 2, 191 379
(millions of rubles)
Value of gross grain product
exports 165 216 41
Oil-seed and oil cake exports declined further despite very favorable
harvests of sunflower seed and cotton in 1927 (Table T_3).66
The evidence that Soviet authorities projected higher grain
exports is indirect. First, grain including rye and corn was exported
in significant but much lower quantities in October-December 1927,
but fell off sharply in January-March 1928, and were negligible for
the remaining six months. In fact, large amounts of wheat and hulled
grains (valued at 43. 3 million rubles) were imported toward the end of
growth was 2.3% in both years.
64 Kaufman-27d, p. 2.
65 VTSSSR-60, Grain-unprocessed, SOVTC 70, Grains-pro-
cessed, SOVTC 820, and Pulses SOVTC 821. See Tables T-9 and T-ll.
66 SUA,Vol. VI, No. 17, pp. 28 and 32. Exports of oil-seed
and oil cake fell from 546,000 m.t. in 1925/26 to 383,000 m.t. in 1926/
27 to 203,000 m. t. in 1927/28 (Table T-3).
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1927/28.67 Few realize that not only did Bukharin suggest grain im-
ports during 1927/28, but that substantial quantitie s of gr ain were act-
ually imported. In this context it is interesting to recall Stalin's com-
mentary on this policy.
Bukharin is for grain purchasing through "voluntary" sale by
the peasant. If they do not market enough? To this Bukharin
replies: Do not worry the kulaks with emergency measures;
import grain from abroad ••• Not long ago he proposed that
we import about 50, 000, 000 poods of grain (820, 000 m. t. )
i. e. to the value of 100, 000, 000 rubles in foreign currency.
But what if foreign currency is required to import equipment
for industry? To this Bukharin replies: Preference must be
given to imports of grain - thus, evidently, relegating imports
of equipment for industry to the back-ground. "68
Net grain product exports in terms of value were about -3 million
rubles as compared to +205 million rubles in 1926/27. 69 Second, it
was emphasized that the slow flow of grain exports in the first half of,
1927/28 caused great strain in_ the import-export plan, which implies
that the export plan had projected higher exports for at least the first
70half of the year. Nevertheless, it was to the planner's credit that
67 It 'is _little known that large quantities of wheat (276, 000
m. t. ) and hulled grain were actually imported in July-September quar-
ter of 1927/28 and accounted for 6%of total imports in 1927/28 (Baksht-
28b, p. 10).
68 Stalin-29a, p. 65.
69 fable T-l1, and VTSSSR-60.,
70 Exports
October -December
January-March
Year
of Grain and Related Products
(Million rubles)
1926/27 1927/28
102.2 39.1
77.8 10.8
234.6 59.0
Source: SUA, Vol, VII, No. 10, p.12.
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they projected severe problems in both grain procurements and grain
exports in 1927/28.
Causes of the grain procurement crisis of 1927/28 had been
thoroughly studied by both Soviet economists at the time and by Western
scholars. We defer our analysis of the procurement crisis of 1927/28
to the next chapter, for the problems of expanding exports during the
NEP were due largely to the failure of grain exports during NEP. The
grain crisis of 1927/28 simply was the Icoup de grace I of re storing of
exports on the basis of NEP agriculture.
Other agricultural exports
A very large portion of the butter and eggs procured by planned
agencies waS exported and this portion increased significantly in 1927/28:
PERCENTAGE OF PROCUREMENTS EXPORTED71
Eggs
Butter
1925/26
58%
56%
1926/27
490/0
40%
1927/28
59%
44%
Butter exports rose, but domestic procurements were stable
and actually declined in the major export regions despite stable or
higher prices so that the supply of procured butter available for dom-
estic consumption was reduced causing butter shortages, especially in
the second half of 1927/28. 72
71 Table T-20.
72
ST, Vol. III, No. 45/46, pp. 44-50. The sale of butter in
Moscow and Leningrad greatly increased, but the supply to other cities
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Egg exports in quantity boomed in 1927/28 (+47.2%), but the
increased export of Soviet eggs was accomplished at the cost of lower
foreign sale prices in an otherwise buoyant foreign agg market - so
the value of egg exports rose only 40%.73 Domestic procurements rose
rapidly in 1927/28 (+27.50/0) but the total marketing of eggs rose less
rapiary because market share of private traders declined. Thus, there
were considerable shortages of eggs in urban areas for most of the year,
and the private trader's price considerably exceeded the retail prices in
state and co-operative stores. The state procurement prices were per-
force maintained at the previous high levels after a temporary redqction
in egg procurement prices demonstrated again the elasticity of state
procurement to low~r procurement prices. Grain shortages also re-
tarded the output and marketing of eggs. Both eggs and butter exports
reflected procurements and as procurements fell off sharply in July-
September 1928, exports dropped below 1927 levels. Increased egg
and butter exports in 1927/28 were achieved basically by restraining
the growth of domestic consumption and the government's willingness to
permit overt exces s demand in the domestic market - this was a defi-
nite change in policy as compared to 1925/26 and 1926/27.74
was at the same levels as in 1926/27.
The difficulties in procuring butter during 1927/28 were ascrib-
ed to a shortage of fodder, and to an inadequate supply for butter pro-
ducing regions of industrial goods, grain and foodstuffs (which was
caused by a diversion of manufactured goods to the grain regions and a
severe shortage of grain). The shortage of fodder and a later spring
caused a slaughter of cattle in some butter producing regions, so that
butter procurements in the second half of 1927/28 lagged behind 1926/27
levels and butter exports during this period were lower than the pre-
ceeding year. (Ibid).
73 Ibid., p. 49.
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The prospects of further expansion was darkened by limited
foreign markets and increasing procurement problems encountered to-
ward the end of 1927/28. The 1927/28 export plans for the se two pro-
ducts (and also for flax) was not fulfilled in 1927/28. 75
Timber exports. Timber exports increased 18%in quantity
even though excess domestic demand existed for almost all timber pro-
ducts during 1927/28 as a consequence of increased construction and
uninterrupted growth of demand in rural areas. 76 Despite this excess
demand, (list) prices were lowered. 77 About 170/0of all hauled industrial
timber was exported (Table T-20). Timber e~orted in 1927/28 was
sold at higher prices because of advanced contract sales, but foreign
prices for sawn lumber at the end of 1927/28 were significantly weaker
than in 1926/27 because of weaker demand (especially in England). The
export plan for sawn materials was 91% fulfilled (in terms of sales).
The export Plan for other types of wood was completely fulfilled. 78
The increase in exports of sawn lumber was at the expense of the Scan-
dinavian timber syndicate which had reduced it sales for a number of
74 Discussion based on ST" Vol. III, No. 45/46, pp. 48-49.
75 Baksht-28b, p. 9.
76
Gosplan estimated that 14. 50/0of the demand for round tim:-
ber and 18%of the demand for sawn timber went unfulfilled in 1927/28
as compared to 5.9% and 20%in 1926/27. Gosplan-29a, p. 489.
77 ST,:, Vol. III, No. 45/46, pp. 54-55.
78 Ibid.
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reasons including a voluntary cutback of exports. Thus, continued
favorable foreign prices for timber were possible only because of the
oligopolistic structure of the European timber market and the USSRIS
willingness to play ball. :But it also limited the possibilities of expan-
ding Soviet sale s.
Oil products. Oil products exports continued to increase (33%
in weights and 20%in value in 1927/28) and foreign prices for Soviet
oil products continued to decline (-8. 40/0),Table T-29. Soviet oil
prices were destined to decline for the next seven years. Oil exports
were definitely carried out at a commercial loss in 1927/28 and requir-
ed "export premiums" from the state budget. 79 Exports increased
along with increased domestic sales (+180/0)so that kerosene and other
oil products continued to be relatively abundant compared to other con-
sumer products. 80 The substantial investment in oil industry in the
past five years was intended not only to increase oi tput of crude oil
but also to improve refinery capacity for exports (to build ahead of
demands). In 1927/28 limited cracking capacity on the first time res-
tricted the export of gasoline to below possible sales so that the oil
industry continued to receive a disproportionate share of the investment
funds. 81 The oil industry was being developed primarily for export
purposes (at least in the short-run) and exports were a significant part
of output:
79 Haensel-30, p. 161.
80 The exception was fuel oil which played a small but signi-
ficant role in the overall fuel balance of the USSR.
409
EXPORTS AS PERCENTAGE OF OUTPUT 1927/2882
All oil products 24.3 (0/0of crude output)
Refinery products 29.9 (% of refinery products)
Kerosene 36.0 (% of refinery products)
Gasoline 86.2 (% of refinery products)
Oil and timber exports equalled 13. 7%and 12. 2%of total exports in
1927/28 as compared to 3.30/0and 11%in 1913 (Table T-4). The volume
of oil exports, however, was abouLdouble 1913 levels while timber exp-
orts were only about 40% (unadjusted for territory changes) (Table T-
26). 83 Kaufman and others emphasized that the poor development of
the timber industry compared to. the oil industry (with respect to both
exports and the domestic markets) was primarily the result of much
greater capital investment in the oil industry. Chapter XII offers an
explanation for this investment policy.
Sugar. Sugar was one of the few consumer goods in excees
supply in 1927/28 (as compared to 1924/25 and 1925/26 when sugar was
so scarce that it was imported). Granulated sugar output rose 47%
because of an exceptionally large harvest (larger sowings (because of
higher prices) and better yields). 84 Thus domestic consumption in-
creased, sugar exports increased and supplies were carried over for
81 Discussion based on Gosplan-29a, p. 472 and ST, ~ Vol. ill
No. 45/46, p.57. Seebelowp.497.
82 Table T-20.
83 1927/28 price weights.
84 6ST., Vol. Ill, No. 45/46, p. 44. NBER!""?a,ser,ies,.11l6.1.
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the following year. But the higher prices for sugar beets and the
larger harvest may have actually discouraged the sowing and marketing
f . 85o graIn.
Cotton cloth exports more than doubled despite the large dom-
estic excess demand for cotton cloth. The share of cloth in total ex-
ports rose from 2. 7%in 1926/27 to 6.4% in 1927/28 - making cloth one
of the most important exports (Table T-4). Exports of cotton fabrics
were roughly 4.8% of total cotton fabric output.86 This was another
good example of the change in Soviet export policy by 1927/28 away from
"exportable surplus" with "market clearing price s" to "forced exports"
with non-market clearing prices. The economic rationality (from the
viewpoint of maximizing total value of exports, and reducing the goods
famine) was nowhere carefully discussed in Soviet literature at the time.
Flax exports. The value of flax exports increased 29% even
though the quantity of flax exports declined 3%in 1927/28. Procure-
ments fell only - 3. 40/0 despite a 9. 1% decline in the crop caused by a
decline in sown area. 87 Procurement prices were higher during 1927/
28. 88 About 360/0 of marketed flax was exported in 1927/28 even though
it reduced the supply of flax to the dome stic flax industry so that dom-
estic output of flax products actually fell in 1927/28. 89
85 See pp. 449 ff in Chapter XI.
86 Table T-20. As far as can be determined about 250/0 of
the increase in cotton fabric output was exported. Table T-20, Nutter-
62, p. 445 and VTSSSR-60.
87 The marketing coefficient for flax actually rose slightly,
but was still below 1925/26 (and 1913) levels.
88 /ST. :Vol. III, No. 45 46, p. 31.
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"Secondary exports. " The group of so-called "secondary ex-
ports" was successfully expanded from 15.3% in 1925/26, and 14. 5%
in 1926/27 to 26.30/0of total exports in 1927/28,90 and was important in
offsetting the collapse of grain exports. But could it be repeated?
Summary. The Soviet's desperate search for exportable pro-
ducts had begun. Comparative prices - at the overvalued parity ex-
change rate - had ceased by and large to be a guide to export and im-
port decisions. An ill-defined system of priorities had perforce been
substituted. Poor prospects for grain exports in 1928/29 was to force
it to continue. 91 The expanding exports, however, for several pro-
ducts - timber, cloth, flax, butter, and eggs - conflicted clearly with
the needs of the domestic markets. The criteria for expanding exports
on the basis of "exportable surplus" at market clearing prices and on
the basis of "commercial profitability" had been abandoned.
Rapid import expansion in 1927/28: its causes
The 330/0increase in imports in value in 1927/28 was due to
price increases for major import items (cotton, wool, hides), large
increases in machinery imports, increased imports of raw materials
89 ST., Vol. III, No. 45/46, pp. 30 and 38, and Table T-20.
90 ST~..:'Vol. III, No. 45/46, p. 9. The export of "basic"
secondary agricultural exports in 1927/28 increased 36%while the
"smaller" secondary agricultural exports increased 115. 70/0;for sec-
ondary industrial exports the analogous figures are 26.60/0and 181.80/0.
91 ST" Vol. III, No.4 (1928), p. 10.
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(particularly for light industry), and emergency grain imports during
the July-September quarter of 1928.
The value of imports of "consumers goods" (excluding gra'in
products), semi-processed goods, and agricultural producers' goods
remained more or less unchanged from 1926/27 levels (Table T-5).
These aggregate figures, however, concealed declines in the volume of
imports in several fields where import substitution was being pressed
including agricultural machinery, paper and cotton. Due to the export
crisis in 1927/28, the government continually urged stricter economy
in the use of imported raw materials, for greater attention to the ,timing
and types of machinery ordered, for import-substitution or simple
"import-deprivation" for imported goods, for import of the cheaper
types of raw materials, and for greater attention to overhead costs in
imports.92 In fact, an editorial in Sovietskaia Torgovlia in January
1928 suggested that a cutback in capital construction might be in order:3
Machinery imports and inve stment
Machinery imports (Soviet definition) for industry and trans-
portation increased from 152.8 million rubles in 1926/27 (24%of total
imports) to 225.8 million rubles in 1927/28 (32.10/0 of total imports).
Two features about these machinery imports stand out in 1927/28.
First, mast machinery was imported on credit from Germany, the
United States, and Great Britain.94 Second, machinery imports (del-
92 ST" Vol. III, No.4, p.2. According to this article over-
head on import operations were not economized on because of the high
profitability of import operations.
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ivery at border) lagged behind the ordering of machinery. The 1926
German credit had been designed to force the Soviet trade delegation
to immediately order machinery in 1926 in order to get the benefit of
the length of the credits; one-half were payable by the end of 1928 and
one-half by the end of 1930. Soviet industrial trusts went on a buying
spree which resulted in a large accumulation of uninstalled machinery
95by the end of 1928.
Increased machinery imports in 1927/28 were by and large not
at the immediate expense of reducing raw material imports in 1927/28 -
despite Stalin's assertions to the contrary. Possibilities for immediately
reducing machinery imports in order to import more raw materials or
to reduce the payments deficit were small because 1) it was commer-
cia1ly difficult to cancel contracts in process, 2) reducing current
orders would not immediately free foreign exchange, for this year's
93 ST, Vol. III, No.4 (January 26, 1928), p.2.
94 Trade with Great Britain continued even though diplomatic
relations were broken between the USSRand Great Britain in 1927.
95 The stock of imported machinery not put into production
was 13 million rubles at the end of 1925/26, 25 million rubles at the
end of 1926/27 and 80 million rubles at the end of 1927/28 (estimate
of VSNKh) (Pashkov-30, p. 59). For Soviet commentary on the use of
the 300 million mark credits, see "Die, Kr,edibil<ti6n","S,UA,.V61.',:V, No.
13, pp. 5-9; "Die Industrie der UdSSRund de Abwicklung ung des Duet-
schen 300 Millionen-Kredit", SUA, Vol. VI, No. 12, pp. 24-25; "Zur
Abwicklung des Deutschen Garanteekredits", SUA, Vol. VII, No. 8/9,
pp. 18-20.
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machinery orders were usually delivered next year on credit and 3) mac-
hinery delivered in 1927/28 was ordered in 1926/27 and was largely on
credit. And "next year" would always be better, so "don't cut down on
orders this year! " - Soviet optimism.
To what extent the level of investment in industry and electric
power industry was dependent on the volume of imported machinery?
Pashkov did a study of the "Balance of Industrial Machinery" in early
1930 which suggested that between 30 to 40% of the expenditure on mach-
inery in 1927/28 was for imported machinery (Table T-23). 96 Three
important trends appeared during 1925/26-1927/28. First, industrial
investment became more machinery intensive, according to Pashkov,
and the demand for industrial machinery rose faster than both investment
in industry and the domestic output of machinery (Table T-23). Second,
the share of imported machinery (at current prices) in the total machin~
ery installed in industry and electric power rose steadily from 25%in
1925/26 to 35%in 1926/27 to 40% in 1927/28 (Table T-23. Third, the
share of machinery imports in total imports was rising steadily and ma-
chinery imports rose much faster than the growth of exports. These
trends for the demand for industrial machinery and the derived demand
for machinery imports compared very unfavorably to the projected
growth (and actual growth) of exports.
Investment in agriculture was much less dependent on imports
than before 1914 (Table T-22).
96 Pashkov- 30.
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Shortages in raw materials. Just as Zalkind predicted, short-
ages of raw materials were a major limitation on increasing the output
of textiles and leather products - and imports were a major source for
t . I 97raw ma erla s.
Cotton imports fell 10%in quantity but a good cotton harvest
increased the total cotton supply in 1927/28, (Table XLV.11). The in-
crease was insufficient however, to fulfill the demand of the cotton ind-
dustry which went on to three shifts. The "strain" on the foreign ex-
change plan in 1927/28 was specifically cited as limiting the actual con-
sumption of cotton and wool. 98 The increase in the domestic cotton
crop was due largely to a 160/0increase in yield. Similar increases in
yield could not be expected in the coming years, for the cotton yield in
the USSRwas variable and was near, post-1917 highs. This suggested
that further increases in the domestic supply of cotton would have to
come from expansion of area sown, pos sibly at the expense of grain? 99
According to,Sovetskaia Torgovlia, imports supplied 400/0of the fiber used
in the cotton textile industry in 1927/28.100 But the possibilities for
rapidly increasing the cotton fiber imports for 1928/29 and beyond was
uncertain - especially in view of the increasing demand for imports, the
high foreign cotton prices, and the projected slow growth of foreign
trade.
97 ST,., Vol. III, No. 45/46, p. 31 and 1. 39.
98 Ibid., pp. 30-32. The consumption of cotton rose 14.80/0.
99 Diamond-55, p. 72.
100 ST,; Vol. III, No. 45/46, p. 32. See Table T-21.
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Wool imports increased 17%in quantity in 1927/28, and accord-
ing to Sovetskaia Torgovlia, accounted for roughly 600/0 of the supply to
101
the (large scale?) woolen textile industry. The dome stic procure-
ments of wool also rose 36%and this success was attributed to the rel-
atively high procurements prices for wool. 102 But the increase in total
supply was not sufficient to meet the demand for wool by state industry.
The shortage of leather and hides was even more acute during
1927/28.103 The value of hide and leather imports rose slightly be-
cause of higher prices but the weight of leather and hides declined
(-13. 4%).
The value of imports of these three items - cotton, wool,
hides - increased 160/0and accounted for 670/0 of raw materials imports
and 27%of total imports in 1927/28. Thus, to continue the expansion of
light industry on the basis of imported raw materials implied either sub-
stantial export growth or adjustments in the growth of other sector s of
the economy.
The demand for raw materials imports used largely in heavy
industry also expanded rapidly (23%) in 1927/28 and comprised 100/0of
total imports in 1927/28. Lower prices facilitated import expansion of
rubber and many non-ferrous metals, but despite the substantial in-
crease in non-ferrous metal imports, there were persistent reports of
shortages of these metals {as well as other non-agricultural materials
101 Ibia.
102 Ibid., pp. 30-31.
103 Gosplan-29a, pp. 201-202.
417
supplied largely from domestic production such as fuel, iron products,
and timber products). 104
Imports supplied between 50 and 100%of the total supply of the
following raw materials in 1927/28: wool, copper, lead, zinc, nickel,
tin, aluminum, ferro-alloys, paper, rubber, tea, and jute (Table T-21).
Some of these materials were not easily produced in the USSRunder
known technique s or geological knowledge in 1927/28 so that the in-
creased demand for these "non-competing imports" such as tin, rubber,
nickel, jute, tea and copra would have to be supplied through increased
imports.
The import situation
Several special conditions tended to accelerate imports in
1927/28, including the delivery of machinery under the German credit
and emergency grain imports in the fourth quarter of 1927/28, but the
basic underlying pressure to expand imports of raw materials was the
continuing increase in industrial output - and the planned acceleration
of industrialization would increase this pressure, especially if the state
was not successful in increasing the domestic output of agricultural raw
. 1 105materIa s.
The share of consumers I goods imports (Soviet definition) in
total imports increased from 130/0in 1926/27 to 180/0in 1927/28 largely
because of grain imports (Table T-7). If imports of raw materials for
104 Gosplan-29a, p. 175 and ST, Vol. ill, No. 45/46, p. 41.
105 In current prices, raw material imports rose 14%and
semi-processed materials imports rose 150/0(Table T-5). Imports of
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use in the consumer goods industry are considered, the "consumer-
oriented imports" accounted for between 49 and 55%of the total imports
in 1927/28 - slightly higher than in 1926/27 Table T-15). This high
fraction of imports oriented toward consumer needs during NEP con-
trasted strongly with the 1933 structure of imports when only 21 to 260/0
of total imports were directed toward satisfying consumer needs (Table
XIV.12). The second "industrialitsatsia" of the import structures was
yet to occur.
Terms of trade
The commodity terms of trade (1926/27 weights) went somewhat
against the USSRin 1927/28 (-4. 3%)and the shift was almost entirely to
be attributed to an increase in cotton prices (Table T-28). The price in-
dex for Soviet exports rose slightly (3%using 1926/27 weights and 0.50/0
using 1927/28 weights). 106 The direction of the price changes for var-
ious exports was discussed above. The price index for imports rose
also (+7.50/0) using 1926/27 weights and 3.70/0 using 1927/28 weights).
Raw material price trends were mixed in 1927/28 but the large increase
in cotton, wool, and leather prices caused the price index for raw mat-
erials (1927/28 weights) to rise 10%(Table T-30). German machinery
prices also increased (Table T-30) and the Soviet trade authorities
these groups rose by about 50/0 in constant prices (Table T-27).
106 Table T-28. The price index using 1913 weights rose
about 8%from 1926/27 to 1927/28 primarily because of higher grain
prices and the heavier weights for grain.
419
accused German industrie s of conspiring to char ge "Rus sian prices",
that is, to charge higher prices to the USSR than to other countries.
Some evidence suggests that this indeed was the case. 107
Trade balance, gold flows, and reserves
The year 1927/28 was a disaster with respect to the Soviet
balance of payments. The foreign trade deficit was 168 million rubles
and the estimated deficit in the balance of payments on current account
was a staggering 247 million rubles (Table T-14). This was financed
by an increase in short and medium-term credits of 120 million rubles
and by the net export of gold and platinum worth 155 million rubles.
Foreign exchange reserves were depleted and were probably down below
330 million rubles by the end of 1927/28. The gold stock dropped from
347 million rubles on January 1, 1928 to 187 million rubles on January 1,
1929 (Table T-17). In contrast, outstanding Soviet foreign debt had in-
creased to 370 million rubles by October 1, 1928, or more than Soviet
reserves. The maturity of most of the foreign debt was short-term with
one group of credits extending as far as 1930. But large repayments on
the German credits were already due at the end of 1928 and the beginning
of 1929. The 1928 crop and grain procurement campaign, however, pro-
mised that almost no grain would be exported in 1928/29. 108 The year
107 A preliminary study by the author of unit-value of mach-
inery exports from both the USAand Germany to the USSRand other
countries revealed a tendency for the unit values of machinery imports
to Russia to exceed the unit values to other countries. See SUAVol. V,
No. 13, p. 8.
108 Baksht-28, p. 10.
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1928/29 - the fir st year of the FYP - was to be begun under extreme
pressure to cut imports and expand exports. A difficult way to start a
program for industrialization. The Soviet economy of 1927/28 had corne
up against the now classic balance-of-payments problems encountered
by developing countrie s today.
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CHAPTER XI
SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE AND THE "GRAIN PROBLEM"
DURING NEP
The collapse of grain exports and the stagnation of Soviet foreign trade
during NEP
The poor recovery of grain exports during NEP was the major
cause of the stagnation of Soviet exports during NEP at levels far below
1909 -13 levels. In comparing pre -1914 grain exports from the Rus sian
Empire and grain exports from the USSR during NEP, recall that, all
other things being equal, the separation of territory from the Russian
Empire would have increased the capacity of the Soviet territory to ex-
port grain, for the separated territories were net importers of grain
(0.5-1.0 million m. t.) from the rest of Russia. 1
GRAIN PRODUCT EXPORTS, 1909-13 AND 1923/24-1927/282
(millions of metric tons)
1909 -13 NEP
1909 12.5 1923/24 2.7
1910 13.9 1924/25 0.6
1911 13.5 1925/26 2.1
1912 9.0 1926/27 2.3
1913 10 • 7 1927/28 0.4
1See page 168.
2Table 111.4 and Table T -9. (Unadjusted for territorial change.)
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What impact did this virtual collapse of grain exports during
NEP have on Soviet foreign trade? Let us make some rough estimates.
Remember that Russian grain product exports during 1909-13 accounted
for more than 45% of the total value of Russian exports and if we ad-
justed the value of Russian grain exports for the increase in prices
between 1913 and NEP, the value of Rus sian gr ain exports during 1909-13
would have been about 900 -1000 million rubles {in NEP prices}. 3 Annual
total exports during 1909-13 (with a similar rough adjustment for in-
creases in prices) would be about 2.0-2.4 billion rubles for the Russian
Empire and 1.8-2.1 billion rubles for the Soviet territory alone (based
on Soviet adjustments). 4
During the NEP, gros s grain product exports never exceeded
210 million rubles and averaged 130 million rubles during 1923/24-1927/
528. As a consequence, even in the two best years during NEP {1926/27
and 1927/28} total annual exports were about 0.78 billion rubles.
3Data for Rus sian Empir e from Table III. 2. Gr ain export
prices during NEP were roughly 40-50% higher than 1913 grain prices
(1926/ 27 weights) {Table T -29}.
4The usual Soviet adjustment for territorial change is 11.1%
(po 11.34), but due to the methodology of this adjustment, there exists
considerable question as to the relevant adjustment for territorial loss
for the actual loss in exportcapaci~y. The total export price index
during 1924/25-1927/28 was between 45 and 550/0 higher than 1913 export
prices using 1913,1926/27 and 1927/28 weights (Table T-28).
5Even if 1923/24 and 1924/25 are excluded as being unrepresen-
tati ve year s for NEP, grain product exports still average Ie s s than
140 million rubles during 1925/26-1927/28 (Table T-ll). Net grain pro-
duct exports {in value} during 1923/24-1927/28 were only 94 million
rubles per year because of significant grain product imports in 1924/25
and 1927/28 {based on sum of imports of SOVTC 70 and SOVTC 82 in
VTSSSR-60}.
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If, all other things being equal, the Soviet government had been
able to restore grain exports simply to 1909-13 levels during these two
years (1926/27-1927/28), then the value of total exports would have been
as high as 1. 5-1. 7 billion rubles instead of about the actual 0.8 billion
rubles.6 The Soviets' inability to restore grain exports was probably
the single most important factor in the failure of Soviet exports to re-
cover to pre-19l4 levels. This failure was not easily offset by the ex-
pansion of other exports (some of which also failed to recover to pre-
1914 levels). 7
6Total annual exports were about 780 million rubles in both
1926/27 and 1927/28; grain product exports were 208 million and 41 mil-
lion rubles in these years. Average annual grain product exports during
1909-13 were about 900 -1000 million rubles (in exports prices during
NEP) (Table T-ll and p.l06). The projection ignors any
effect of Soviet grain exports on world grain prices, domestic income,
other exports, etc.
7Karcz-67a, p. 410, argued that the pressure to export grain
was not a valid or important consideration in the grain problem of 1928
because these grain exports could easily be compensated for by expand-
ing the exports of other products. He cited the "successful compensa-
tion" by other exports, especially agricultural products, when grain
product exports fell sharply during 1927/28.
Karcz's hypothesis, however, misleads the reader about the
broader implications of the grain problem to Soviet foreign trade and
the whole strategy of industrialization. First, the collapse of grain
exports in 1927/28 was only the final phase of a continuing crisis in
Soviet efforts to restore grain exports on the basis of small peasant
agriculture; this collapse of grain exports ended any hope of immedi-
ately restoring total exports to 1909-13 levels. Second, the short-run
effects of the collapse of grain exports were particularly burdensome
in 1927/28, and required the export of precious metals and the forcing
of export of goods in exces s demand within the USSR (lumber, flax,
etc.). That is, in the short-run, increasing non-grain exports was
costly from the viewpoint of other goals in the economy, and offered
little promise of offsetting the loss of grain exports from 1909-13
levels. The text develops this hypothesis further. Third, the failure
of exports to recover to pre-19l4 levels restricted the growth of
imports and hence retarded the recovery of light industry and threat-
ened to restrict the level of investment because of the insufficient
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This chapter examines the basic causes for the failure of grain
exports to recover to pre-l9l4 levels. The obvious but simply sympto-
matic cause of the failure was the Soviet government's inability to in-
duce the peasant to produce and market sufficient grain and to restrict
the domestic demand for marketed grain so as to generate large ex-
portable surpluses comparable to the pre-19l4 grain exports.
Here we attempt to identify the major factors in 1) retarding
the recovery of grain output to pre-l9l4 levels, 2) the poor recovery
of grain marketing by the peasants, and 3) the growth of domestic
demand for marketed grain. In particular, we reexamine the conven-
tional explanations for the" grain problem" during NEP (recently chal-
lenged by a provocative article by Jerzy Karcz8) and consider various
hypotheses about the causes of the so-called "grain procurement crisis
of 1927/28". In the process we question the importance of the "goods
famine" and various sets of relative prices in the "grain marketing
problem" and trace the relationship between Soviet policie s to deal
with the problem of the poor recovery of foreign trade (through expand-
ing non-grain exports, import-deprivation, and import-substitution)
and the actual set of relative prices evolving during NEP and other
factors influencing the recovery of exportable grain surpluses.
equipment. The desire to overcome the constraint on growth imposed by
limited import capacity influenced the structure of the FYP.
8Karcz-67a.
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The grain problem and the 1927/28
marketing crisis
There are two distinct questions to be asked about grain market-
ing by the Soviet peasant during NEP. First, why did gross grain mar-
keting fail to recover to pre-19l4 levels during NEP? Second, why did
gross grain marketings decline so sharply in the fall of 1927, so as to
precipitate an internal political crisis and to force the government to
confiscate grain from the peasant? The causes of the grain marketing
problem during NEP are still debated among Western specialists and
one Western economist recently has gone so far as to deny its existence
as an important factor in the Soviet NEP economy (up to 1928). 9
Conventional wisdom and grain marketing problem during NEP.
The usual Soviet explanation during NEP of the general problem of re-
storing grain marketing to pre-1914 levels emphasized 1) the poor terms
of trade of grain sold by the peasant for manufactured goods bought by
the peasant (the" scissors"), 2) the higher per capita consumption by
the peasants, whose real income was larger because of the social and
economic changes wrought by the revolution (including the redistribution
of the large estates) and to the increased use of grain for livestock
feed.lO Only in 1928 did Stalin really start pushing the hypothesis that
the major cause of the grain marketing problem during the NEP was
9Karcz-67a. See Addendum to Chapter XI, pp. 468 for a
critical analysis of Karcz's conclusion that the share and quantity of
grain marketed by the peasant by 1926/27 were roughly identical to pre-
1914marketings.
10For example, see above, p. 271. See also Bukharin-28a in
Spulber-64, pp. 259 ff. and discussions of the grain export problems in
Chapter s VII-IX of this study.
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the redistribution of land from the estates (which marketed a large
fraction of its grain output) to the smaller peasant holdings (which
marketed a much smaller share of its output) - - but recall here that
Stalin was also attempting to push the idea of collectivization, for
collective farms marketed a large share of their output as the kulak
and large estate did before 1914.11
Western economists - - basing their explanation heavily on the
famous Nemchinov-Stalin data on grain marketing -- tend to emphasize
even more the differences in the "marketing coefficients" and the re-
distribution of the large estates to the small peasant producers as the
major cause of the general grain marketing problem during NEP.
12
It is interesting that Stalin's original hypothesis about the relation-
ship of the grain marketing problem and the redistribution of grain
production was based on the Stalin-Nemchinov data which presented
only the average propensity to market grain from gross output produced
by various types of grain producers -- whereas the relevant concept is
the marginal propensity to market grain.13 It is likely, however, that
the marginal propensity-to-market grain from an increment in per
capita output eventually rises as real per capita income (or grain out-
put) rises.
llStalin-28b, pp. 85-101.
12Compare Dobb-48, pp. 216-221; Jasny-49, pp. 192, 223-224;
Schwart-54, pp. 111-112;Erlich-67, p. 254. This table is reproduced
in Dobb-48 (p. 217), Karcz-67a (p. 402) and Stalin-28b (p. 89) as well
as in other references cited in Karcz-67a.
13Although the table strongly suggested that redistribution of
grain output from the rich to the poor will lower grain marketing, close
examination shows that their data are gross figures rather than the per
capita figures necessary for cross-section analysis. Furthermore,
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The impact of the redistribution of the large estates to the
small producers or agricultural laborers on both the recovery of
gross grain marketing and net grain marketing (net of repurchases
by rural population) during the NEP is much more complex than sug-
gested by Stalin's rough data cited in 1928, as will be discussed below.
14
The Western explanation emphasized the r edi stribution of the
estate lands (and hence grain production) to the small producer as a
source of increased real income (from the rents and profits formerly
earned by the landlord) and hence increased demand for grain. The
Soviet explanation - - before Stalin - - insofar as it emphasized income
redistribution and higher per capita income rather than relative prices,
argued more that the higher demand for grain by the peasant was a
function of higher real disposable money income after taxes, rent,
and debt repayment rather than higher gross real income alone which
might result from a redistribution of estates. For the revolution and
the social-economic policy of the Soviet government wiped away rents,
and old debts, and possibly lowered direct agricultural taxes. 15
when considering demand for grain in all forms and considering the per
capita output on kulak farmsteads and estates, we see that the Stalin-
Nemchinov data may well be consistent with a constant marginal pro-
pensity-to-market grain (although this is probably not the case), in
which Stalin's strongest argument for collective farms fall apart.
14For example, redistribution of grain output from estates to
smaller producers (who were formerly paid money wages rather than
grain-in-kind) would reduce rural demand for marketed grain (reducing
the demand on gross marketed output).
l5See Jasny-49 (po 226) for discus sion of Soviet explanation.
The comparison of direct money taxes on agriculture before and after
the revolution is still unclear (Timoshenko-32, p. 400). According
to Carr-58a, (po 261), " ••• at the 14th Party Conference on April 27,
1925 •••• T syurupa ••• claimed that th e annual tax falling on the
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But how adequate is the income-redistribution hypothesis in
explaining the grain marketing problem during NEP. In particular,
the hypothesis suggests that per capita grain consumption in rural
areas would be higher during NEP than in 1913. This prediction has
not been supported by empirical studies! 16 Then where was the grain
during NEP if it was not marketed? Perhaps it didn It exi st at all (on
a per capita basis) during NEP!
The grain crisis of 1927/28 and "conventional wisdom"
The conventional Western explanation for the grain marketing
crisis in the fall of 1927 emphasized the worsening" goods famine" and
the de facto deterioration in the terms of trade of grain for industrial
manufactured goods - - this factor was also recognized by almost all
Soviet leaders. 17 There are two flaws in this explanation. First, if
the" goods famine" for industrial goods were severe enough to be a
major factor in the collapse of grain marketing, then one would think
that the marketing of other agricultural goods would also be reduced
by the" goods famine" because of a similar de facto deterioration of
peasantry was now only 4 rubles a head against a pre-war annual charge
covering taxes, rent and other obligatory payments of 10 ruble s. "
l6For empirical studies, see Timoshenko-32, pp. 401-403.
Dobb-48 (p. 216) expressed the common belief that the peasants were
eating more.
l7See Erlich-60 (pp. 170-171), Baykov-47 (pp. 68-69), Dobb-48
(pp. 219-220), Schwartz-54 (pp. 111-112). Erlich's analysis of the grain
crisis emphasized the goods famine as the basic cause of the market-
ing crisis (Erlich-60, pp. 170-175).
See footnote 71 on p. 453 and p. 273, n. 67, for references
to Soviet analyses of the grain marketing problem.
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the terms of trade. Second, the pI'ice ratio of industrial goods to grain
would be expected to rise relative to the previous year. But neither of
these predictions were true. Rather, in 1927/28, procurements of
virtually every major agricultural commodity except grain rose above
1926/27 levels (Table T -51). 18 But even more startling was that the
purchasing power of grain (and especially wheat) sold at official pro-
curement prices in the fall and winter of 1927, in terms of manufactured
goods sold in private trade was equal or above the purchasing power of
grain in the fall of 1926. 19 In fact, retail prices of manufactured con-
sumer goods did not begin to rise rapidly until the fall of 1928 (after the
price of grain had been raised considerably). Is there a better explan-
ation than the" goods famine" argument for the sudden unexpected grain
marketing crisis in November and December of 1927? We shall con-
sider this problem after analyzing the general grain marketing prob-
lem during NEP, for the explanations of the general grain marketing
problem and the 1927/28 crisis are closely related.
18Although Karcz's conclusion about the virtually complete re-
covery of grain marketing and the importance of grain exports for
Soviet foreign trade are at odds with my analysis and my data (see Add-
endum at end of Chapter XI), we should not ignore his two important
conclusions about agriculture during NEP. Fir st, the grain marketing
problem was not as bad as implied by the often-cited Stalin-Nemchinov
data (Karcz-67, p. 409), and second, total agricultural marketings
were increasing during 1926-1928 despite the so-called goods famine
(Karcz-67, p. 410).
19See Table T -35. We must not rule out, however, the possi-
bility that the price index for private trade was no longer representative
of "private-trade market clearing prices" in the rural areas.
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Alternative explanations of the grain marketing problem
during the NEP
The hypothesis that the combination of the different average
propensities to market grain and the redistribution of grain output from
the estates to the small producers was the important factor in the fail-
ure of grain marketing to recover to pre-19l4 levels is inadequate. The
basic causes of the failure of grain marketing to recover to pre-19l4
levels were due to 1) lower gross output, 2) larger rural population
and 3) a series of other factors, such as the need to replenish stocks,
reduction in taxes, favorable prices for other agricultural goods, and
perhaps, the worsening of the goods famine at critical moments. We
must then ask why the gross output of grain failed to recover to pre-
1914 levels and why grain prices were relatively unfavorable to the
prices of other agricultural products.
Poorer harvests during NEP. The major reason for the poor
recovery of gros s grain marketing during the NEP was simply that the
absolute quantity of the gross grain crop was significantly less during
the NEP than during 1909-1913 on the same territory (Table T-8 and
Table XI. 1)• Such poor recovery of the harve st would be expected to
be reflected in a decline in gross grain marketing by the peasants, all
other things being equal. 20
20A constant rural population and a fairly inelastic demand for
grain is assumed. Before 1914, however, marketing was asserted to be
less sensitive to the size of the harvest (Jasny-49, p. 193 and others)
because of 1) the financial pressure of the fixed taxes, rents and debts
(as well as monetary wage payments by the landlord) on the peasant to
market, 2) the existence of substantial grain reserves in the possession
of the peasant and 3) the poor transportation system.
As noted above, the social and economic changes caused by the
revolution reduced the monetary pres sure on the peasant to market {see
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The causes for the poor recovery in the gross grain harvest
are considered below.
Larger rural population. The population grew rapidly during
NEP, and according to Soviet sources, it already exceeded the popula-
tion of January 1, 1914 by January 1, 1925, so that the restoration of
the grain harvest during the NEP on a per capita basis (for the same
territory) remained much below 1913 per capita grain output. 21 Grain
marketing, however, depended more on the output per capita of rural
population (or output per capita of rural population in grain-producing
areas) than on the output per capita of the total population. According
to Soviet data, the rural population already by January 1, 1924 exceeded
the rural population of January 1, 1914, and it was growing at about
1-3/40/0 per year, so that by April 1, 1928, the rural population was
10.5 million (8.3%) more than January 1,1914.22 Western sources
(Eason-62) estimated the same growth rates for total population, but
Ie s ser increase s in the rural population during NEP as compared to
1914; nevertheless, even these sources indicate that the rural popula-
tion on January 1, 1928 was about 3 million more than on January 1,
1914. 23 Based on identical per capita consumption in 1913 and in
pp. 50, 70-72, 272 ff, and chapter 10.
21Table T-48, Par~ A, Table T-12, and Table XI. 1.
22Table T-48, Part A. Growth rate of rural population cal-
culated from January 1, 1924 to January 1, 1928. Western sources
(Eason-62) differ from Soviet sources about the growth of rural and
urban population but not about the total growth of population. See
Table T -48, Part B.
23Table T-48, Part B.
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mid-NEP of about 250 kilograms of grain, by early 1928 the population
increase in rural areas over 1913 levels implied an increase in the
rural demand by 1927/28 for grain of about 2.5 million m. t. (according
to Soviet data) or 0.7 millionm. t. (according to Western estimates)
above 1913 levels. 24
The combination of poorer harvests and a larger rural popula-
tion during NEP as compared to 1913 could well have caused much of
the decline in gross marketing during NEP as compared to 1913. Assum-
ing identical levels of rural per capita grain consumption (directly for
foodstuffs) in 1913 and during the NEP, the change in the quantity of
\I grain surplus available for marketing" in any year during NEP as com-
piredto 1913 resulting from smaller harvests and increased rural popu-
1ation would be the sum of the absolute difference between the harvest
in that year during NEP and the 1913 harvest, plus the absolute increase
in rural demand for grain as foodstuffs to feed the increase in the rural
population (above 1913 rural population).
24STAT -28 (p. 853) indicated that rural per capita grain con-
sumption was roughly identical in 1909-13 and 1925-1928. The figure of
250 kilograms per capita consumption of all grains in rural areas is a
rough estimate based on Timoshenko-32 (p. 402) and may be somewhat
low. Jasny-49 (p. 280) stated that rural per -capita grain consumption
fell from 265 kilograms before World War I to about 255 kilograms in
1927/28. See Jasny-49 (pp. 750-751) for a discussion of these estimates
of direct grain consumption in 1909-13 and 1927/28.
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CHANGEIN "SURPLUS AVAILABLE FOR MARKETING"
DURINGNEP COMPARED TO 191325
(millions 01 metric tons)
Harvest of
1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 192B
Difference from
1913harve st -13.5 -lB.7 -7.6 -3.3 -7.B -6. B
Additional rural
demand due to popu-
1ation increase
(Soviet data) - 0.3 - 0.7 -1.2 -1.7 -2.3 -2.7
Total change in
"surplus" available
for marketing com-
pared to 1913
harvest -13.B -19.4 -7.B -5.0 -10.1 -9.7
0/0 reduction of
surplus compared
to 1913 17.2 24.2 12.2 6.2 12.6 12.1
Such reductions in the II surplus" available for marketing should reduce
gross grain marketing (assuming no change in per-capita rural con-
sumption).
25From Table XI. 1. Additional rural demand for grain based on
Eason1s population data (Eason-62, pp. 72-73) would be the following
(in millions of metric tons):
114.1 l16.3a lIB. Sa 120.B 122.3 123.4
Rural population
on Jan. 1 of next
year
Increase in rural
demand over 1913
levels
119.5
- 1.4 -O.B - O. 3 +0. 3 +0. 7 +1•1
alnterpo1ated estimates of rural population for January 1, 1925
and January 1, 1926.
TABLE XI. 1
USSR: GROSS HAR VEST AND MARKETABLE SURPLUS
OF ALL GRAIN ON SOVIET TERRITORY
(millions of metric tons)
HARVEST OF
Average
1909-1913 1913 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928
l. Gross harvest 81. 6 80. 1 65. 6 51. 4 72. 5 76.8 72.3 73.3
2. Decline (-) from
+1. 5 0 -13. 5 -18. 7 9. 1 3.3 7. 8 6. 81913 levels - - - -
January 1st of following year
3. Total population [133.5] 139. 7 137. 0 140.0 143.2 147. 1 [150. 5] [153.9]
4. Rural population
(Soviet estimates) 113. 9 114.9 116. 8 118. 7 120.8 [122.9] [125.1]
5. Output per capita
of total population 611 573 479 367 506 522 481 476
6. Output per capita
of rural population 703 571 440 610 635 588 584
7. Additional grain (-)
required by rural 0
- O. 3 - O. 7 - 1.2 - 1.7 - 2. 3 - 2.9
population to main-
tain per capita levels
8. Total reduction (-)
in surplus available 0 -13. 8 -19.4 - 9. 8 - 5. 0 -10. 1 - 9. 7
for marketing (from
col. 2 and col. 7) ~
Source: Notes to Table XI. 1, Appendix B I p. 770.
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Additional factors depressing grain marketing during NEP
The quantity of grain marketed from a given harvest is also
influenced strongly by other factors including the marginal propensity
to consume grain from higher incomes, the demand for additional
reserve stocksJ the demand for livestock feed, the money prices and
financial pressures to meet money payments, and the price of grain
relative to the price of other marketable products and the prices of
grain and other marketable products relative to the prices of commod-
ities the peasant purchases. 26 The net effect of these factors probably
depressed grain marketings during NEP relative to 19130
The per capita quantity of grain consumed for food by the peas-
ant (especially in surplus areas) fluctuated significantly during the
19201s. Some variation in. per -capita consumption was to be expected
in 1920 and 1921, when the crops were extremely poor, but variations
in per capita consumption in 1923-26 seem to suggest some direct rela-
° hO bOO d to 27Th htlons lp etween per caplta graln output an consump Lon. us, t e
impact on grain marketing from the changes in surplus from 1913 levels
would be less than suggested by the above table. For reasons discussed
26Gross marketing also depends on the distribution of the crop
between surplus and deficit areas and the distribution of the crop among
various type s of producer s (on a per capita basi s) 0 Similarly, the
effect of an increase in the rural population on gross marketing from a
given harvest depends on the distribution of this increase between sur-
plus and deficit producers. In general, the more unequal the distribu-
tion of the crop in favor of the surplus producer (on a per capita basis),
the larger the gross marketing of grain. Net marketing should be less
sensitive to these factors.
27STAT -28, p. 853.
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below, however, per capita grain consumption in the surplus areas in
1926 and 1927 changed in the opposite direction of the grain harvest. 28
What impact would small shifts in rural per capita consumption have on
grain marketing and exports? The decision of the peasants to consume
more or less grain from a given harvest usually has magnified effects
on the level of marketing because of the residual nature and the rela-
tively smaller volume of marketings (as compared to total demand by
the rural population). 1£ all peasants consumed 5%more grain in 1926/
27, rural consumption would have increased 105 million mo t. and net
marketing would have been reduced about 16% from 10. 3 million m. t.
to 8.8, which would have in turn wiped out most of the grain which had
been made available for exportso 29 That is, relatively small shifts
(5%) in the per capita grain consumption of the rural population cause
larger shifts in the net marketing of grain available for the urban popu-
lation, and because the grain requirements of the urban population are
relatively inflexible, relatively large shifts in net grain marketing
results in massive changes in the surplus available for exports.
The peasants' demand for additions to reserves varies accord-
ing to the pattern of preceding harvests; the replenishment of stocks
depleted from the early years of NEP and from the poor harvest of
1924 was a significant part of the total utilization of the harvest in 1925
28lb. d P .... 1 d_l_. er caplta graln consumptlon In surp us areas e-
clined somewhat in 1926/27 when grain harvest increased, and increased
about 4% in 1927/28 when the crop declined.
29Based on rural population of 120.8 million, average per cap-
ita consumption of 250 kilograms and net marketings of 10.3 million
m.t. (cited by Karcz-67, po 408).
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and 1926 (but not in 1927). 30 Peasants also used considerable quantities
of grain brewing (for a strong drink called" samogen" or self-distilled)
and it was estimated that about 1.4-1.5 million mot. were used for
private brewing about 1925.31
The other major use of grain was for livestock feed. The evi-
dence about the actual quantity of grain and grain by-products fed to
livestock in 1913and during NEP is still a matter of dispute. 32 Even
with constant rates of feeding, the demand for feed grain grew rapidly
as livestock recovered from the 1922 low:
LIVESTOCK 33
(Number in millions of head)
(June-July count)
1916 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928
Horses 35.8 24.1 24.6 2S~7 27.1 29.2 31.6 33.5
Cattle 60.6 45.8 52.9 59.0 62.1 65.5 68.0 70.5
Cows 26.0 24.8 26.1 27.1 2806 29.7 29.9 30.7
Swine 20.9 1201 12.9 22.2 21.8 21.6 23.2 26.2
30
See Jasny-49, pp. 230-231. See also Timoshenko-32,
pp. 396-399.
31Reingo1d-31, pp. 196-197. Private brewing used 2.5 times
more grain per unit of alcohol than industrial brewing of vodka which
could also use potatoes.
32 See Jasny-49, pp. 752-759.
33Diamond-55, pp. 140, 142, 144 and 147.
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SOVIET ESTIMATES OF FEED USE OF GRAIN
(million m. t. )34
Quantity
% of Crop
1909-13
19.0
23.5
1925/26
20.9
28.0
1926/27
2403
1927/28
23.8
32.9
1928/29
2206
31.0
Gosplan estimated that the rates of feeding were rising in 1926/27 and
1927/28 and were 20% above pre-19l4 levels: the rates of feeding clearly
increased in 1926/27 as indicated by the increase in feed use shown in
the above table. 35 In 1927/28 the total use of grain for feed fell only
slightly below 1926/27 levels (-0.5 million m. t.) even though the 1927
crop was substantially below the 1926 crop (409 million m. t. )36 Thus,
the increasing demand for livestock feed during NEP (relative to the
size of the crop) tended to increase the market demand for grain (to
feed livestock in urban and grain difficient areas). These are the fac-
tors which directly depressed the willingness of the peasant to market
grain during NEP relative to 1913.
34V• P. Nifontov, Animal Husbandry of USSR in Figures (in
Russian?) (Mos'cow, 1932), pp. 127; cited by Jasny-49, p. 754.
35Jasny-49 (pp. 752-753) disputed Gosplan's assertion that
feeding rates were 200/0higher and the rates were rising, but Jasny's
evidence for disputing Gosplan's claim is inconclusive. In fact, Nifon-
tov's data, (cited by Jasny), for total feed grain and for per capita
feeding of horses and cows revealed that the rate of feeding rose
sharply in 1926/27 (over 1925/26 levels) and declined somewhat in
1927/28 (Nifontov-32, pp. 128-148 as cited in Jasny-49, p. 753).
36The livestock herds continued to expand in 1927/28, so that
the feeding rate fell somewhat. Data from pp. 437-438.
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Causes of poor recovery of grain output during the NEP
Why did grain output recover only partially to 1913 levels during
the NEP while the other agricultural crops recovered much faster (in
terms of sown area if not output)?
SOWN AREA (SOVIET TERRITOR y)37
(millions of hectares)
Total Industrial Flax Sunflower
Area Grains Crops Fiber Sugarbeet Seeds Cotton
1913 105.6 94.4 4.55 1.01 0065 0.97 0.69
1925 104.3 87.3 7.17 1.27 0.53 3.10 00 59
1926 110.3 93. 7 6.66 1.27 0054 2.59 00 65
1927 112.4 94. 7 7.29 1.20 0.66 2.83 0.80
1928 113.0 92. 2 8.62 1.36 0077 3.90 o. 97
Three factors probably tended to retar~ the recovery of grain output.
First, subdivision of large estates into small holdings tended to reduce
yields.38 Second, loss of draft power (horses) during the 1921-22
famine greatly retarded the recovery of sown area in important grain
producing regions during NEP; areas with fewer horses during NEP
than in 1916 in general experienced a less complete recovery of sown
37Johnson-60, p. 229.
38Yields on estates were 15-200/0higher than on peasant hold-
ings, probably because of better equipment, better seed, better tech-
niques and more rational use of resources (Timoshenko-32, ppo 274-
275). Average yields of the 4 major grains for 1922-1927 were substan-
tially below average yields for 1909-13 according to Groman-28 (po 238).
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area.39 Third, the prices of grains were unfavorable relative to most
other agricultural crops and tended to become even Ie s s favorable during
NEP for reasons discussed below (Table T-34). 40
Prices and grain marketing. The prices of most major mar-
keted products - - flax, cotton, tobacco, hemp, butter, leather, eggs,
wool --were much higher relative to grain prices during NEP than in
1913, so that the expected market behavior of the peasant, ceteris pari-
bus, would be to curtail the production and marketing of grain relative
to the production and marketing of other higher priced agricultural
goods. This shift in relative prices against grain and in favor of other
crops helps explain the faster growth of areas sown to technical crop
relative to grain (which reached 1913 levels only in 1927). The area sown
to non-grain crops in 1928 had almost doubled over 1913 levels. 41 To the
extent that individual peasants increased their sowing of technical crops
at the expense of grain acreage, the peasants would either demand more
grain on the grain market (depressing net marketings) and produce lower
39See Timoshenko-32 (pp. 226-234) for a discussion of the sup-
ply of horses during NEP relative to 1913. The shortage of horses in
the Volga area (which supplied much of the grain to the domestic defi-
ciency regions) was particularly acute during NEP and explains the
reason why the sown area recovered so slowly. The decline in grain
shipments from the Volga had to be covered with grain from the former
export regions. See also Gosplan-29a, pp. 576-578.
40Gosplan-29a, p. 412. Jasny-49 (pp. 213-222) particularly
noted the effects of the unfavorable grain prices on the recovery of grain
output and of the favorable price of technical crop, etc., on the recovery
of these other products. It did not fail to escape the attention of Gosplan
either (Gosplan-29a, p. 232).
4lJohnson-60, p. 229.
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surpluses for market (depressing both net and gross marketing). 42
The high prices of non- grain crops and animal products (rela-
tive to 1913 and to grain crops) tended to depress grain marketing in
other ways besides retarding the recovery of grain acreage. First,
high prices of animal products relative to grain prices induced peasants
to use grain as feed for livestock and to market the animal products
rather than the grain. 43 Second, for any given set of agricultural pro-
ducts produced by the peasant, and which could be sold on the market
or consumed on the farm, a shift to higher relative prices for non- grain
products and lower relative prices for grain normally induced the peas-
ant to consume more grain and to sell more non- grain products, i. e. ,
b .. d f . d t . thO k t' 44to su stltute non-graIn pro ucts or graIn pro uc s In eIr mar e Ing.
Third, high or rising prices (absolutely and relative to grain) stimu-
lated the output and marketing of most non-grain agricultural products,
and the combination of high or rising prices with increased marketing
sharply increased the money income of the peasant (at least from these
sources) and offset the impact on money income of the lower prices for
. 45
graIn.
4:2This was the cas e in flax growing and cotton growing regions
in the U. S. S. R.
43See above, Pl? 347-348.
44Assuming that substitution effect outweighs any income effects.
45h_.;.JSeeTable T-34 and T-5l.
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Tax policy, manufactured goods prices and marketing. The
direct agricultural tax was either stable or falling (in total revenue)
during mo st of NEP and further increased net money income.
46
RELATION OF AGRICULTURAL TA?S!1'0 MONEY INCOME
OF PEASANTS
(million rubles)
1924/25 1925/26 1926/27 1927/28
Agricultural tax for year
July 1 to June 30 346 250 331 320
Money income of the
peasantry from sales
of produce and from
non-agricultural
earnings 3,300 4,300 4,700 5,200
Percentage of the money
income levied as agri-
cultur al tax 10.6 3.8 7.1 6.2
The peasants had accumulated a fair amount of monetary reserves by
1927, reducing the incentive to sell merely to accumulate money (as
part of their "portfolio" of assets: grain, money, cloth, gold, livestock,
house, land).48 Last, although there was continual discussion of the
!'goods famine" from the beginning of 1925, the volume of consumers'
goods was rapidly rising during the entire period.49 The prices of
46Reingold-3l, pp. 160-167.
47Reingold-3l, p. 167.
48Zalkind-27b, p. 3. In July 1927 the peasant population held
an estimated 400 million rubles of cash hoards (cited in Karcz-67a,
p. 419).
49SUYB-30, p. 171.
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manufactured goods in the private trade (which tended to be market
clearing prices) were stable or even tended to decline at times from
the spring of 1926 to the fall of 1928, but they were usually significantly
higher than goods sold in the state and cooperative retail stores. 50
The governmentl s official policy to reduce the prices of manufactured
consumers! goods was implemented largely by price controls on the
goods sold in the state and cooperative retail stores. These prices
were lower than private traders' prices and were generally not market
clearing prices so that there was excess demand for many (but not all)
goods at the se lower price's even though the volume of goods supplied
in general and by these price-controlled stores was increasing. The
government's price policy increased the real income of the peasant,
so that the peasants' real income was rising faster at times than his
net money income.
This combination of higher money income from non-grain agri-
cultural sales, lower taxes, and falling prices increased real income
(including a mild "Pigou effect" from accumulated money assets). If
the income-elasticity of demand for grain used in all forms is positive,
then the total on-farm demand for grain would increase as a result of
the increase in real income, and the combination of income and substi-
tution effects tended to reinforce each other to reduce grain market-
ings from any given grain harvest during NEP. 51 If these simple income
50ST, Vol. I, No. 11 (1926), p. 63 and ST, Volo I, No. 43 (1927),
p. 66. -
51The terms of trade of grain for manufactured products was far
inferior to 1913 terms of trade and the governments' grain price policy
for reasons discussed below - - did not permit the terms of trade .of
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and substitution effects are considered along with the lower per capita
output of grains and the greater demand for livestock feed during NEP,
grain marketing should have been substantially less. This multiple
cause explanation of the grain marketing problem - - as opposed to the
land redistribution argument -- is more satisfying from theoretical
viewpoint and more accurate and complete from the viewpoint of actual
developments in the economy during NEP. But more detailed data
would be required to settle this issue completely.
More important, our explanation suggests strongly that the
Soviet economic policy de-aling with agriculture was based on the wrong
assumptions as to the cause of the grain marketing problem and that the
policies of 1) lowering agricultural taxes, 2) reducing the price of manu-
factured goods for which excess demand existed in order to improve
the terms of trade of grain (and agricultural products in general), 3) re-
stricting the mobility of factors and the incentives of the more produc-
tive peasants for social and political reasons, and 4) permitting a sharp
increase in the relative and absolute prices of non-grain agricultural
prices -- all these policies probably aggravated the grain marketing
problem. This explanation suggests that an entirely different set of
agricultural and other economic policies - - higher direct taxes on the
peasant, reducing disposable income of urban population through taxes
and wage controls, charging peasants rent, supplying agricultural
technical aid, capital fertilizer and seeds to increase yields and reduce
grain for manufactured products to rise during most of NEP (after 1924)
(Table T-34).
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costs, permitting greater mobility of factors of production and reducing
the political, social and economic disincentives of becoming a success-
ful farmer, reducing the prices of non-grain agricultural products
through increased monopsony power in these markets or restriction of
demand, charging higher market-clearing prices for available manu-
factured conSUIner goods and increasing their supply - - all these poli-
cies might have succeeded in stimulating the marketing and production
and export of grain. To have simply raised grain procurement prices
without any other policy changes would - - and did - - simply result in
a worsening of the goods famine and increased inflationary pressures
because of its large effect on rural disposable income. 52 Furthermore,
this explanation also leads us to a better explanation of the grain mar-
keting crisis in the fall of 1927 than the conventional explanations of the
"goods famine," "terms of trade," and "kulak plot, " nom of which have
sound factual support.
The grain procurement crisis of 1927/28
The factors which depressed grain marketing during 1923/24 -
1926/27 "converged" in the summer and fall of 1927 and caused the
"grain procurement crisis" in the fourth quarter of 1927 and early 1928.
This forced the government to take "extraordinary measures" to insure
the flow of grain to the cities and grain deficit regions.
Procurements in July and. August proceeded better than
52According to STAT-28 (pp. 278-279), grain marketing equal-
led about one-third of total agricultural marketing during 1926/26 - 1921/
28; animal pro~ucts also equalled about one-third in value at current
prices.
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predicted, but procurement prices moved slightly higher. 53 Grain
procurements dropped slightly in September as procurement prices
were lowered" and dropped disastrously in November and December"
when again the procurement prices were reduced.
GRAINPROCUREMENTS BY PLANNED AGENCIES54
(millions of metric tons)
1925 1926 1927 1928
January -Mar ch I 1.2 2.4 2.6 4.3
April-June :11 0.7 1.3 1.1 0.9
July-September III 2.3 2.4 2.7 2.1
October -December IV 2.•3 4.7 2.4 3.7
The procurement of only 2.4 million m. t. in the fourth quarter of 1927
as compared to 4. 7 million m. t. in the fourth quarter of 1926 repre-
sented a catastrophe with respect to supplying the city, exports and re-
plenishing government stocks. The impact of the "extraordinary meas-
ures" in early 1928 is reflected in the jump in procurements in the
January-March quarter of 1928. Why did procurement drop off so
sharply in the fourth quarter of 1927?
First, the 1927 grain harvest was 60/0(4. 5 million metric tons)
less than in 1926 (Table T-8). Second" the purchasing power of grain
53SUA" Vol. VI, No. 15/16, p. 49;' SUA, Vol. VI, No. 17"
pp. 20 and 45; and SUA, Vol. VI" No. 18, p. 12.
54Table T-IO. The planned agencies' share in total marketing
of grain products increased from 69%in 1925/26 (AY) to 840/0in 1927/28
(AY) based on data from Table T -10. The share of planned agencie s was
sharply increased after the October-December quarter of 1925, when it
equalled 59% 'ofr'ail shipments, (see p. 268, n. 58.)
447
sold at procurement prices fell about 140/0from August to December 1927
due mostly to the reduction of grain procurement prices. The prices of
manufactured consumer goods sold in the private trade rose slowly
during this period but they were still lower than in the previous fall
(Table T-35). Prices in the state-cooperative retail network were being
reduced despite a shortage of goods. 55 Are the lower harvest, the re-
duction in the purchasing power of grain (substitution effect) and peas-
ants' price expectations the complete explanation for the sharp, unex-
pected decline in grain procurements in the fall of 1927? I think there
are additional factors which tended to further reduce peasant market-
ing -- in many ways the pro:curement crisis of 1927 was due to the same
policy errors and forces which caused the procurement problems in
1925. 56
Numerous factors tended to increase the peasants' on-farm
demand for grain in 1927/28 as compared to 1926/27j . which when
combined with the lower harvest, would naturally tend to reduce total
grain marketing below 1926/27 levels. In particular, the increase in
rural population required another 1/2 million tons just to maintain
average per 'CClpi1aconsumption, 57 livestock herds had grown consider-
ably during 1926/27 (Table T-49) and third, the price of animal products
(relative to grain products) had continued to improve during 1927,
55Sugar, kerosene, salt and other commodities were in good
supply but cloth and leather products were in excess demand (Mikoian-
27a, pp. 1-2).
56See Chapter VIII, pp. 267-295.
57See above, 433.
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increasing the incentive to feed livestock more intensively during
1927.58
Income and substitution effects also tended to depress the
peasants' willingness to market grain in the fall of 1927. The peas-
ants at the start of the season held larger quantities of money than in
the previous year. 59 As a result of favorable prices for and greater
output of non-grain agricultural products, the marketing of technical
crops, animal products and oil increased considerably in value in
1927/28. Furthermore, larger quantities of grain were sold at higher
prices in the July-September 'quarter of 1927. 60 As a consequence,
rural incomes in June-November 1927were 20%above the correspond-
ing period in 1926 (primarily because of higher sales of animal products
and technical crops). 61 Net money income was even higher because
direct agricultural taxes had been reduced compared to 1926/27 (AY). 62
Prices of manufactured consumer goods were more or less stable and
the volume of goods sent to the countryside was deliberately increased
(even at the expense of urban consumption) and steps were taken to
58As a consequence, the total use of grain for feed for all of
1927/28 was estimated at only 1/2 million m. t. less than 1926/27
despite the 4-1/2 million decline in the gros s crop - - and the peasant
probably would have fed more grain to his livestock if large quantities
had not been confiscated.
59Mikoian-27a, pp. 1-2.
60ST, Vol. III, No. 45/46, pp. 68-69, Table T-34 and T-lO.
61ST, Vol. III, No. 45/46, pp. 68-69.
62Reingold-3l, p. 167.
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increase the output of textiles and other manufactured consumer goods
through triple- shifts in the cotton-textile industry and increasing
imports of cottonJ wool fiber and tea). 63 The real income of the peas-
ants was further increased in the fall of 1927 because the prices of man-
ufactured consumer goods were being reduced in the state-cooperative
retail store network as part of the official price policy to reduce the
price level and to improve the terms of trade of agriculture - - so that
the retail value of all industrial goods was to be lower in 1927/28 than
in 1926/27 despite the fact that the volume of output was much larger. 64
This official price policy not only aggravated the" goods famine" and
resulted in higher "market-clearing price" in the private tradeJ it also
increased real income and hence the on-farm demand for grain in all-
forms, (which was a superior goodJ especially at these lower income
levels).
Higher prices for non-grain agricultural products also increased
the peasants' demand for grain because of the substitution effect. The
opportunity cost to the peasant of consuming grain relative to the oppor-
tunity cost of consuming other agricultural products fell considerably
in the fourth quarter of 1927 because of lower grain procurement prices
and slightly higher prices for non-grain agricultural products (Table
T-34). The combination of these two effects should raise per capita
63Mikoian-27aJ p. 2. Output for consumer goods show substan-
tial increases in output in 1927/28 over 1926/27: cotton fabric (+9%L
rubber footwear (+23%):Jboots and shoes (+8%)J vodka (40%), matches
(32%), cigarettes "(22%)Jwoolen fabric (14%)J salt (9%) (Nutter-62J
p. 420 ff.).
64Mikoian-27aJ pp. 1-2 and Table T-33.
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grain consumption, ceteris paribus. In fact, despite the poorer har-
vest in 1927, per capita grain consumption for foodstuffs in rural
grain surplus provinces rose 4% in October, 1927 compared to October
1926, which implied an additional 1/2 to 1million m. t. consumed
directly by the peasants. 65
Thus, when all these factors are considered, a sizable drop
in grain marketing in 1927/28 compared to 1926/27 was to be expected
even though the parity price (terms of trade) of grain with respect to
manufactured goods actually was slightly higher in the fall of 1927 than
in the previous year (Table T-'35). That gross grain marketing de-
clined only slightly (0.18 million m. t.) in 1927/28 was the result of
the "extraordinary measures" taken in the spring of 1928 -- although
more positive measures such as increased tax collection, additional
66consumer goods, etc., were also taken. The sudden drop in procure-
ments in the October-December quarter as compared to previous years
(and the previous quarter) was basically the result of 1) lower prices of
grain (lowered absolutely) relative to prices of non-grain agricultural
products so that the peasant changed his marketing pattern away from
grain, 2) price expectations of a seasonal rise in grain price, 3) a
high net monetary income early in the procurement season, and 4) pos-
sib1y, an increase in the excess demand for goods in the late fall of
65Timoshenko-32, p. 402. Per capita grain consumption in
October 1927was roughly at p're-1914 levels in grain surplus regions.
66Karcz-67a, p. 408; Mikoian-27a, p. 2; ST, Vol. III,
No. 45/46, pp. 14-15 and Timoshenko-32, pp. 451-455.
451
1927 which resulted from the rapid increase in net money income rela-
ti ve to the increased supply of manufactured goods early in the season.
The government, by and large, repeated the error made in the fall of
1925, except that then both grain prices and consumer goods prices
were bid rapidly upward.
Net grain marketing, rural demand and exports. The "net
marketed grain supply" available for urban areas and exports fell much
more than the" gross marketed supply" in 1927/28 (2 million m. t. de-
cline) largely because of the increased rural demand for marketed
grain.67 The rural demand for marketed grain increased in 1927/28
for several reasons including poorer grain crops (which made more
peasant households deficit in grain), larger acreages devoted to non-
grain crops (especially in cotton-growing and sugar beet regions),
larger population in grain deficiency regions, increased demands for
livestock feed, lower taxes,- and possibly the income and substitution
effects (although grain purchasers faced a much ~igher price for grain
than did grain sellers). Thus, the difference between net and gross
grain marketing rose from about 6 million m. t. in 1926/27 to 7. 7 mil-
lion m. t. in 1927/28 and accounted for 850/0of the decline in the net
k. f . 68mar etlng 0 grain.
Net grain marketing, according to Karcz, rose from 9.4 mil-
lion m. t. in 1925/26 to 10.3 million m. t. in 1926/27 and then fell to
67Karcz-67, p. 408.
68Karcz-67, p. 408.
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8. 3 million m. t. in 1927/28 despite the If extraordinary measures"
taken in the spring of 1928.69 During NEP the domestic demand for
makreted grain also increased because of the growing urban popu1a-
tion, the growing livestock herds owned by the urban population and
for technical purposes (production of vodka).
From 1925/26 to 1926/27 net grain marketing rose about 0.9
million m. t. (from an increase in the harvest of 4.4 million m. t. ),
but grain product exports rose only 0.2 million m. t. 70 In 1926/27
grain product exports of 2. 3 million m. t. were a small fraction
(2.9%) of the 1926harvest and 'also of net marketing in 1926/27 (22%)
-- but made up a large fraction of exports (27%). Thus, when net
grain marketing dropped roughly two million tons (-190/0of net market-
ing of 1926/27) and urban and industrial demand continued to grow,
the surplus for grain exports was wiped out completely. This slight
dip in the 1927harvest combined with other factors to cause a more
significant dip in net grain marketing, which in turn led to a collapse
of grain exports and to a grave balance of payments crisis in 1927/28.
Relative prices, the grain problem and foreign trade
The price of grain relative to other prices also affected, to
a certain extent, the recovery of both grain output and grain market-
ing.
69Ibid• Karcz noted that an alternative figure of 9. 8 million is
given by Gosplan for 1926/27.
70Karcz-67a, p. 408 and Table T -11.
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Two hypotheses. Two major hypotheses have been offered to
explain the relationship between low grain prices relative to other
prices and unsatisfactory development of grain marketing. The first
(and conventional) hypothesis stated that low grain prices relative to
the price of manufactured goods purchased by the grain producer {~
pared to pre-19l4 price relatives} reduced the incentive of the peasant
to produce and market grain and therefore the low prices of grain re-
lative to manufactured goods was the major factor in retarding the
. f . d. d k t. 71expanslon 0 graln pro uchon an mar e lng.
The second hypothesis' is that the low price of grain relative
to technical crops and animal products induced the peasants to expand
the output and marketing --and exports -- of these products at the
expense of grain and grain exports. 72 If this second hypothesis more
accurately describes the cause of the grain output and grain market-
ing problem, then the policy to stimulate the output and marketing of
grain differs radically from the policy required if the grain problem
is caused by low grain prices relative to manufactured consumer
goods. Did the "scissor crisis't of 1923 influence excessively the
judgment of the policy-maker s and focus their attention too much on
7lThis hypothesis was widely held by influential party members
in the mid-1920ts, including Bukharin and Rykov and members of the
Commissariat of Trade {see Zalkind-27a, Mikoyan-27a, Kaufman (vari-
ous years)). Many Western observers have accepted this hypothesis
(Jasny-49, pp. 206-214). Jasny was in favor of price control on grain
as a temporary anti-inflationary measure during World War I (Jasny-
49, pp. 210-211).
72Zalkind-27a (p. 3) and Zalkind-27b (p. 2) increasingly empha-
sized this second hypothesis. High prices for animal products might
induce continuing expansion of grain output but not grain marketing.
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the wrong set of relative prices during most of the NEP?
Although I wonrt argue that low prices of grain relative to man-
ufactured goods had ~ effect at all on the production and marketing of
grain in mid-NEP, I think that excessive emphasis has been placed on
this factor while other important factors have been under-emphasized.
In particular, I think that the price relationships between various com-
peting agricultural products during NEP have been ignored.
An equally plausible hypothesis can be made that the low price
of grain relative to other crops and livestock products shifted resources
from grain to these higher priced products and shifted on-farm demand
from non-grain products to grain, and thus induced peasants to market
less grain and more of the other higher priced products. A strong
argument for this hypothesis is that the rate of return to agriculture
(and even to grain farming) was sufficient to induce the peasant to ex-
pand total sown area, to increase his capital investment in workstock,
and to increase marketing, even though the prices of agricultural goods
relative to manufactured goods was less favorable than in 1913. Of
course, I am talking about the price relationships that existed from
mid-1924 to mid-1928. The extremely low relative price of grain
(and agricultural products in general) in the fall of 1923 and from late
1928onward are sufficiently different to be a separate case.73
73In the fall of 1923wholesale grain prices were roughly sixty
per cent of 1913levels, while the retail prices for manufactured goods
were as much as or more than 2400/0of 1913levels. Similarly, the low
procurement prices of grain relative to market-clearing prices of
manufactured consumer goods in the winter of 1928/29 was substan-
tially less favorable than in the best years of NEP.
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Relative prices 1924-1928. What was the behavior of relative
prices in agriculture during 1924-1928 and what factors influenced
them? Why did the producersl prices of some commodities -- espe-
cially grain -- increase much less above 1913levels than did the pro-
ducer s I prices of other commodities such as flax, cotton, animal
products and sugar beets?
Four factors influenced relative prices in agriculture at one
time or another during NEP: a concern for overall price stability in
the economy, a need to stimulate production and marketing of agricul-
tural commodities for industry and export, an expectation that exports
be commercially profitable in the long run, and, last, the elasticity
of procurements, marketing, and output to changes in relative prices.
The prices of all agricultural products (sold either in the
wholesale trade or to procurement agencies) relative to privately sold
manufactured goods never reached their pre-19l4 parity even in the
"golden era of agricultural prices" in the spring of 1925, when grain
procurement prices soared briefly above 1913parity levels {Table T-
35}. Between October 1924 and March 1929, the level of agricultural
procurement prices relative to privately-traded manufactured goods
fluctuated between 45%and 780/0of 1913parity levels; (the low of 45%
and the high of 780/0came in October 1924 and April 1925). After June
1925, it fluctuated between a relatively narrow range of 50 to 70%of
parity (Table T-36). Despite these low parity prices, aggregate
agricultural output recovered to 1913levels fairly satisfactorily, espe-
cially if we consider the adver se effects of the reduced number of
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horses, legal restrictions, and subdivision of estates. 74 Most stu-
dents of Soviet agriculture believed that by 1927/28, additional in-
creases in agricultural output would not be due to the expansion of
land and labor inputs, but rather to added inputs of capital, fertilizer,
new technology and rationalization of agricultural operations. 75 That
is, the next step in expanding output was highly dependent on govern-
ment policy.
Although low agricultural prices did not prevent the recovery
of sown area and agricultural output to 1913levels these low relative
prices may have contributed to the decline in the tovarnostl (market-
ing coefficient) of agricultural output. Why were the prices of agri-
cultural goods relative to the retail prices of manufactured consumer
goods "held" at fairly low levels during NEP compared to 1913? Was
it a conscious ,effort to shift resources from agriculture to industry
as part of Soviet policy for industrialization, or can we ascribe this
behavior to other causes and policies?
Price - stability and export-profitability were, I think, the two
major constraints on the increase in the overall price level of agri-
cultural goods. Relative prices of various agricultural goods were
also influenced by a concern for price-stability and export-profitabil-
ity (especially during mid-NEP), but the elasticity of supply (marketing)
74Per capita agricultural output was not quite reached by 1927/
28 -- population in 1927/28 was 7.6% larger than the population in 1913.
(Jasny-49, p. 217)
75Jasny-49, pp. 198, 204, 217. The retardation in the growth
of agriculture in 1927/28 came from lower yi.elds and the unavailability
of additional easily cultivated land.
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and the requirements of industry and foreign trade exercised an increas-
ing force on price formation in agriculture.
Export-profitability, import- substitution and relative price s in
agriculture. Even in 1924/25 (EY) when the 1924 grain crop was poor,
the average procurement price level of grain was below the price level
of most other agricultural goods. To some extent, this change in rela-
tive agricultural prices reflected the change in the world market prices
for these agricultural commodities. Prices of most major grains in the
major Soviet export markets in .~924/25 were relatively lower than the
world prices of flax, butter, and eggs, so that from the viewpoint of ex-
port operations (a major use of these products), the procurement
prices of these latter products could rise (or be bid up) more than grain
prices while still maintaining profitable export operations. 76 The
prices of cotton,' leather, and wool -- all major import items -- were
relatively independent of foreign prices because of the foreign trade
monopoly. Thus, higher prices were offered, from early in NEP, as
a method of inducing the peasants to expand output and marketing of
these raw materials which were in such short supply relative to demand
and to pre-19l4 supply. (The scarcity of foreign exchange had forced a
sharp reduction of most Soviet imports of these products during NEP
relative to 1914(Table T-6). 77 Thus, export prices and tmport-sub-
stitution were two important factors influencing the absolute and
76See Chapter VIII and Table s T-43 through T -46.
77In addition, inexpensive grain was sold to peasants in cotton-
growing regions (Jasny-49, p. 211). Quantity of imports in Table T-6
not adjusted for territorial losses.
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relative prices of various agricultural goods in 1924 and 1925.78
Evidence of the impact of foreign market prices on Soviet procurement
prices came in 1925/26 when foreign market prices fell. Soviet pro-
curement agencies deliberately lowered prices in order to maintain
export profitability; grain, flax, butter, and egg prices were all cut
substantially.79 Export operations for grains were still unprofitable
and further price reductions were made in the spring of 1926; an ex-
plicit goal of the 1926/27 grain procurement campaign was to restore
and maintain the profitability of grain exports. 80
The price cut in oil seed, butter, eggs and flax caused an
immediate sharp decline in the state procurement of these products
and, in the case of flax and oil seed, a reduction in sowing. The peas-
ants either sold eggs and butter to private traders -- because the
govermnent could not establish sufficient monopsony power in the
81purchase of these goods - - or willingly consumed or used these pro-
ducts on the farm because of the peasants. high price-elasticity of on-
82farm demand or output of such products. Exports fell sharply and
78See p. 246 for Preobrazhenskii' s view about the relevance
of world prices as a guide to imports versus domestic production deci.~'
sions, when there is an 'Hnsuffciency of foreign exchange. "
79See above, pp. 297 ff.
80See above, pp. 338 ff.
BlSee Preobrazhensky-26 (p. 175) for discus sion of state
monopsony and monopoly power in the mid 1920's for various products.
82The reasons for this high price-elasticity is discussed below
on pp. 492.
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contributed to the export crisis in 1925/26. The high price-elasticity
of marketing to state agencies convinced the state trading authorities
that the maintenance or expansion of output, marketing and exports
of these products was more important than commercial profitability
in the short-run, so the price was raised back to (and beyond in cer-
tain cases) the previous levels. By and large, marketing and output
responded well and exports were forced, i.e., sold at a commercial
loss or for prices below domestic market prices. Export goals were
an important factor in raising tl:e procurement price of these goods.
Price of grain. Why didn1t the government raise the price of
grain as well in order to stimulate output and marketing, and to re-
store grain exports to pre -1914 levels? One important reason why
grain prices did not rise much after the winter of 1925/26 was that
the government increased its monopsony power in the grain market
by restricting competition of private traders and also among state
procurement agencies. The government fixed maximum prices at
which grain could be bought by a planned agency and then they bought
the grain offered to it more or les s voluntarily (principle of "samotek"
or "spontaneous" marketing at state prices) up until the spring of
1928. As we noted in Chapters VII and VIII, there were many pres-
sures on the government to hold down grain prices including general
price stability, its large impact on aggregate demand in the country-
side and on the cost-of-living of workers and poor peasant export
profitability, insufficient knowledge about the price - elasticity of both
grain marketing and grain output, and the problem of allocation of
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of resources between agriculture and industry, and savings and con-
sumption.
The primary constraint on raising grain prices was the goal
of price stability for the entire economy. As Naum Jasny and others
pointed out, the entire price level in the Soviet economy would be
affected by the price of grain because of its importance in the workers'
83and peasants' budgets. Higher living costs were likely to be quickly
reflected by higher money wages and higher costs, which, in turn,
resulted in higher wholesale prices, and higher retail prices in the
state and cooperative trading network and possibly in private trade. 84
Further price increase of manufactured goods would be pyramided
into higher labor costs because of the wage-setting mechanism. 85
Higher grain prices would have to be offset either by higher
cotton, flax, and sugar beet prices or be absorbed by the state, be-
cause the sowing of these crops (and especially cotton) were sensitive
h . f .. t h .. 86Th t ....to t e ratio 0 grain prices 0 t eir prlces. a is, raislng grain
prices relative to non-grain agricultural products might have reduced
83Jasny-49, p. 210 and, above, pp. 236-237.
84Baykov-47, p. 58. The retail prices in state and coopera-
tive stores were more or les's cost-determined rather than market-
clearing prices. (Mark-ups of some goods became increasingly con-
trolled in the private trade in late-NEP~) What happens to private
trade prices in the free markets is a more complex problem.
85At issue here is the distribution of consumption between the
workers and the peasants. Here the government's political needs and
social bias was an important element in the cost-push mechanism
(Baykov-47, p. 58).
86See above, p. 300 Jasny-49, p. 211.
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the output and marketing of these other products, so that the export-
able surplus would be reduced (or imports increased). An increase
in the price of grain, ceteris paribus, might stimulate grain market-
ing and grain exports, but because of limited resources and income-
elasticity of demand, higher grain prices might merely shift factor
inputs from other products to grain, shift marketing from other agri-
cultur al products to grain and induce the peasants to consume more
of both (income effect), and increase grain export at the cost of other
exported agricultural products and additional imports of raw materials.
The two basic issues, therefore, concerned 1) the price and income
elasticity of agricultural production and marketing in general rather
than for a specific product, and 2) the optimal combination of relative
agricultural prices to achieve their economic goals. As area sown
approached pre-19l4 levels the price elasticity of output in Soviet agri-
culture as a whole probably became fairly price inelastic because of
the limitation of resources (in the short run). 87 Total marketing of
agricultural products may have been somewhat price-elastic even
though output was not. But raising grain prices alone caused the
problems in the output, marketing, and export of non- grain products
mentioned above. But if the price of the non-grain crops were raised
along with grain prices so as to maintain the relative price advantage
of technical crops, then the costs of the raw materials for industry
would rise, thereby leading to cost-push price increases in the state
87Baykov-47, p. 62.
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and cooperative trade network.88 Furthermore, price increase in
major export agricultural commodities would make the export of
these products commercially unprofitable.
Third, an increase in the price of grain would further increase
the money income of the peasant (to the extent he increased total mar-
keting rather than reducing marketing and output of non-grain agricul-
tural goods). Increased money incomes would either push up the retail
prices of manufactured goods if additional goods were not made avail-
able or require that the supply <>.fthese goods to the urban areas be
curtailed. This latter action was difficult to implement from a polit-
ical viewpoint. Increasing the total supply of manufactured goods
depended almost entirely on the supply of raw materials. The impor-
tant question is, of course, whether or not an increase in the price of
grain would induce increases in marketing to permit sufficient addi-
tional exports to finance an increase in the imports of raw materials
or manufactured goods adequate to meet the additional demand for
these goods generated by higher grain prices. As pointed out in
Chapter II, there were good theoretical reasons for suspecting that
increasing the supply of manufactured consumer goods by increasing
grain exports on the basis of higher procurement prices might actually
have increased the excess demand for manufactured consumer goods. 89
88Baykov-47, p. 62.
89See pp. 64-74.
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The" goods famine" reexamined
If the" goods famine" (a euphemism for repressed inflation)
was actually an important factor in retarding the recovery of grain
marketing (from 1925 to the spring of 1928) then the official policy of
the forced lowering of retail prices in the state and cooperative trade
networks was ineffectual at best in the presence of excess demand
for these goods (for reasons discussed in Chapter II) 0 90 It was infla-
tionary at worst because it increased the real income (and hence
demand) of those peasants buying goods at the below market clearing
prices. It failed to ration out some buyers, who would otherwise be
unwilling to buy at market-clearing prices, while it simultaneously
rationed out (because of its arbitrary basis) some buyers willing also
to pay higher prices and forced their additional demand onto the pri-
vate traders.9l The policy with respect to industrial price reveals
a basic lack of under standing of the price system even among the
Right. 92
Similarly, we saw that increasing grain prices was not a
satisfactory policy for inducing additional marketing. Yet these were
the two major policies.pushed hy the government to stimulate the out-
put and marketing of grain, and they both were based on the assump-
tion that the major cause of grain marketing probems was an
90
See pp. 84.
91Reducing wholesale prices to all retailers increased the
profit margins of the private trader (Baykov-47, pp. 65-66).
9
2
See p. 289 -291 for Presbrazhenskii' s insightful criticism
of this policy.
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unfavorable price of grain relative to the market clearing price of
manufactured goods.
Increasing the output of consumer s goods enough to overcome
the goods in excess demand was difficult because of the scarcity of raw
materials, the import of which was essentially limited by the level of
exports.
There were several other policies available which would have
overcome the" goods famine" including increased direct taxe sand
"state rent" on agricultural producers, a redistribution of real income
from the workers to the peasants, and inducing the peasant to save
more of his income in savings accounts. Let us consider the actual
policies pursued during the NEP.
As could be seen above, the policy of agricultural taxation
during 1924-1928 was directly opposite to the desirable policy to
maximize grain (and agricultural) marketings. 93 Total direct taxes
on peasants were either constant or falling during this period or rising
peasant incomes, even though the rate of taxation on higher incomes
was increased. Soviet social and political goals worked at odds with
economic policy. 94 The more sophisticated economists in the Com-
missariat of Trade were well aware of the excess demand for indus-
trial goods in the countryside and even made projections of the value
of the excess demand.95 But they had no control over tax policy.
93See above p. 42.
94Reingold-32, pp. 160-167.
95See Zalkind-27 references.
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Social, political and economic goals also limited the extent
to which urban consumption of manufactured goods (as well as major
export goods) could be constrained in favor of increased supply for
rural areas and for exports. Reducing the real wage of the workers,
however, was politically difficult because of the Party. s reliance on
the workers for a political power base and the wage-setting mechan-
ism quickly passed on higher living costs. During 1925-28 the aggre-
gate demand for manufactured consumer goods, as well as for major
export products, was increasing rapidly in urban areas due to infla-
tionary wage increases (greater than productivity increases) and
rapid expansion of the labor forces employed in light and heavy in-
dustry and construction. (The inflationary impact of producing in-
vestment goods and construction activity was recognized and perhaps
overemphasized by some contemporary Soviet economists.) Some
steps were taken in 1927 to divert supplies destined for the cities to
grain surplus areas, but it did not represent a fundamental, perman-
ent change in policy of preserving the workers! living standard. Again,
social and political and ideological goals seemed to thwart implemen-
tation of the correct economic policy.
Inducing the peasant to save more money was a most diffi-
cult job in the Soviet peasant economy because of his distrust of
paper money. The peasant, remembering recent price behavior,
preferred to hold his "portfolio of assets" in grain, commodities,
cattle, gold or coin, agricultural implements perhaps, and possibly
some money. Thus, the money rate of interest might have little
effect on the rate of saving from money income - - and in fact, the
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peasant was likely at best to deposit his currency, which he would
hold anyway, even at zero interest, in a savings bank, and thereby
augment hi s money income further. One wonder s to what extent both
the rate of saving and the "peasants' portfolio" (particularly grain re-
serves) would exhibit any interest-elasticity. Most observers agree
that the response of peasant saving to interest-earning assets was in-
1 . 96e astlco
Thus, of four possible policies for overcoming the goods
famine - - large increase in output, stimulating monetary saving,
raising taxes, and transfer of goods from town to country -- the first
was not possible because of raw material shortages, the second was
ineffectual because of the peasants I inelastic response to inducements
to save (money), and, the last two could not or were not applied on
an adequate scale because of social, ideological and political impli-
cations.
The two policies which were seriously debated and applied to
a limited degree -- lower retail prices and increased grain prices --
were incorrect and probably did not improve the market situation and
might well have wor sened it. The whole conduct of economic policy
during 1924-1928 revealed a lack of understanding of the functions
and working of a price system (as well as an under standable inability
to deal with the macro-economic aspects of the price policies). Their
ideological and political baggage not only hindered adoption of a "proper
tax and wage policy," -- it hindered the rational analysis of the prob-
lems by most Party leaders.
96Firth-64, passim.
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Thus the grain export problem was not a problem to be solved
in a short time. The planners also concluded -- correctly or incor-
rectly - - that the grain export problem could not be solved within the
NEP forms of agricultural org.anization. The draft of the foreign trade
plan for the first FYP gave up hope of any significant grain exports in
1928/29 and 1929/30, suggested that modest grain exports might be
possible in 1930/31 and based their optimistic conclusion about grain
exports in 1931/32 and 1932/33 on the surpluses which would be pro-
duced by the new mechanized state and collective farms. 97 Despite
the large investments planned for agriculture, grain exports were
still expected to reach less than 50%of 1909-13 levels.98
Thus, in the face of the grain export problem, the Soviet
Union was forced to develop other export resources as well as to
develop domestic sources of imported products, which could not be
purchased abroad in sufficient quantities because of foreign exchange
shortage. In some sense, the grain problem forced the Soviet Union
to industrialized.
97See below, p. 522.
980riginal projections were for 5 million tons, later projec-
tions were for 8 million tons. See p. 526.
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IAddendwn to Chapter XI
The" conventional knowledge" of the grain marketing problem
based on Nemichinov1s table cited by Stalin (Dobb-48, p. 217), has
been challenged in a provocative article by Jerzy Karcz (Karcz-67).
He argued that the fanloUStable cited by Stalin compared Tross grain
marketing in 1913by various grain producers and net 1926 27 market-
ing by various groups of peasants. In essence, gross marketing in-
cludes marketed grain which is subsequently repurchased by other
peasants. This comparison exaggerates greatly the deficiency in
grain marketing during NEP and Karcz cited figures which showed
that the volwne of gross marketing during 1926/27 - 1927/28 came to
96.7% of the 1909-1913average (Karcz-67, p. 409). His figures implied
gross marketing of 16.7 million tons, but unfortunately his sources for
this figure are not clear. In fact, other data suggests strongly that
Karcz1s figure for gross marketing of grain products during 1909-13 of
16.7 million m. t. (preswnably for Soviet territory alone) is too low
and that the gross marketings of grain products were closer to 20-24
million m. t. than to 16. 7 million m. t.
The first important clue that Karcz's estimate of gros s market-
ing of grain products is too low is that the Soviet territory in 1909-13
exported about 12.5 million m. t. (including 11.9 million metric tons
abroad and net exports to the separated territories of at most 1. 2 > ••
ffiillionlm. t. so that net exports of grain during 1909-13 from the Soviet
territory 'Wereabout 11.3 million m. t. (based on Groman-28a). This
implies that only about 5.5 million m. t. were available for the supply
of urban areas, for the supply of grain deficit areas, and for resale to
grain-deficit peasants. This amount seems inadequate for these needs.
Urban demand during 1909-13 averaged about 4.9 million tons alone,
assuming an average of 23. 5 million urban dwellers during 1909-13
(Karcz-67, p. 409) and a per capita consumption of grain of urban
dweller s of about 220 kilograms of grain products in terms of unmilled
grain. This latter figure is based on an annual average per capita
urban conswnption of grain products (flour) of 175kilograms during
1924/25 - 1926/27 cited by Timoshenko-32, p. 403 from A. Lositsky,
"Dynamics of Grain Conswnption" (in Russian) Statisticheskoe Obozrenie,
No. 12, 1927; this figure was adjusted upward by coefficients cited in
Groman-28a (p. 223) to convert flour, etc., into full grain equivalents.
Urban per capita grain consumption during the mid-19201s did not seem
to be significantly higher (if at all) as compared to the 1909-13period
(Timoshenko-32, p. 402). Demand for marketed grain by the rural
population is the basic difference between gross and net marketing ac-
cording to Karcz-67, p. 403. According to Karcz-67 (p. 408), the dif-
ference between gross and net marketing during 1925/26 - 1927/28 was
between 6.0 and 7. 7 million m. t. There is little reason to think that
rural demand for marketed grain was substantially less during 1909-13.
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Therefore, gross marketed grain during 1909-13must have
been on the order of 21-24 million m. t. (11.9 for net exports, 4.9
for urban areas, and 5 - 8 for rural demand by grain-deficient peas-
ants). If these rough estimates are at all accurate, then Karcz1s
figure, that gross grain marketing during 1909-13was roughly 17mil-
lion m. t., is too low by 4 - 7 million m. t., and his provocative con-
clusion that gross grain marketings had almost entirely recovered
during 1926/27 - 1927/28 is incorrect. According to these figures,
gross grain marketing recovered, in 1926/27 - 1927/28, to approxi-
mately 67-76% of average 1909-13 levels. On the other hand, Karcz1s
conclusion that grain marketings had recovered more than the 50%
figure implied by the Stalin-N emchinov data is still valid.
Other evidence supports my conclusion about the recovery of
gross grain marketing in 1926/27. Karcz-67 (p. 406) argued that the
Stalin-Nemchinov figure for gross marketing for 1913(21.3 million
m. t.) must have been relatively high compared to the 1909-13 average
gros s marketings because the 1913crop was much bigger than the
average crop during 1909-13. Data in Timoshenko-32 (p. 524) indicate.
that the average crop (wheat, rye, barley, oats) during 1909-12was in
fact about 180/0 lower than in 1913. The gross marketing figure cited
by Karcz for 1909-13 (16.7 million m. t.) was about 210/0lower than the
Stalin-Nemchinov figure for 1913(Karcz-67, pp. 408-409).
But there are several reasons for thinking that gros s market-
ings for the calendar year 1913are more or less representative of
average marketing during 1909-13. First, grain marketing, according
to some observers (e. g. Jasny-49, p. 193)was fairly insensitive to
the size of the harvest in the short run because of institutional factors
(stockpiling, forced sales, slow transportation). Second, the impact
of the harvest, which comes in the latter part of a calendar year, has
much less impact on total marketing during a calendar year than on
the agricultural year running from July 1 to June 30. Marketings
during the first half of 1913were strongly influenced by the lesser
1912harvest. Third, according to Timoshenko-32 (p. 419) shipments
of bread grains (wheat and rye) in 1913were just about average for
1909-13. All this suggests that Stalin-Nemchinov's figure for gross
marketing in 1913was not significantly unrepresentative of annual
average marketing during 1909-13. Thus, these data suggest, that,
contrary to Karcz1s provocative hypothesis, there was a significant
problem in restoring gross marketing to 1909-13 levels during late -
NEP. Further support for the existence of a grain marketing problem
was that data on rail and water shipments of grain also indicated that
grain marketing (especially in traditional grain surplus regions) had
not recovered in volume to 1909-13 levels. Timoshenko-32, a strong
proponent of this latter viewpoint, cited considerable evidence in sup-
port of the "grain marketing problem" hypothesis, especially with
respect to the marketing and supply of bread grains (Timoshenko-32,
pp. 414-418, and pp. 419-432).
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CHAPTER XII
THE RECOVERY OF SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE DURING THE NEP
AND THE PROBLEM OF RAPID INDUSTRIALIZATION
SUMMARYAND CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this chapter is 1) to summarize the major trends
and factors affecting the recovery of foreign trade during the NEP, 2) to
describe the major changes in Soviet foreign trade policy which occurred
during the NEP and the forces which c,aused these changes, and 3) to re-
view the relationship between the recovery of various sectors of the
economy and foreign trade during the NEP and to examine within this
context the problems which would be caused inthe foreign trade sector
by the acceleration of industrial growth and investment planned by the
Soviet leader ship after the mid -1920IS.
Failure of Soviet foreign trade to
recover during NEP
The most outstanding feature of Soviet foreign trade during the
NEP was its relatively slow recovery toward pre -1914 levels compared
to the rest of the economy. Estimating the recovery of the volume of
Soviet foreign trade as compared to 1913is complicated by the uncertain
impact on import demand and export capacity caused by the loss of ter-
ritory from the Russian Empire in the formation of the USSR.1 As we
argued in Chapter III, the Soviet adjustments overstated the los s of
1See above, pp. 157 ff.
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export capacity and the reduction of import demand because of their
failure to take interregional trade into account. Thus" the recovery of
foreign trade during the NEP relative to the needs and resources of the
territory of the Soviet Union would be over stated by the index based on
Soviet estimates of 1913foreign trade from the Soviet territory of Russia
and the recovery of Soviet foreign trade during NEP would probably be
understated if no adjustment were made at all for the loss of territory.
Regardles s of which basis is used for estimating the recovery of foreign
trade during NEP, the recovery of Soviet foreign:\trade and especially
exports lagged far behind the recovery of the rest of the Soviet economy
on Soviet territory.
USSR: RECOVERY OF FOREIGN TRlADE
AND DOMESTIC PRODUCTION2
(1913 prices, 1913 = 100)
Foreign trade Gr 0 s s output
Adjusted for los s Unadjusted for Soviet territory
l:,ofterritory los s of territory (Soviet data)
Export Import Export Import -Industry Agriculture
1913 100 100 100 100 100 100
22/23 10 15 9 11 40 75
23/24 28 28 24 21 48 81
24/25 26 52 22 39 67 85
25/26 34 66 29 48 90 103
26/27 40 66 34 52 104 102
27/28 41 84 35 66 117 104
Exports. After an initial spurt from virtually zero exports in
1920 to about 24-28% of 1913 levels, the recovery of exports (in volume)
2Foreign trade data from Table XII. 1. Gros s output data from
SUYB-30, pp. 92-94. Agricultural index excluded output of forestry,
fishing and hunting.
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TABLE XII. 1
USSR: THE RECOVER Y OF SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE
1913, 1922/23 - 1927/28
1913 = 100
A. Foreign Trade on Soviet Ter ritorya
Exports Imports
Current 1913 1927/28 Current 1913 1927/28
prices prices prices prices prices prices
1913 100 100 100 100 100 100
1922/23 16 10 14 14 15 14
1923/24 41 28 29 44 28 28
1924/25 43 26 - 25 72 52 51
1925/26 52 34 34 75 66 64
1926/27 60 40 38 70 66 68
1927/28 60 41 37 94 84 81
B. Soviet Foreign Trade Compared to Foreign Trade
of Russian Empire in 1913
Exports Imports
Current 1913 1927/28 Current 1913 1927/28
prices prices prices prices prices prices
1913 Russ. Emp. 100 100 100 100 100 100
1922/23 Sov. Ter. 14 9 12 14 11 10
1923/24 Sov. Ter. 35 24 25 32 21 20
1924/25 Sov. Ter. 37 22 22 53 39 37
1925/26 Sov. Ter. 45 29 29 55 48 47
1926/27 Sov. Ter. 52 34 33 52 52 50
1927/28 Sov. Ter. 52 35 32 69 66 60
aBased on Soviet estimates of 1913 trade by separated territories with
foreign countries only and probably understates totalforeign trade of
Soviet territory (including trade with separated territories).
Source: Notes to Table XI!.1, Appendix B, p. 770.
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proceeded very slowly (about 6.5-8.0%jper year) durin.g 1923/24-1927/28
and failed to grow at all in 1927/28. By 1927/28 the volume of exports
had recovered to about one-thi-rd of Russian foreign trade in 1913 and
to about 37-41% of foreign trade in 1913 using Soviet estimates of ex-
ports on Soviet territory in 1913 (Table XII. 1). In contrast, the gros s
agricultur al output - the main bas is of pre -1914 exports - had recovered
to 104%of 1913 levels (unadjusted for increases in population).
Imports. Imports in volume recovered more rapidly than the
volume of exports and reached two-thirds of 1913 Rus sian imports by
1927/28 and above 800/0of 1913 imports using the Soviet adjustment for
los s of territory (Table XII. 1). In contrast, gros s industrial output -
a major user of Soviet imports - on Soviet territory was 117%of 1913
levels by 1927/28. This more favorable recovery of imports by 1927/28,
however, conceals the fact that the value of Soviet imports had to be held
virtually constant because of balance of payments pressures during the
three crucial years during the NEP (1924/Z5-1926/27). The great
surge in imports in 1924/25 and 1927/28 was achieved only at the cost
of large balance of trade deficits, and the levels of imports for 1924/25
were sustained in 1925/26 only1.because of the government's willingness
to continue to run a balance of trade deficit, to export precious metals,
to accumulate short-term foreign debt and to increase exports. The
surge of imports in 1927/28 was achieved largely by expanding short-
term foreign debt and exporting large quantities of precious metals; the
1927/28 level of imports were clearly not sustainable in the coming year
(in the opinion of the foreign trade planners) so that a cutback in imports
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3
was planned for 1928/29.
The favorable recovery of imports compared to 1913 levels was
achieved largely at the cost of shifting from a relatively large balance
of trade surplus in 1913 to a large balance of trade deficit in 1927/28,4
so that the more favorable recovery of imports relative to exports
during 1923/24-1927/27 depended on the export of precious metals and
on the accumulation of short-term foreign debt.
Terms of trade. The Soviet commodity terms of trade were
slightly more favorable in general during NEP than the commodity
terms of trade for Russian foreign trade in 1913 (Table T-38). This
conclusion is true for all five weight years; the measured improvement,
however, varies considerably depending bn:;the chosen weight year
(Table XIVo8). 5 The terms of trade fluctuated considerably from year
to year (as much as 15%)and affected the fulfillm ent of the foreign
trade plans and the palance of trade, but there was no discernible trend
up or down. Soviet planners did not foresee or consider in their five-
year perspective plans the possibility of a severe prolonged collapse in
the Soviet terms of trade. But this was precisely what occurred during
the depression in the 1930's (Table XIV. 8).
The export price index tended to decline from 1924/25 to
1927/28 (using 1926/27 or 1927/28 quantity weights)" but the decline was
not continuous and was relatively slow when compared to the sharp
3See Table XIII. 4.
4See below, p. 476.
5See Appendix F.
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decline during 1929-34 (Table XIV. 6). 6 A decline in the export prices
of flax, oil products, animal products and timber accounted for the
overall tendency for the Soviet export price index to decline (Table
T-29). The import price index also tended to decline and was influenced
chiefly by changes in raw material prices (especially cotton, but also
wool and hide prices) (Table T-30). The fluctuations in raw material
prices and especially cotton prices caused considerable difficulty in ad-
hering to the import plan during NEP.
Balance of trade and payments during the NEP
The Soviet balance- of payments was under constant pressure
during the NEP with the possible exception of 1923/24 when a payments
surplus was forced for domestic monetary policy reasons. The rela-
tively small trade surpluses achieved in 1923/24 and 1926/27 were quite
inadequate to cover the large trade deficits in 1924/25, 1925/26 and
1927/28 as well as in the early 1920's.
In general, the plan targets for the balance of trade were
underfulfilled with a less -than planned trade surplus or a greater-than-
planned trade deficit (Table T-l). The total trade deficit and the large
deficit for the invisible trade items on current account from 1924/25
to 1927/28 (341million rubles and 235 million rubles) were financed by
the shipment of precious metals and the accumulation of short-term and
medium -term foreign debt.
6The export price index using 1913export quantity weights of
Russian trade, however, tended to rise or be stable during 1924/25 -
1927/28 because of the much larger weight of grain and other agricul-
tural goods whose prices tended to rise during 1924/25 - 1927/28. See
Tables T-28 and T-29.
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BALANCEOF TRADE, NET DEFICIT ON CURRENT ACCOUNT,
PRECIOUS METAL SHIPMENTS, AND CHANGESIN
SOVIET FOREIGN DEBT 1923/24 - 1927/287
(millions of rubles)
1913 23/24 24/25 25/26 26/27 27/28
Balance of trade +130.9 9:83.2 -163.6 :79.7 +65.9 1-:-163.7
Balance of invisible trade :30 -59 -71 -75items on current acc It.
Net shipments of precious +24 +72 +34 +155metals
Net increments in Soviet +69 +62 +41 +120foreign debt
From 1924/25 to 1927/28, about 355 million rubles of precious
metals were exported including about 270 million rubles of gold and
about 85 million rubles of platinum (Table T-16). Particularly large
quantities of gold were exported in 1925, 1926, and 1928 in order to
finance emergency imports and to cover an unexpected shortfall in
exports. Net exports of precious metals were lower (285 million rubles)
because of some imports of gold for domestic foreign reserves in 1924
and because of substantial imports of silver coin and silver bullion for
minting (Table D. 3). 8 But these silver imports did not enter directly
into foreign reserves in the State Bank, so that the net drain on Soviet
foreign reserves was greater than indicated by the "net shipments"
figures cited above. 9
7Tables T-14 and T-l6, p. 202.
8See p. 238-246.
9This imported silver apparently was recovered for the purpose
of foreign reserves. During the worst balance of payments crisis in
1932, it appears that the USSRwithdrew the silver coins from~-~ .~.:."~::.
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Domestic production of gold (about 174million rubles for the
calendar years 1924-1928) and of platinum (about 88 million rubles in
current prices for 1923/24 - 1927/28) were less than net exports of
gold, platinum, and foreign exchange during 1924-1928.10 Thus, Soviet
reserves of precious metals (gold, silver, platinum) and convertible
foreign currency fell from 445-590 million rubles at the end of 1924 to
313-329 million rubles at the end of 1928 (Table T-17). Soviet gold re-
serves fell from 330 million rubles at the end of 1924 to 187million
rubles at the end of 1928. Russian gold reserves were about 1200mil-
lion rubles in October 1917, and about 1560 million rubles in 1913.11
Low Soviet foreign reserves, and risk aversion. This low
level of foreign reserves was inadequate for Soviet needs, especially
because of the sharp fluctuations in the harvest, marketing, and
foreign prices which led to large unexpected deficits and because of
the need to maintain some reserves for possible repayment of outstand-
ing short-term and medium-term foreign debt. Furthermore, con-
tinued reduction of visible gold reserves along with large trade deficits
made foreign suppliers and financial institutions increasingly reluctant
to grant credits to the USSRand increased the cost of these credits.
The depletion of foreign reserves during NEP made Soviet
circulation, melted them and exported them. The shortages of coins
in 1932was created by the government rather than by peasants' hoard-
ing, as it was officially stated. There is no other way to explain the
large silver exports in 1933-350 See Appendix D and Table D..3.
10Tables E.l and E. 3, Do1, D.5 and T-14.
11Pasvolsky-24, po 193.
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planners increasingly conservative in projecting exports and increas-
ingly reluctant to rely on and contract for imports, for by the end of
1927/28, Soviet holdings of foreign reserves were insufficient to cover
several large trade deficits of the size which were incurred during
1923/24 - 1927/28. Since planners could not fall back on large-scale
expenditures of foreign reserves to finance imports if exports fell
below expectations or the terms of trade shifted, the depletion of
foreign reserves reinforced the planners' tendency to rely on the
development of dome sHe import- substitute sector s for the supply of
selected imported: goods rather -than to rely more on imports.
The large balance of payments deficit during NEP was also
financed by an inflow of foreign capital in the form of short and
medium term credits granted by firms, banks, brokers, and foreign
governments.12 The total foreign debt outstanding on October 1, 1928
was estimated at 370 million rubles (exceeding foreign reserves) and
had grown rapidly since October 1, 1924, largely on the basis of credits
received in Germany and Great Britain (Table T-15 and above footnote).
The Soviet leadership, however, believed that the supply of credit was
unreliable because of the international political relationship of the
Soviet Union to the encircling "hostile capitalist world economy".
They attributed their difficulties and the high cost of credit to a delib-
erate financial blockade.13 The volatility of the credit supply was
l2The major articles on the development of Soviet foreign debt
during NEP are Shenkman-3l, -32a, and Birmingham, No. 2-1931.
13Gosplan-29a, p. 391.
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illustrated by the sudden withdrawal of credit by the British Midlands
Bank when diplomatic relations with Great Britain were broken off in
May 1927, and the prolonged and arduous negotiations with Germany
for an extension of the credit guarantee and trade agreement in 1928
(because of the Shakhty Trial of German engineers). 14 Since most of
the outstanding credit had relatively short maturity, a sudden collapse
of the overall foreign credit supply would force the USSRto run an
unusually large trade trade surplus to prevent a default and the large
volume of debts maturing each year. Because of the low foreign re-
serves holdings and the policy 6f "maximum" forcing of exports (by
1927/28), moving toward a larger trade surplus implied cutting back
imports and in turn cutting either output and investment programs
dependent on imports. To some extent, therefore, import-substitu-
tion was a form of risk-aver sion - - namely the risk of defaulting and
the risk implied in an unexpected forced import deprivation. The poten-
tial economic oosts of defaulting were high for the USSRbecause most
foreign firms already considered the USSRto be a poor credit risk
because of their attitude toward private capital and capitalist countries
and because of initial annulling of foreign debt and foreign property
rights in the first years of Soviet power. The government responsibil-
ity for the debts of Soviet firms was implied by the institutional frame-
work of foreign trade (the state monopoly of foreign trade). Thus, to
default on the payment of any bill of any Soviet import organization
14Dyck-66, pp. 128-131and 139-143. See above po299.
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would be interpreted as an insolvency (in terms of foreign exchange)
of the USSR. The practical result of a default would have probably
been complete cessation of foreign credits to the USSRand possibly
the refusal of some foreign firms to ship to or manufacture for the
USSR(except perhaps against cash pre -payment, which was a proced-
ure used in the early 1920's). Another embargo or form of economic
and political retailiation might also result from a large-scale default.
Default in essence threatened to cut off trade entirely or to at least
cut back imports sharply and to raise their costs. ;Thus, although the
development of import-substitute industries might have been less
efficient from strictly economic arguments based on comparative
advantage, this loss of efficiency from not specializing according to
their comparative advantage was in pirt the premium paid for reducing
the risk of default and the economic sloV\downcaused by forced import
deprivation. As events turned out, this insurance premium built into
the 1st FYP turned out to be well spent, for precisely this type of
event -- a reduction in the supply of credit -- occurred in 1932 and
was aggravated by Hitler's rise to power in 1933: The Soviets were
forced to trim back their imports sharply with considerable import
deprivation and were forced to export grain and cotton even in the face
of a vicious famine so as to avoid defaulting on outstanding Soviet
bills. We shall return to this problem in Chapter XIV..
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Fundamental changes in the planning criteria
for export and import
A fundamental change occurred in the criteria for planning
exports and imports during the NEP. After the decentralization of
foreign trade operations in 1922, one basic principle of foreign trade
planning was to maintain market equilibrium. The composition and
level of exports was planned on the concept of "surplus" where the
amount of surplus was the quantity which could (and should) be ex-
ported without excessive increases in the domestic market price.
Domestic demand for a produc~ would be fully satisfied at the desired
dome stic price. One upper boundary on the domestic price was the
price of Soviet products on foreign ~arkets, because the NKT relied
on the initiative of individual profit-maximizing firms and trading
agencies to carry out export operations and because existing economic
orthodoxy insisted on the long-run commercial profitability of export
operations. When the trade authorities had tried to reduce domestic
agricultural prices (of eggs, butter, flax, oil seed, barley, etc.) in
order to maintain the export profit margins, however, the peasants
responded rapidly by reducing marketing to state agencies and by
reduCi.:q:goutput. D:>mesticprices in private trade for these products
rose substantially above state prices, and the state trade agencies
were faced with the dilemma of shipping procured products to
domestic markets to satisfy the rapidly rising urban demand to main-
tain domestic price s.tability, or of exporting procured products.
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Furthermore, they had to decide between less exports at a commer-
cial profit, or to raise the domestic procurement price and to export
larger quantities at a commerciallos s. As discussed in Chapter XI,
price policy was complicated by the fact that raising domestic pro-
curement prices of important non-grain agricultural products was
likely to aggravate the goods famine in the countryside and to reduce
h k. 14t e pressure to mar et graln.
But as the pressure to expand exports increased, the govern-
ment decided to increase domestic procurement prices and they in-
creasingly exported products which were "commercially unprofitable"
and for which domestic demand was unsatisfied at current government
(retail) prices; that is, they forced exports. Prices in the private
trade were higher than state trade prices (and occasionally higher than
foreign market prices) so that the government was increasingly forced
to restrict the activity of private traders -- especially in the grain
trade -- in order to be able to purchase increased quantities (for ex-
port) without excessively bidding up the price. Thus by the end of
1927/28, the cirteria for planning exports had changed from the estim-
ation and export of surplus based on maintaining market equilibrium,
commercial profitability and enterprise initiative to the forcing of
exports of planned quantities regardless of commercial profitability
and by-the use of obligatory export quotas for selected enterprises
and export subsidies. The export plan considered domestic require-
ments, but the size of these requirements was no longer determined
14.See Chapter XI, p. 440.
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purely on the basis of market equilibrium, and the authorities did not
try to continuously clear the market at state prices at the cost of re-
d . 15uClng exports.
The criteria and goals of import planning and operations also
changed considerably during NEP. Most of this change was due to the
overvalued exchange rate and the expansionary economic policy so that
there was large excess demand for imports compared to foreign ex-
change resources during all of the NEP. In general, tighter control
was exercised over the expenditure of foreign exchange than any other
economic activity. After the decentralization of foreign trade opera-
tions, individual firms, syndicates, and trading agencies would on
their own initiative apply for import licenses. Their incentive to
apply for import licenses was based on the profit-motive and at times
firms would apply for licenses to import products produced within the
USSRbecause the imported product was cheaper and superior to the
domestic version. Tariffs were raised several times (1922, 1924,
1926, 1927) so as to reduce domestic demand for imports (requests
for licenses) and to encourage the development of domestic industry
(Table T-47).
Increased tariffs proved to be an ineffectual weapon in reducing
import-demand because of the large excess demand for imported goods
simply not available in the short run at any price domestically,
15The supply of urban areas was determined in part on a per-
capita basis, in part on total supply of retail goods, and in part on
the availability of supplies in the private market at reasonable prices.
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because of the price-setting mechanism or productivity gains which
allowed costs to be passed on or absorbed" and because of general
exce ss aggr egate demand. Lenin r s worry about the ineffecti vene ss
of a tariff system in restraining imports was right -- but for the wrong
reason! It was not foreign exporters trying to destroy Soviet industry
(through export subsidies) but just the contrary -- Soviet industry and
consumers wanted more imported goods (even at the higher "Russian
prices" occasionally charged) than the import-capacity of the USSR
permitted.
After considerable debate" ultimate control of imports was
retained by the State in the form of a licensing system and the NKT
allocated licenses to individual. firms on the basis of the import-plan
confirmed by Gosplan and STD.16 The individual firm would then
negotiate with foreign suppliers of its choice through the trade dele-
gations. The biggest problem for NKT was the allocation of licenses.
By and large" licenses were reserved for the import of so-called
"producer's goods" and especially raw materials and semi-processed
goods for light industry" and machinery. Luxury goods wer e not
imported.
l6SUYB-25" pp. 267-291. The initiative to import lay basically
with the individual firm and the NKVT had to turn down the request
within 48 hours or five days (depending on the type of goods)" or it had
to issue a license. Since some types of firms had higher "national
priority" and were more difficult to refuse" pressure existed for ex-
cessive issue of licenses. See Carr-58a (pp. 445-464) for a descrip-
tion of the debates in 1922-23 about the foreign trade monopoly versus
free trade.
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Imports and market equilibrium during NEP. In early NEP
the government experimented several times and in several ways with
the use of moderate scale imports of consumer goods and foodstuffs
as a method of restoring equilibrium in some markets and to offer
competition to domestic monopolies. 17 This policy of "goods interven-
tion" was abandoned by the end of 1926, and imports of most manufac-
tured consumer goods and foodstuffs were not allowed even though it
was thought that the market disequilibrium in the countryside ("goods
famine") might well disrupt the marketing of grain and other produce.
The basic reason for abandoning the policy of "goods intervention" was
the scarcity of foreign exchange rather than any deliberate attempt to
restrict the consumption of the populace. On the contrary, it was
thought that the gains from the policy of goods intervention were insig-
nificant compared to the total shortages and the short supply of foreign
exchange, and that the same foreign exchange expenditure would have
been more effectively used for importing raw materials for the expan-
sion of the domestic consumer goods industry. For eXanlple, based
on import values of cotton cloth and fiber in 1925/26 (VTSSSR-60), one
metric ton of cotton cost less than one-third the price of a metric ton
of cloth, which suggests that a unit of foreign exchange spent on cotton
fiber would increase the supply of (domestic) cloth about three times
more than spending the same amount on imported cotton fiber. This
17Ironically, a large part of the goods imported under the
policy of goods intervention were major export items under the
Tsarist regime. See Chapter s V, VII, and VIII.
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argument ignores the effect on aggregate demand (and on the worker's
demand for scarce consumer goods and exportable goods) represented
by the additional wage bill of the workers hired to produce the con-
sumers' goods from imported raw materials. The increase in aggre-
gate demand, however, is the difference between total unemployment
compensation, and the wages; furthermore, additional raw materials
might have increased the productivity of the existing labor force which
was idle part-time from the lack of raw materials. This first so-called
"industrialization of the import structure" (increasing the share of pro-
ducer s t goods in imports) was not intended to reduce consumption but
rather to increase the domestic output of consumption goods, and the
share of "consumer-oriented imports" did not decline substantially in
1926/27 (Table T-18). When a severe goods famine and grain shortage
arose in the spring of 1928, the export receipts, holding of foreign
exchange and credits were already too over-committed to permit a
moderate-scale import campaign similar to that attempted in 1924-1926
to help restore market equilibrium (although some modest amount of
grain was imported in 1928 and some above-plan cotton fiber imports
were sanctioned to increase domestic textile output in 1927/28). The
import plan by the end of 1927/28 was directed almost entirely toward
the supply of materials for domestic industry, which in turn was relied
on entirely to provide sufficient manufactured consumer goods. Imports
were no longer directly used to bring about equilibrium in the retail
markets for consumer goods.
Decentralization of import operations. The second change in
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the planning and operation of imports was the gradual abandonment
of a decentralized allocation of licenses and purchasing in favor of
a centralized system of monopoly trading firms re sponsible for the
supply of imported raw materials and imported machinery to all the
firms in an entire industry.18 The advantages of a centralized import
monopoly were stricter control over the issue and use of import
licenses, immediate flexibility in changing the overall level of imports,
increased monopsony power of foreign markets, greater expertise
about foreign markets, greater efficiency in import operations, and
greater control over the disbursement of foreign exchange: the dis-
advantage was the added layer of bureaucracy between the operating
enterprise and the center of decision-making. This was important,
however, in reducing the many pressures on NKT from individual
firms. The pressures of firms were now directed to the import mon-
opoly, and the import-monopoly had to carry its argument for addi-
tionallicenses to NKT and to higher economic organs.
In summary, by the end of 1927/28 the attempt to decentralize
foreign trade operations and to utilize profit incentive and tariffs to
develop foreign trade, and the attempt to use foreign trade as a method
for maintaining market equilibriUm had been abandoned under the pres-
sure to expand foreign trade and domestic inflation and an undervalued
exchange rate. Foreign trade operations had become increasingly re-
centralized, exports were forced despite market disequilibria at home,
and imports were permitted on the basis of priority as perceived by
18SUYB-29, p. 244.
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the government rather than market demand and profitability.
Problems in the poor recovery of
exports during NEP
A major problem in the Soviet economy during the NEP was
the restoration of Soviet exports to pre-19l4 levels. The stagnation
and collapse of grain exports was the most important factor in the
Soviet government1 s failure at this task - - a failure which had wide-
spread ramifications in other areas of the economy and in the policy
decisions about industrialization. In addition to the grain export prob-
lem, the failure of many other export groups -- flax, timber, man-
ganese ore, sugar, cloth, animal products -- to recover to pre-19l4
levels also contributed to the problems of restoring exports to pre-
1914levels; the notable exceptions to this poor export performance
wer e oil products and timber.
Poor recovery of other major agricultural exports. The
export of major export commodities such as flax, sugar, eggs, butter,
hemp, oil seed and oil cake, and rawhides failed to attain the level of
pre -1914exports from both the Rus sian empire and even from the
Soviet territory, as can be seen in the table below (and also in Table
T - 3):
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INDEX OF EXPORTS OF SELECTED AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS19
(1913price weights, 1913= 100)
oil- seed fibers animal products
1913 - Rus sia 100 100 100
1913- Soviet Territory 90 74 85
1923/24 42 28 15
1924/25 64 45 24
1925/26 60 55 22
1926/27 39 35 28
1927/28 19 39 37
Relatively little of this shortfall in the recovery of exports can be
ascribed to the loss of the Baltic-and Polish Provinces. 20
For the most part, the decline can be traced to reduced ex-
portable surpluses which resulted from lower output (total or per
capita), smaller marketing coefficients (tovarnost') and marketing,
and a larger urban and industrial domestic demand for these agricul-
tural products.
The total marketing of agricultural products in 1926-28 was
less than in 1913.21 Since agricultural exports were only about 28%of
19All data except for 1913estimate s of exports from Soviet
territory from Table T-26. Little adjustment should be made for oil
seed exports from Soviet territory because most oil seed area was in
the Southeast (Jasny-49, p. 195). Virtually no area in separated ter-
ritories were sown to sunflower seed (Johnson-60, p. 228). The
adjustment for fiber exports from Soviet territory is based on a Soviet
estimate for flax exports from Russia and the Soviet territory (Table
T -23). The 15%reduction in animal product exports to adjust for ter-
ritoria110sses is based on the fact that about 14.5% of the egg output
and 13.5% of the cows of the Russian empire were in the separated
territories (Table 111.22).
20See Chapter III, pp. 157 ff.
2lJasny-49 (p. 224) stated "According to Oganovsky, marketing
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agricultural marketings before World War I, a decline in marketing
combined with stable or increased domestic demand inevitably would
result in a larger reduction in agricultural exports. 22 Although gross
agricultural output in 1927/28 exceeded 1913by 4-5%, rural population
grew even more rapidly (8%), so that per capita gross output was only
about 950/0of 1913levels, and if gross per capita consumption was main-
tained in rural areas, marketings would fall by roughly 20-22% because
marketing was a relatively small part of total agricultural output. 23
This relatively poor r~covery of marketing of non-grain agri-
cultural products seems somewhat surprising at first, in view of the
relatively favorable procurement prices, tax advantages and other
economic advantages (cheaper grain, lower priced finished goods)
accorded to the producers of these technical and export products. 24
per capita of rural population declined 32 per cent from 1913to 1926/27,
assuming average crops. This implies a decline in total marketing by
about 25 per cent. 11 His reference was N. P. Oganovskii in Socialist
Economy in Rus sian, Vol. V, 1927, 2nd is sue, p. 38.
22Data cited by Krasin-28, p. 158. Estimates based on 1913
prices. Dobb-28 (p. 224) stated that gross agricultural marketing in
pre-19l4 Russia was 32 per cent of gross output.
23Jasny-49 (p. 226) found little increase in the per capita con-
sumption of agricultural products in rural areas. Vegetable oil was
the major item consumed in larger quantities in 1927/28 (Ibid., p. 227).
With the exception of butter, both the quantity and the share of output,
which was marketed during NEP, failed to recover to 1913levels --
tovarnost' was a problem throughout Soviet agriculture (Jasny-49,
pp. 223, 228 and 232).
24See Carr-58a, pp. 249-265, for a discussion of their tax
policy and for references to original Soviet sources. According to
Jasny-49 (p. 211), sugar beet growers had their agricultural tax reduced,
while cotton growers could buy grain at lower retail prices than else-
where in the USSR. They also got help in maintaining irrigation systems
and purchasing fertilizer.
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The economic advantages of producing non-grain agricultural
products did in fact stimulate the peasants to expand their sown area
for these crops and to expand their livestock holdings, so that by 1927
the sown area for most crops and the size of the cow, swine, and sheep
herds exceeded 1913levels for comparable territory.25 For some pro-
ducts (flax, sugar beets, cotton, eggs, wool) however, total output
failed to recover by 1927 to 1913levels on comparable territory and
this failure was probably a major factor in the reduction of marketing
and hence of exports. 26 If the recovery of output during NEP is com-
pared to 1913on a per capita basis (of either total population or rural
population), then the recovery was even less favorable than 1913and
explains why the marketing of several products recovered substan-
tially less than output.27 Other factors also tended to depress the
peasants' incentive to market. The lack of fiscal pressure during NEP
compared to pre-19l4 -- lower rents, taxes, and debts -- probably
28played some role.
25See Johnson-60, pp. 232-235, and Diamond-55. But not on
a per capita basis.
26Some observer s (Jasny-49, p. 216, and Gosplan-28j 29,
p. 232) attributed this decline in yield to the subdivision of the better
managed and better capitalized estates into small peasant holdings.
27Jasny-49, p. 217.
28See above, p. 442.
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High price-elasticity of state procurements for non-grain
agricultural products. Another important factor in reducing market-
ing (and increasing procurement prices) was the apparent high price-
elasticity of on-farm demand (or output) of these products with respect
to their prices relative to the price of manufactured goodso 29 This
high price-elasticity might be attributed to two characteristics of Rus-
sian peasant agriculture. First, many of these "cash crops and pro-
ducts" (such as eggs, butter, meat, and the end-products of leather,
hides, feed, oilseeds, flax, wool, and cotton) were as much luxury
goods to the average peasants as were purchased manufactured goods
and hence were fairly substitutable in consumption. 30 Second, the
peasant could process on the farm (or trade with local village crafts-
men) many of the agricultural raw materials into goods which served
as close substitutes for purchased manufactured products. Thus, if
the retail price of those manufactured goods which could be easily
produced locally rose enough, the peasant responded by processing
substitute goods locally rather than marketing the raw material In-
31puts.
The price elasticity of state procurements for several of these
goods was further increased because of the high substitutability of
29preobrazhensky-26 (p. 143) and Baykov-47 (p. 62) stress
this point.
30See above footnote. Jasny-49 (p. 226) discusses this point
also.
3TF1ax into linen, oilseed into oil and feed, hides into boots,
wool and hemp into cloth, milk into butter. See Baykov-47, p. 62.
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factor inputs from one crop to another, and of feed from one animal
to another, and because of the difficulty in eliminating the private
trader from trading in some of these products (especially animal pro-
ducts).32 These factors explain the sharp decline in output and/ or
marketing which occurred in 1926 when authorities tried to reduce pro-
curement prices in order to maintain commercial profit margins for
these export goods when foreign prices declined. Confronted with the
elastic marketing response, the trade authorities restored procure-
. h .. 1 1 33ment prlces to t elr prevlous eve s.
Despite these measures, the marketed supply of most non-
grain agricultural goods available for urban consumption and export
never attained 1913 levels in the best years of NEP. 34
Increased urban demand for exportable foodstuffs, etc. The
exp~nsion of exportable surplus of agricultural products, sugar and
cloth was further retarded by rapidly increasing urban demand. The
urban population was growing at roughly 5 1/2% per year from 1924 to
1928, and according to Soviet data, urban population on January 1st,
1928 was 106. 6% of urban population on January 1st, 1914 (a comparable
32
Cotton and sugar beets crops were sold almost completely
to state procurement agencies.
33The prices of final products of selected raw materials were
also adjusted downward in the major producing regions of these raw
materials {linen in flax areas, cotton cloth in cotton areas, sugar in
sugar beet areas, vegetable oil in oil seed areas (Mikoian-27a)).
34With the exception of butter and tobacco. See Jasny-49,
p. 223.
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figure based on Western estimates is 1350/0of 1914).35 Between 1924
and 1928 income grew faster than urban population increase. 36 The
total income of wage labor in urban areas grew 18%in 1926/27 and 11%
in 1927/Z8 over preceding years, while the demand from the income
of wage labor for agricultural and manufactured consumer goods grew
14.2% and 12.1%in 1926/27 over 1925/26 and 8.7% and 8.9% in 1927/28
37compared to 1926/27. The demand of the total urban population grew
somewhat more slowly. The growth in urban demand was frequently
cited as a cause of underfulfil1ment of export plans (particularly in
1925/26 and 1926/27) especially for butter and eggs and other food-
38stuffs. Additional direct taxe s and a stricter incomes policy should
have been imposed on the urban work force. The current levels of
wages were not needed to attract labor from rural areas; on the con-
trary, the high wages had attracted large numbers of workers who
were unable to find jobs. Restricting the growth of urban demand
would have increased the exportable surplus (especially of butter,
eggs, meat) and reduced the urban demand for manufactured goods
wp.ich could be shipped to the countryside (or exported, in the case
of sugar and cloth). 39
35Table T -48.
36Cf. Gosplan-29a, p. 398 and Gosplan-29a, p. 446.
37Gosplan-29a, p. 447. Wage labor earned 65-70% of urban
income.
38See Chapter VIII, pp. 303.
39The tax structure, however, relied largely on excise taxes
(vodka, sugar, tea, tobacco products, salts, textiles and petroleum
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Rising industrial output during NEP also increased domestic
demand for flax, hemp, wool, hides, tobacco and reduced export sur-
pluses sharply, and there arose a clear conflict between the expansion
of industrial output and the expansion of exports {such as for flax}. 40
The important point here is that the growth of agricultural export sur-
pluses were not only determined by the expansion of output and market-
ing of these export goods, but also by the expansion of domestic demand.
Accelerated industrialization, ceteris paribus, reduced agricultural
41export surpluses.
Recovery of industrial and other exports
Expansion of industrial exports was mor e under the control of
the government and -- unlike agriculture -- did not rely on proper and
delicate manipulation of the proper price, tax, and other signals to
influence indirectly the growth of export surpluses provided by millions
of producers. The government could simply reallocate scarce re-
sources to the export producing sectors and to "contract" with the trusts
for the export of these additional products. The best success in the use
of this policy during NEP was the expansion of the petroleum industry
almost entirely for the purpose of expanding petroleum product exports.
products) and there was considerable reluctance to increase direct
taxes on wage-earners who earned much of the urban income (Reingold-
31, p. 174).
40See Chapter IX, p. 350.
4lEven though surplus labor immigrated from off the peasant
homestead, marketing did not necessarily recover enough to feed the
labor migrant. The higher per capita income in agriculture, which
occurs because of immigration, might result in higher consumption of
farm products on the home stead.
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INDEXOF INDUSTRIALEXPORTS42
(1927/28 price weights 1913= 100)
1913Russia
1913Sov. Terr.
1923/24
1924/25
1925/26
1926/27
1927/28
Oil
Products
100
100
70
120
135
195
255
Mining
Timber Products
100 100
60 100
26
28 49
25 61
34 75
40 59
A partial explanation for the exceedingly rapid expansion of petroleum
product exports as compared to timber is the distribution of investment
during NEP. As Gosplan noted in 1929:
The necessity to force industrial exports and to replace imports
by products of domestic fabrication had a large influence on the
direction of these expenditures. The large expenditures in the
petroleum, paper, timber and chemical industries, general
agricultural machine-building and several other fields were
made with this purpose. 43
The investment among "planned industries" under the supervision of
VSNKhwas distributed in the following manner:
42Table T-26. No territorial adjustments for mining products
or oil products were made beca':lse all oil product was located within
Soviet territory, and most mineral exports (manganese ore, iron ore)
came from Soviet territory. Forty per cent of the timber exports, how-
ever, came from the separated territory according to Table 111.22.
43Gosplan-29a, p. 173.
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INVESTMENT IN PLANNED INDUSTRY
DURING1925/26 - 1927/28
(1925/26 Prices)44
Industry
Metallurgical & Metal-
Working
Petroleum.
Textile
Coal
Foodstuffs
Chemical
Glas s and Pottery
Paper Industry
Timber
Leather -working
Electro-technical
Other
Millions of Ruble s
822.8
536.6
489.9
346.9
216.0
.181.3
145.3
104.5
95.6
66.8
50.8
107.5
0/0 of Total
26.0
17.0
15.4
11.1
6.7
5.8
4.6
3.3
3.0
2.1
1.6
3.4
The poor development of timber exports and inve stment in the
timber industry during NEP was somewhat of an enigma because few
investment resources were allocated to develop this old export indus-
try. Output failed to regain 1913levels until 1928 and all during the
45NEP exports fell far short of 1913exports. Part of the poor recov-
ery of timber exports is explained by the fact that 40% of Russian
timber export: originated from the separated territories (see above
table). This apparent neglect of the timber exports was explained
also by the condition of the Soviet and foreign timber markets until
1927. Foreign markets for Soviet timber were in general fairly
44Gosplan-29a, p. 173.
45Nutter - 62, p. 428. Industrial timber hauled from the for ests
on Soviet territory in 1927/28 was still below 1913levels. Sawn lumber
had just reached 1913levels by 1928.
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depressed from 1924/25 to 1926/27 and the oligopsonist foreign market
structure along with the size of Soviet timber sales made any rapid
expansion of timber exports impossible without a price war. 46 The
foreign demand was not expanding rapidly. Second, the Soviet demand
for timber did not begin to grow rapidly until the end of 1926 (except
for speculative demand in the fall of 1925which resulted from Gosplan's
control figures for 1925/26). 47 Thus, there seemed to be excess capa-
city in the timber industry during mid-NEP and there was little pres-
sure to expand investment in an industry where there was excess capa-
city. Only in 1927 and 1928 did timber export possibilities and domestic
demand ~xceed dome stic output capacity. 48
Although the expansion of industrial output and the allocation
of output could be more directly controlled by the government during
NEP, several problems hindered the expansion of industrial exports.
First, rapid expansion of domestic demand reduced the exportable sur-
pluses of timber and petroleum products, and especially sugar and
cloth. Second, the expansion of output for export of sugar and cotton
cloth and vegetable oil was dependent on raw material produced by agri-
culture (or imported) and hence was dependent on agricultural develop-
ments and the weather. Third, the market demand for many major
46Chapter VII, p. 231. Fo'reign prices were so depressed in
1924, that the profit oriented firms preferred to sell to domestic con-
sumers. Sovetskaya Torgovlia always emphasized the success in sell-
ing (not shipping) the planned amount at the planned prices
47 See p. 247.
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Soviet foreign industrial exports were les s than perfectly elastic.
Soviet planners were aware that the foreign demand for Soviet
exports was definitely limited in any given period for many important
Soviet export products including flax, manganese ore, platinum,
petroleum products, furs, timber, butter, eggs, and possibly grain. 49
Either the Soviet market share was large enoughJ or the market imper-
fect enough (oligopsonist or cartelized) so that at one time or another,
Soviet attempts to expand their market share required significant cuts
in export prices. 50 Furthermore, the Soviet trade authorities and
planners were well aware of their monopoly (or market) power, and
in several casesJ tried with some success in exercising it to their
advantage. 51 This market imperfection - - especially for "industrial
exportsll - - had serious implications for the growth of Soviet exports
and tended to lower the optimal point of Soviet exports below the free
trade equilibrium levels. The choice faced was to expand these ex-
ports at lower prices (and hence much lower marginal benefits from
expanding exports) or to restrict the expansion of exports to the ex-
pansion of foreign demand, which was below the desirable rate of
Soviet export expansion. That is, the slow growth of world demand
and the limited capacity of world markets for major Soviet export
49Gosplan-29a, pp. 392-'393.
50Gosplan-29a, pp. 392-393.
SlOne of the earlie st steps was to eliminate competing Soviet
agencies selling the same product abroad (such as flax, oil, and
timber).
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products presented a barrier to expanding Soviet trade. 52
Problems in restoring agricultural exports
What were the prospects of renewed rapid expansion of agri-
cultural exports in the corning years within the framework of NEP
agriculture? This was an important question in deciding on the
strategy and tempo of Soviet economic growth and industrialization.
From 1900to 1913under fairly good conditions Russian exports
grew at an average rate of 6%(uncorrected for price changes). 53 Was
this an upper limit on the possible long-run growth rate of Soviet ex-
ports. Was this moderate growth even attainable under the NEP system?
Or could the Soviet state accelerate export growth to the much higher
rates required to finance the rapid expansion of imports of equipment
and raw materials for economic growth?
Agricultural exports were the traditional basis of Rus sian ex-
ports before World War I and the rapid expansion of exports during
1900-1913was based on a renewed expansion of agricultural output after
Russian agriculture had stagnated for 20 years because of the world
52Soviet leaders on the Right were aware of the limited capacity
of foreign markets, but thought that market capacity for Soviet exports
had not yet been attained during NEP (Shanin-26b, in Spu1ber-64, p. 214).
The optimal points of offering is at the same price and quantities as for
the optimum tariff. Cf. Chapter II, pp. 59-64.
53Actually, the growth rate of exports depends on end points:
from 1897 to 1913exports grew at about 4-3/40/0, from 1897 to 1911
(peak-to-peak) exports grew at 5-3/40/0. Exports stagnated from 1897
to 1900 (Pasvolsky-22, p. 27).
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agrarian depression (1875-1895). 54 But Russian agriculture1s long-
run growth rate (1860-1913)was between 1.5 - 1.9% per year -- and
barely exceeded (by 1/4 - 1/2%) the 1-1/2% growth rate of the popula-
tion during the period. 55 And the growth rate of population during
NEP of about 2 - 2.4% per year. 56 Thus, the increased population
growth rate combined with the long-term growth rate of agriculture
would imply little or no growth in the surplus available for export.
Could rapid industrialization using mostly imported equipment and
raw material be founded on agricultural-dependent exports, when
agriculture was the traditional If slow-growth sectorlf in modern eco-
1"
. 11. T . t R . 57nomles as we as ln sarlS USSla?
54Liashchenko -49, p. 453.
55Goldsmith-6l, p. 454.
56Eason-62, p. 49n. SUYB-30, p. 21 stated that the popula-
tion growth rate was between 1.8 - 2.4%. The increase in population
rate was the result of public health measures and heavier incidence of
the famine of 1921on the older cohorts of the population.
57Gross Soviet agricultural output weight with 1925-29 price
weight and adjusted roughly for territorial change, grew at about 2 -
2-1/4% per year between 1928 and 1957 (excluding the nine war years
and recovery 1941-1949). Data from Johnson-60, pp. 204-205.
The problems confronting the expansion of agricultur e on the
basis of NEP peasant agriculture were basically the shortage of addi-
tional good quality land, the shortage of draft power and the ineffi-
ciencies of small-scale traditional peasant agriculture (parcelled
plots, separation, agricultural techniques). The Soviet government
further complicated the problem by its basic mistrust of successful
peasants, who had all the trappings of a capitalist in the eyes of most
Party leaders; restrictions on hiring of labor, leasing or sale of land,
the tax structure, and eventually procurement policies, all affected
the allocation of resources. Furthermore, government investment
and credit were placed in the hands of the poor peasants, who generally
were the most inefficient farmers. See Carr-68a, Chapter 5.
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Even with high growth rates in agriculture, two barriers to
rapid industrialization remained as long as the "voluntary aspects"
of NEP agriculture were maintained. First, there was no as surance
that marketing would immediately grow along with the increase in out-
put because of the Russian peasants' income-elasticity of demand for
his own produce (for direct consumption of higher-grade products and
for "reserves" as savings). Second, even if the peasant marketed a
larger fraction of his additional output, he might demand either an
excessive amount of consumer goods in exchange for his produce (see
Chapter II) or he might be willing only to save and to invest in the
sense that he would invest in additional investment goods - - better
seed, fertilizer, housing, livestock, machinery, barns -- but would
not be willing to save in a monetary form (currency, bank deposits,
bonds). Then, the only way to mobilize the peasants voluntary savings
would have been to provide him with the "physical investment goods"
for his own ownership and use, for if he is not provided with the oppor-
tunity to. invest, he will demand consumer goods or not market. That
is, the allocation and level of inve stment would be dependent on the
government's willingnes s 1) to let some significant amount of invest-
ment be directed toward agriculture, 2) to permit increasing class
differentiation in the countryside and 3) to permit the emergence of an
increasingly wealthy class of capital-owning peasant who produces
most of the surpluses. {Of course, an astute combination of agricul-
tural taxes and price-fixing might avoid some of these problems by
inducing (forcing) the peasant to market grain to pay taxes and rent,
and then by getting him to market some additional amount for goods
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and savings -- but Soviet authorities had proven inept in applying these
tools during the critical year s of NEP.
Even a successful expansion of agricultural marketing would
not automatically lead to a successful expansion of agricultural ex-
ports (in value). First, some part of the rapidly increasing marketing
would have to be used to provide for the rapidly growing industrial
demand and industrial labor force. Recall that this was apparently an
important factor inhibiting the recovery of exports duringNEP. Second,
some agricultural exports -- flax, eggs, butter, and even grain
faced less than perfectly elastic demand in foreign markets.
In summary, the growth of Soviet exports was retarded by the
slow recovery of agricultural output and marketing, by increasing dom-
estic demand for export commodities and by inelastic foreign demand
for major Soviet export products.
Imports and economic recovery
during NEP: summary
The expansion of imports during NEP was restricted by the
slow growth of exports, the failure to attract large-scale long-term
capital, and the necessity to conserve meager foreign exchange hold-
ings. As a result of the slow growth of imports during NEP, the
demand for imported goods by industry and consumers was not satis-
fied compared to 1913levels even though industry and agriculture had
recovered to 1913levels.
The most important consequences of the restricted growth of
imports during NEP was the shortages of consumer goods, which re-
suIted primarily from the, shortage of imported raw materials but
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also from the virtual elimination of all consumer goods imports (except
those from the Eastern trade). For Soviet light industry was as depend-
ent on imported cotton, wool, hides, dyes, paper, chemicals, and tan-
ning materials as was Tsarist Rus sia and the shortages of these mate-
rials was the major constraint on the expansion of output of light indus-
58try. Thus, during NEP the Soviet government continually attempted
to stimulate the domestic output and marketing of cotton, wool, and
hides by offering relatively favorable prices, better seeds or animals
and special tax concessions to the peasants. As noted above, such poli-
cies competed directly with the expansion of exports of other agricul-
tural products (in the use of land and the growth of animal herds) and
tended to aggravate the goods famine and depress grain marketing
because of the higher inoomes from the higher prices, lower taxes,
and increased marketing of these products. 59 Soviet planners also
promoted the growth of paper, non-ferrous metals, and chemicals
output in order to overcome the shortages of these products. Their
policy of pushing import- substitution of domestic output for these
imported products followed directly in the footsteps of Tsarist eco-
nomic development, when the output of these goods was vigol.'lously
promoted by a tariff policy. The Soviet policy of import- substitution
during NEP was for the most part not inspired by some goal of eco-
nomic independence qua economic independence but was dictated by
58Kaufman-29f (p. 9) discussed the problem of raw material
imports and the recovery of light industry. See also Krzhizhanovskii-
27a, p. 424.
59 C:hapter XI.
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structural disproportion in an economy which had previously relied
on higher levels of foreign trade and capital inflow to supply needs
.. 60ln certaln areas.
The development of domestic sources of selected raw mate-
rials (where technologically possible and economically feasible) was
increasingly more important because of the growing demand for the
so-called non-competing imports which could not be produced domes-
tically because of current resource endowment. These "non-compet-
ing imports" included tin, nickel, rubber, tea, jute, cocoa, coffee,
tropical fruit as well as aluminum and certain chemicals; in 1909-
1913these non-competing imports made up more than 12.5% of total
~us sian imports (Table 111.8). During NEP the imports of tea and
other "non-competing foodstuffs" was sharply restricted because of
the foreign exchange shortage: nevertheless, these "unavoidable"
imports accounted for 9.40/0of Soviet imports in 1927/28 (Table T-7). 61
As income and industrial output increased, the demand for these non-
competing imports would claim an ever increasing amount of foreign
62exchange.
60Kaufman-29f.
61See Kutusov-28 or Conolly references.
62We have excluded imports of "non-competing luxury goods"
(caviar, furs, silk) as well as machinery which currently could not be
produced for technological deficiencies rather than capacity deficien-
cies. If we considered items such as radios, airplanes, automobiles,
etc., "non-competing" import shares would be higher. Excluded are
also goods such as lead and zinc where the import-consumption ratios
wer e very high.
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During NEP the nature of the Eastern trade further limited
the amount of total export earnings which could be devoted to mate-
rials and machinery imports. Foreign trade over the Eastern border,
and the type of goods offered by the Eastern countries (other than low-
quality wool and hides and cotton) were largely consumer foodstuffs.
To some extent this permitted a change in the composition of consumer
goods (because cloth and sugar and eventually oil products were ex-
ported to these countries), and hence extended the Soviet consumers'
choice to citrus fruit, rice, herbs, dried fruit, and additional tea as
well as providing additional raw materials. Nevertheless, it must be
pointed out that the rapid expansion of the Eastern trade did not in gen-
eral augment the Soviet Union's foreign exchange resources and thus
did not augment their ability to expand Soviet imports from stable-
currency countries.
In addition to the import demands from light industry, unavoid-
able imports, and the Eastern trade, the expansion of heavy industry
and the investment level also required a complimentary expansion of
imports (beyond a certain level, or in certain fields) because of the
lack of output capacity in the investment goods and input-industries
(especially metals and some chemicals). In 1927/28 the import-depend-
ence pattern of Soviet heavy industry and investment still reflected more
or less the import-dependence pattern of Tsarist Rus sia. The Soviet
electrical industry and other metal-working industries continued to rely
heavily or entirely on imports of non-ferrous metals and ferro-alloys,
but Soviet heavy industry was almost entirely inqependent of imports
5D17
for ferrous metals, just as the Russian heavy industry had been largely
self-sufficient in ferrous metals. Thus, the Soviet leadership's desire
to build further ferrous metal producing capacity was not new policy of
import-substitution or the pursuit of autarky. 63 They were simply
building to meet the demands of their expanding machine building indus-
try as the Rus sian industry had done from 1890-1913. The Soviet depend-
ence on imported investment goods was particularly crucial in some
sectors -- tractors, complex agricultural and electrical machinery,
auto-transport, air-transport, large-shipbuilding, and complex indus-
trial machinery (textiles and chemical), and the Soviet government to'ok
steps quite early in NEP (1924) to start up domestic production of these
products (especially tractors, trucks, airplanes, and more complex
electrical equipment). 64 Again, one co.uldinterpret these policies as
an early indication of Soviet drive toward autarky or as Soviet continu-
ation of developments in the machinery industry which were taking place
al~eady in the pre-World War I decade, when increasingly complex
equipment was being either completelY,manufactured or assembled
° hO R ° 65Wlt ln us Sla.
Not only were certain types of investment dependent on imports
during NEP, but the overall level of investment beyond a certain level
63TheSoviet ferrous metal industry recovered less quickly
than the rest of industry and was retarding the expansion of machinery
output and the supply of roofing iron, rails, etc., by 1927/28. See
SUYB-30, p. 129, p. 139.
"64
See Dodge-66 for a discussion of the development of plans to
produce tractor s.
65
See Rosenfeld-6l and Chapter III, pp. 120 ff, pp. 137 ff.
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was also dependent on imports because of the limited capacity of
Soviet investment goods industry. When import funds were relatively
plentiful and investment levels were a fairly modest proportion of na-
tional income during the Tsarist period, this import-dependence of
Russia on imported machinery was not a barrier to the desired level
of investment. 66 But during NEP when foreign exchange was relatively
scarce and when the metal industries had only partially reoovered, then
the total supply of investment goods from both imports and domestic
producers seemed to be a barrier to raising the level of investment.
So much so that some policy-maker s felt at time s that reconstruction
of Soviet industry was dependent on obtaining long -term capital funds
from abroad. 6
7
And in fact much of the capital equipment imported
during 1925-1928 was financed ei~he;- directly or indirectly through the
expansion of short and medium-term credits granted for machinery
imports into the USSR. It was unlikely that such alar ge inve stment
program would have been planned for 1926/27 and 1927/28 if the German
and other foreign credits for machinery imports had not been available
-- because to have carried out such a large machinery import program
(under the given development of exports) would have necessitated cut-
ting back raw material imports for light industry just at the very moment
when the expansion of light industrial output was thought to be crucial to
the realization of grain marketing and export plans. The inability to
.'(>,6According to Dobb-28 (p. 311)pre-19l4 investment was about
8 - 9% of national income (Soviet definition).
61
Krasin-28, pp. 354-373 and Dohan-65.
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expand capital equipment imports did not become a pressing constraint
on investment in most industries during NEP because the existence of
excess capacity in much of industry until the end of 1925/26 and when
the pressure to expand investment grew in 1927 and 1928, foreign cre-
dits smoothed the way to expanding machinery imports - - but not of
the necessary raw material imports. But the supply of machinery was
clearly perceived by most planners as being an important potential
constraint on industrialization, electrification, and the mechanization
of agriculture.68
Some economists felt that exports could not be increased rapidly
enough to finance the required machinery imports so that the Soviet in-
ve stment goods industry would have to be expanded to permit further
increases in the level of investment?9' And by the endeaf 1927/28, this
latter interpretation clearly was a very realistic view of the foreign
trade problem confronting planners working on the first Five- Year Plan.
Investment (mostly in fixed capital) was about 200/0of GNP in 1927/28 as
68Pashkov-30, Table T-23. For example, the pace of me-
chanization and collectivization of agriculture was thought to be directly
dependent on the speed with which the Soviet government could produce
sufficient agricultural equipment and fertilizer s for the collective farms
so as to induce the poor peasant to voluntarily join ~scr: ',) .:\,
The 1925/26 investment plan was predicted on a certain supply of invest-
ments supplied by both domestic and foreign producers. When the dom-
estic producers could obviously not fulfill their output plan, the invest-
ment targets had to be cut back and part of the short-fall in investment
goods was to be covered by expanding machinery imports (on credit).
See Chapter VIII, p. 307, n. 144.
69Pashkov-30.
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compared to 8 - 9% of "material income" in 1913.70
The dependence of the Soviet economy on imports not only
meant that the Soviet economy1s continued progress was dependent on
the continued willingness of capitalist nations to trade with ideological
enemies and on the continued pro~pperity of the world capitalist economy.
Under the NEP system, the total level of import-dependent activities
(output of light industry, level and direction of investment, output of
certain heavy industrial branches) depended essentially on the level
of exports (given the uncertainty of the expansion of foreign credit and
the low levels of foreign reserves). And during the mid-1920's the
growth performance of exports depended on the harvest and the willing-
ness of the surplus-producing peasant to expand his output and to bring
his surpluses to market in every increasing amounts. Most Soviet
policy-makers felt that this good performance of a basically class-
enemy capitalist peasant class was dependent on expanding the supply
of consumer goods (and agricultural equipment) and improving the terms
71of trade. But they were caught in a vicious circle, because the ex-
pansion of consumer goods output and agricultural equipment supply
required increased imports of raw materials (and agricultural equip-
ment) which cut down growth of industrial investment goods from any
.. f . 1 l' 72 U d h NEPglven expanslon 0 agrlcu tura exports. n er t e system, to
70Moorsteen-66, p. 364 and Dobb-28, p. 311.
71This argument was examined critically in Chapter XI.
72Furthermore, some of the additional investment would
have to be allocated to the investment demands of the prosperous
peasant.
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eschew development of Soviet heavy industry and to rely instead on
the growth of imports for the entire additional supply of investment
goods meant that the industrialization program of the socialist worker's
state would depend on the state's ability to indirectly stimulate (through
price-manipulation and tax concessions) the rich kulak peasant to accu-
mulate capital and to expand his output and his marketings at a fast
rate. And the success of this policy would result in a growing class
differentiation in the countryside, with the (relative) impoverishment
and political subjugation of the poor and middle peasants, who were
supposed to be, at least in theory, the workers' class ally in the coun-
tryside.
Many in the Party doubted if this "easier route" (economically
more efficient) to industrialization was worth the political, social and
economic risks of gambling on the goodwill of their class enemy and on
Mother Nature. Both seemed to have failed them in 1927/28 and caused
a serious foreign trade crisis and a severe domestic grain collection
crisis, which was remedied only by compulsion. Compulsion of the
peasant, unbeknownst to the Party leadership in the spring and summer
of 1928, was to become the permanent solution of the grain marketing
problem. But in 1928 they were still seeking the economic policy to
avoid both compulsion and this gamble on the kulak and the harvest.
The chosen policy was rapid industrialization with considerable empha-
si s on the development of the Soviet inve stment goods industry as well
as further expansion of light industry and agriculture.
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CHAPTER XlIII
FOREIGN TRADE PLANS ANDSOVIET INDUSTRIALIZATION
STRATEGY IN THE FIRST FIVE YEAR PLAN
"Increasing the foreign trade turnover will strengthen
the connections of the USSR,with the world economy,
but not on the basis of an increase of the dependence
on foreign markets, but on the basis of reducing this
dependence in the fundamental and most important
junctions in the economy of the USSR. "
2G. Geller and A. Sovalov
Voprosy Torgvli, 1928
Drafting of the Five Year Perspective Plans
and foreign trade during the NEP
Various versions of five year perspective plans for various
sectors of the economy and for the entire national economy were drawn
up during NEP. 3 Starting in 1925/26, Gosplan drew up several plans
for the national economy; during 1928 and the early months of 1929,
Gosplan worked upa perspective five year plan for the period 1928/29
1 This chapter is abstracted from a longer study by the author
and presents only the barest bones of the foreign trade plan for the 1st
FYp. In particular, we have omitted most discussion about the planned
trade and output for individual co'mmodities and the problem of equili-
brium in the economy.
2
Geller-28a, p. 45.
3 Strumilin- 32a. Chapter I discusses the history (from
Strumilin 1 s viewpoint) of the evolution of the five year plans during NEP.
See also Zaleski-62, pp. 32-70 for a Western economists's description
of this proces s.
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1932/33 (designated as the "Draft 1st FYP" in this study), which was
based on directives issued in December 1927 by the XV Party Congress;
these directives called for the enlargement of the socialist sector, for
the maximum development of the defense industries, for moderately
high growth rates over the long-run, for a "balance" :between growth
4of consumers' goods and producers' goods, etc.
The "optimal variant" of this draft five year plan for 1928/29-
1932/33 was adopted in April 1929, and is referred to simply as the
"1st FYP" in this study, or as the "approved 1st FYP" in contexts wher e
it could be confused with the "draft 1st FYP". 5 The period, during
which the original directives were issued and the draft 1st FYP was
being worked on by Gosplan,was precisely the period when the USSR ex-
perienced a .most severe crisis in foreign trade because of the collapse
of grain exports. Furthermore, by the end of 1928, it was also clear
that grain exports were not likely to be restored to even the moderate
4 Strumilin-32a, p. 133 and Zaleski-62, p. 52. Three editions
of the First Five Year Plan were published. According to Zaleski-62
(p. 52), the second edition published in 1929 was the definitive text.
Piatiletnii plan narodno-khoziaistvennogo stroitel'stva SSSR, 2nd edition,
Moscow: Gosplan, USSR, 1929, in three volumes.
In 1930 the third edition was published which differed basically
in an extra annex added to Volume III describing the various construction
projects in the FYP. References to the Five Year Plan in this study
(Gosplan-30a) are to the 1st volume of the third edition: Gosplan USSR,
Piatiletniiplan narodno -khoziaistvennogo stroitel1 stva SSSR, tom pervy,
tret' e izganie, Moscow: Izd., "Planovoe khoziaistvo" under the aus-
pices of Gosplan SSSR, 1930.
5 SUYB-30, p. 562.
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levels attained during NEP in the coming few year s and hence could
not be relied upon for a rapid expansion of trade in 1928/29 or 1929/30.
It must have been clear to all the planners in Gosplan - who had to cut
back output targets for two and possibly tliree years in succession be-
cause of inadequate growth of foreign trade - that Soviet foreign trade
had failed to keep pace with the rest of the economy (aft.er its moderate
success in 1923/24) in making a full recovery toward pre-1914 levels. 6
As Krzhizhanovskii :summarized in his introduction to the control figures
of 1929 about the relationship of growth and foreign trade:
The XV Party Congress has emphasized a number of basic
disproportions left to us from the past: the" scis sor s" between
prices in industry and in agriculture, between whole and retail
prices, and between world and domestic prices; the dispropor-
tion between demand for technical raw materials and their act-
ual supply ••• the "scissors between the dynamics of the growth
of industry and of agriculture ••• has not yet entered its zone
of mitigation •••
Which disproportions of a new order can be noted by us as
resulting from the entrance of the economy into the phase of
socialist reconstruction ••• ?
••• The general growth of domestic production is not accom-
panied by a corresponding quantitative growth 'of foreign trade,
a fact which, in turn, depends not only on the lack of coordin-
ation between domestic outputs and the needs of the world mar-
ket, but also on the policy of economic and financial isolation of
the USSRdue to the continuing capitalist encirclement. A direct
expression of this disproportion is represented by our needs in
foreign currencies, by our overexpenditure of our currency
.means, and by shortage of currency savings as necessary re-
serves for defense purposes and as insurance against economic
difficulties ••• 7
6 During 1923/24-1927/28 exports grew less than 110/0per year.
7 G.M. Krzhizhanovskii in the introduction to Gosplan-29a
as translated in Spulber -64, p. 463. He further noted that~ "The data
on industry disclose the critical bottlenecks of our economy; the series
on the industrial branches working for export reveal our difficulties in
the foreign trade area". (Ibid., p. 466).
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The more rapid growth of imports during NEP had been achi-
eved only at the cost of the accumulation of volatile short-term costly
foreign debt and by reduction of foreign reserves to a dangerously low
point by January 1st, 1929.8 Furthermore, political and economic re-
lations with the USSR's two largest trading partners - Great Britain and
Germany - were very unsettled and until the very end of 1928, the
Soviet government was uncertain about the renewal of the important
9credit guarantee and trade agreements by the German government.
Thus, we should not be surprised if the Soviet planners did not wish to
rely on the expansion of foreign trade as a leading sector in promoting
economic growth in the coming five year plan - for all the actual devel-
opments in Soviet foreign trade reinforced the natural tendency and
ideological bias of the Soviet leadership against staking the future growth
of the Soviet economy on the growth of foreign trade with a hostile cap-
ita1ist world.
8 See section on "Economic Independence II in Chapter II and
Chapter s X and XII for discus sion of trade in 1927/28 and during NEP.
9 Recall that diplomatic relations were broken off between
Great Britain and the USSRin 1st May 1927 as a result of the British
police raid on the "Soviet foreign trade delegation" in London (the Arcos
incident of May 12). Formal diplomatic relations were not resumed
until the fall of 1929 (SUYB-30, pp. 561-563). The diplomatic break dis-
rupted commercial and credit relations although considerable trade (esp-
ecially Soviet exports) with Great Britain continued.
Dyck-66 (pp. 128-131 and 139-142) discusses the unsettled eco-
nomic and political relations between Germany and the USSRwhich were
cause by the poor results of the German-Soviet trade and credit agree-
ment and by the Shakhty Trail of the German engineers. A German
trade organization was founded of all organizations dealing with the
USSR (Dyck-66, p. 146): the USSRviewed that as a monopolistic com-
bination against the USSRand as a threat to new trade.
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Central importance of foreign trade
in fulfillment of 1st FYP
The Soviet planners knew that the developments in the foreign
trade sector could have a decisive influence on the fulfillment of the
plan. As Gosplan wrote in the draft 1st FYP:
The question of economic relations with the world economy is
one which considerably influences the possible speed of the
national economic construction according to the minimal or the
optimal variant •••
The whole national economic plan in both variants is based on
the necessity of widening the ties with the world economy with,
however, the indispensible condition that this widening in the
final analysis and in all important stages leads to a systematic
strengthening of inde~endence of our country from the leading
capitalist countries. 0
The role of foreign trade in the realization of the 1st FYP is discussed
in more detail below.
No published foreign trade plan for draft 1st FYP. As far as
can be determined, no comprehensive or aggregate targets for the devel-
opment of foreign trade during 1928/29-1932/33 were ever published in
the "definitive texts" of the draft 1st FYP, although rough estimates of
the volume or fraction of exports or imports in domestic supply or out-
put are mentioned for several products. 11 Gosplan noted in the third
edition of the 1st FYP (Gosplan-30) that: "Here it is possible to indi-
10
Gosplan - 30a, p. 101.
11
I have not found any reference to the foreign trade plan for
the draft FYP in reading Gosplan-30a, nor have I fonnd any references
to such a plan in any other sources,sU'ch as Zaleski-62, who made a
thorough study of the 1st FYP - his references to a five year plan for
trade are not from the summary volumes, such as Gosplan-30a, but
from journal articles.
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cate in only the most general form without numerical illustration the
position which both variants of the national economic: .:plan take s with
respect to the question of economic relations with the world economy'! 12
The reasons for this public silence about the development of Soviet for-
eign trade during the five year plan in the summary volumes of the draft
1st FYP can only be surmised. This silence does not mean that the plan-
ners and Soviet leaders were indifferent to the development of foreign
trade during the FYP - on the cont;rary, the development of foreign
trade during the FYP was probably one of their mo st important concerns
as shall be seen below.
Foreign trade pl:ans for both the "draft 1st FYP" and the "adop-
ted 1st FYP" were drawn up by NKVT and these shall be discus sed in
detail below. An interesting question is why target figures for such an
important sector were not included in the summary volumes. There are
two types of reasons. First, no definitive plan existed or at least, no
plan existed to whi ch Gosplan wished to :commit its elf in print, or which
they felt they could rely on because of the uncertainties inherent in the
foreign sector (harvest, prices, marketing, credits, etc.). Or, second,
a definitive plan for foreign trade may have been drawn up or accepted
from other sources by Gosplan, but Gosplan or the Soviet leadership may
have decided to keep it secret for a number of reasons including a) a de-
sire not to reveal Soviet intentions to foreign competitors about Soviet
12' Gosplan- 30a, p. 101. By the third edition, published in
1930, this absence of specific targets may have been the result of the
chaotic conditions existing for Soviet trade during late 1929 and 1930.
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plans for export expansion in certain markets, b) to have an upper hand
in concealing the import needs when purchasing machinery, etc., c) to
conceal from the Soviet and foreign public the') :i:inplications of the foreign
trade plan for the balance of domestic supply and demand, d) to remain
uncommitted on paper so as to permit deviation from the foreign trade
plan without political embarrassment, etc. From statements in both
Gosplan-30a ( which was published after the onset of the world depres-
sion) and in Gosplan-29a (Control Figures for 1928/29) I feel that the
first set of reasons for not publishing a foreign trade plan in either Gos-
plan-30a or in Gosplan-29a is closer to the actual situation prevailing
in 1928 and 1929 - Gosplan was simply not in possession of a foreign
trade plan although they had to make some ass.umptions about the devel-
opment of imports and they did have some general ideas about the sourc-
es of export supply, especially of "industrial exports". 13
Before turning to the foreign trade plans for the 1st FYP we
review briefly the orientation figures for imports for the Perspective
Five Year Plan 1927/28 - 1931/32 worked up by 'VSNKh which was drawn
up during 1927, because changes between this plan for 1927/28 - 1931/
32 and the foreign trade plan for the draft 1st FYP and the foreign trade
plan for the approved 1st FYP are indicative of the deteriorati6nn of for-
eign trade situation between early 1927 and early 1929, and are also
indicative of the greater demands being placed on foreign trade by the
more ambitious economic plans for the national economy.
13 As explained in the Notes to Table XIII. 9 and the text.
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VSNKh's import plan 1927/28 - 1931/32
VSNKh's perspective plan for 1927/28 - 1931/32, which was
completed in 1927, projected a steady but relatively slow increase in
imports for the for the year s 1928/29 - 1931/32 (8% increas e per year
14
compounded annually).
INDEX OF PLANNED IMPORTS
Imports
(1927/28 = 100)
1927/28
100.0
1928/29
106.0
1929/30
116.8
1930/31
126.4
1931/32
136.0
The important unknown is the value of imports in 1927/28 which
was used as a base for the above index. Available evidence suggests
that the NKVT expected imports to be about 830-860 million rubles
(Table T-l). 15 On the basis of this estimate the planned annual growth
14 Chernobaev-29a, p. 20. The compounded growth rate is
for the years 1928/29-1931/32 on a base of 1927/28. These import pro-
jections were made by VSNKh on the basis of exports and "the needs of
the Soviet Union" and were cited by Chernobaev strictly as "orientation,
illustrative materials". Chernobaev cited an average growth of 7.20/0
per year (uncoPlpounded). Growth of imports for the five year period
1927/28-1931/32 which he derived apparently by dividing the total in-
crease of imports in the fifth year as compared to the first year of the
five year period by five. This procedure was either incorrect or assu-'
med that imports in 1927/28 were identical to 1926/27 (which was also
incorrect). If this latter as sump~ion was actually made, this would im-
ply a 6. 5% growth rate of imports (compounded annually). If it was an
error, then the expected average annual growth rate for the four years
1928/29-1930/31 was 9% (uncompounded) and 80/0(compounded annually).
15 Two boundary assumptions about the value of 1927/28 trade
were that VSNKh as sumed that imports in 1927/28 would be equal to
1926/27 imports (713.5 million rubles), and that imports in 1927/28
would be equal to actual 1927/28 imports (945. 5 million rubles). With
this range of as sumptions the range in increase in imports in 1931/32
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rate of imports for 1927/28 - 1931/32 was about 9.5 - 10.5%. Pro-
jected growth of industrial output for planned industry during 1927/28 -
1931/32 was 12-15% per year and was substantially higher than the in-
crease in imports especially in the years 1928/29 - 1929/30.16
Foreign trade and the basic as sumptions of the basic
and optimal variants of the 1st FYP
The success of both variants of the 1st FYP and especially the
succes sful construction of the giant industrial projects were thought to
be - and were in fact - highly dependent on importedt equipment and tec-
hnica1 aid to build the factories, imported raw materials for existing
and new factories, and imported agricultural machinery for the mech-
anization of agriculture. The planned tempo of investment, industrial-
ization and growth depended strongly on imports because of the tempor-
ary structural rigidity of dome stic productive capacity which would pre-
vent savings - 'should they in some sense be "mobilized" - from being
converted into the appropriate set of inputs required to carry out the
desired pattern of investment. Exports, as a consequence, were given
high priority in terms of theory, policy, and even allocation of resource~
as compared to 1926/27 would be between 36% and 80% (or between 6. 5%
and 12. 50/0 compounded annually).
16 Chernovaev-29a, (p. 20). Several variants of the projected
five year plan (1927/28 -1931 / 32) for industrial output have been esti-
mated. According to Strumilin-32a, p. 126, an early variant drawn up
under the guidance of A. Ginsburg projected an 820/0 increase in the
output of planned industry (12. 7% per year compounded growth rate). A
later variant for the same period 1927/28-1931/32 drawn under the
leadership of V.!. Mezhlank projected an 108% increase (about 160/0 per
year compounded growth rate).
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but the importance of exports was based on the pres sing demand for
imports. As has been repeated in many arti:cles and speeches:
The level of our imports depends on the development of our
exports.
Mikoian, Commissar of Trade
Izvestia, March 24, 1929
Basic assumptions about foreign trade. In the very first pages
of the text of the 1st FYP, the basic as sumptions about the relationship
between the fulfillment of the 1st FYP in its two variants and the devel-
opment of foreign trade were spelled out clearly:
The difference between the initial and optimal variants - with
unity of their economic policies - proceeds along the following
lines. The starting variant (referred to as "basic variant"
in this study) takes into account:
(a) the possibility of partial crop failures during the five year
period;
(b) the present-day type of relations with the world economy,
approximately (particularly in the sense of the growth of long-
term credits - namely, a projected increase at the rate chara-
cteristic for recent years);
(c) a relatively less rapid progress in the realization of high
qualitative objectives in economic construction in general and
in agriculture in particular; •.•
The optimal variant, on the contrary, postulates:
(a) the absence of any even moderately serious crop failure
during the five year period;
(b) a considerably greater scope of economic ties with the
world economy by virtue of the presence of greater export re-
sources in the country (complete realization of the decree •••
concerning crop yields) as well as by virtue of a considerably
more rapid growth of long-term foreign credits in the initial
year s of the Five Year Plan;
(c) a sharp shift in the qualitative indicators of economic con-
struction during the next two years (production costs, crop
yields, etc.). 17
17 Gosplan-29b (pp. 9-12) as cited in Spulber-64, pp. 476-477.
Also in Gosplan- 30a, p. 11.
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In the introduction Gosplan also wrote that "The construction of
the collectivized sector in agriculture has been projected on almost the
same scale for both variants, with the greatest possible forcing of this
matter in view of its particular importance. 18 As will be seen in the
discussion below, the fulfillment of the foreign trade plan - especially
in the last three years - was closely tied to the realization of the targets
for agriculture, the succes s of the harvest and the collectivization of
agriculture (which at the time of the drafting of the 1st FYP was being
19planned on a very modest scale - 13. 3% of sown area).
The fulfillment of both the basic variant and the optimal var-
iant depended on the growth of foreign trade and the expansion of cre-
dits. The major differences between the two variants with respect to
foreign trade were the growth of foreign long-term credits, and the
performance of agricultural exports in the last three years of the plan.
For example, the basic variant assumed that grain exports would be re-
sumed in the third year of the FYP. 20 Furthermore the magnitude of
the projected grain exports varied between the two variants. 21
Foreign trade plan for draft FYP 1928/29 - 1932/33
By late 1927/28 NKT had drawn up a draft foreign trade plan
to accompany the draft Perspective Five Year Plans being drawn up by
18
Gosplan-29, (pp. 9-12) as cited in Spulber-64, pp. 476-477.
19 ARCC-31, (p. 50).
20
Gosplan-29b p. 99.
21 .
See below, p. 523.
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Gosplan and VSNKh. The export plan was worked up in two variants
(basic variant and "otpimal" variant) which were almost identical in the
first three years and differed largely in~the assumptions made about the
growth of grain exports and animal-poultry product exports in the last
23
two years (Table Xli. 1). Exports would grow at a compounded rate
of 18. 5% by the basic variant and 21. 50/0 by the optimal variant; these
planned growth rates exceeded the growth rate of exports during NEP,
exceeded by a wide margin the historical growth rate of Tsarist Russia
trade and exceeded the historical growth of exports in most large of
industrialized countries. 24 The two variants were identical during the
first three years; the basic difference was the estimate of grain exports
in th~ last two years of the FYP {and to a lesser extent animal-poulttry
product exports (Table Xli. 2). For example, projected exports of
grain and related products in 1932/33 were 3.9 million tons in the basic
22 This section is based primarily on two articles appearing
inVoprosy Torgovli, Geller-28a and Kaufman-28f. The foreign trade
plan for the 1st FYP (1928/29-1932/33) was perhaps the first draft of a
foreign trade plan drawn up specifically for the draft plans of Gosplan
and VSNKh for 1928/29-1932/33; it was probably worked up during the
summer of 1928, for the complete dat a or even preliminary estimates
of Ioreign trade for 1927/28 was not yet. available and they had to use
"expected" figures, which differed from the final figures.
The f foreign trade plan worked up to accompany the optimal
variant of Gosplan's FYP was significantly different than the plan des-
cribed in this section. See the next section.
Furthermore, Geller-28a (p. 37) noted that it was difficult to
plan foreign trade (exports) without knowing the final targetS: for devel-
opment of industry and agriculture. Gosplan probably felt the same way
about the incomplete foreign tr ade plan.
23 Geller -28a, pp. 40, 47.
24 Projected compound growth rate of exports based on "ex-
pected exports" in 1927/28 (Table XIII. 1) and planned exports in 1932/
33.
TABLE XIII. 1
USSR: ORIENTATION ESTIMATES OF EXPORTS IN 1932/33 OF
DRAFT FYP (BASIC AND OPTIMAL VARIANTS)
COMPARED WITH EXPORTS OF 1927/28
1927/28 1932/33 Plan
Expected
Exports Bas i c Variant 11 Optimal" Variant
millions '70 of millions '70 of 1932/33 millions
'70 of 1932/33
rubles total rubles total as % of total as % of
exports exports 1927/28 rubles exports 1927/28
Agricultural Exports
a. Crops 93. 5 12.0 409.3 22.4 437.8 612.0 29.6 654. 5
b. Animal and poultry 136. 6 17. 5 280.7 15.3 205. 5 333. 1 16. 1 243.9
c. Hunting and fishing 130.0 16. 6 127.0 7. 0 97. 7 129.0 6. 2 99.2
d. Other products of
agricultural 25.4 3. 3 68. 5 3.8 269.7 53.9 2.6 212.2
Total Agricultural 385. 5 49.4 885. 5 48. 5 229.7 1128.0 54.5 292.6
Industrial Exports
a. Mining industry 134. 5 17. 3 353.8 19.4 263.0 353. 8 17. 1 263.0
b. Timber industry 94.2 12. 1 225.3 12. 3 239.2 225.3 10.9 239.2
c. Chemical industry 16. 8 2. 1 69.9 3. 8 416. 1 69.9 3.4 416. 1
d. Food industry 61. 5 7. 9 125. 3 6. 9 203.7 125. 3 6. 1 203.7
e. Textile industry 66.8 8. 6 122. 5 6. 7 183.4 122. 5 5.9 183.4
f. Other branches 20. 5 2. 6 43.6 2.4 212.7 43.6 2. 1 212.7
Total industry 3q4 3 50 6 Q40.4 51 5 238.5 Q40 4 45 5 238.5
TOTAL EXPORTS 779.8 100.0 1825. 9 100.0 234. 1 2068.4 100. 0 265.2
Source: Notes to Table XIII. 1, Appendix B, p. 770.
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TABLE XIII. 2
USSR: ORIENTATION ESTIMATES OF IMPORT REQUIREMENTS
FOR DRAFT FYP IN 1932/33 COMPARED WITH
IMP ORTS OF 1927/28
~xpected 1927/28 1932/33 Plan 1932/33
millions %of total millions %of tota % of
rubles imports rubles imports 1927/28
1. Equipment for industry 200.0 22.4 300.0 20.6 150.0
and electrification
2. Equipment for trans- 33. 5 3. 8 125.0 8. 6 373. 1
port and communal
needs
3. Raw materials 352.2 39.4 543.0 37. 2 154.2
4~ Semi-proce s sed 84.2 9.4 60.0 4. 1 71. 3
materials
5. Needs for agriculture 39.4 4.4 84.0 5. 8 213.2
Total Producers' Imports 709.3 79.4 1112.0 76. 3 156.8
1. Foodstuffs 94.9 10. 7 174.0 11. 9 183.4
2. Needs for public health 8. 9 1.0 9.0 O.7 101. 2
3. Cultural goods 9.2 1.0 17. 5 1.2 190.2
4. Manufactured consumers' 4.9 O. 5 50.0 3.4 1020. 5
goods
Total Consumers' Imports 117.9 13. 2 250. 5 17. 2 212. 5
Other goods 60.0 6. 7 60.0 4. 1 100.0
Reserves 6.'0 O. 7 35. 0 2.4 583.4
Total Imports 893. 1 100. 0 1457. 5 100. 0 163.4
Source: Notes to Table XIII. 3, Appendix B, p. 770.
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variant and 6. 5 million tons in the optimal variant; average annual
exports of grain and related products were 2 million tons during 1923/
24 - 1927/28 and 11.3 million tons during 1909-13.25 Geller and others
emphasized that even thLs.:modest grain export program (compared to
1909-13) depended on the timely and effective development of kokhozy
and sovkhozy, which in turn required "large financial means" and a
large supply of imported and domestic agricultural equipment.26 Both
agricultural exports and industrial exports were to be expanded at the
same rate so that Soviet exports would continue to rely more on the
export of the so-called industrial exports (about 1/2) than foreign trade
of Tsarist Russia (1/4 industrial exports). 27 Economists in NKT em-
phasized strongly that this was the maximum expansion of industrial
exports which could reasonably be expected by the end of the FYP and
28only one variant of the industrial export component was drawn up.
Industrial exports would be limited in the first years of the FYP by in-
sufficient productive capacity, but a large investment program in oil,
timber, and other exports industries (more than 2 billion rubles during
the FYP was projected by VSNKh)would:increase output capacity, esp-
ecially of the extractive industries, so much so that the barrier to fur-
25 Kaufman-28f, p. 9, and Table III. 23.
26 Geller-28a, p. 40 and p. 46. Kaufman-28f, p. 8.
27 Tables III. 3 and XIII. 1.
28
Geller-28a (p. 38) noted the plans for industrial exports
were less uncertain because of greater control over state industry.
Agricultural exports would grow slightly faster in the optimal variant.
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ther expansion of industrial exports by the end of ~he FYP would be the
limited foreign demand for more Soviet export goods (especially oil,
.29
timber, asbestos, manganese). Geller also viewed the world cartels
as a barrier to the growth of Soviet exports in oil, timber and a series
of less significant Soviet exports. 30 Other potential industrial exports
could not be expanded because very rapidly rising domestic demand
(chemicals and fertilizers) combined also with limited raw materials
from agriculture (vegetable oil, canned goods, starch products, linen
31
cloth). Geller though that these estimates of industrial export possib-
29 Geller-28a, pp. 46, 47. He cited for oil, the problems of
Venezuala oil, dominance of world monopolies, increasing refining of
oil within boudaries of consuming nations, prospect of synthetic oil
(Ibid., pp. 38-39, 43). Similar p.poblems were cited for timber. The
export plan would double the market share of the USSRoil exports in
Europe and would take 3/4 of the increase in European consumption of
raw timber (Ibid.). Foreign market capacity was specifically cited as
making unprofitable any more investment in the timber than planned for
by the end of the FYP (Ibid.). Soviet markets for raw materials were
in Western Europe and less in the USA, while the export markets for
their manufactured goods (sugar, cloth, canned goods, metal articles)
were also limited by the size of the market and the implementatione of
the "net balance principle" which did not permit running a large export
surplus or deficit with the Eastern countries. See Geller -28a, p. 44.
30 Geller -28a, p. 7. See Mason-46 for a study of world car-
tels and commodity agreements during the inter -war period. The Soviet
government itself participated in several commodity or cartel agree-
ments including lumber, wheat, sugar, watches, platinum, asbestos,
oil, electric lamps, phosphates, potash and soda ash (Ibid., p. 14).
But the USSRhad to purchase ma:q.ycommodities sold by world or re-
gional cartels and I agree with Mason-46 (p. 14) that the USSR's losses
from being forced to buy from cartels :pTobablywere greater than its
gainse These latter cartels, however, existed independent of the USSR.
31 Geller -28a, pp. 43-44.
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ilities by VSNKhmight be excessive in view of these factors. 32 Accor-
ding to Geller, agricultur al exports would be limited by insufficient
exports surpluses and these could not be expanded :more rapidly be-
caus e of the growing demand of the expanding urban population and in-
dustrial sector and because of the state Is lack of direct control on out-
33put and marketing decisions of the peasant. He also p.0inted out that
foreign market demand would limit meat exports and possibly butter
exports.34 Exports would grow slowly in the early years (because of
time required for "reconstruction") and the resultant constraint on im-
ports (to maintain a trade surplus) would cause "great tension" in the
supply of imported materials and machinery so that the needs of several
low-priority industries would not be met. 35 But by 1932/33 the volume
of exports would finally exceed average exports for 1909-13 by 14.20/0in
the basic variant and 30. 1% in the optimal variant (with Soviet adjust-
ment for territorial loss). 36 It is important to note that Geller and
others thought that there were no other possibilities for further expan-
32 Geller -28a, p. 44.
33 Geller-28. He noted that "lOO's of millions of rubles" were
to be spent on butter facgories, elevators, flax factories, refrigerated
warehouse, bacon factories, etc. (Ibid., p. 46). But this investment
merely improved the quality and value - still the basic raw inputs into
this investment (and its intensity of use) depended on the peasants I will-
ingness to market and increase output.
34 Geller-28a, p. 47. We also saw that the market for Russ-
ian eggs was limited.
35 Geller-28a, p. 47.
36 Ibid., p. 40. Exports in 1932/33 in pre-19l4 prices would
be 1493.8 million rubles and 1701. 1 million rubles in the two variants.
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ding exports and that even this export program rested on large-scale
investments in the export field and in socialist agriculture. The
barriers to further export expansion were world markets and the slow
growth of agricultural surplus with rapidly rising domestic demand. 37
The import plan was drawn up only in one variant and projected
a 63.2% increase in imports in 1932/33 over 1927/28 levels (10.3%
annual compounded growth rate) (Table XIII. 2). The reason for such
a low target for.planned growth of imports relative to exports was the
need to go from a 113. 3 million rubles trade "expected deficit" in 1927/
28 to a minimum large (368.4 million rubles) trade surplus by 1932/33;8
Some trade surplus was simply necessary to cover the other current
"invisible items" (about 80 million rubles in 1927/28).39 But the plan-
ners wanted also to accumulate reserves of foreign exchange and com-
modities to p~rmit the trade agencies more flexibility in the sale and
purchase of goods in world markets rather than being forced to export
at once and buy at the last minute. 40 The planned trade surpluses and
complete satisfaction of import needs" in 1932/33, however, concealed
the great strain in the foreign trade plan in the early years. In addition
37 Geller -28a. This theme runs through his article. '
38
Geller -28a, p. 45•. Presumably if the optimal export plan
was realized, they would also expand imports, but no extra variant was
worked up.
39 Table T-14.
40
Geller -28a, p. 45. See also Ianovski-29a, p. 50.
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to the rapid expansion of imports, considerable import-substitution
was also planned as a means of reducing the tension in the foreign trade
sector and to make the economy more independent of the world economy
in its most important branches and Geller pointed out that the success in
the "foreign trade plan" depended also on the large investment plan for
cotton irrigation, non-ferrous metals, and machine-building. 41 The
target shares of imports in 1932/33 compared to 1927/28 and 1913 are
presented in Table XIV. 3. Imports of raw materials would continue to
rise but at a less rapid rate than the consumption of raw materials, .so
that the share would fall. In 1927/28 the demand for imported raw mat-
erials (especially cotton, wool, leather) was unfulfilled, and despite
efforts to increase domestic output by the end of the FYP, increases in
both imports and domestic production would be needed to satisfy all
domestic needs fully. Similarly with machinery and agricultural equip-
mente Only imports of semiprocessed materials (paper, checmiaals).
would fall absolutely as well as relatively.42 Geller noted the large
deficit in the machinery supply needed for carrying out VSNKh' s invest-
ment plan for industry in the early years and he doubted that exports
could be expanded rapidly enought in the early years to permit the rapid
expansion of machinery imports required to barry out the plan.43 As an
41 Geller-28a, p. 46.
42
Paper imports would be ended by the end of the FYP and the
imports of dyes and semi-processed materials would be reduced because
of increased domestic output (Geller-28a, p. 42).
43
Geller-28a, p. 48.
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TABLE XIII. 3 (continued)
Actual Plan ActualVariant 1913 ' [927/28 1932/33 1932 1933(Russia)
Alum.inu:m (1000 m.. t. )
18. dom.estic output 0.0 0.0 5.0 O. 9 4.4
19. im.ports 1.8 5. 8 5. 7 10. 6 12.8
20. total supply 1.8 5. 8 10. 7 11. 5 17.2
21. im.ports % of supply 100. 0% 100. 0% 53. 3% 92. 2% 74. 4%
Nickel
22. im.ports % supply opt. var. 100. 0% 100. 0% 44. 0% 100.0% 100. 0%
Cotton
23. dom.e stic output opt. yare 239.0 209.0 606.0 386.3 394.8
24. im.ports opt. yare 197.0 145. 0 78.7 21. 0 10. 5
25 .. total supply opt. var. 436.0 354.0 684.7 407.3 405.3
26. im.ports % of supply opt. yare 45.2% 41.0% 19. 5% 5.2% 2.6%
im.ports % of supply draft 36.40/0 42.3% 24. 80/0 5. 2 % 2. '6%
Fine Wool
27. im.ports % planned supply draft 47. 5 88.3% slightly less
Wool
28. im.ports % planned supply opt. var. 43.9 36. 1
Leather
29. i:mports % consum.ption draft 10 .. 00/0 11. 20/0 higher
TABLE XIII. 3 (continued)
Actual Plan ActualVariant 1913 1927/28 1932/33(Russia) 1932 1933
Industrial Machinery
30. iTIlports % of supply opt. var. 50% 27.2% 21.8%
Agricultural Machinery
31. iTIlports % of supply opt. var. 9.6% 7.6%
Tractors
32. iTIlports % supply opt. var. 100. 0% 67.5% 21.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Source: Notes'to Table XIII. 3, Appendix B,p. 771.
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indication of the problem, he presented the following rough estimates
of the supply and demand for equipment for industry and electrifi'cation.
PROJECTED MACHINERYBALANCE 1926/27 - 1932/33
(millions of rubles)
26/27 27/28 28/29 29/30 30/31 31/32 32/33
Total Capital Expenditure in Industry
and Electrification (VSNKhdata)
1154.0 1578.8 1943.6 2654.6 2861.6 2867.4 2665. 1
Required Expenditure on Equipment
(400/0 of total cost of construction)
461.6 631.5 777.4 1061.8 1144.6 1147.0 1066.0
Domestic Output of Equipment (VSNKhdata)
(in prices of respective year)
356.6 443.6 518, 3 569.8 603.8 651.0 752.0
Deficit of Equipment
(Supplied by Imports?)
105.6 187.9 269.1 498.1 540.8 496.0 314.0
Presumably the deficit was to be covered by imported equipment. Geller
had similar doubts about the combined ability of imports and domestic
output~ to provide sufficient tractors and fertilizer for agriculture in the
early years to permit the mechanizati()n and intensification of agricult-
ure required to expand exports in later years, for the new domestic fac-
tories would produce only toward the end of the FYP, and import re-
sources were inadequate in the short-run to permit much expansion of
imports for agricultural"producers.45 Thus, the inadequate supply of
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machinery from domestic output and inputs was looked at as a barrier
to implementing the investment plans - as in the traditional investment-
goods growth models. Nobodymentioned that one might actually cut
back the imports of raw materials for light industry and thereby "force"
consumers to save (not consume) so as to permit the necessary mach-
inery imports in the short-run. Instead they alluded to the great strain
in the foreign trade plan and in the short supply of imports in the early
years of the FYP. In some sense the FYP could be interpreted as an
effort to break out of the tightening bands of import shortages which
increasingly threatened to slow the growth of the economy to a snail's
pace by the end of NEP 0 '
The final foreign trade plan for the
approved version of the 1st FYP.
In April 1929, the optimal version of the draft 1st FYP was
approved and made official. About the same time NKT published a
series of articles in various journals (fairly obscure journals for the
most part) about the foreign trade plan dnawn up to accompany the ap-
proved optimal ver sion of the FYP. 46 These foreign trade plans are
largely unknown in the West and largely undiscussed in the USSR - esp-
ecially when discussing the fulfillment of the 1st Fyp.47 NKT's foreign
44 Geller -28a, p. 48. Domestic machinery prices were higher
substantially higher than prices of imported machinery.
45 Geller-28a, p. 48.
46 The May, 1929 issue of Voprosy Torgovli contain numerous
articles, which have been summarized in Gosplan-30b, pp. 196-216.
47 The only study on the foreign trade plans of the 1st FYP is
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trade plan was drawn up by the Torgplan section of NKT; contrary to
the basic assumptions about the more rapid growth of long-term cre.-
dits assumed in the optimal variant of the FYP, NKT's final foreign
48
trade plan as sumed no growth in foreign credits. Kaufman justified
Torgplan's assumption because "it would be incorrect to include in the
projection of the Five Year Plan an increase of foreign credits. It is
more correct and more probable to consider only our own resources.,,49
NKT's foreign trade plan
NKT's final foreign trade plan for the 1st FYP (1928/29 - 1932/
33) reflected the actual developments of foreign trade in 1927/28 and the
expected pressures on the balance of payments in the first two years of
the 1st FYP. In 1927/28 the value of exports stagnated at 1926/27 levels,
(actually declined slightly in volume) while the value of imports rose
sharply causing a huge trade deficit and catastrophic depletion of foreign
reserves.
Differences between the final foreign trade plan and the draft
foreign trade plan. The final ver sion of the for eign tr ade plan for the
adopted 1st FYP (optimal variant of Gosplan's Draft FYP) was worked
up in a single variant which differed significantly from either variant of
Zaleski-62, pp. 102-104, 142-45, and 246-50. Bettelheim-40 discusses
more general problems of planning foreing trade and its relationship to
industrialization, but does not treat foreign trade plans for the 1st FYP
in detail. Gosplan-33a does not mention the foreign trade sector in dis-
cus sing the fulfillment of the 1st FYP.
48 Kaufman-29a, p. 93.
49 Ibid.
TABLE XIII.4
USSR: FOREIGN TRADE PLAN FOR VALUE OF EXPORTS AND IMPORTS DURING 1st FYP
(millions of rubles in current prices)
Russia Totals
Annual Actual Actual Plan Plan Plan Plan Plan Planned
Average 1926/27 1927/28 1928/29 1929/30 1930/31 1931/32 1932/33 for
1909-13 FYF
Total Export 1487. 1 779.4 781. 8 910.0 1078.4 1272. 2 1662. 6 2047.5 6971. 7
Agricultural 1127.3 448.5 364.9 386.8 423.7 497.4 776.6 1033.0 3117.5
Industrial 359.8 330.7 416. 9 523.5 654.3 774.6 886.4 1014. 5 3853.3
Total Imports 1139.0 712.7 944.7 754.8 950.0 1220. 0 1550.0 1705. 0 6179.8
Producers I goods 646.8 626.2 796.2 - - - - 1273.0 4823.0
Consumers I goods (493. 0) 80. 8' 142.3 - - - - 282.0 925.0
Machinery (126. 8) 152.3 256.0 158.0 240.5 350.0 510. 1 525. 5 1784.0
Raw Mate rials (291.7) 328.0 384.0 296. 5 399.5 400.0 482. 1 523.3 2046.4
All other goods (720. 5) 231. 7 304.6 300.3 365.0 470.0 557.8 657.0 2349.0
_ semi-processed (138 ) 101. 9 117. 1 - - - - 60.0 370
on ( 50 ) 5. 6 O. 6~. fuels - - - - - -
-.-4
~ agri. prod. gds ( 91 ) 37. 8 39.0 - - - - 165. 0 622g consumer s I gds (493 ) 80.8 142.3 - - - - 282.0 925
~ "other"
- - - - - - -
150.0 430
Balance of Trade 348. 1 66. 7 -162.9 155.2 128.4 52.2 112. 6 342.5 791. 9
Source: Notes to Table XIII. 4, Appendix B, p. 773.
TABLE XIII. 5
USSR: INDEX OF FOREIGN TRADE PLANNED FOR 1st FYP AND BASED ON THE VALUE
OF EXPORTS AND IMPORTS IN CURRENT PRICES, 1927/28 =100
(based on values in current prices)
1913-Russia
Actual Actual PlanCurrent 1927/28 Plan Plan Plan Plan
prices prices ~926/27 1927/28 1928/29 1929/30 1930/31 1931/32 1932/33
Total Export 192.6 312.3 99.7 100.0 116.4 137.9 162. 7 212.7 261. 9
Agricultural 277.9 - 122. 9 100.0 106. 0 116. 1 136. 3 212.8 283. 1
Industrial 92.8 - 79.3 100.0 125. 6 156. 9 185. 8 212.6 293.3
Total Imports 145.4 169. 5 75.4 100. 0 79. 9 100. 6 121. 1 164.0 180.5
Producers (Ill. 1)
- 78.6 100. 0 - - - - 159.9
Consumers (275.5)
- 56.8 100.0 - - - - 198.2
Machinery 67. 3
- 59. 7 100.0 61. 7 93.9 136. 7 199.3 205.3
Raw Mate rials 89.3 - 85.4 100.0 77.2 89.7 104.2 125. 5 136. 3
All othe r good s 281. 4
-
76. 1 100.0 98. 6 119. 8 154.3 183. 1 215. 7
on. d (181.4) 87. 0 100.0 51. 2~ seml-processe
- - - - -
't1 (167. 4) 96.9 100.0 423. 1...-l agr. prod. gds - - - - -() .
~ consumers (274. 5) - 56. 8 100.0 - - - - 198.2-,-I
-
Source: Notes to Table XIII. 5, Appendix B, p. 775.
TABLE XIII. 6
USSR: ANNUAL GROWTH RATES OF FOREIGN TRADE DURING NEP
AND PLANNED FOR 1st FYP
(based on values in current prices)
- Average Annual
% IncreIIlent Preceding Year av.annualGrowth Rate over growth
Russia ~923/24- Actual Plan Plan Plan Plan Plan rate
1900-1913 1927/28 1927/28 1928/29 1929/30 1930/31 1931/32 1932/33 for FYP
Total Export 5.9% 10.5% 0.3% 16.4% 18.5% 18.0% 30.7% 23.1% 21.1%
Agricultural
- - -18. 4% 6.0% 9.5% 17.4% 56. 1% 33.0% 23.1%
Industrial
- - +26. 1% 25.6% 24.9% 18.4% 14.4% 14.4 19.5%
Total IIIlports 6. 1% 21. 10/0 32.6% - 20. 1% 25.9% 28.4% 27.0% 10.0% 12.5%
Producers
- - 27.2% - - - - - 9.8%
ConSUIIler s
- - 76.1% - - - - - 14.7%
Machinery - - 67.5% -39.3% 52.2% 45.6 45.8 3. 0 15.5%
Raw Materials - - 17.9% -22. 8% 16.2% 16.2% 20.4 8. 6 6.5%
All other goods - - 31.4% - 1.4% 21. 50/0 28. 8 18. 6 17. 8 16.6%
;:a- seIIli-processed - - 14.9% - - - - - -12.5%
r-i 3.2% 33.5%g agr. prod. gds - - - - - - -
:.::. conSUIIlers - - 76.1% - - - - - 14.7%
Source: Notes to Table XIII. 6, Appendix B, p.776.
TAB LE XIII. 7
USSR: STRUCTURE OF FOREIGN TRADE DURING NEP AND PLANNED
STRUCTURE DURING THE 1st FYP
(based on values in current prices)
t<7< fT t IEtf EtStD ruc ure a x par s : 0 a a a xpor s
Averagea Actual Actual Plan Plan Plan Plan Plan Plan
1909-13 1926/27 1927/28 1928/29 1929/30 1930/31 1931/32 1932/33 FYP
Total Exports 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
A. Agricultural 75. 8 57. 5 46.6 42. 5 39.3 39. 1 46.7 50. 5 44.7
B. Industrial 24.2 42.4 53. 3 57. 5 60.7 '60.9 53. 3 49. 5 55. 3
t<7< fT t IItf ItStE ruc ure a :m.por s : 0 a a a :m.por s
Total Imports 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
A. Machinery 11. 1 21.'4 27. 1 20.9 25. 3 28.7 32.9 30.8 28.9
B. Raw Mate rials 25. 6 46.0 40.6 39.3 36. 3 32. 8 31. 1 30.7 33. 1
C. Other 63.3 32. 5 32.2 39. 8 38.4 38. 5 36. 0 38. 5 38.0
Source: Notes to Table XIII. 7, Appendix B, p. 776.
aR .us Sla.
TAB LE XIII. 8
USSR: PROJECTED ANNUAL GRAIN EXPORTS FOR FIRST FYP
AND THEIR EFFECT ON THE TOTAL FOREIGN TRADE PLAN
(m.illions of rubles)
tEG1 d'Id PITF orelgn ra e an nc u Ing r aln xpor s
Actual Plan Plan Plan Plan Plan
1927/28 1928/29 1929/30 1930/31 1931/32 1932/33 Plan F YP
I. Total Exports 781. 8 910 1078 1272 1663 2048 6971
2. Agricultural 364.9 387 424 497 777 1033 3118
3. Grain (estim.ate) 59.0 ( 0) ( 0) ( 74) (295) (440) 809
4. Industrial 416.9 524 654 775 886 1015 3853
5. Total Im.ports 944. 7 755 951 1221 1551 1706 6179
6. Balance of Trade
-162.9 +155 +127 +51 +112 +342 +792
EG1 d'Ed PITForeig-n ra e an xc u 1 n Q' raIn xDorts
7. Total Exports 722.8 910 1078 1207 1367 1608 6162
(excluding grain)
8. Agricultural 305.9 387 424 423 481 593 2309
(excluding grain)
9. Industrial 416.9 524 645 775 886 1015 3853
10. Total Imports 944.9 755 951 1221 1551 1706 6179
II. Balance of Trade
- 222. 1 +155 +127 -14 -184 ':'98 -17
(excluding grain
exports)
Source: Notes to Table XIII. 8, Appendix B, p. 776.
TABLE XIII. 9
USSR: NKVT's EXPORT PLAN FOR FIRST FYP AND FOR 1932/33 COMPARED TO 1927/28
(ITIillions rubles, current prices)
Actual Actual Actual 1927 /2g.
a ) Plan 1932/33 Entire
1913 1926/27 Value % Total Value % Total Index FYPExoorts Exoorts 1927/28=100
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total Exports 1505. 9 779.4 (774.4) 100.0 2047.0 100.0 264.6 6971. 7
A. Agricultural Exports 1014.2 448.5 382. 3 49.4 1033. 0 50.5 270.2 3117. 5
l. Major croM (697.2) (237. 1) 95. 3 12. 3 543.5 26.6 570.3 -
a. grains{ (595. 9) (208.1) 52.5 6.8 440.0 21. 5 837.5 809.0
(inc. oil seed)
bo flax :::~ 94.2 20.8 24.2 3.1 66.5 3.2 274.8 -
co heITIp & oakuITI 23.7 1.9 3. 7 o. 5 8. 0 c 0.4 218.0 -
do tobacco~:' 6.6 4.4 4.9 0.6 12.0 o. 6 247.4
-
e. medicinal herbs~:' 6. 6 4.4 4.7 0.6 11. 0 O. 5 236.6 -
f • seeds: non-oil~:' 6.6 4.4 5.4 0.7 6.0 o. 3 110.7 -
2. Animal & poultry 135. 2 17.5 :..3.190 5 13. 6 236.3-
.; t
a. butter ~1.6 c:f4.2 b P9.2 a·
l N·' ~{ ~t~ ol -.i. 45. 2 ~ 5.8 N.;b. eggs ~ 90.7 ~ 29.0 ~'ibacon ~ 5.1 4.8 9.6 ~ 1.2 N,:,c. ~ J
_,,
d. poultry, killed'"- 9.7 1.3 18. 0
· 9 185.6 -
e. guts (sausage
casing) ~:' 10. 7 1.4 19. 0 .9 177.6 -
f. hor sehair~:' 13.1 2.3 2.4 . 3 2.5
· 1 104.2 -
g. bristles':' 8. 9 6.7 6.6 . 9 11. 0
· 5 166. 7 - U1
h. rawhide 47.7 5. 7 4.5 . 6 10. 0
· 5 222.2 - ~N
TABLE XIII.9 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) ( 5) (6) (7) (8)
2. (continued)
-" 2.3 . 3i. feathers & down'l' 5.0 . 2 217.4
-
j. cocoons ~:< 1.7 . 2 4.0 . 2 235.3
-
k. other animal prod. 3. 3 .4 (s.7.8 . 3 236.4
-
3. Fur & fish 15. 1 96.3 132.2 17.1 130.0 6.4 98.3
-
a. fur 6.5 86.1 119. 3 15.4 110. 0 5.4 92.2
-
b. fish (excluding 8.6 10. 2 13. 7 1.8 20.0 1.0 146.0
-
canned(d) )
4. Other >::: 19. 6 2.5 40.0 2.0 204.0
-
B. Industrial Exports (e) (484. 2) (336. 7) 391. 6 50.6 1014. 5 49.6 259.0 3853.3
l. Forest & mining 241. 2 207.1 230.5 9.8 678.4 33.1 294.3
-
a. lumber 166. 0 80.4 LC (?4.1 I..C': 12. 1 0' r c~{ ["-- [3.Jb. oil products 50.4 89.4 106. 7 ~13. 7 ~ 2258.8~ ~ --l CD14.5 24.1 ~ 13.8 1.7 ('l) ('~c. manganese 0r~ '" C':d. other mining ' .... "'C ~17. 0 "2.2 46.5 2.3 -
2. Food processing
industry 27.6 31. 2 48.7 6. 3 99.6 4.9 204.5 -
a. sugar 34.2 4.4 33.8 1.7 98.8 -
b. oil seed pressing . 7 24.3 1.2
industry
c. canned goods
(fish) 2.0 .0 24.0 1.2
d. other foods -
processed 7.2 . 9 16. 6 . 8 230.5
TABLE XIII.9 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) ( 5) (6) (7) (8)
3. Other industry 112.4 14.5 236.5 11. 5 210.4
-
che:mica1 industry :::~ :::< 21. 4 2.8 76.5 3.7 357.5a.
-
b. textile 63.3 8.2 14. 5 5.6 180. 8
-
i. cotton cloth 4.39 20.9 49.8 6.4 74.0 3.6 148.6
-
ii. other textiles
....1......1...
13. 5(flax, etc. ) ',"I' 1.7 40.5 2.0 300.0
-
c. other industries
....'......1...
28.2 3.6(n. e. s. ) 'I' ',' 45.5 2.2 161. 3
-
Source: Notes to Table XIII. 9, Appendix' B, p. 778.
TABLE XIII. 10
US S R : N K TIs IMP 0 R T P LAN FOR THE F Y P (19 2 8 /29 - 1932 /33 )
(millions of rubles, current prices)
A c tu al Plan 1932/33 Value
1927/28 %of total % of total 1927/281 9 1 3 1926/27 value FYP
value imports imports = 100
Total Imports 1374.0 712.7 945.5 100. 0 1705. 0 100. 0 180.0 6971
A. aProducers I goods 884.4 626.2 796. 1 84.3 1273.0 74.7 159.9 4823
L Machinery for
industry and 172.4 152.8 255.8 27. 1 525.0 30.8 205. 1 1784
transport
2. Raw materials 343. 1 328. 1 383.6 40.6 523.0 30.7 136. 2 2047
3. Semi-processed
goods 212.4 101.9 117. 1 12.4 60.0 315 51. 3 370
4. Import for agri-
cultural purposes 65.3 37. 8 39.0 4. 1 165.0 9. 6 431. 1 622
B. Consumer Goods 392.0 80.8 142.9 15. 1 282.0 16. 5 197. 2 925
L Goods for general
consumption 392.0 80.8 120.0 12. 7 250.0 14. 6 208.3 814
2. Hygenic & medical 392.0 80.8 10. 5 1.1 12.0 0.7 114. 3 45
3. Cultural 392.0 80.8 12. 5 1.3 20.0 1.2 160.0 66
C. Diverse Commodities 91. 6 5. 7 5. 6 0.6 150.0 8.8 - - 430
aSee Appendix A, Technical Note 4 for description of goods included in each category.
Source: Notes to Table XIII. 10, Appendix B, p. 781.
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TABLE XIII. 11
COMPARISON OF FOREIGN TRADE PLAN AND BASIC INDICATORS
OF THE OPTIMAL VARIANT OF THE FYP
1927/28 = 100
Total Exports
Agricultural
Industrial
Total Imports
Machinery
Raw materials
Consumer, agricultural, other
National Income
1926/27 prices
Cur rent price s
Gross Industrial Output - All Industries
1926/27 prices
Current prices
Gross Output of "A!' Industry
1926/27 prices
Current prices
Gross Output of "B" Industry
1926/27 prices
Current prices.
Agricultural Output
Pre-war prices
lq27/2R 1932/33 - Plan
100 265
100 270
100 259
100 180
100 205
100 136
100 215
100 203
100 175
100 232
100 182
100 302
100 214
100 204
100 166
100 154
Source: Notes to Table XIII. 11, Appendix B, p. 781.
547
the draft export plan and from the draft import plan drawn up in mid-
1928. The foreign trade plan projected a 165% increase in exports, an
80% increase in imports during the five year period. The target for
total exports of 1932/33 in the final foreign trade plan was only slightly
below the total export target of the optimal variant of the draft export
plan (in value terms, but not in percentage growth). 50 But the final plan
was less optimistic about the prospects of crop (grain and flax) and ani-
mal-poultry exports in 1932/33 than the draft optimal export plan, for
the grain marketing crisis repeated itself in the latter half of 1927/28.
Instead, the final export plan emphasized mining and timber exports
more than the draft optimal export plan. That is, the final export plan
shifted its structure even more toward state-controlled industrial ex-
ports and away from reliance on peasant agriculture. 51
The final import plan for 1932/33 of 1705 million rubles was
significantly higher (17%) than the draft import plan for 1932/33 of
1458 million rubles for the FYP and again called for increased imports
of vi<rtually every clas s of imports except semi-proces sed materials.
The bulk of the increase in import targets was for equipment imports
(from 425 million in draft import plan to 525 million in final import plan)
and to imports of producers I godds for agriculture (from 84 to 165 mil-
lion rubles). The projected trade surplus for 1932/33 was slightly
lower in the final plan, but a larger sum was allocated to ~_'reserves 1/
(presumably for emergency imports or possibly for military or defense
50
Compare Table XIII. 1 and Xill. 10.
51 Ibid.
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needs). Did the pressure for higher import plans force the planners to
opt for the higher variant of the export plan even though the outlook for
agricultur al exports deteriorated during the winter of 1928/29?
Tension in the foreign trade sector during first two y.ears. The
projected distribution of exports and imports during the I st FYP is
.. 52InterestIng.
FOREIGN TRADE PLAN FOR 1st FYP (1928/29 - 1932/33)
Index, 1927/28 = 100 (current prices)
Export
Import
1927/28
100
100
1928/29
116
80
1929/30
138
101
1930/31
163
129
1931/32
213
164
1932/33
262
180
Percentage increase over preceding year
Export
Imports
( - ). 6 17. 6
32 • 5 (- ) 20. 0
18. 5
25.9
18. 0
28.4
30.8
27. 0
23. 5
10. 0
Exports were projected to grow at 180/0per year during the
first ,~hree year s (1928/29 - 1930/ 3l} largely on the basis of increased
industrial product exports; the projected growth in exports during the
last two years was to be raised to 30.8% and 23. 50/0and was to be based'
almost entirely on expanded exports of grain which would be made pos-
sible through the development of collective farms. 5,? As Gosplan noted:
52 Tables XIII. 5 and XIII. 6.
53 See Tables XIII. 4-6 and XIII. 8. Table XIII. 8 illustrates
the great importance of grain exports for fulfillment of the foreign trade
plan for the entire FYP.
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••• The development of state and collective farms will be of
particular importance in its effects upon the export trade. The
extension of the socialized sector will bring about an increase
in the relative amount of the marketable portion of agricultural
output, and this will not only result in making available for ex-
port additional grain supplies from the socialized sector, but
will also furnish a firmer and more reliable basis for the real-
ization of the export program. 54
Exports would be expanded more rapidly than total gros s output, and
industrial exports would be expanded more rapidly than gros s industrial
output, but agricultural exports would be expanded les s rapidly than
gross agricultural output in the early years and much more rapidly than
gros s agricultural output in the later years. 55
The projected growth of imports. was much lower than the
projected growth of exports and was also lower than the projected growth
of industrial output and investment. 56 The total projected increase in
imports for the five years compounded annually (as compared to a 21%
annual growth rate for exports). The restraint in the projected growth
of imports was due almost entirely to the balance of payments constraint
and the restricted growth of imports increased the tautness in the plan,
especially in the first years. As Kaufman, a planner of foreign trade
for NKT noted:
The first two years of the projected five year plan of foreign
trade are them-ost strained, and to a certain degree places a
limit on the development of industrial and agricultural output.
Therefore, in these two years special effort in the field of
foreign trade is required to assure the plan tempo of the dev-
elopment of industry and also partially agriculture .•• the
third year is Ie s s strained. 57
54
Gosplan-30b, p. 199.
55 Table XIII. 11.
56 Tables XIII. 11 and XIII. 4.
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Imports were to be reduced 20% in the first year of the plan,
restored to 1927/28 levels in 1929/30 and increased 28% in the third
year of the plan so that the annual growth rate of imports during the
first three years of the plan would be about 9% per year. Imports were
to be expanded 27% in the fourth year and only 100/0in the last year of
the 1st FYP: this decline in:~the growth rate of imports in the last year
would be due largely to a sharp cutback in the expansion of machinery
imports which would be possible because of the new machine-building
factories (Table XIII. 6). The foreign trade plan projected a trade sur-
plus for each year of the FYP. This trade surplus, especially in the
early years of the FYP, was not evidence against the notion that the
foreign trade plan was "strained" during the early years. Just the
opposite. It was the need to force a trade surplus .'because of balance
of payments pressures that forced the reduction in imports the forcing
of exports and the general strain in the first two years. These balance
of payments pressures included repayment of some credits, the growing
interest payments on the outstariding foreign debt, the projected increase
in expenditures on technical as sistance from engineering firms and
skilled foreign personel, and the previous general level of expenditures
on the invisibles trade items and the need to rcest'ore s'omewhat their
depleted foreign reserve boldings (Tables T-14and T":"J6).
The most important conclusion here is that only a moderate in-
crease in imports would be pos sible even if the optimistic export plan
57 Kaufman-29a, p. 93.
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was realized because of the balance of payments constraints. It was
always emphasized that the plan targets for investment and imports
could be raised if a large flow of foreign capital became available. 58
Equilibrium in the 1st FYP and import substitution
The different planned trends of machinery imports and raw
material imports for the 1st FYP reflect the planned trends of invest-
ment (using machinery) and light industry (chief consumer of raw and
semi-processed materials). Comparing the growth of the main users of
machinery (investment) and the major consumer of raw materials and
semi-processed materials (light industry and also heavy industry), we
see that considerable "import substitution" would be necessary to real-
ize the plan targets even though exports (and imports) would grow rapid-
ly during the Fyp:59
1927/28 1932/33
Imports of machinery 100 205
Inve stment in basic capital
at 1926/27 prices 100 321
Imports of materials 100 136
Gros s output of "B" industry
in 1926/27 prices 100 204
The general expansion of investment and other import-consum-
ing activities and especially light industry (or so-called import-depen-
dent activities) at a higher growth rate than the maximum feasible
58
Gosplan- 30b, p. 225.
59 Table XIII. 5 and Gosplan-30b, p. 229.
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growth of imports would require not only an expansion of import-sub-
stitute industries in general but an overall expansion of import substi-
tute industries at a faster rate than the growth rate of imports. That is,
the particular set of output and investment targets selected for the 1st
FYP could be made internally consistent at all (from the viewpoint of
.materials and machinery alone) only if rapid expansion of import- sub-
stitute industries were undertaken. It was not a question of import-sub-
stitution versus no import-substitution or export-expansion versus no
export expansion at the tempo planned for the FYP, but rather it was
a question of the most effective area of import- substitution and export-
expansion.
The table below indicates the general trends of import-substi-
tution which were to occur by the end of the 1st FYP:
PLANNED IMPORT SUBSTITUTION IN THE FYP: 1932/3360
I. Not Mentioned: High iinport-supply ratio not likely to fall.
A. rubber C. some ferrous alloys
B. tin D. coffee, cocoa, citrus fruits
II. No or Little Planned Relative Import Substitution. Imports
increase relatively faster than output.
A. rawhides (a) C. aluminum? (b)
B. nickel? (b)
III. Relative Import Substitution (accompanied by rising imports)
A. wool (slight) (b) E. copper, lead, zinc (b)
B. industrial machinery (b) F. some ferrous alloys (a)
C. agricultural machinery (b) G. tea, rice, herring (c)
D. tractors (b) H. fertilizers? (d)
60 Source:
(a) Gosplan- 306.
(b) Table XIII. 3.
(c) SUA, VIII, no. 13 (1929), p. 34.
(d) Kaufman-29b, p. 19.
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IV. Absolute Import Substitution: Decline in imports
A. cotton (b)
B. chemicals (especially dyestuffs and tanning material) (e)
V. Elimination of Imports by End of FYP
A. paper (e)
B. yarn (e)
Table XIII. 3 presents import-supply ratio targets for 1932/33 for Sev-
eral goods.
Import substitution dn the Soviet ::economic
plans: and the Tsarist .economy
The Soviet five year econ omic plans developed in 1927 and 1928
continued the major trends of import-substitution, which were develop-
ing in the Tsarist economy in the three decades before the war. Part-
icularly conspicuous similarities between Soviet and Tsarist policies
for import substitution occurred in the fields of cotton fiber, copper
and other non -ferrous metals, paper, chemicals, and agricultural,
electrical, and transport equipment and in the trend of producing in-
creasingly complex equipment in these fields. 61 And these Soviet pol-
icies were adopted long before the adoption of the 1st FYP.
The heavy emphasis on ferrous metals is also continued a
trend from the Tsarist economy. It shoula be emphasized that in the
1913 Tsarist economy a large domestic ferrous metallurgy almost en-
tirely satisfied the internal ferrous metal requirements of a substantial
machinery industry, the expanding railroad network and for domestic
construction. Moreover it was among the most rapidly expanding in-
dustries in Tsarist Russia from 1880 to 1913•
.(e) S.~A." YIlI, no" 13 (1929), p. 13.
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Heavy industry grew as fast or faster than light industry in the
Tsarist economy in the forty years before World War I, as well as in
the Soviet economy. 62 But now as the Soviets pushed for the expansion
of their investment goods industry to make up for the reduction in mach-
inery exports caused by the poor development of foreign trade during
NEP and to provide the additional investment goods to boost the invest-
ment levels to higher growth rates and shares of national income, the
Soviet economy would also have to pres s for a rapid expansion in the
ferrous metals production because of the obvious backward linkages of
the Hirschman-type between machine-building and ferrous metal pro-
duction.63 For otherwIse, they would have to import increasing quan-
tities of ferrous metals (unlike their Tsarist predecessors) and the
foreign exchange savings and economic independence achieved in the
investment goods field would be lessened by this increasing reliance on
imported iron and steel. The pressure on Soviet iron and steel output.
capacity was sorely felt in 1927/28, when the shortage of ferrous metals
prevented the fulfillment of output and construction plans and led to small
emergency imports of ferrous metals. 64 As the Soviets wer e to dis-
cover in the 1st FYP, the failure of p~g iron and steel output to expand
according to plan was to cost them hundreds of millions of rubles for
61
See Chapter III, p. 136.
62
Goldsmith-6l, pp. 459 -462.
63
Table T-25, Volume of Machinery Imports. Even in 1927/
28 when mas sive machinery imports occurred on the basis of credit and
gold shipments, the volume was 25-40% below 1913 levels.
64 Gosplan-29a, see below, Chapter XIV, p. 571-572.
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imported steel at precisely those moments when foreign export earnings
were both most scarce and costly in terms of Soviet commodities. Thus,
the important point here is that the type and emphasis of the Soviet in-
vestment decisions implied in the 1st FYP draft plans were not sign-
ificantly different than those made under the Tsarist capitalist economy
intthe three decades before World War I and were not made within a new
policy framework of economic autarky, but rather within the framework
of continuing import-substitution started in the Tsarist economy and of
the shortages of foreign exchange during the NEP due to the failure of
Soviet exports to recover to 1913 levels, and within the framework of
an expected rapid growth in foreign trade during and after the 1st FYP
was carried out.
Foreign price expectations for the FYP
Gosplan predicted a 130/0decline in the foreign prices of the
main Soviet export goods during the FYP; nevertheles s, NKT predicted
relative stability of "net sales prices" of Soviet export: goods because of
better Soviet quality control and sales timing.
Nevertheless, the general lines, which we consider to be cor-
rect with respect to the level of prices, proceeds from the
stability of the average level of (foreign) sale price. This
stability can and should be achieved as a result of a raising of
the quality of our export goods and of our techniques in the
export trade, which ought to occur as the planned measures are
put into action. 65
The foreign trade plan drawn up by NKT in 1929 was apparently based
65 Vop. Torg. (May, 1929), pp. 98-99. Of course, Soviet ex-
port prices for a particular kind and quality of Soviet good - strictly
defined - were to decline.
556
on estimates of trends in world prices and production made by Gosplan's
Section on the World Economy. A comparison of 1927/28 exports and
1932/33 exports in current and constant prices, implies that NKT' s plan
was based on a very slight decline in export prices (from 131 to 128
where 1913 = 100) over the five year period.66 The price decline was
partially attributed to I) increased competition where the Soviet Union
was a major influence on the market (wood, oil, manganese ore, plat-
inum, flaz, eggs, butter), 2) increasing protectionism especially against
Soviet "processed" commodities, and 3) the slower growth of world
demands.67 In particular, Torgplan (of NKT) assumed that, as in the
preceding five years, the decline in prices would occur chiefly:, among
industrial goods and industrial raw materials. 68 The projected trend
of import prices is not known definitely, but evidence suggests that Gos-
plan predicted downward price pressure on important items purchased
by the USSR, for Gosplan predicted a slowdown in the world economic
growth and a growing disproportion between capacity of basic capital,
output, and market in the world capitalist economy (i. e., excess cap-
acity) which was significant primarily because the "capitalist world
would be interested in enveloping Soviet markets and in increasing their
66 According to SUA, Vol. VIII, No. 13 (1929), p. 24, exports
for 1932/33 were planned for 2, 047 million rubles at 1932/33 prices and
1,600 million rubles at pre;1914 prices; thus 1932/33 prices relative
was 128 (1913 = 100). The p~ice relative for Soviet exports in 1927/28
was 131 according to Soviet figures.
67 Vop. Torg., (May 1929), pp. 98-99.
68
Ibid., p. 98.
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exports to the USSR" and would be willing to lower prices. 69 Drastic
decline in world prices and in the Soviet terms of trade was not projec-
ted by NKT.
Three important observations should be made abo'ut~the foreign
trade plan for the 1st FYP. First, the FYP projected considerable
investment for the so-called "export sectors" not only in agriculture in
general but also in export industries of industry such as in timber,
petroleum, food industry, textile industry, and also various minerals.70
Second, the Soviet planners were very aware that significant marketing
difficulties would be encountered in selling much larger quantities of
most exports than the quantities already projected in the optimistic
export plan and they expected price wars in some products (oil, timber,
manganese and flax). To expand exports much further might actually be
economically irrational from the viewpoint of the profit-maximizing
1. 1. 1. t . t .. t. 71 Thi' d h FYPo Ig0po 1st or monopo IS - an In rlgulng ques Ion •. r. , t e
would definitely result in increased relative economic independence from
the world capitalist economy - but it was, by no stretch of the imagina-
tion, intended to make the Soviet economy absolutely autarkic of the
world economy as one might tend to think, - and which is conventional
knowledge in our field - when looking at the development of Soviet for-
See also Kaufman-29b,
Chapter II.
69 Vop. Torg., (May 1929), p. 98.
pp. 17-18.
70
See for example, Gosp1an-30b pp. 200-203. Most art-
icles stres sed the importance of capital construction in realizing the
export plan: see articles by Kaufman for 1929 and 1930.
71
See section above on "Draft foreign plan for FYP" and
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eign trade and listening to the Soviet planners after 1931 exhorting com-
rades to find domestic substitutes for all and every imported product. 72
Foreign trade during NEP and the
decisions on the 1st FYP
How did the poor recovery of foreign trade during NEP in-
fluence the timing and type of decisions about the strategy and tempo of
the 1st FYP and industrialization in general? Fir st, the slow recovery
of exports during NEP and the resultant retardation of industrial growth
and the constraint of imports in investment plans compelled economic
planners and Party leaders to seek a growth stJ!ategy which was not
bound to the performance of foreign trade. Second, the planners real-
ized that the hope of restoring grain exports and agricultural exports
in general to the dominant position in Soviet exports was not feasible
as long as agricultural exports were based on Soviet agricultuxe as con-
stituted during NEP. Thus, long-term rapid industrialization could not
be based on imports of materials and machinery which were in turn
based on expansion of agricultural exports until the Soviet planner s eould
rely on fairly reliable marketing and higher output ~rom a newly organ-
ized heavy-capitalized State-controlled agriculture. Third, the planners
realized that the same barrier s to the recovery of exports during NEP -
limited foreign markets, increasing domestic demand, and inadequate
recovery of output on a per-capita basis, bad harvest and marketing
72
See below, Chapter XIV, for brief discussion of the "active
policy of forced import substitution" which really started in late 1930
and early 1931.
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problems - would continue to retard the growth of exports in the coming
years. It was difficult to see how much higher growth rates of export
could be expected even if additional investment resources were allo-
cated to the important export fields. And since imports had to be more
or less restricted to the levels of export growth, the growth rates of
industry and investment in the early years of the FYP would be quite
constrained by the relatively slow growth of exports - just as it was
during NEP - until the import- substitution investment projects came
into operation.
The catastrophic developments of foreign trade during the 1st
FYP which led the Soviet economy into almost complete autarky by
1935, are discus sed briefly in Chapter X~V:t For the problems encount-
ered in expanding foreign trade during the 1st FYP dwarfed those en-
countered in NEP and would have thrown the NEP type economy into
virtual shambles and would have brought economic growth to a halt.
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CHAPTER XIV
POSTSCRIPT: THE SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE CRISIS
AND SOVIET ECONOMIC AUTARKY IN THE 1930's
The purpose of this chapter is to describe briefly the develop-
ment of foreign trade after 1927/28, to compare the actual development
of foreign trade during the 1st FYP to the foreign trade plan. for the 1st
FYP, and to examine the causes for absolute decline of Soviet foreign
trade during 1931-1935 (into what Western observers would describe
as "economic autarky").
Foreign trade and the 1st FYP
Soviet foreign trade expanded rapidly in volume up through 1931-
in the face of collapsing world trade - and then exports fell sharply and
imports literally. collapsed in 1932 and 1933. Actual and planned exports
are compared below.
USSR: EXPORTS 1927/28 - 19331
Plan
Actual
Volume
Value
27/28 28/29 29/30 30/31 31/32 32/33
100 116 138 162 213 262
1927/28 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933
100 129 193 212 167 160
100 118 133 104 74 60
1 Plan figures from Table III. 5, Volume figures in 1927/28
prices from Table XIV. 4, Value figures based on Table XIV. 3.
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Exports 1928/29 - 1931. The growth of exports in volume ex-
ceeded the export plan for the first three years of the plan. The success
in 1929 resulted from the forcing of timber and flax exports despite
severe shortages at home and from an increase in oil product exports.
Grain exports fell to even lower levels and the volume of animal pro-
ducts exports also declined slightly (Table XIV. 9).
The continued expansion of exports in 1930 and 1931 was partly
due to continued expansion of timber and oil product exports and the ex-
pansion of minor exports (secondary exports) (Table XV. 9). But the
major part of the export expansion resulted from the resumption of
large scale grain exports which started in early 1930, but assumed
really significant levels from mid-1930 onwards (Table XV. 1).2 This
resumption of grain exports was a year earlier than as sumed in the ex-
port plan and exceeded all predictions for 1929/30 and 1930/31 (Table
XV. 1), but then grain exports dropped back sharply to much lower levels
due to the crop failures of 1931 and 1932 and 1933 (Table XV. 1). Grain
exports, however, even in these years continued at a fairly high level -
especially when compared to similar harvest years during the NEP and
despite the starvation of millions of peasants in 1933 and 1934. 3
Although the excellent crop of 1930 undoubtedly facilitated the
2 VTSSSR-60. ERSU (Vol. V, No. 1 (1930), p. 320)mentioned
exports of barley, wheat and rye in the first two quarters of 1929/20 -
i. e., during the period of collectivization. Food rationing for grain had
also become widespread by 1929 (Chapman-63, p. 19).
3 For a discussion of famine in the USSR during 1932~34, see
Dalrymple-64a and Dalrymple-64b. These articles contain many further
references.
TABLE XIV. 1
USSR: GROSS GRAIN PRODUCT EXPORTS 1927/28 - 1934
(value in millions of rubles, quantities in
millions of metric tons)
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Plan 1927/28 1928/29 1929/30 1930/31 1931/32 1932/33
Value 41 0 0 (74) (295 ) 440
Quantity 410 0 0 (6. 50)
A c tu a1 1927/28 1928/29 1929/30 1931 1932 1933 1934
Value in
current 41 15 153 146 63 51 32
prices
Value in
1927/28 41 (16) (320 ) (445 ) (175) (180) (115)
prices
Quantity 0.41 O. 10 2.29 5.22 1. 87 1. 81 0.97
1927/28 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934
Price index
of Soviet
grain
exports 100 94 48 33 36 29 28
(1926/27
weights)
1927/28=100
1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933
Gross grain
71. 7 73.3 71. 7 83.5 66.6 63.0 67.1harvest
Source: Notes to Table XIV. 1, Appendix B, p.781.
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resumption of large-scale grain exports at an earlier than planned date -
and it is probable that sufficient grain would have been marketed from
the 1930 harvest to permit resumption of large grain exports from the
NEP-type of Soviet agriculture - both the early timing (early 1930),
the magnitude of grain exports, and the continuation of substantial grain
exports during two poor crops and widespread famine in rural areas
must be attributed to the l) compulsory widespread collectivization of
Soviet agriculture far beyond the levels originally foreseen in ,the draft
1st FYP, 2) the existence of rationing in urban and grain deficit areas
and tight state control over grain markets, and 3) the attitude of Soviet
leadership toward the fate of millions of peasants as compared to the
gains from grain exports. 4 Compulsory mass collectivization of the
Russian peasant was not done directly to increase grain exports, but
occurred in a rather ad hoc manner on an emergency basis to insure the
domestic supply of grain deficient regions. The grain exports of the
1930's, however, would simply not have been possible under the NEP
system of agriculture. 5 Even the drafters of the 1st FYP foresaw that
some voluntary collectivization of high-productivity, high-marketing
farms would be neces sary to produce an adequate amount of marketed
grain for exports - but they envisaged a completely different mode and
4 ARCC-31 (p. 50) stated that the original FYP's targets for
state and collective farms in 1932/33 were 13. 30/0 of sown area. For
"official attitude" reported "unofficially" see Dalrymple-64b, pp. 473-
474.
5 For several articles on the evolvement of the policy goal of
"sudden mass collectivization" see Lewin-65, Narkiewicz-66, Karz-67.
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6
degree of collectivization. What compelled the Soviet leadership to
export several million tons of grain while millions of peasants starved
to death? The answer - but not a justification - is found in the extreme
balance of payments pressures which arose in the end of 1932 and grew
worse during 1933 (as will be discus sed below).
Three major exports - fur, eggs, butter - declined during
this period in volume. Fur declined becaus.e of depletion of the wiId
fur resources and perhaps the inauspiCious market conditions for this
luxury good during the depression. But exports of the two major animal
products - eggs and butter - fell sharply because of the livestock dis-
aster caused by collectivization - so that exports of these products and
especially butter exports (produced in State-controlled factories) were
being forced from a greatly diminished supply.
Campaign against Soviet exports 1930-1931. Soviet export prices
were falling faster than import prices and the commodity terms of trade
deteriorated sharply. The Soviet export problems - already plagued by
domestic shortages of "exportable surpluses" - were further aggravated
6
See Chapter XIII, pp. 459.
7
Johnson-60 (p. 235) gives the following data for milk and
egg output during 1928-1934. Exports of butter and egges from VTSSSR-
60.
Milk Butter Export Eggs Egg Exports
(millions m. t. ) (1000, m.t.) (billions) (1000, m.t.)
1928 a 27. 0 32.9 9.9 94.4
1929' 25.9 25.6 9.3 44.4
1930 23.4 10.5 7. 2 9.9
1931 20.4 30.9 6. 0 20.4
1932 17. 9 30.9 4.0 7. 1
a. 1927/28 for exports.
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by foreign campaigns - both organized and unorganized - against the
import of Soviet goods into various countries including the USA, France,
Belgium, the Netherlands, Canada, Rumania, Hungary, Jugoslavia,
Bulgaria and Albania. Although individuals within Germany and Great
Britain agitated for a ban against Soviet exports, the governments of
these two countries - which were major Soviet export markets - did not
support the anti-Soviet export campaign; that possibility, however,
greatly worried the Soviet government. The "anti-Soviet export cam-
paign" was inspired partly by individual producers wishing to protect
diminishing domestic markets from the encroachment of expanding
Soviet exports - exports which the Soviet government wanted to sell at
the highest- possible price, but which they were willing to sell at any
price. The campaign - often named the "anti -Soviet dumping campaign"-
started in early 1930 and reached its peak in mid-1931. 8 But by mid-
1931 even the removal of this open discrimination against Soviet exports
8 For a detailed description of the "anti-dumping campaign
against Soviet exports in the U.S. ", see Committee-33, pp. 208-222.
For brief discussion of Belgium embargo against Soviet exports, see
ERSU, Vol. VI, No.3, (February 1, 1931), pp. 70-71. For Canadian
embargo against Soviet exports in February 1931, see ERSU, Vol. VI,
No. 7 (April 1, 1931) pp. 155-156. For French restrictions against
Soviet goods initiated in October, 1930, see ERSU, Vol. V, Nos. 22-
23 (December 1, 1930), p. 458. For Soviet discussion of this anti-
Soviet export campaign (rumored to have been instigated by the French
government), and their official reaction to these restrictions against
Soviet goods, see ERSU, Vol. V, No. 22-23 (December 1, 1930), pp.
456-458. For further Soviet discussion of this anti:..soviet export cam-
paign see: SUA, Vol IX, No. 17 (1930) pp. 2-7 (a particularly good art-
icle emphasizing the Soviet need to export in order to import for the
FYP and admitting that the USSR did export goods which were in deficit
supply in the USSR in order to import goods which were considered to
be in even "great demand" for industrialization); SUA, Vol. IX, No. 20
(1931), pp. 2-7. In 1931, and early 1932, almostevery other issue
of SUA (the Soviet trade delegation's press organ in Germany) contained
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would greatly improve the prospects of expanding Soviet exports without
great difficulty - market conditions and general tariff and trade barriers
had become much worse and made the expansion of Soviet exports in-
creasingly more difficult - these conditions deteriorated further in
1932 and 1933. 9
Imports during the first three years of the FYP. The volume of
imports grew much more slowly than exports (and the rest of the econ-
omy) from 1927/28 to 1931 and were actually reduced somewhat in 1929 -
although by ales ser amount than stipulated in the plan. Actual and plan-
ned imports are compared in the table below:
USSR: IMPORTS 1927/28 - 193310
Plan
Actual
Volume
Value
27/28 28/29 29/30 30/31 31/32 32/33
100 80 101 129 164 181
27/28 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933
100 99 120 137 101 59
100 93 112 117 74 37
Unlike exports during the first two years of the FYP, the value of im-
ports greatly exceeded the plan targets resulting in a much smaller
than planned trade surplus for 1928/29 and a large unplanned deficit in
an article about the anti-Soviet export campaign or the "alleged sumping"
of this or that Soviet product. Also Izvestia. October 22, 1930, The
clas sic journalistic description of this anti ~Soviet export campaign is by
Knickerbocker-3la. See Knickerbocker-31 b, and Documentation-33.
9 League-33a, Chapter VII. ST, Vol. V, No. 30, pp. 11-13
(October 20, 1930) described the increase in tariff barriers.
10 Planned figures from Table XII. 5. Volume figures in 1927/
28 prices from Table XIV. 4. Index of value in current prices based on
data in Table XIV. 3.
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in 1929/30 as can be seen below: 11
USSR: BALANCE OF TRADE 1928/29 - 1929/30
(millions of rubles, current prices)
1928/29
Plan Actual
1929/30
Plan Actual
Exports
Imports
Balance
910
755
+155
877.6
836.3
+41.3
1078
951
+127
1002.3
1068.7
-66.4
The value of imports continued to rise despite a decline in the value of
exports and resulted in a huge balance of trade deficit of nearly 300 mil-
lion rubles in 1931 (Table XV. 3). The volume of imports (in 1927/28
prices) exceeded the plan during each of the first three years - but the
volume of exports (especially in 1931) exceeded the plan by even a larger
margin - so that, as we shall see below, part of the deficit must be
ascribed to the adverse terms of trade as well as to the uneven fulfill-
ment of the export and import plans.
Growth of machinery imports. Even though machinery imports fell
17-18% in 1928/29 because of a decline in deliveries 5 from the orders
placed under the German credit of 1926, the value and volume of mach-
inery imports during 1928/29 - 1931 exceeded the import plan by con-
siderable margins and were the major source of imports growth during
these years. Actual and planned imports of machinery are compared in
Table XIV. 2. The share of machinery imports in total exports rose
from 27% in 1927/28 to 510/0in 1931 {and these shares do not include
11 6ERSU, Vol.. VI, No.3 (February 1, 1931), pp. 5 - 58.
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TABLE XIV. 2
USSR: MACHINER Y IMPOR TS FOR INDUSTR Y AND TRANSPOR T
PLANNED AND ACTUAL IMPORTS 1927/28 - 1933
Value
(millions of rubles in current prices)
1927/28 1928/29 1929/30 1930/31 1931/32 1932/33
1. Plan: 256 158 240 350 510 525
2. Actual: 256 213 (370) (565)a (424)a (178)a
lnd ex
(1927/28 = 100)
3. Planned
value: 100 62 94 137 199 205
4. Actual
value: 100 83 (145) (221)a (166)a ( 70)a
5. Actual
volume: 100 82 (139) (219)a (180)a (78)a
Foreign Prices and Share in Total Imports
6. Price indexb
of German
machinery 100 102 104 101 92 89
7. Share of
machinery
in total a a aimports 26. 9% 25. 4% 34. 6% 51.1% 60.2% 51.1%
aCalendar years 1931, 1932, 1933.
bCalendar years 1938, 1929, 1930, 1931, 1932.
Source: Notes to Table XIV. 2. p.782.
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imports of agricultural machinery which equalled about: 10% of total
imports in 1931). 12 Machinery for the 1st FYP had quickly come to
dominate the structure of imports - much more so than foreseen by the
plan. This in part was undoubtedly due to the greater availability of
credits for machinery than for other types of goods. 13
Imports of semi-processed goods declined steadily to a small
fraction of their 1927/28 levels as the paper, chemical and leather fac-
tories started during NEP came into operation during the early part of
the FYP. This cutback in imports of semi-processed goods, however,
was so abrupt that it caused "import-deprivation" (reduction in domestic
consumption in the face of excess demand or rising demand) for some
goods such as paper, tanning materials, and pas sibly leather and dyes,
rather than being made possible by direct import-substitution of dom-
estic output for imports (what I would call "absolute import substitution ")
(Table XIV. II).
The volume of raw material imports fluctuated around 1927/28
levels rather than being sharply reduced in the first year and then grad-
ually recovering. If the plan for raw material imports was drawn up
as suming little foreign price change for raw materials, then the import
plan for raw materials in terms of "volume" was excessively fulfilled in
each of the three year s:
12 VTSSSR-60.
13 See below discussion of credit in 1927/28 -1931.
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INDEX OF PLANNED AND ACTUAL RAW MATERIAL IMPORTS14
1927/28 = 100
Planned 27/28 28/29 29/30 30/31 31/32 32/33
Value 100 77.2 89.7 104.2 125. 5 136. 3
Actual 27/28 1929 1930 :.11931 1932 1933
Value 100 94.2 74.0 76.6 46.0 32.2
Volume 100 103.5 93. 1 119.7 86.9 69.2
(27/28 prices)
More important, the composition of raw materials imports - and imports
in general - underwent a "second industrialization" of the import struc-
ture between 1927/28 and 1931 when the imports of raw materials for
light industry were cut back and imports of metals (especially ferrous
metals) and rubber were rapidly increased; the share of consumer-
oriented imports excluding rubber and aluminum fell from 52% in 1927/
28 to 18% in 1931 (Table XIV. 12). This second "industrialization of the
import structure" was due not only to the more rapid expansion of mach-
inery than the rest of the import structure, but also to the change in the
composition of raw ,material imports and to the elimination of grain
imports {which had been undertaken in 1927/28).15
Perhaps the most dramatic trend in raw material imports during
this period were the extremely large imports of ferrous metals. The
14 Planned value of raw material imports from Table XIII. 5.
Actual value from STAT-34, p. 381, STAT-36, p. 571. Volume from
Table XIV. 10.
15 A Soviet economist described the change in the structure of
Soviet import in 1930 and 1931 as the "metalization" (German word -
Metallisierung) (B. S., "Die Entwicklung des Aus senhande1s der UdSSR",
SUA, Vol. 11, No. 21 (1932), p. 51).
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share of imports in the supply of rolled ferrous metals, articles, and
pipe rose from 5-6% in 1927/28 to 26% in 1931 at a time when domestic
output was also rising rapidly - and the share of ferrous metal (not in-
eluding metal articles and pipe) rose from 7.20/0 of total imports in
1927/28 to 17% of total imports in 1931 (Table XIV. 11).16 Recall that
Tsarist Rus sia in the pre -1914 decade supplied most of its ferrous metal
requirements from domestic output and at times was a net exporter of
ferr ous metals. In 1913 - a boom year - imports supplied about 2 or 3%
of rolled ferrous metals. The recovery of the domestic pig iron and
rolled steel during NEP lagged behind the rest of the economy and had
not reached 1913 levels by 1927/28 so that ferrous metals were in def-
icit supply in that year. 17 The slow recovery of ferrous metallurgy
during NEP was an important reason behind the Left's urging for larger
allocations of investment funds to this large existing branch of Soviet
industry - an industry which was badly damaged during the Civil War.
When the rate of investment accelerated in the early years of the FYP,
the domestic ferrous metallurgical industries just did not keep up with
the demand for construction and other types of ferrous metals so that
imports of ferrous metals rose rapidly - a trend not at all forecast in
drawing up of the foreign trade plan for the 1st FYP:
16 VTSSSR-60.
17 Clark-56, p. 10 and Gosplan-29a, p. 200.
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IMPORTS OF FERROUS METAl.S 1913, 1926/27-193318
(OOO'smetric tons)
1913 26/27 27/28 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933----
All Ferrous
Metals 199 148 278 341 699 1624 1004 615
Rolled Steel 98 46 106 275 585 1289 885 457
Pipe 13 30 73 17 40 114 60 90
Semi- Pro-
cessed 37 36 83 25 44 88 35 17
For the first time since the early 1900's, Russia (USSR) had
become significantly aependent on foreign supply of ferrous metal both
for construction and indirectly and directly for the building of mach-
inery - and the trend was clear. Further acceleration of investment
beyond 1931 levels clearly required more equipment and structural
steel and similar producers' goods either from domestic or imported
sources. But the outlook for expansion of export became worse as the
world depres sion deepened, trade barriers increased, the terms of
trade worsened and domestic export surpluses were being reduced
through the slaughter of livestock, through the demands of construction
(timber), through the mechanization of agriculture and the development
of auto-transport (petroleum products), etc. The high export levels
attained in 1931 were extremely costly - especially to the domestic con-
sumer - in terms of alternative uses of the exported products, for the
USSR began to export almost anything that they could sell including
cotton, hides, canned goods, butter, eggs, etc., all of which were in
18 Data from VTSSSR-60. All ferrous metal is SOVTC 26.
Rolled steel is SOVTC 264. Pipe is SOVTC 266. Articles are SOVTC
268 -269. See Appendix A, Technical Note 5 for description of SOVTC
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excess demand within the USSR.19 Here - through the foreign trade
sector - the domestic "savings" were being converted into investment
goods, and at an increasingly more costly rate, not only in terms of
the marginal utility to the domestic consumer as the per capita supply of
thes e products fell, but also with respect to the commodity terms of
trade. Furthermore, even if the planners judged the cost of increased
exports to the economy to be less than the benefits of increased imports -
they surely harbored doubts about the simple practical possibility of
increasing exports sufficiently to maintain the necessary increase in the
imports of producers I goods for their investment program alone to say
nothing about their once ambitious program for expanding the output and
imports of consumer goods as well, which by 1931 had foundered on the
shoals of unrealistic planning, the livestock disaster in collectivization
and the world depres sion. For example, cotton exports were not at all
foreseen in foreign trade plan of the 1st FYP drawn up in 1929 - the
cotton exports of 1931 were a sign of the de sperate position of the for-
eign trade sector by 1931.
When faced with 1) the proppect of stagnating imports (because
of stagnating exports) an~ 2) the impossibility of cutting back consumer-
oriented imports to increase the imports of commodities directly or
indirectly used for investment - for the second "industrialization of
system.
19 Even in 1927/28 and 1928/29, exports of timber and many
agricultural products were being forced despite excess demand ("def-
icits in the domestic supply") of these goods (Gosplan-29a, p. 193,
pp. 295-296).
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imports" had already occurred by 1931 - the planners were left with only
one alternative if they were to continue to expand the level of investment
in the economy, rather than to abandon their long-run growth plans.
That alternative was to place even greater emphasis on the rapid ex-
pansion of so-called investment goods industry (which actually included
many branches of the economy including machine-building, ferrous
metallurgy, non-ferrous metallurgy, construction materials industry,
heavy industrial chemicals, etc.) in order to provide the investment
goods which would have otherwise been imported in later years. While
it is true that the discussions:)of the FYP and the discussion of the
foreign trade plans often mentioned that the FYP would simultaneously
increase economic ties with the world economy and make the economy
more (relatively but not necessarily absolutely) independent of the
world economy with respect to a series of raw materials (non-ferrous
metals) tractors, complex agricultural machinery and machinery in
general, the public discussion was aimed toward the end of the FYP and
lacked any semblance of a widespread publicity campaign and great
urgency in 1928. But from the middle of 1930, the public campaign for
"uncovering" domestic sources for the supply or production of imported
goods (especially equipment) began to swell and reached a loud crescendo
in 1931 - this contrasted strongly with the press campaign to expand
exports in 1929. 20 And it was during 1930 that the output tar gets for
20 For some articles referring to the campaign to expand ex-
ports see Izvestia, March 24, 1929 ("Nado usilit' i uluchshit' eksport");
Izvestia, June 13, 1929 (Eksport vtorostepennykh produktov ••• ); Izves-
tia' March 26, 1929 ("Neispo1' zovannye vozmozhnesti v oblasti ekspor-
ta"); Izvestia, June 8, 1929 ("Postavim eksport v tsentre vnimanila
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steel were revised upward and continued to be revised upward in 1931.21
Foreign trade and the revised (revealed?) priorities
of the FYP: A hypothesis
Was there any relationship between the failure of foreign trade
and the revised - or should we say "revealed" - planners' priorities
away from light industry and agriculture toward heavy industry in the
fulfillment of .the 1st FYP and in the upward revision of the output tar-
gets in heavy industry during the 1st FYP? By failure of the foreign
trade sector, clearly we do not mean that it had failed to grow, for
Soviet foreign trade grew rapidly from 1927/28 to 1931. In fact, most
vsei obshchestvennosti SSSRrr) and ma~y articles in 1929 in Sovetsklaia
Torgovlia.
By the middle of 1930 the tone of the press had changed; for a
few articles referring to the "battle for economic independence campe
aign" see Izvestia, July 5, 1930, p. 2 ("Import i mobilizatsiia nashikh
proizvodstvennykh vozmozhnostei"). According to Za1eski-62 (pp. 104)
the campaign for economic independence and to economize of foreign
exchange began in March 1930, and a letter from Kuibyshev published in
Ekon. Zhisn on March 25, .1930, emphasized the importance of econ-
omizing in the use of imported machinery. The flirectives of the XVI
Party Congress in July 1930 decreed a "complete re-examination of the
plans for the machinery industry from the point of view of substantially
freeing industry and the national economy from its dependence on foreign
countries in view of assuring the essential needs by the (Soviet) machine
ery industry" (as cited in Zaleski-62, p. 104). Industries using primary
agricultural materials, according to the same resolution of the XVI Party
Congress, should be freed from their dependence on foreign markets
(for raw materials) in the next three years (Ibid.). A special commission
for imports was created and many orders for machinery previously im-
ported from abroad were placed in arsenals (Ibid.). The complete
change in attitude toward "economic independence" and its economic and
political meaning is seen in the tone of the lead chapter in an edited
collection on Soviet foreign trade in 1931 (Badmas - 32). The article by
V. Prosin was entitled "Vheshniaifu. torgovlia i borba za ektonomiches-
kuiv nezavisimost' SSR" in Badmas-32, pp. 3-39 and emphasized the
importance of this or that accomplishment in economizing on foreign
exchange.
21 Jasny-61, pp. 75-78.
TABLE XIV. 3
USSR: EXPORTS, IMPORTS, BALANCE OF TRADE
1913 - 1940 IN CURRENT PRICES
(millions of gold rubles, all borders)
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Excluding Precious Metals Including Platinum
Exports Imports Balance Exports Imports Balance
Tsarist
Russia :,. ~,t
.1140.16 .1140.16 361. 26Av.1909-l3 : 1487.19 347.03 1501.42
1913 (, 1505. 90 1375.05 130.85 1520.14 1376.05 145.04
Soviet
Territory
1913 \ 1291.00 1007.00 284.00 ,1305.00 1007. 00 298.00
1918 11919
1920
>- Not avc ilable in c arrent > Not a railable in current
1921 prices I prices
1921/22 . j J
1922/23 [210. 60] [187.50] [23. 10] 212.47 l187.50] 24.97
1923/24 [522.60] [439.40] [83.20 528. 33 [439.40] 88.93
1924/25 558.78 723.41 -163.63 577.79 723.41 -145. 62
1925/26 676.65 756. 32 -79.67 703.29 756.32 -53.03
1926/27 779.41 713. 52 65.89 805. 98 713. 52 92.46
1927/28 781. 79 945.52 - 163.73 791.61 945.52 - 153. 91
1928/29 877.60 836. 30 41. 30 [889.71] 836.30 53.41
1929 923.75 880.65 53.10 937.80 880.65 57. 10
1930 1036.42 1058. 84 ...:.22. 42 1042. 42 1058.84 -16.42
1931 811.25 H05.09 - 293.84 816.65 1105.09 -288.44
1932 574.97 704.07 - 129. 10 580.97 704.07 - 123. 10
1933 469.66 398.23 121.43 475.86 348.23 - 127.63
1934 418. 34 232.44 185. 90 421. 24 232.44 188. 80
1935 367.43 241. 39 126.04 373.93 241. 39 132. 54
1936 310. 32 308.82 1. 50 315.22 308.82 6.40
1937 376. 34 291. 50 84. 84 384.64 291. 50 93.14
1938 273.09 312.78 - 19.69 298.29 312. 18 - 14. 49
1939 132.45 213. 64 - 81. 14 - - 213. 64 - -
1940 305.75 313. 10 - 7.95 - - 313. 10 - -
Source: Notes to Table XIV. 3, Appendix B, p. 782.
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observers will readily concede that many projects of the 1st FYP could
simply not have been completed (at least within the period) without
access to imports and foreign technical assistance. By failure of the
foreign trade sector we are referring to the failure of domestic export
resources to develop as planned, to the deterioration of the terms of
trade which made imports very costly in terms of scarce exports, and
more important, to the poor outlook of continued expansion of foreign
trade through the rest of the Ist FYP and beyond. Consider the following
hypothesis:
Foreign trade by the end of 1931 no longer seemed to offer a
method of overcoming the Current structural rigidities in the
economy encountered in shifting to higher investment rates and
the cost of using the foreign trade sector to overcome the
current structural rigidities at the existing level of imports was
increasing because of the deteriorating commodity terms of
trade on world markets for .:Soviet exports. Furthermore, the
cost was also increasing at the margin because of the extreme
forcing of exports (lowering per capita supplies, etc.) and be-
cause of the adverse effects further expansion of Soviet exports
might have on the terms of trade - as suming that exports could
be expanded at all in terms of real import capacity, an assump-
tion to be questioned by Soviet planners observing world trade
in 1931.
Thus, while the Soviet economy was not a "closed
economy" in the traditional sense - for trade had expanded con-
siderably in the past years - from the viewpoint of treating the
foreign trade sectors as an advantageous method of converting
additional "mobilized savings" in the form of export goods int9
addItIonal investment goods in the form of imported investment
goods, the Soviet economy was indeed a "closed economy" at
the margin of its current levels of trade. Or, at least, there
was little or no cost advantage to be derived by trying to convert
additional mobilized savings in the form of exports goods into
additional imported investment goods. The Soviet government -
quite correctly - feared that current trade levels might not be
sustainable in the near future for a number of reasons.
Thus the failures in the foreign trade sector and the
threatening stagnation of exports - and hence imports - com-
pelled planners to cHange (de facto as well as on paper) their
priorities in the allocation of investment and other resources
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away from the consumers' goods industry toward the so-called
investment goods industry in order to develop the sectoral
structure of the economy which would allow a further expansion
of investment to the desired levels without any further expan-
sion of foreign trade. They engaged in - to use Jasny's ex-
pression - Baccanalian planning rather than to publicly face
the prospects of accepting lower long-term growth rates (esp-
ecially in the investment goods industries) in the national econ-
omy.
Thus, we should not attribute the unrealistic planning
in the 1930 - 32 period entirely to the caprice of Stalin, but
rather - at least in part - to the problems in the foreign trade
sector.
Deterioration of the Soviet terms of trade, 1929 - 1931. The
world depression had a catastrophic effect on the Soviet commodity terms
of trade during 1930 and 1931. Export prices plummeted 40-50% (depen-
ding on the quantity weights) from 1927/28 to 1931 (Table XIV. 6). The
import price index also fell but much more slowly (around 250/0) (Table
XIV. 7) so that the commodity terms of trade shifted badly against the
USSR and fell from 100 in 1927/28 to 70 (1926/27 quantity weights) or to
80 (using 1927/28 quantity weights). The 1926/27 quantity weights for the
export price index are much more relevant to the actual terms of trade
in 1930 and 1931 because they included substantial quantities of grain
exports which were also important in 1930 and 1931 (Table XIV. 9). The
slower decline in the import price index could be attributed to several
factors. First, the price index is basiced on .unit':'values so that a
longer lag in the delivery of import goods compared to export goods
during a period of falling prices would make the measured commodity
terms of trade fall; in fact many products ordered by the USSR did have
fairly long delivery periods (especially machinery) but also long-term
contracts had been made for the delivering of metals and chemicals,
TABLE XIV. 4
USSR: VOLUME INDEX FOR EXPORTS 1913, 1922/23 - 1938
(1927/28 = 100)
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1 9 1 3 1926/27 1927/28 1932 1937
price price price price price
weights weights weights weights weights
1913 282.3 289.6 312.3 265. 1 293.8
1922/23 24.8 31. 8 36. 9 29.3 40.0
1923/24 67.2 72.8 76. 5 65. 5 75.3
1924/25 61. 9 64.6 67.9 62.3 71. 7
1925/26 82.3 85. 1 91. 3 79. 7 88.2
1926/27 96.8 100.2 102. 7 93.0 99.4
1927/28 100. 0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1929 131.0 128.6 129.0 125.2 137.4
1930 194.4 191. 3 192.8 171.8 200.2
1931 218. 2 207.8 211.5 189.3 202.2
1932 181. 5 164. 1 167.4 153. 9 164.9
1933 171.5 156. 5 160. 7 148. 3 159.0
1934 163.2 148.2 152.1 145. 7 147. 6
1935 145. 3 133.1 136.2 131.7 132.3
1936 114. 7 105.5 108.0 Ill. 1 100.4
1937 113.3 110. 1 113.6 110. 8 99.9
1938 98. 5 105.5 112. 0 104.2 98. 5
Source: Notes to Table XIV.4, Appendix B, p.782.
TABLE XIV. 5
USSR: VOLUME INDEX OF IMPORTS 1913, 1922/23 - 1938
(1927/28 = 100)
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1 9 1 3 1926/27 1927/28 1932 1937
price price price price price
weights weights weights weights weights
1913 152.6 167.8 169.5 158. 5 165.4
1922/23 16. 8 16. 8 17. 0 17. 4 17.2
1923/24 31. 7 31. 8 33.9 33. 7 28.6
1924/25 59. 1 61. 7 63.0 59. 5 56.5
1925/26 73.8 77. 1 79.3 76. 7 76.4
1926/27 79.0 80.3 83.3 81. 4 77. 5
1927/28 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1929 95. 2 99.3 99.3 96.4 98. 1
1930 117.4 124.5 120.0 126.3 132. 6
1931 141. 7 144.8 137.0 147. 1 159. 3
1932 101. 1 107. 0 101.2 105.0 116.9
1933 67.4 63.4 59.0 57.9 63.2
1934 64.6 54.3 50.0 42.0 45.3
1935 64.6 55. 7 52.8 45. 5 46.7
1936 65.4 59.6 56.4 52. 2 55.0
1937 65. 7 57. 1 54.0 47.2 49.6
1938 70.3 62.0 59. 1 54.2 57.0
Source: Notes to Table XIV. 5, Appendix B, p. 782.
TABLE XIV. 6
USSR: PRICE INDEX OF EXPOR TS 1913, 1922/23 - 1938
(1927/28 = 100)
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1 9 1 3 1926/27 1927/28 1932 1937
quantity quantity quantity quantity quantity
weights weights weights weights weights
1913 63.5 67. 2 71. 8 76. 1 70.6
1922/23
1923/24
1924/25 108.2 108. 5 114.0 113. 0 113. 7
1925/26 96. 5 101. 5 108. 0 105. 6 104.6
1926/27 92.2 97.0 99. 5 97.9 97.0
1927/28 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1929 90.2 94.0 95. 6 91. 1 91. 3
1930 64.3 72. 1 81. 8 75. 1 76.6
1931 46.6 51. 9 60.4 54.8 56.5
1932 41. 1 43.8 48.4 44.4 47.2
1933 34.5 37. 1 41. 7 38. 6 39.8
1934 34.4 33. 5 36. 3 35. 1 36.2
1935 33. 5 34.0 36.2 34.7 33.7
1936 35. 5 36.4 37.8 37. 2 35.4
1937 45.8 46.9 48.6 48.2 43.0
1938 38.8 46.2 51. 6 48.0 42.2
Source: Notes to Table XIV. 6, Appendix B, p. 783.
TABLE XIV. 7
USSR: PRICE INDEX FOR IMPOR TS 1913, 1922/23 - 1938
(1927/28 = 100)
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1 9 1 3 1926/27 1927/28 1932 1937
quantity quantity quantity quantity quantity
weights weights weights weights weights
1913 69.0 71. 0 75.4 78. 5 88.3
1922/23
1923/24
1924/25 116.5 112. 6 113.7 113. 7 110.0
1925/26 107. 1 107. 5 109.3 112.0 118. 3
1926/27 96.0 93.0 96.4 101. 6 102. 5
1927/28 100. 0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1929 94.4 95.7 97.3 92. 6 92.0
1930 86. 7 89.0 91. 1 89.3 81. 0
1931 75. 1 74.7 75.8 78. 7 66. 1
1932 62. 7 66. 1 67.6 70.4 57.6
1933 51. 4 53.9 56. 5 63.3 49.0
1934 46.9 48.8 53. 5 60. 5 44. 1
1935 47.8 48.0 .49. 8 58. 2 42.3
1936 50.4 49.4 51. 6 61. 6 45.2
1937 53.6 53.0 56. 8 66. 5 50.2
1938 51. 5 50.8 54.3 66.9 46.6
Source: Notes to Table XIV. 7, Appendix B, p. 783.
TABLE XIV. 8
USSR: COMMODITY TERMS OF TRADE 1913, 1922/23 - 1938
(1927/28 = 100)
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19 13 1926/27 1927/28 1932 1937
quantity quantity quantity quantity quantity
weights weights w ei gh t s weights weights
1913 92. 0 94. 6 95. 2 96. 9 80. 0
1922/23
1923/24
1924/25 92. 9 96. 4 100.3 99.4 103.4
1925/26 90. 1 94.4 . 98. 8 94. 3 88.4
1926/27 96. 0 104.3 103.2 96. 1 94. 6
1927/28 10 O. 0 100.0 100.0 10 0 • 0 100.0
1929 95. 6 98. 2 98. 3 98.4 99. 2
1930 74. 2 8 1 . 0 89. 8 84. 1 94. 6
1931 62. 1 69. 5 79. 7 69. 6 85. 5
1932 65. 6 66. 3 71. 6 63. 1 8 1. 9
1933 67. 1 68. 8 73. 8 6 1 . 0 8 1. 2
1934 73. 3 68. 6 67. 9 58. 1 82. 1
1935 70. 0 70. 8 72. 7 59. 6 79. 7
1936 70.4 73. 7 73. 3 60.4 78. 3
1937 85.4 88. 5 85. 6 72. 5 85. 7
1938 75. 3 90. 9 95. 0 71. 7 90. 6
Source: Notes to Table XIV. 8, Appendix B, p. 783.
TABLE XIV. 9
USSR: VOLUME INDEXES FOR SELECTED EXPORT
COMMODITY GROUPS 1927/28 = 100
(1927/28 unit value weights)
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. a
timber petroleum fiber animal furgraln
products products products products products products
1913 2334 248 39.2 835.4 272.5 75.7
1922/23 165 30 3. 5 115. 3 21. 0 59.3
1923/24 620 65 27.4 84. 1 40.3 62.4
1924/25 139 68 47.0 140.6 62. 7 80.2
1925/26 486 63 53.0 176.7 60. 7 77. 7
1926/27 556 86 76.6 106.4 75.3 81. 8
1927/28 100 100 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1929 69 180 135. 5 212. 3 91. 4 98.7
1930 1217 229 166.1 225. 1 65. 1 94.8
1931 1307 200 182.2 327. 5 80.7 80.4
1932 443 194 214.4 258.0 69.0 86. 7
1933 446 212 163.3 201. 5 64.2 85.2
1934 224 216 149.4 227.0 61. 7 89.6
1935 408 226 108.0 135. 8 46.6 80.3
1936 124 206 83.7 136. 2 33.0 91. 4
1937 368 177 65. 3 225.5 25. 5 70.8
1938 591 119 48.0 124.0 7. 8 74.8
Source: Notes to Table XIV. 9, Appendix B, p. 783.
TABLE XIV. 10
USSR: VOLUME INDEXES FOR SELECTED IMPORT
COMMODITY GROUPS 1927/28 = 100
(1927/28 unit value weights)
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machinery raw semi- non- 'consurrer
'tropicarr
rubber,
~ncluding material process'd ferrous oriented" products
tin,
. 1 a materials metals imports nickelagrlcu •
19.13 133. 0 141. 5 302.7 79.4 (200.3) 224.8 105.3
1922/23 14.2 11. 8 19. 7 7.8 14.7 7. 9 18. 3
1923/24 14.7 41. 9 44.8 20.2 46.3 30. 1 28.7
1924/25 31. 1 51. 1 110. 3 26.0 88.5 47.7 35.2
1925/26 70.2 62. 1 183. 4 40.6 87. 1 67.8 45.6
1926/27 71. 6 95.2 93.1 68. 7 94.0 83.3 72.5
1927/28 100. 0 100.0 100. 0 100. 0 100. 0 100.0 100. 0
1929 114. 5 103. 5 76.5 98.3 91. 7 103. 6 91. 4
1930 213. 7 93. 1 67.3 108.4 72.9 101 . 2 113 . 0
1931 263.5 119.7 39.0 122. 1 56.5 116 . 2 163. 4
1932 188. 6 86.9 8.4 78.4 46.2 100. 9 170. 8
1933 75.6 69.2 7.9 65.0 35.6 106. 0 172.6
1934 30.6 71. 5 9.4 69.3 40.9 151. 1 258.3
1935 31. 8 81. 0 17. 5 94.7 53.2 139. 8 232.3
1936 62.8 70.8 24.5 125. 2 42.4 108. 5 226. 1
1937 41. 2 77.9 10. 0 174. 3 41. 7 117.4 249.0
1938 57.2 75.6 10. 9 198. 9 46.2 115.8 229.6
a
Deflated by exporting country's price index for machinery.
Source: Notes to Table XIV. 10, Appendix B, p. 783.
TABLE XIV.ll
USSR: IMPORT-SUPPLY RATIOS, IMPORTS AND TOTAL SUPPLY FOR
SELECTED COMMODITIES, 1913, 1923/24 - 1938
COTTON FIBER WOOL FIBER COPPER
Im.ports Total Share of Net Total Share of Im.ports Supply of Share of
of Cotton Imports Fiber and Supply Im.ports of Ingot Copper; Im.ports
Cotton Consum.p in Total Yarn to State in Supply and Rolled Im.ports in Total
Fiberb tion Consump- Imports Industry to State Copper + Output Supply
tion (Im.ports+ Industry (including
~rocurem.'t old scrap)
1000 I S m. t. % 1000' s m.. t. .% 1000's m.. t. %
197. 0 436.0 45.2 44.4 0 0 7.3 40.1c c1913 18.2
1923/24 13.7
1924/25 122.0 211. 5 57.7 11. 4 1.6 15.2 10.7
1925/26 L02.6 265.6 38.5 20.4 . 11. 3 30.7 36.8
1926/27 138.2 306.8 45.1 2.8.8 56.2 51. 2 18.5 41. 3 49.7
1927/28 145.6 354.0 41. 0 34.6 73.3 47.2 27.8 56.3 49.3
1929 126.8a 380.2a 33.4a 35.9 79.9 44.9 25.5 65.7 38.8
1930 67.7a 325.1a 19.3a 27.2 79.2 34.3 21. 1 63.4 33.2
1931 47.6 349.4 13. 6 23.2 72.2 32.1 26.6 68.6 38.6
1932 21. 0 407.3 5.2 20.6 61. 6 33.5 14.9 57.7 25.8
1933 10.5 405.3 2.6 22.6 60.6 37.3 7.9 49.9 15.7
1934 24.0 403.0 5.9 22.8 64.8 33.2 11. 5 62.2 18. 5
1935 44.0 573.0 7.6 31. 0 84.1 37.0 32.2 104.4 30.8
1936 15. 0 628. 0 2.3 27.0 46.2 151. 9 32.5
1937 30.0 109. 0 27.5 65.7 158.4 41. 5
1938 30.1 82.3 180.4 45.6
TABLE XIV. 11 (continued)
LEAD ZINC NICKEL TIN
Imports Supply Share of Imports Total Share of Total Share of
of of Lead Irn.ports Slab Zinc Supply of Imports Supply Imports Imports
Lead Irn.ports in Total Rolled Zinc in Total (lrn.ports in Total inplus Supply Zinc (Output + Supply plus Supply IngotsOutput Imports) Output)
1000 IS m. t. % 1000 r s m. t. % rn.. t. % m. t.
1913 58.1 59.6 97.4c 28.2 47.6 59. 3c 3007 100. 0 6035
1923/24
- - - - -
- - 1 100.0 2539
1924/25 14.8 15. 9 93.6 12.2 13. 7 89.1 6 100.0 2177
1925/26 22.7 24.0 94.4 15. 2 17. 1 89.0 23 100.0 2234
1926/27 31. 5 33.0 95.4 29.8 32.1 92.9 361 100.0 3748
1927/28 48.3 51. 7 95.5 31.0 33.2 93.2 1732 100.0 4704
1929 44.3 52.1 85.0 35.6 39.6 89.9 961 100.0 5050
1930 50.2 60.5 82.9 40.0 45.5 88.0 2907 1.00. 0 4906
1931 41. 9 57.4 73.0 23.7 32.6 72.5 3841 100.0 4486
1932 33.8 52.5 64.3 10.6 24.3 43.7 3959 100.0 3910
1933 16.4 30.0 54.6 5.8 22.4 25.9 3498 100. 0 4117
1934 18. 9 45.9 40.8 4.3 31. 5 13. 7 5123 83.2 5879
1935 30.9 67.3 25.9 1.5 47.7 5.1 6601 84.5 7428
1936 29.7 78.4 37.9 0.1 63.4 0.2 9958 75.7 9819
1937 43.2 105.5 40.9 2.9 79.4 3.7 11435 79.4 12507
1938 41. 8 119.6 34.9 0.6 83.7 0.7 13157 80. 3 11057
TABLE XIV. 11 (continued)
Rolled Ferrous Metals Pap e r and Cardboard Tanning Materials
and Allied Products Paper Imports of (in term.s of pure tannin)Total TotalIm.ports Supply of Imports Consum.pn Supply of Paper and
of Rolled Rolled as % of Based on Paper Pulp as Total ImportsSteel Im.ports of % Total Imports as % of
"Article s " Steel, Pipe Total Paper and Supply Supply Total
Pipe &Imported Supply and Pulp Cardboard (see notes) SupplyArticles
1000 IS m.. t. % 1000 ISm.. t. % 1000 I S m.. t. %
1913 119.2c 247.2 605.6 c 40.8(,;
1923/24 9.4 - 174.1 - 9980 14231 70.1
1924/25 24.1 218.4 350.2 72.4 17716 25501 70.5
1925/26 62.6 256.5 433.7 58.0 23464 33265 70.6
1926/27 85.3 222.8 420.3 53.0 31039 42968 72.3
1927/28 249.8 3771. 4 6.6 190.7 422.5 45. 1 30297 49890 60.8
1929 299.3 [4360.0](; [ 6. 9]a 15 o. 6 a 520.6a 28. 9a 23285a 54110a 43.0a
1930 653.8 [5344. O]C [12. 2] 183.4 642.4 28.5a 25500 54900a 46.9a
1931 1490. 1 5857.2 25.4 110. 1 596.2 18. 5 2700 45400 5.9
1932 974.6 5488.6 17.8 4.4 544.8 0.8 0.0 41. 4 o. 9
1933 533. 5 [ 5750.4 9.3 3.4 585.6 o. 6 .
1934 355.5 7580.4 4.7 4.4 657.8 0.6
1935 347.0 9965.9 :3.5 6.4 749.0 0.9
1936 222.5 13012. 1 1.7 5. 3 898.4 0.6
1937 123.0 13386. 3 0.9 978.1 .
1938 76.2 982.6
aEconom.ic year 1928/29, 1929/30. cRussian Em.pire
bGross fiber im.ports. Net fiber imports were 48, 000 In. t. in 1930, 14,000 m. t. in 1931, 6,000 In. t. ~
in 1932. ex>
Source: Notes to Table XIV. 11, p. 783.
TABLE XIV. 12
USSR: CONSUMER - ORIENTED IMPOR TS 1913, 1922/23 - 1938
(percent of total imports)
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Adjusted Definition
Soviet Foodstuffs Plus fiber!: Plus paper Plus other Plus raw
definition and manu- hides,dyes pulp and raw rubber
factured tanning cardboard material aluminum
consumer materials for manu-
goods facturing
consumer
1913 30. 1 31. 2 53.8 56. 1 56. 7 59. 6
1922/23 25.8 45.9 49.8 50.0 55.3
1923/24 18. 9 18. 7 56.2 62.3 63.4 67.4
1924/25 33. 1 32. 6 68.6 72. 6 73. 7 75. 1
1925/26 19. 3 18. 3 55.0 59.9 60.9 64.6
1926/27 10. 8 10. 9 50. 5 54.3 54.9 58. 6
1927/28 14. 1 14. 1 49.5 52.6 52.4 55. 5
1929 12.4 10. 4 43.0 44.6 45. 3 47.3
1930 12. 5 12. 3 27.4 28.8 29.2 31. 4
1931 7. 9 7. 4 17. 0 17. 6 17. 8 20. 5
1932 11. 7 11. 2 19. 5 19. 5 19. 7 21. 8
1933 9. 8 9. 3 22.0 22. 1 22.3 26. 1
1934 16. 0 15. 9 31. 4 31. 6 32. 1 40.5
1935 13. 9 13. 2 34.4 34.6 34. 1 41. 1
1936 12. 2 12. 3 26. 5 26. 7 27.4 31. 9
1937 9. 8 10. 6 26.3 26.5 27.4 33.7
1938 12.9 13. 5 26.3 26.6 27.5 32.4
Source: Notes to Table XIV. 12, Appendix B, p. 786.
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while most Soviet exports were sold and delivered within a short period
of time - and in fact many export goods were shipped and valued at
current prices without being sold so that the eventual sale price was
below the invoice price. 22 Second, the USSR pruchases substantial
quantities of manufactured goods whose prices tended to fall less rapidly
than the raw material prices of Soviet exports. Third, the USSR pur-
chased goods (especially in Germany) where prices were regulated
officially of unofficially in international control agreements or cartel
arrangements. The commodity terms of trade were to fall further in
the coming three years ..
Adverse balance of payments 1929-1931. Thus despite the slow-
er growth of import volume relative to export volume from 1927/28 (but
recall the large trade deficit in 1927/28), the balance of trade deterior-
ated again after a smalL.surplus in 1929 and the trade deficit in 1931
reached almost 300 million rubles (Table XIV. 3). Much of the trade def-
icit must be attributed to the deterioration of the terms of trade, for if
1927/28 prices had prevailed in 1931, exports would have been about
1650 million rubles while imports would have been about 1300 million
23rubles.
The balance of payments on current account was deficit in each
of the first three years of the FYP because of large and increasing net
imports of "invisibles trade items on current account. 24 These invis-
22 See Appendix A, Technical Note 2.
23 Based on the ruble value of exports and imports in 1927/28
and the colume index of exports and ~mps>rts using 1927/28 price weights
from Tables XIV. 4 and XIV. 5.
24 Table T-14.
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ible trade items on current account included increasing interest pay-
ments on the growing short-term foreign debt and payments for patents, .
foreign technical assistance and remittances of foreign workers. 25
Thus, after a moderately favorable year in 1929, the Soviet balance of
payments deteriorated rapidly in 1930 and 1931.
The large balance of payment deficits in 1930 was financed
almost entirely by an increase of more than 200 million rubles in out-
standing short-term foreign debt so that virtually no precious metals
were exported during 1929 and 1930. (Tables T-15 and T-16). In 1931,
outstanding foreign debt rose again by more than 200 million rubles,
but this time net exports of 120 million rubles of precious metals were
also required to cover the Soviet payments deficit in 1931 (Table D.8).
Foreign credit conditions had improved considerably in the first years
of the depres sion as foreign governments were anxious to attract orders
to their industries, and major credits (actually, government guarantees)
were received from Great Britain, Italy (1930), Germany (1931), and a
host of other smaller countries. 26 The Soviet's major creditor was
25
Birmingham - 32a, pp. 11-12.
26 There exists considerable scattered literature on credits
to the USSR. The two major studies covering the period up through 1931
are Birmingham-32a and Shenkman-32a. For references to British cre-
dits to the USSR, see ERSU, Vol. VI, No. 11 (June 1, 1931), p. 257;
ERSU, Vol. VI, No. 20, (October 15, 1931), p. 471; and ERSU, Vol. VII
No. 13-14 (July 15, 1932), p. 296. For references to the 1931 Soviet-
German credit guarantee agreement, see SUA, Vol. X, No. 7 (1931)
pp. 2-4 and other numerous articles in SUA on the employment of this
credit during 1931; the duration of the credits were for 14 to 27 months
and all the orders had to be placed before August 31, 1931. The German-
Soviet agreement was extended for the unused portion in June 1932 (SUA,
Vol. XI, No. 11 (1932) pp. 4-11). ERSU also contained considerable dis-
cussion of the German-Soviet credit agreements in 1931 and 1932. For
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Germany (estimated as high as 50% of outstanding Soviet-foreign debt);
the second largest was Great Britain followed by Italy and the United
States (granted by i'nilividual firms without any g~vernment guarantee). 27
In general, these credits were relatively short-term (six months to two
years).28 These credits when all costs were considered were usually
quite expensive for the actual amount of credit received because of the
giving of bills when the order was placed, because of the premiums paid
for the insurance guarantee and similar costs, because of the higher
prices which firms charged the USSR in order to compensate for the
high dis count rate on the unguaranteed portion of the Soviet bill which
they were not willing to hold in their portfolio. 29 If the drastic decline.
in the prices of Soviet export goods is also considered between the time
the credits were granted and the running of the trade surplus to repay the
credits, the cost of imports:bought with these credits in terms of ex-
ported goods was much greater. Despite the high cost of these credits,
Soviet trade usually fb Howed the availability of credit rather and out-
standing Soviet foreign debt grew in the following manner (Table TJ:15).
the Italy-Soviet credit agreement of 1930 and 1931, see ERSU, Vol. VI,
No. 10 (May 15, 1931), pp. 220; and Documentation-33, pp. 29-31.
See Committee-33, pp. 187-199 for description of credit agreements
signed as renewed in 1930 or 1931 with Austria, Norway, Latvia and
Japan.
27 Shenkman-32a, pp. 544-546 and Birmingham-32a, pp. 11,
20-21.
28
Birmingham-32a, p. 16 and references cited above in note
on p. 591.
29 Shenkman-32a, p. 544, Birmingham-32a, p. 20.
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SOVIET FOREIGN DEBT 1927/28 - 1932
(millions of rubles)
Outstanding as of October 1st of
1928
370
1929
415
1930
625
1931
855
1932(Ju1y 1)
975
Since much of the outstanding debt was short-term, the USSR was locked
in to purchasing where credit was made available because as much as
two-thirds of the outstanding Soviet bills had to be paid each year (as of
1930/31); thus, unless the USSR was willing to run a large trade surplus
to reduce its outstanding foreign debt, trade was almost forced to follow
d• °1 bOlo 30ere. ltr:aval a 1 Ity.
In comparison, Soviet foreign reserves were about 360 million
rubles on January 1st 1932 (Table T-17).
The Soviet foreign trade and payments crisis 1932-1933
The stage was set for a severe crisis in the Soviet foreign trade
sector by the end of 1931 - the worst grain harvest since 1925, a slaughter
of livestock and poultry supplying major export products, collapsing terms
of trade, increasing trade barriers (not only tariffs, but also quotas), and
increasing domestic demand for oil products, timber, and other major
export products. Recall that grain exports equalled 20% of total exports
in 1931.
Plan and reality in 1932 and 1933. Although the volume of for-
eign trade far exceeded the plan targets during the first three years of
30 Shenkman-32a, p. 549 cited the "two-thirds" figure~.
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the FYP, the deterioration of the terms of term and the excess fulfill-
ment of the import plan resulted in large trade deficits rather than the
large trade surpluses which were projected for these years in the foreign
trade plan, so that in 1931 large quantities of gold had to be shipped and
foreign reserves declined again after being slowly built up through dom-
estic gold production and the payments of the large deficit on current
account through accumulation of high-cost short-term foreign debt.
The foreign trade plan had called for continued expansion of
both imports and exports in 1932 and 1933; recall that exports were
supposed to be expanded on the basis of increased grain exports (Table
XIV. 1). But Soviet foreign trade had reached a turning point and these
trade plans were never even remotely fulfilled - and never again ;men-
tioned in the Soviet press.
Exports. Exports fell 29% in value in 1932 and 190/0in volume
(1932 price weights) rather than increasing 310/0as projected in the plan.
The decline was largely due to the cutback in grain exports which was
caused. ,by the bad 1931 harvest, but exports of tirnber, manganese ore
and other minerals, and flax also fell (Tables XIV. 1, XIV. 4, T-3).
Exports fell another 37% in value in 1933 even though the vol-
ume (1932 price weights) fell only a few percent - the plan, of course,
had had projected a 230/0increase in exports, which when combined with
the moderate growth of imports was to result in a very large trade sur-
plus (almost one-half of the entire trade surplus was to be achieved in
1932/.33). A trade surplus was indeed achieved in 1933 - but not at all
according to plan.
Imports. Imports were chopped back by 37% in value in 1932
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and 26 -29% in volume. But the real cutback in Soviet imports was
really felt in 1933, when the value of imports fell to about 50% of. 1932
levels and to about 32% of the level of 1931 imports. The cutback in
volume in 1933 was even more draconian than in 1932; the volume of
imports were reduced 45% below 1932 levels and equalled about 39% of
1931 import volume (using 1932 price weights)(Table XIV. 5). Whereas
the plan had projected import to be about 80% above 1927/28 levels, the
actual volume of imports in 1933 was about 400/0below the volume of
imports in 1927/28. What went wrong in 1932 and 1933 in the foreign
trade sector to cause such ~'underfulfillin"ent~i:: of the import plan (and
also the export plan)? For previously the overall trade plan targets for
imports and exports were being exceeded at least in volume in 1929,
1930 and 1931.
The cutback in imports was widespread, throughout the import
list, but machinery, ferrous metals, non-ferrous metals, and paper
imports were reduced most. 31 In some cases these cutbacks of im-
ports caused a reduction in the net supply: of these products to the econ-
omy (import deprivation rather than import substitution); this occurred
in the case of wool, sopper, lead, since, tin, aluminum, pipes, rolled
ferrous metals, paper, and possibly leather and some types of mach-
inery (and machinery in general). (Table XIV. 11) Could this cutback
in imports have contributed to the slowdown in investment and the growth
31 An order went out in early 1932 cancelling previously
granted licenses for imports of many types of machinery (Baykov-46,
pp. 55). Assessing the impact on the total supply of machinery from
the cutback in machinery imports is difficult because of the weighting
problems (see Table XIV. 2).
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of non-agricultural output and in the production of certain products such
as electrical machinery in 1932 and 1933. 32 Other reasons could have
contributed to the slowdown, including the famine (which according to
most observers was prevelant mostly in rural areas while the industrial
areas rema ined fairly well supplied). 33
Reasons for the cutback in trade in 1932 and 1933. Why was
trade (and especially imports) reduced so sharply in 1932 and 1933.
The major reason of course, was the problem in expanding Soviet ex-
ports. The Soviet explanation for the reduction in Soviet exports (and
therefore, also imports) was explained by the editor of the ~journal of the
Soviet trade delegation in Germany:
32
Indexes using 1937 price weights
1930 = 100
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
Gross Annual
Investment in
Fixed Capital
100
112.4
117.5
104. 5
118.6
Non-agric. &
Non-resident.
component of
national prod.
100
109
113
115
128
Industrial
Output
100
III
108
103
114
Electrical
Equipment
100
185
274
235
218
Sources: Gros s annual investment in fixed capital based on Moorsteen-
66, p. 358. Non-agricultural and non-residential component of gross
national product from Moorsteen-66, p. 361. Output of electrical equip-
ment based on Moorsteen-62, p. 314. Output of final industrial product
from Powell-63, p. 178.
Electrical machinery is one of the major consumer s of copper,
the net supply of which was cut back in 1933.
33
Cf. Moorsteen-66, p. 285. See Dalrymple-64a for discus-
sion of the distribution of the famine.
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the cause of the cutback in imports consists in no way in a
reduction of the demand of the Soviet economy for the import of
producers' goods, but rather exclusively in the reduction in the
absorbtive capacity of foreign markets for the sale of Soviet
goods - a condition, which is the result of the world economic
crisis and the foreign trade policy measures to limit imports.
As it is known, since the export of commodities is the major
basis for the development of imports for the USSR, curtailment
of exports must for the above named reason necessarily be fol-
lowed by a curtailment of imports. 34
While the increasing trade-policy restrictions on world trade
undoubtedly were a major factor in restricting the expansion of Soviet
exports in volume, two other factors also played an important part in
the cutback of Soviet exports in 1932 and 1933.
First, the domestic output of several major export products
such as grain, flax, crude oil, timber, matches, sugar, eggs, meat and
milk actually fell in 1932 or 1933;35 at the same time domestic demand
for many export products (including grain, refined petroleum products,
timber, etc.) was expanding because of the growing population, the de-
sired expansion of investment and industrial output. Thus, the "export-
able surplus" - if this term has meaning in an economy with great ex-
ces s aggregate demand - was being reduced for those goods whose out-
put in absolute terms was failing to keep up with domestic demand. 36
34 SUA, Vol. 11, No. 19 (193l), p. 5~ This article also noted
the rising trend of using quotas to limit imports especially in Germany,
a major Soviet export market.
35 Data on grain, milk, eggs, flax, meat and sugar beets
during 1931-34 from Johanson-60, pp. 266-267. Data on timber and
crude oil and sugar output from Nutter-60, pp. 420-459.
36 Maybe a more relevant term than "exportable surplus" is
"relative exportable surplus" denoting changes in relative shortages
and relative excess demand (assuming some set of prices).
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Second, the substantial deterioration of the commodity terms
of trade in the first three years of the FYP had sharply reduced the
gains of trade for the USSR - not only from the viewpoint of further
"export specialization of the economy" by expanding export fields rather
than import substitution industries, but also from the viewpoint of the
economic gains of export-import operations from the current structure
of output. If it is assumed that the planners' or Soviet leaderships'
preferences did not change between 1927/28 and 1931 - which, of course,
was not true - ,then from any given level and structure of output, an
adverse shift in the terms of trade would be expected to cause a reduc-
tion in the level of imports. The planners' and leaderships' preferences,
however, did change between the approval of the 1st FYP in 1929 and in
late 1930; this change was not entirely unrelated to the adverse trends
in the foreign trade sector. For now much greater emphasis was being
placed on "heavy industry" or the "investment goods industry" to make
the USSR more rapidly indpendent of the world economy. The gains from
becoming more independent of the world economy were greatly enhanced
(or the opportunity costs of becoming more independent from the world
economy based on other reasons were reduced) by the decline in the
terms of trade and the other adver se developments in world trade during
the early 1930's. Thus, the planners' desire to accelerate the process
(or at least maintain the proces s) of becoming less dependent on foreign
trade to supply the Soviet economy with investment goods was increased,
and they might have become more willing to expand trade even though
the terms of trade had deteriorated. But once sufficient structural
change had been achieved in the economy in the direction of a larger
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investment goods industry, so as to permit the desired rate of invest-
ment without imports, that component of the gains of foreign trade which
depended on the gains to the economy (or to the Soviet leadership) from
changing the structure of the economy through export-import operations,
became unimportant. During 1930 and 1931, this "structural change
component" of the gains of trade was perhaps the most important com-
ponent of the gains of trade to Soviet leaders and to Soviet planners.
Remove this component of the gains of trade - which explains at least
partially why the Soviet Union expanded trade in the face of deteriorat-
ing terms of trade - and the previous level of trade :neces sary during the
structural change period turns out to be excessive with respect to the
remaining gains of trade, so that the planners become willing to cut
back on trade at the current terms of trade. Thus, we have a second
reason why the USSR might start reducing foreign trade in 1932 and:
1933.37
The terms of trade continued to deteriorate in 1932 (-9%) and
1933 (-3%) which, even without any further change in the planners' pre-
ferences, would increase the tendency for the planners to reduce trade
(Table XIV. 8, 1932 quantity weights). Against this tendency, however,
must be considered the growth of the Soviet economy during this period
and the economy's marginal propensity to import (the economy's mar-
ginal propensity to imports, however, was being reduced during .this
period by deliberate policy of the government).
37 Holzman-63, p. 304 also suggests that the terms of trade
might have been important in reducing Soviet foreign trade.
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Thus, four factors tended to depress exports after 1931 - the
poor harvests of 1931 and 1932 and a decline in output of other major
export goods, increasing domestic demand for export goods, increasing
world trade barriers in the form of both tariffs and quotas, and a re-
duction in the gains of trade because of the deterioration in the terms of
trade and because of the structural changes in the economy toward im-
portsubstitution.
Imports 1932-1933. Imports were reduced basically as a result
of the deterioration in the export situation. The interesting question is
why imports were not maintained at higher levels through the expansion
of outstanding foreign debt rather than being reduced by almost one-
third in 1932 and cut again by one-half in 1933. In 1932 the reduction
of imports was sufficient to reduce the trade deficit by over 150 million
rubles, but the trade deficit was still about 130 million rubles which
when considered with the deficit of invisible trade items on current
account must have resulted in a balance of payments deficit of more than
200 million rubles. Ou.tstanding foreign debt did in fact increase some-
what in 1932 to maintain the level of imports; this reflected the fact that
it was difficult to reduce imports of machinery to ;any greater extent in
1932 because of the lag between ordering and delivery of the equipment,
so that the increase in foreign debt to July 1932,at least,represented the
delivery of equipment purchased under previous credit agreements
rather than any increase in the availability of foreign credits offered. 38
38
See below, pp.60l and Table T-15. See also ERSU, (Vol.
XII, No.8 (1932) p. 185) for the 1932 extension the permissible period
for discounting Soviet bills under the 1931 credit agreement - but this
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Political relations, credits and trade 1932-33. The possibi-
lities of greatly expanding credits diminished during 1932 and large sums
of bills were falling due during and e specially toward the end of 1932 and
the beginning of 1933. Furthermore, the Soviet government had increas-
ing reasons to doubt the willingnes s of the German government to pro-
long or renew their credit and the pos sibilities of expanding British
credits because of the deteriorating political relations between the USSR
and Germany and the USSR and Great Britain. 39 The deterioration of
pplitical relations between the USSR and its two major creditors in late
1932 and early 1933 was an important factor in the decisions to cut back
Soviet imports, for the level of imports depended to a large extent on
the willingness of these two governments 1) to guarantee Soviet bills
and 2} to accept Soviet exports. The forming of the von Papen govern-
ment in Germany in mid-1932 certainly worried the Soviet government,
for von Papen was long associated with anti-Soviet policies, while the
continued rise of the stridently anti-Communist Nazi Parti and final
assumption of the Chancellorship by Hitler in January 1933 was not a
sound basis for planning the long term continuation and expansion of
trade and credit relations with the Soviet's major creditor and trading
40
partner. In October 1932 Great Britain denounced the Soviet-British
1932 agreement provided only for a very small increase in the credits to
be made available.
39 Malevsky-33, pp. 559 -560 discussed the increasing reluc-
tance of British and German firms to grant credit to :the USSR, and em-
phasized that a large sum of Soviet bills were maturing in 1932 in Ger-
many (180 million rubles) and in other countries (especially during the
latter half of the year).
40 See Dyck-66, pp. 250-255 for the Soviet attitude toward von
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trade agreements and, as a consequence of the arrest in March 1933 of
several British subjects in the USSR, the British government declared
an embargo in April 1933 on about two-thirds of Soviet exports to Great
Britain - here again there seemed to be little ground to assume stability
of trade relations with this major trading partner. 41
Deteriorating political relations with these two countries were
reflected in the increasing unwillingnes s of the Soviet Union to rely on
continued trade and credit relations with these two countries. Here
were several reasons for not maintaining imports at higher levels
through the expansion of credits, for the instability of trade and political
relations and the emerging network of trade and currency restriction
increased the risk of forcing the Soviet government to default on Soviet
foreign obligations.
From the deficit of 1932 to the surplus of 1933. The trade
deficit of 1932 and the even greater deficit on current account was fin-
anced by the shipment of about 100 million rubles in precious metals
and some additional accumulation of short-term foreign debt (Tables
T - 15 and T- 16).
In 1933 the Soviet trade surplus was about~ 120 million rubles
and the balance on current account probably showed even greater imp ....
rovement over 1932 due to efforts by the USSR to reduce their expendi-
tures on invisible items on current account (especially technical aid and
Papen, and Beloff-47, pp. 64-69 and pp. 94 for the Soviet attitude to-
ward Hitler.
41 Beloff-47, p. 35.
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and the hiring of foreign workers). The large sum of maturing credits,
however, could be covered completely only by continued shipment of
precious metals of 110 million rubles (including large quantities of
I
silver) and by an emergency "transition credit" (Uerberbrueckungskre-
dit) of about 75 million rubles from Germany, which was to be paid off
in the summer of 1934. 42
Soviet foreign reserves fell only slightly in 1932 and were at
about 350 million rubles on January 1st, 1933. Domestic gold produc-
tion was rising rapidly and as far as can be determined the large ship-
ments of gold in 1933 were probably less than the total quantity of gold
produced in that year so that the gold stock actually r.ose in 1933 (Table
E.3). Thus, all indications are that Soviet foreign reserves rose slightly
by January 1934 (Table t.3.).
Repayment of the Soviet foreign debt 1932-1934. The real cost
of these relatively short-term credits to the USSR was quite high for a
variety of reasons. First, the term s of the credit including the "insur-
ance costs", the timing of the handing out of the trade bills, the deposit
requirements, and the basic interest rate (especially in Germany in 1931)
were not particularly favorable. Second, firms often increased prices
on "Rus sian busine s s If in order to compensate the firm for the high di s-
count rate (on the "black bourse") on the non-guaranteed portion of the
Soviet acceptances or on non-guaranteed Soviet bills, which they did not
wish to hold in their own portfolio until maturity. Third, the real costs
of these credits were increased by the decline in Soviet export prices
between the time of the is sue of the Soviet bill and the repayment of the
Soviet bill by ,means of a trade surplus. Fourth, the short-maturity of
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the biils locked the direction of Soviet trade into the availability of
credit rather than being guided by competitive costs. Five, the re-
payment of Soviet foreign debts became increasingly more complex
because of the end of multi-lateral clearing upon ~he creation of the
maze of currency controls (especially in Germany, their ma in creditor),
so that these currency controls threatened to raise the cost of credits
to the USSR even more.
It is, therefore, understandable that the Soviet government be-
came increasingly wary of relying on increasing short-term foreign
debt as a basis for maintaining their import levels in 1932 and 1933 at
the previous high levels - even if the political and commercial relation-
ships with its major creditors and trading partners made it pos sible.
Thus the Soviet government during the middle of 1932, 43 it seems,
decided (was forced?) to reassess and to "reconstruct their current
system of paying for a large share of importsthrough the use of short- ~
term credits and using current export receipts to cover maturing short-
term credits. They decided (or were forced?) to convert to a system
of paying for current imports with cash received either from current
export receipts or from long-term low-cost loans {in the form of bonds,
42 Huntingdon- 35, p. 13 and Wirtschaftsdienst (April 6, 1934)
p. 480. This credit is very little discussed in any of the Soviet foreign
trade press organs and was almost not noticed by the Western press -
but it was very important to the USSR in permitting it to meet its payment
obligations in 1933.
43 Furthermore, the Soviet government wished to maintain
and, if possible, increase, their foreign reserves because of the in-
creasing threat of war with Japan in the Far East toward the end of 1931
and during 1932 (Beloff-47, pp. 80-88 and pp. 163 ff). The military
events in the Far East also reduced trade with China and ended the con-
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or long-term bank credits). But to reconstruct to this cash basis of
import payment required paying off the large outstanding Soviet foreign
debt - and this the USSR accomplished with amazing rapidity as can be
seen in Table T.':'15.
eign debt so rapidly?
How did the USSR reduce their outstanding for-
The Soviet foreign debt was reduced in a number of ways in-
eluding the traditional methods of running a large trade surplus and the
shipment of precious metals as well as the reduction of the large Soviet
stocks of commodities warehoused abroad, the fortuitous devaluation of
several creditors' currency, and the attraction of fairly substantial
quantities of foreign currency into the hands of the government by means
0.£ a network of foreign currency stores (Torgsin). In addition the Soviet
government took measp:r.-es to improve their balance on the invisible
trade items by reducing the size of trade delegations abroad, by the
development of a Soviet shipping fleet, by encouraging tourism in the
Soviet Union, by cutting back on their use of foreign technical assistance
and foreign technicians, by changing the method of payment of the re-
maining foreign workers from convertible rubles to inconvertible rubles
44
by the establishment of Soviet insurance and forwarding firms abroad.
Devaluation and repayment of the Soviet debt. The 400/0 deval-
uation of the pound after October, 1931, significantly reduced the amount
siderable. Soviet trade of oil and textiles to Manchuria (Ibid. p. l66).
In 1933 further friction arose over the "forced sale" of the Chinese
Eastern Railway by the USSR to the Japanese again causing consider-
able concern about the possibility of a war (Beloff-47, pp. 167-177).
44 See ERSU and VTin 1934 and 1935 for description of these
measures.
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of Soviet foreign debt valued in gold rubles because much of the foreign
debt was payable in pound sterling (even trade acceptances of some Ger.-1
man firms), and the quotation (based on the cross exchange ra te on the
dollar in 1932) of the pound sterling in terms of rubles fell. Several
other creditor countries (Norway, Denmark, Austria) devalued in 1931
and 1932 and the United States finally devalued in 1933. By the end of
1933 the devaluation of the pound and other currencies made a major con-
tribution - maybe as much as 300-350 million rubles - to the reduction
45of Soviet foreign debt in terms of gold rubles.
The devaluation also reduced the foreign debt in terms of gold
and the USSR was forcing up the output of gold at a frantic pace in the
early 1930' s (Table E. I). This increase in Soviet gold output was the
second major means of paying off the Soviet foreign debt and net ship-
ments of precious metals in 1932 and 1933 were estimated at 210 million
rubles; another 120 million rubles of precious metals were shipped in
1934 (Table D. 8). 46
The Soviet government, however, was not able to reap the full
benefits of the increased "debt paying power" of gold in reducing its
foreign debt during 1932 - 35 througl,i ,gold shipments during this period.
The balance of trade with Germany during this period was strongly un-
45 Prokopovich-52, p. 210 noted that some foreign observers
attributed about 300-350 million rubles of the rapid reduction in the
Soviet foreign debt between 1932 and 1935 to the devaluation of currency.
46 Considerable quantities of silver were exported in 1933 and
1934 (Table D.8). The silver probably came from the melting of Tsar-
ist and Soviet silver coinage, which was withdrawn from circulation or
which was received through the network of "foreign currency stores"
(Torgsin) which sold consumer goods to both Soviet citizens and tourists
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favorable during 1930-1933 and the trade surplus was not very large
relative to the debt repayments to be made in 1934. The Soviet govern-
ment attributed their deficit to the increasing restriction on German
foreign trade in general and also specifically on Soviet trade; the matter
of expanding Soviet exports was the subject of continual negotiations in
471932 - 34. Thus, the Soviet government had to ship gold to payoff its
foreign trade debts to Germany; in fact, almost all Soviet gold shipments
in the period 1931-1934 went to Germany (Table D. 1). This was unfort-
unate because it had to purchase marks with gold at the official parity
rate of the Reichsmark and the German government refused to devalue
the' mark. Thus, the "debt-paying power" of Soviet gold in paying
Soviet'debt denominated in marks was less than the "debt-paying power"
of Soviet gold in paying Soviet debt denominated in now devalued pounds
sterling (or eventually the U.S. dollar). In Great Britain, on the other
hand, the debt-paying power of gold had "risen" 40% in terms of paying
off Soviet debt denominated in pounds. But because of the lack of foreign
currency reserves, the USSR covered its pound sterling debts in Great
Britain through the forcing (or maintainance) of its traditional trade
surplus with Great Britain and since wholesale prices continued to de-
cline in 1933 and were lower than when much of the original Soviet debt
was incurred, the cost in real terms to the USSR in paying off Soviet
foreign debt in Great Britain was not at all improved, but on the contrary
continued to deteriorate because of the lower prices for Soviet export
only in exchange for foreign exchange, precious metals and silver and
gold coin. See Appendix D, "Silver Exports".
47 See issues of SUA, for these years.
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goods.48 Thus, while devaluation may have nominally reduced the Soviet
foreign debt in terms of gold rubles, in practice it did not have a similar
beneficial effect in real terms because of the distribution of the Soviet
foreign debt between devalued currency countries and gold-standard
countries and the varying possibilities of running an adequate trade
surplus to payoff the Soviet foreign debt in each country.
Foreign currency stores as an export operation. In 1930 the
USSR began to set up a network of retail stores, at which scarce (often
rationed) consumer goods could be freely purchased by any foreigner
or Soviet citizen possessing foreign currency, gold, silver, and old
silver and gold coins. This chain of stor.es, called Torgsin, also ad-
vertised abroad that" Torgsin orders" could be sent to relatives and
friends :in Russia from abroad by purchases of a "Torgsin order" at
local banks or authorized agents. 49 The purpose of these stores was
primarily to bring foreign currency and precious metal and coinage out
of the hoards of the Russian peasant (and other citizens); Aizenberg-62
cited estimates of pre-1917 hoards of 200-250 million rubles in gold,
100 million rubles in silver, and 75 million rubles in foreign currency. 50
The Torgsin network also served tourists - for otherwise, the position of
the tourist in Russia and the expenses of the tourist in Russia for foreign
currency converted at the' official exchange rate would be prohibitively
48
Huntingdon- 35,{ p~) 11), noted this point in an oblique manner.
49 See for example the ad in ERSU, Vol. IX, No. 12 (December
1934), p. 280.
50 Aizenberg-62, pp. 64-65.
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difficult and expensive. According to estimates cited in Aizenburg,
sales and the ratio of Trogsin sales to total exports developed in the
following manner:5l
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 Total
Value (millions of
gold rubles) 7 49 115 72 44 287
Torgsin sales as
% of total exports 8. 6% :23.80/0 16% 13.8%
Several aspects of Torgsin operations are important for esti-
mating their importance in foreign trade and the reduction of the foreign
debt.- .First, the net earnings in foreign exchange and precious metals
from the viewpoint of the balance of payments is les s than total sales of
the Torgsin network, because some goods of unknown proportion sold in
these stores were imported expressly for the purpose of Torgsin sales
or used imported inputs. Second, it would be interesting to know what
portion of sales were for foreign currency or against foreign Torgsin
orders - for the export of currency or the receipt of such money orders
are not traceable in recipient countries I trade statistics, while statistics
of Soviet exports of gold and silver are available from recipient coun-
try statistics; gold and silver exports originating from Torgsin sales
would be no different than exports from domestic production in esti-
mating the role or precious :metal exports in reduction of the foreign
debt. The League of Nations did cite an estimated composition of the
Torgsin receipts: 15%was received in foreign currency from tourists,
16% from foreign money orders payable to the USSR citizens, and as
much as 69% from the domestic population in the form of old coins, gold
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and silver ornaments, etc. 52 Thus, about 90 -1 00 million ruble s of
foreign currency was received in Torgsin sales which could be used to
payoff the foreign debt without appearing in recipient country trade
statistics. 53 The reduction in the "real foreign debt" of the USSR from
about 850 in October 1st, 1931, (and perhaps even temporarily higher
in 1932) to roughly 170 million rubles at the end of 1935 - a reduction
of about 600 million rubles - appears to have been achi eved by forcing a
200 million ruble trade surplus during the four and ore-quarter years,
1932-1935, by exporting about 387 million rubles of precious metals
and by the transfer of roughly 100 million rubles of foreign currency
and deposits abroad and a fairly substantial sum, perhaps :as much as
300 million rubles, through devaluation of the pound sterling and the dollar
and several minor currencies. 54 Of course the total payments are in
excess of the reduction in real debt during the period, but it must be
recalled that the USSR ran a deficit on invisible items in the current
accounts during most of these years-.
The Soviet government claim to have reduced their foreign
debt from 1400 million rubles at the end of 1931 to about 450 million
rubles at the end of 1933 to about 170 million rubles at the end of 1935.
This seems on the face of it to be completely at odds with the above
51 Aizenberg-62, p. 65
52
League-36a, p. 180.
53 For some description of the Torgsin operations see Aizen-
berg-62, pp. 64-66; League-36a, p. 180; ERSU, Vol. VII, No. 13-14
(July 15, 1932); p. 303; ERSU, Vol. IX, No.4 (April, 1934), p. 101;
SUA, Vol. XII, No. 23/24 {1933}, pp. 62-63.
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statement about the reduction of theSoviet foreign debt (Table T-14)
The Soviet figures are not necessarily incorrect, but they probably
refer to different definitions of foreign debt - namely, to total liabilities
including "real debt" as well as lonas against Soviet goods warehoused
abroad and for bills given out when orders for machinery and other goods
were placed (20% was the practice in Germany). 55 These liabilities
are what Shenkman called "contingent liabilities" for the loans against
export goods warehoused abroad could be reduced simply by selling off
the warehoused goods and this was probably what actually happened
during 1932-35.56 The bills delivered against commodities at the time
of ordering rather than their delivery - even if the practice was continued
as late as 1935 - would be much lower in value in 1935 due to the sharp
cutback in the value of outstanding orders in 1935 (not only for imports
in general, but even more for the type of commodities which required
such financial arrangements). Since much of the import purchases by
the USSR by 1935 was for cash rather than on credit terms, it was likely
that such "contingent liabilities" would be even further reduced. In fact,
it is likely that both types of "contingent liabilities" were negligible in
1935 because of a distinct change in export policy during the mid-1930's
away from the export of unsold goods to warehouses abroad, and the
policy of "cash payment for imports". In October, 1931, these contin-
54 See Tables XIV. 3, A. Ie, T-16, and text of Chapter XIV.
55 Shenkman-32a. See terms of 1931 credit agreement
between Germany and the USSR in Committee-33, p. 189.
56 See Prokopovich-52, p. 210 for his explanation of the in-
crease in the foreign debt for 1929-1931 and its reduction in 1932-1933.
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gent liabilities" were roughly 450 million rubles (Table T-15). If the
reduction of these contingent liabilities are taken into account, the great
discrepancy between the Soviet description of their debt reduction and the
above description of Soviet debt reduction is largely eliminated.
1934 - toward stabilization at lower levels of trade
The factors which had originally caused the turnabout in Soviet
foreign trade and complete realigning, of the Soviet foreign trade policy
continued in various degrees in 1934 and need not be reviewed exten.-
sively here.
The volume of exports declined very little during 1934 as the
pres sure to maintain exports continued; the value of exports fell 110/0
as export prices continued to decline. Important structural changes
occurred (Table XIV. 9). Grain exports, which were still quite sub-
stantial in 1933 despite the famine were reduced 50% in 1934 (Table
XIV. 2) and oil product exports continued to decline as internal demand
outpaced domestic production - this decline in oil product exports con-
tinued uninterruptedly during the rest of the period 1934-1938 (Table
XIV. 9).
The volume of imports again was sharply reduced (by 28% using
1932 price weights), although the reduction was not as drastic in either
relative terms or absolute terms as in the previous years (Table XIV. 5).
The effect on the economy of this further reduction in imports was much
less than in the previous two years because in the interim the domestic
import- substitute industries ha-d been sufficiently developed to permit
increases in domestic supply despite the cutback in imports. The cut-
back occurred almost exclusively in machinery imports and ferrous
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metals (Table s XIV. 10 and XIV. 11), while the import of tropical pro":
ducts and non-ferrous metals actually increased somewhat.
The structural change in the economy to permit economic growth
independent of the level of imports had proceeded far enough so that the
cutback in machinery and ferrous metal imports had little or no effect on
the aggregate level of investment after 1934. The volume of imports in
1934 had been reduced to level below the volume of imports in 1924/25
(Table XIV. 4) and this was to be the nadir of Soviet imports during the
period 1924/25 - 1938, a low level of imports completely unforeseen in
the beginning of the 1st FYP. This was not the goal of the 1st FYP or
even of the changes in the planners' preferences,;in 1930-31 - but were
it not for the FYP and the shift toward a heavier emphasis on the invest-
ment goods and import-substitution industries, such low levels of imports
would have posed a barrier to the growth of the Soviet economy even in
the early 1930's. Soviet imports in 1934 had to be forced down to such
low levels because of the large deficits run in the early 1930' s - and
the largest trade surplus of the entire period between the two world
wars - 186 million rubles - was forced in 1934 in order to meet maturing
Soviet obligations and to rebuild Soviet foreign reserves (which increased
roughly 100 million rubles in 1934 (Table T-17). Large exports of pre-
cious metals continued to be neces sary during 1934 in order to meet
maturing obligations (especially in Germany), so that the increase in
reserves was due largely to an exces s of gold production over gold
exports. Why did the Soviet government throttle imports rather than
spend:...,' ; foreign reserves? The decline in imports might well have
been the result of the policy actions taken in 1932 and 1933 - namely,
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the decision to reduce imports and especially to reduce the ordering of
machinery abroad, for the major reduction in imports in 1934 was in
machinery and ferrous metal product imports while imports of other
products including consumer goods such as tea actually increased in
1934. Second, the Soviet government had long felt that its foreign
reserves were too low with respect to national security needs and also
" h "t "d 57WIt respect to 1 s economIc nee s.
The accident of absolute autarky. Ih summary, the trends in
Soviet foreign trade after 1931 were not at all the result of a,dong-run
policy to reduce the level of Soviet foreign trade through industrialization
and the achievement of "economic independence". Both the original plan-
ners of the FYP in 1928 and Soviet leaders in the mid-1930's saw little
contradiction between the Soviet goal of economic independence and a
policy of expanding foreign trade. The low levels of foreign trade, it
must be emphasized, were the result not of deliberate long-run policy
goals, but rather the result of a series of unforeseen events - collapse
of world trade, failure of Soviet agriculture, ;military, political and
commercial problems with foreign countries - to which the Soviet
government responded with ad hoc policy decisions which eventually led
to a sharp cutback in foreign trade. The levels of trade maintained
during 1933 and 1934 were at the cost of literally millions of lives -
which the Soviet leaders were willing to sacrifice rather than to risk
the credit of the USSR and another embargo which might cut the USSR
completely off from access to world markets. That exports and imports
were maintained even at such levels in 1933 and 1934 in the face of dom-
estic starvation and very adverse terms of trade is somewhat surprising.
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The sequel: moderate trade expansion in 1935-1938
By the beginning of 1935, two important policy goals had be en
more or les s achieved. Fir st, the structure of the economy had been
sufficiently developed so that growth and output in the essential fields
could proceed without foreign trade if necessary. 58 Second, the Soviet
foreign debt had been greatly reduced and the foreign reserve position
of the USSR had improved sufficiently to allow the USSR to pay cash for
all imports if necessary, so that they were no longer locked in to the
availability of credit (which in the past had proven so expensive). In
fact, by the end of 1934, the Soviet Union paid cash rather than asking
for credits in the purchas e of machinery in Great Britain. 59 This was
thought to be of great significance in the nature of future foreign trade
relations of the Soviet Union, first because there existed very few com-
modities or machinery which they could not produce themselves if they
so desired, so that they would no longer be forced to trade under very
unfavorable terms such as existed in the early 1930's and second, they
were able to shop around for the best bargains in the goods they wished
to import rather than being forced to buy where they could find credits
60as they had been forced to in the early 1930's.
57 Gerschenkron-45, p. 12.
58 Rozengolts - 34a, pp. 3-8.
59 ERSU, Vol. X, No. 1 (January, 1935), p. 29.
60
Rozengolts - 36b, p. 79; Rozengolts - 34a (pp. 10-11) empha-
sized that imports were not neces sary for the 2nd FYP, but that imports
might well be expanded under the proper credit and price conditions.
ERSU (Vol. X, No.3, (1935) pp. 77 -78) emphasized the Soviet desire to
expand imports if the price and credit terms were favorable and empha-
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The new nature of the "Russian market" was reflected in the
improvement in the terms and availability of low-cost long-term {five-
year} credits which were offered to the USSR after 1935 by Germany,
Great Britain, Czechoslovakia, and Sweden.61 Furtherm-ore, the terms
of trade shifted in favor of the Soviet Union slightly {Table XIV. 8}.
World trade was expanding. Shouldn't the USSR's trade also have ex-
panded? It is not the purpose of this study to analyze Soviet foreign
trade during this later period, but several trends and factors should
be pointed out.
First, after the great bulk of the short-term debt had been paid
off by the end of 1934, the Soviet balance of trade was no longer forced
to such high surplus levels, and in 1936 was negligible and in 1938 in
deficit {Table XIV. 3}. Second, imports rose somewhat in volume and in
value - a trend realized largely at the cost of the trade surplus. Third,
exports declined almost continuously in volume during 1935-1938, which
I attribute to several factors including I} domestic supply and demand
problems for their major export products {timber, petroleum products,
flax fiber, and animal products, 2} to the aggregate excess demand for
raw material imports which existed under the system and which was not
countered by any great pres sure from the leader ship to "force" exports
at the cost of domestic production, 3) to the terms of trade which con-
tinued:'to be less favorable than in 1927/28 and, 4} the continuing system
sized that during the early years of the FYP the USSR "overpaid" for
other imports.
61 Gerschenkron-45, {p. 70} describes briefly these new types
of long-term, low cost foreign credits.
617
of trade restrictions in particular with the Soviet's major trading part-
ners, Great Britain and Germany. The trade pact signed with Great
Britain in February, 1934, contained a clear restriction on the ratio
of Soviet exports to Soviet imports, for the USSR traditionally ran
large trade surpluses with Great Britain which the British government
wished to reduce for balance of payment reasons; thus the treaty stipu-
lated that the ratio of Soviet exports to Soviet imports in trade with
Great Britain be reduced from 1. 7 for 1934 to 1. 1 in 1938 - such treaty
.. d . t h . fS. t 62provIsIons were notcc:on UCIve 0 t e expansIon 0 oVlet expor s.
Trade and especially exports to Germany fell off sharply after
1934 after the rep~yment of the bulk of the short-term debt and this
decline in exports also must be attributed at least in part to the autarkic
policy pursued by Germany (rather than the USSR) during this period.
Furthermore, political relations between these two countries had deter-
iorated greatly after Hitler's taking office in 1933.
Thus, the possibilities of expanding trade with the USSR's two
major trading partners were artificially restricted.
Another important factor in the Soviet foreign trade policy was
the desire of the Soviet government to accumulate large quantities of
foreign reserves - a polis:y goal which undoubtedly was influenced by
their very unstable relations with Germany and the increasing threat
of war on both their eastern and western borders. And Soviet foreign
reserves did in fact increase very rapidly during the period 1934-1938
(Table T-17).
62 Handbook-36, p. 87.
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Thus Soviet foreign trade more or less stabilized at fairly low
levels - primarily because of continued difficulties in expanding exports.
Imports, however, were permitted to increase somewhat after the ex-
treme balance of payments crises of 1932-34 had been survived and the
balance of trade surplus tended to decline in this period.
The Soviet leadership continually expressed their desire to
expand trade - under the proper ;conditions - but they also emphasized
that they were no longer forced to expand trade. Kuibyshev in 1932
expres sed the future policy of the USSR with respect to foreign trade: and
the 2nd FYP - a policy which was echoed many times in subsequent
years:
In the second Five Year Plan we shall undertake a very large
task - the task of making our socialist economy completely in-
dependent economically from the capitalist world. This is in-
dispensable if we are to preclude thepos sibility of the country of
socialism falling under the economic sway of our capitalist
antagonists. In the second five year period we must attain com-
plete economic independence from the outside capitalist world
at all costs, so that we need fear neither threats nor blockades.
But of course, this does not mean tn'at our ideal is a shut-door
economy. We shall extend our foreign trade connections.
{emphasis added}. But while doing so, it is necessary to real-
ise definitely that the socialist state does not need connections
of any sort of description with the capitalist world, but only such
as help to strengthen socialist construction and are in conson-
ance with the complete economic independence of the U. S. S. R.
Connections which will as sist us in obtaining from abroad cer-
tain products, raw materials and machines as and when re-
quired, connections which will promote the marketing abroad
of our exces s products, we shall always be ready to develop.
But we must be masters of the situation; if we want to, we sell;
if not, not. We must be so situated that we ourselves shall be
able to produce all the products needed in our Union, and shall
therefore not be obliged under any circumstances to import
anything. If we care to buy, we shall buy or vice versa, as it
may suit us best. We must control the sitgation concerning our
mutual relations with the capitalist world. 3
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Soviet goals and absolute autarky. The major point of this review
of Soviet foreign trade from 1927/28 to 1938 is that the movement of the
Soviet economy toward absolute autarky which occurred from 1932 to
1935 was not by design but was forced by a number of other events in the
world and Soviet economy. And if an economy is forced to become ab-
solutely more autarkic and therefore can not import the planned quantity
of investm ent goods, then the only way to assure the economy a sufficient
supply of investment goods to attain the desired investment levels to
"get on the desired growth path' is to allocate additional resources to the
domestic investment goods sector. Was this not the sequence of events
in the USSR in 1929-1933?
63 Quote of Kuibyshev from Kuibyshev-32a (pp. 21-22) see also
Rozengolts -34a.
TABLE T-l
USSR: ANNUAL FOREIGN TRADE PLANS DURING THE NEP 1922/23 - 1927/28
(Inillions of rubles in current prices)
EconoInic Planning Exp 0 r t IInport Trade COInInentsYear Agency Balance
1922/23 Actual 210.6 187. 5 t23. 1 European borders onl¥
Plan ? 228.0 162.0 +66.0 European borders only?
% fulfillInent 92% 116% 35%
1923/24 Actual 523.0 439.0 t84.0
Plan A ? 500.0 300-350 t150-200 As of January 1924.
% fulfillInent 104% 88-146% 42-56%
Plan B NKVT 428. 7 334.3 +94.4 Final revised plan, June 2,
% fulfillInent 122% 132% 89% 1924,
1924/25 Actual 558.8 723.4 -164. 6
Plan A NKVT 507.0 577.0 - 70.0 Septem.ber 1924? or March
% fulfillInent 110% 125% 235% 1925, m.ay not be first plan,
Plan B NKV~T·
-
504.0 659.0 -155. 0 Final revised plan, June
% fulfillm.ent 110. 8 109. 7 106% 17, 1925,
1925/26 Actual 677.0 756.0 - 80.0
Plan A Gosplan 1200. 0 [1009. 7] [tI90.0] Gosplan's original projec-
% fulfillInent 56% 75% tion for export.
Plan B NKVT 1105.2 1009. 7 +95.5 Cited by Rykov, March 3,
% fu1fillInent 61% 75% 1926 as original plan fig.
(J u1Y 31, 192 5). 0'
N
o
TABLE T-1 (continued)
y
Economic Planning Exp 0 r t Import Trade CommentsYear Agency Balance
1925/26 Actual (continued)
Plan C NKVT 1000. 0 950.0 +50.0 EIKSSSR estimates
% fulfillment 68% 80%
Plan D NKT 750.0 700.0 +50.0 Preliminary est. of Januar
% fulfillment 90% 108% revision?
Plan E NKT 720.0 685.0 to + 35. 0 "Final revision adopted in
0/0 fulfillment 94% 110% January"
1926/27 Actual 779.4 713. 5 +65.9
Plan A Gosplan 820.0 745.0 +75.0 Original control figures
0/0 fulfillment 95% 95% 88% (August? )
Plan B Gosplan 800.0 704.0 + 96.0 Revised control figures
% fulfillment 97% 101% 68% (October? )
Plan C NKT 780.0 680.0 + 100. 0 Control figures by NKT
% fulfillment 990/0 104% 66% October, 1926
Plan D NKT 762.9 699.0 + 63.9 Final revised plan by NKT
% fulfillment 102% 102% 104%
1927/28 Actual 781. 8 945. 5 , -163.7
Plan A NKT? 754.0 (830-860) - (76-106) Data are estimates
% fulfillment 103.7 (110-113)
Source: Notes to Table T-l, Appendix C, pp. 787-788
TABLE T-2
USSR: VALUE OF EXPOR TS, 1913, 1923/24 - 1927/28
(millions of rubles at current prices)
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1913 1923/24b 1924/25 1925/26 1926/27 1927/28
TOTAL EXPOR TSa 1505.9 522.6 558.8 676.7 779.4 781. 8
Agricultural Exports 1114. 5 364.4 338. 1 430.6 476.8 399.7
A. Crops 797. 5 [247.0] 161.0 248.3 265.4 106.4
. d c 595.8 192.0 52.3 159. 1 208. 1 40.5graln pro ucts
wheat 225. 2 . 16.4 76.4 126. 2 11. 5
rye 32. 9 . 5. 1 10. 8 35.4 10. 1
barley 186.2 . 15. 6 50.4 17. 6 0.4
oil seed 21. 2 10. 7 24.0 13. 9 3.8 1.5
oil cake 38. 8 20.8 26. 5 24.0 22.7 16.9
flax 94.2 23. 3 52. 5 45.5 20.8 26.9
hemp 23. 7 2.0 3. 9 2.2 1.9 3. 7
tobacco 6. 6 . 1.2 1.0 4.4 4.9
B. Animal products 291. 3 [45. 4] 93.9 96.6 109. 5 140.3
butter 71. 6 26.5 27. 6 30.9 34.2 39.2
eggs 90. 7 13.4 25. 7 23. 6 29.0 40. 5
meat 16. 6 . 6. 2 5. 3 12.0 24.3
hides 47.7 . 1.6 5. 0 5. 7 4.5
horsehair 3. 1 1.6 1.9 1.9 2. 3 2.4
bristles 9. 9 3. 9 15. 3 10. 3 6.7 6.6
wool 10. 6 . 5. 0 1.4 0.7 0.9
C. Furs and fish 15. 1 [49. 7] 80.9 82.4 96. 3 132. 1productsd
fur 6. 5 49.7 67. 3 69.3 86. 1 118. 5
fur, raw 6. 5 . 63. 1 64.0 77. 3 105. 6
fish 8. 6 . 13. 6 13. 1 10. 2 13. 6
caviar 4.2 . 6. 7 5. 9 3. 9 6. 2
D. Other agricultural 10. 5 [20.4T 1.3 2. 3 5. 6 10.4
Industrial Exports e 391. 4 158. 3 220. 7 246. 1 302.6 382. 1
A. Timber products 166.0 70.4 72.8 58. 5 80.4 94.8
unworked 62.8 . 25.4 20.3 23. 2 32.5
sawn 96.4 . 40.8 32.4 49. 7 52.3
plywood 0.0 . 1.4 1.4 2.9 4.6
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TABLE T-2 (continued)
1913 1923/24b 1924/25 1925/26 1926/27 1927/28
B. Mining products 75. 2 [51. 7] 88. 8 107. 3 126. 7 136. 6
oil products 50.4 37. 3 66. 7 76. 0 89.4 107. 1
gasoline 8. 3 . 25. 9 35. 7 40. 1 46.5
kerosene 21. 8 . 16. 6 14.4 17. 5 25.2
diesel and mazut 5. 6 13. 4 13. 3 16.4 18. 3
manganese ore 14. 6 14.4 17. 9 21. 3 24. 1 13. 8
iron ore 3. 1 . 1.7 1.4 4.2 4.5
c. Food industry 36. 8 . 21. 1 36. 7 43.6 52. 5
sugar 27.6 6. 6 14.0 19. 0 31. 2 34.2
alcohol 5.2 . O. 1 0.0 0.0 O. 5
D. Textile industry 49.9 . 8. 5 19._5 25.3 60.6
cotton cloth 43.9 . 5. 2 14. 7 20.9 50.8
E. Other industries 63. 5 . 29. 5 24. 1 26.6 37.6
Source and explanatory notes: Notes to Table T-2, Appendix C, pp. 788 ff.
TABLE T-3
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USSR: QUANTITIES OF EXPORTS FOR SELECTED PRODUCTS,
1913, 1923/24 - 1927/28
(1000' s metric tons)
1 9 1 3 1923/24 1924/25 1925/26 1926/27 1927/28
Agricultural Exports
A. Crop exports
Grain products 10,331.002686.00 606.00 2082.00 2256.00 410.00
wheat 3329.43 554.61 167.41 737. 15 1198.54 Ill. 34
rye 646.53 1316.06 72. 10 158. 31 417.40 114.93
barley 3926.5::: 327.07 199. 15 836.07 262.30 4.94
Oil seed 250.07 78.96 190.88 140.67 30.37 9.77
Oil cake 736.38 291. 59 324.60 405.41 352.38 193.57
Flax 305.11 35.54 55. 63 70.92 43.73 42.54
Hemp 67.96 4.36 7. 58 6. 57 8.02 13. 59
Tobacco 12.83 2.62 1.55 1.43 3.93 5. 06
B. Animal products
Butter 78.02 22. 53 24.49 27.25 30.30 32.85
Eggs 254.01 23.33 48.98 41. 41 61. 83 94.41
Meat 34.43 0.76 8.27 7. 86 16.81 40. 53
Rawhides 52.39 1.00 1. 16 2. 19 2.67 .
Horsehair 2.28 1.54 1.07 0.96 1. 11 1.30
Bristles 2.60 0.77 1.69 1.55 1. 19 1.36
Wool- 17.49 0.98 7.00 2. 19 1.59 1.82
Live animals 70.99 0.01 1.21 0.32 0.95 1.20
C. Furs and Fish
Fur 2.71 1.61 1.81 2. 05 2.78 3.42
raw 2.71 1.45 1.59 1.83 2.22 2. 66
Caviar 3.33 1.56 2. 73 3. 71 2.22 2.26
Industrial Exports
A. Timbe r products 7488.49 2041. 26 g126. 90 1913.47 2483.63 2979.92
Unworked 3799.27 1105.61 1174.41 1030.77 1196. 50 1583.71
Sawn 3554.32 403. 50 912. 14 841. 73 1232. 57 1329. 17
Plywood 8. 76 8.92 8. 73 18.28 30.33
TABLE T -3 (continued)
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1 9 1 3 1923/24 1924/25 1925/26 1926/27 1927/28
B. Mineral products
Oil products 952.55 711. 66 1372. 50 473.49 2086. 14 2782.84
gasoline 152. 15 134.30 277.45 388.03 612.68 760.32
kerosene 439.70 335.25 453.91 343.77 473.97 691. 28
diesel and 166. 76 117.95 555.32 641. 55 825. 10 1144.27
mazut
Manganese ore 1193.80 493.83 526.91 672.99 784.69 498.88
Iron ore 469.69 7.08 189. 35 149.75 407.69 428.43
Products of other
Industries
Sugar 147.34 15.42 26. 17 45.48 121. 98 133.10
Cotton cloth 17. 20 0.26 1. 14 3. 17 5. 36 12.48
Alcohol 36. 10 1.71 O. 54 O. 12 O. 15 2.90
Machinery 4.50 0.35 2. 54 2.07 1.27 1.07
Source: Notes to Table T-3, Appendix C, p. 792.
TABLE T-4
USSR: STRUCTURE OF EXPOR TS, 1913, 1923/24 - 1927/28
(percent of total exports)
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1 9 1 3 1923/24 1924/25 1925/261 1926/27 1927/28
TOTAL EXPOR TS 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Agricultural Exports 74.0 69.7 60. 5 63.6 61. 2 51. 1
A. agricultural crops 53.0 47.3 28.8 36.7 34. 1 13. 6
grain products 39. 6 36.7 9.4 23. 5 26.7 5. 2
wheat 15. 0 . 2.9 11. 3 ' 16. 2 1.5
r
rye 2.2 . 0.9 1. 6 . 4.5 1.3
barley 12.4 . 2. 8 7.4 2. 3 0.9
oil seed 1.4 2.0 4.3 2. 1 . O. 5 0.2
oil cake 2. 6 4.0 4.7 3. 5 2. 9 2. 2
flax 6. 3 4. 5 9.4 6. 7 2. 7 3.4
hemp 1.6 0.4 O. 7 O. 3 . 0.2 O. 5
tobacco 0.4 . 0.2 O. 1 0.6 o. 6
.
B. animal products 19. 3 [8. 7] 16. 8 14. 3 . 14.0 17. 9
butter 4.8 5. 1 4.9 4. 6 · 4.4 5.0
eggs 6.0 2. 6 4.6 3. 5 3. 7 5. 2
meat 1.1 . 1. 1 O. 8 1.5 3. 1
hides 3. 2 . 0.3 O. 7 0.7 0.6
horsehair 0.2 O. 3 0.3 0.3 0.3 O. 3
bristle s 0.7 0.7 2. 7 1.5 0.9 0.8
wool 0.7 . 0.9 0.2 O. 1 O. 1
C. fur s and fish 1.0 [9.5] 14. 5 12. 2 12.4 16. 9
products
fur 0.4 9. 5 12. 0 10. 2 11. 0 15. 2
furs, raw 0.4 . 11. 3 9. 5 9.9 13. 5
fish 0.6 . 2.4 1.9 1.3 1.7
caviar O. 3 . 1.2 0.9 o. 5 0.8
D. other agricultural 0.7 3. 9 0.2 O. 3 0.7 1.3
TABLE T-4 (continued)
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1913 1923/24b 1924/25 1925/26 1926/27 1927/28
Industrial Exports 26.0 30.3 39. 5 36.4 38.8 48.9
A. timber products 11. 0 13. 5 13. 6 8. 6 10. 3 12. 1
unworked 4.2 . 4. 5 3.0 3.0 4.2
sawn 6.'4 . 7.3 4.8 6.4 6. 7
plywood 0.0 . 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.6
B. mineral products 5. 0 9. 9 15. 9 15. 9 16. 3 17. 5
oil products 3. 3 7. 1 11. 9 11. 2 11. 5 13. 7
gasoline 0.6 . 4.6 5. 3 5. 1 5. 9
kerosene 1.4 3.0 2. 1 2.2 3.2
diesel and
mazut 0.4 . 2.4 2.0 2. 1 2. 3
manganese ore 1.0 2.8 3.2 3. 1 3. 1 1.8
iron ore 0.2 0.3 O. 2 O. 5 0.6
c . food industry 2.4 . 3. 8 5.4 5. 6 6. 7
sugar 1.8 1.3 2. 5 2. 8 4.0 4.4
alcohol O. 3 . 0.0 0.0 0.0 O. 1
D. textile industry 3. 3 . 1.5 2.9 3. 2 7. 8
cotton cloth 2. 9 . 0.9 2.2 2.7 6. 5
E. other industrie s 4.2 . 5. 3 3. 6 3.4 4.8
Source: Notes to Table T-4, Appendix C, p. 792.
TABLE T-5
USSR: VALUE OF IMPORTS, 1913, 1923/24 - 1927/28
(millions of rubles at current prices)
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1913 1923/24 1924/25 1925/26 1926/27 1927/28
TOTALIMFORTS 1374.0~ 434. 1E 723. 50 756.33 712.69 944.70
I. F roduce r's goods 884.43 362. 83 470.57 590.50 626. 19 796. 14
A. machinery for 172.36 53;91 71.37 107. 57 152. 84 255.83
industry and
transportation
B. raw mate rials 343. 11 221. 24 244. 50 273.98 328. 12 383.62
cotton 114.04 141. 84 133.83 117.78 131. 51 154.22
wool 60.11 43.88 47.48 41.41 51. 12 62.05
leather, unwork'd 25.08 7.64 16.76 24.84 38.63 40.08
rubber 40.17 8.77 8. 41 26.24 23. 56 24. 11
non-ferrous 56. 11 14.43 18. 78 20.66 45.44 57.70
metals
ferrous metals 56.38 O. 91 3.79 10.36 11. 28 16. 76
C. semi-proce ssed 212. 41 69. 91 112.11 145. 83 101. 85 117. 10
products
paper and card- 29. 53 9.38 21. 98 29.26 18.44 14. 59
board
leather, worked 21. 24 7. 78 17.26 21. 85 7. 52 7.27
dyes 14.97 3. 54 19.37 16.95 11. 09 11. 74
tanning mate r. 7. 72 13. 59 8. 82 11. 45 12.25 15. 72
D. fuel 91. 22 6. 33 0.84 3. 72 5. 59 0.62---
E. agric. producers I 65. 33 11.45 41. 72 59.41 37.79 38.98
goods
tractors 49.04 6. 21 32.24 48. 15 23.81 21. 77
II. Consumers I goods 391. 99 67. 10 240. 75 153.49 80. 77 142.29
A. foodstuffs 261. 27 46.06 204.86 70.41 63. 52 114.97
tea 62. 17 10. 55 17.30 26.07 .27.94 36.79
herring 24.33 3. 72 9. 86 2.05 3. 16 2. 50
fruit 38.75 6. 91 14.63 13.38 10.08 16.57
sugar 0.03 4.60 40.39 6.15 0.66 0.58
grain products 39.49 112.06 11. 18 17.25 43.26
TABLE T- 5 (continued)
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1 9 1 3 1923/24 1924/25 1925/26 1926/27 1927/28
B. Manufactur ed Con- 130.72 21. 04 35.89 83.08 17.25 28.07
sumer goods
cloth 37.10 1. 65 12.09 41. 05 1. 50 O. 76
III. Other 97.62 4.23 12. 18 12.34 5. 73 5. 58
Source: Notes to Table T- 5, Appendix C, p.792.
TABLE T-6
USSR: QUANTITY OF IMPOR TS FOR SELEC TED
COMMODITIES, 1913, 1923/24 - 1927/28
(thousands of metric tons)
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1913 1923/24 1924/25 1925/26 1926/27 1927/28
PRODUCER'S GOODS
A. machinery for indus- not avaq- able i.ntry and transporta- sources
tion--
B. raw materials
cotton 197.17 100. 31 107. 09 103. 16 162. 68 145.18
wool 55.49 14. 50 17.76 21. 59 29. 79 34. 71
hides 59.34 9.45 18. 52 36.68 54.40 46.04
rubber 12.7E 2.79 4.89 7.26 10.96 14. 71
non-ferrous 118.99 21. 93 34. 11 54. 74 88.22 122. 15
metals
ferrous metals 199.44 23.93 34.80 92. 12 147. 99 271. 79
C. semi-processed
goods
paper and card- 144.51 47.83 115. 72 146. 66 107. 78 90.89
board
leather 7.44 1. 38 2.64 5. 03 1. 38 1. 45
D. fuel (coal) 7758.01 318. 74 47.59 306. 15 471. 56 61. 38
E. agric. producer's
goods
tractors and 139.27 12.36 57. 71 87.04 44.99 36.00
machinery
CONSUMER'S GOODS
A. foodstuffs
tea 75.81 7.06 11. 92 22.07 22.55 28. 13
herring 329.72 45.87 48.03 19.29 36. 76 37.25
fruit 277.57 35. 14 57.36 42.33 37. 12 49.22
sugar 0.24 25.86 227. 79 38.13 4.27 3.66
grain products 584.10 56.72 654. 71 59. 63 60.29 309.95
TABLE T-6 (continued)
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1913 1923/24 1924/25 1925/26 1926/27 1927/28
B. manufactured con-
sumer goods
cloth 6.87 0.49 3.69 11.40 0.36 O.21
Source: Notes to Table T-6, Appendix C, p. 793.
TABLE T-7
USSR: STRUCTURE OF IMPORTS, 1913, 1923/24 - 1927/28
(0/0 of total imports)
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1 9 1 3 l1923/24 1924/25 1925/26 1926/27 1927/28
TOTAL IMPORTS 100. 00 100. 00 100. 00 100. 00 100. 00 100. 00
I. Producer's Goods 64.36 83. 57 65.03 78.07 87.86 84.27
A. machinery for 12. 54 12.42 9.86 14.22 21.44 27.08
industry and
transport
B. raw materials 24.97 50.96 33.79 36.22 46.04 40. 61
cotton 8.30 32.67 18. 50 15. 57 18.45 16. 32
wool 4.37 10. 11 6. 50 5.47 7. 17 6. 57
leather, 1. 83 1. 76 2.32 3.28 5.42 4.24
unworked
rubber 2.92 2.02 1. 16 3.47 3. 31 2. 55
non- fer rous 4.08 3.32 2. 60 2.73 6.38 6. 11
metal
ferrous metal 4. 10 O. 21 O. 52 1. 37 1. 58 1. 71
c. semi-proce s s ed 15.46 16. 10 15.49 19.28 14.29 12.40
goods
paper and card- 2. 15 2. 16 3.04 3. 87 2. 59 1. 54
board
leather, worked 1. 55 1. 79 2.39 2.89 1. 06 o. 77
dyes 1. 09 0.82 2.68 2.24 1. 56 1. 24
tanning mater. O. 56 3. 13 1. 22 1. 51 1. 72 1. 66
D. fuel 6.64 1. 46 O. 12 0.49 0.78 0.07--
E. agric. producer's 4.75 2.64 5. 77 7. 85 5.30 4. 13
goods
tractors 3. 57 1. 43 4.46 6.37 3.34 2.30
II. Consumer's Goods 28. 53 15. 45 33.27 20.29 11. 33 15.06
A. foodstuffs 19.01 10. 61 28. 31 9. 31 8. 91 12. 17
tea 4. 52 2.43 2.39 3.45 3.92 3.89
herring 1. 77 0.86 0.97 0.27 0.44 O. 26
fruit 2.82 1. 59 2.02 1. 77 1. 41 1. 75
TABLE T-7 (continued)
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1913 1923/24 1924/25 1925/26 1926/27 1927/28
A. ~ontinued)
sugar 0.02 1. 06 5.58 O. 81 0.09 0.06
grain products 2.87 15.49 1.48 1. 56 4.58
B. manufactured con- 9.51 4.85 4.96 10.98 2.42 2.97
sumer goods
cloth 2. 70 0.38 1. 67 5.43 0.21 0.08
III. Other 7. 10 0.97 1. 68 1. 63 0.80 0.59
Source: Notes to Table T-7, Appendix C, p. 793.
TABLE T-8
USSR: HARVEST, PROCUREMENTS AND EXPORTS OF GRAIN
PRODUCTS a 1909-13, 1922 - 1930
(tni11ions of tnetric tons)
Year Year of
Harvest Agricultural Year EconoInic Year
Marketing Exports ProcureIn't Exports
of m.arkting Gross Net Privateb P1annedb of by of
the and
Harvest Harvest ~nd Planned Agencies Grain Planned Grain
arvest exports Agencies (procur eIntts) Products Agencies Products
( 1) (2) (3) (4) (5 ) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1909 1913 65 c - - - - .- 11. 92 ed
11. 92e1909 1913 81. 6d - - - - -1913 1913/14 80. 1 - - - - - 10. 71 e
1922 1922/23 50.3
- -
[7. 00]
- -
0.76
1923 1923/24 65.6 - [9. 98] [6. 50] .- - 2.69
1924 1924/25 51. 4 [ 8. 6] 4.55 0.38 5. 98 0.61
1925 1925/26 72. 5 38. 7 [12.2] 8.44 2.03 8.45 2.08
1926 1926/27 76.8 38.2 [13. 4-13. 9] 10. 84 2. 56 11. 02 2.26
1927 1927/28 72.3 34.9 [12.2] 10. 27 - 9. 71 0.41
1928 1928/29 73.3 36. 9 [10.8] [8. 48] - 11. 52 0.28
1929 1929/30 71. 7 35. 7 [15. 5] - - - 4.86
1930 1930/31 83.5 48.4 [22.5] - - - -
h
a
See Appendix A, Technical Note 6 for definition of "grain product
"
.
bEstiInates based on tnarket shares. .
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TABLE T-8 (continued)
cHarvest estimate for Soviet territory, uncorrected for underestimation
of crop.
dHarvest estimate for Soviet territory, corrected for underestimation
of crop.
eExport data for Russian Empire.
f. Export data for calendar year.
Source: Notes to Table T-8, Appendix C, p. 793.
TABLE T-9
USSR: EXPORTS OF GRAINS AND RELATED PRODUCTS
1909-13 to 1928/29
(1000's metric tons)
Economic Years (October 1 to Septem.ber 30)
1909 -13 1913 1922/23 1923/24 1924/25 1925/26 1926/27 1927/28
1. Total export of grains in grain form 9,182 728 2,576 569 2, 016 2,099 288
2. including: four major grains 10,287 8,503 661 2,336 441 1,754 1,880 267
3. wheat 4,613 3,329 27 555 167 737 1,199 III
4. rye 832 647 518 1 , 316 72 158 417 114
5. barley 3,636 3,927 89 326 199 836 262 5
6. oats .1 ,206 600 27 139 3 23 2 37
7. Total exports of grain products 11, 916 10, 331 741 2,686 606 2,082 2,256 410
8. including: grains in grain form 9,182 728 2,576 569 2,016 2,099 288
9. bran 797 839 10 18 4 3 65 32
10. othe r (flour, etc.) 310 3 34 4 63 92 90
11. Total exports of grains and related 12,803 11,647 881 3,056 1,122 2,628 2,638 614
products
12. including: grain products 11, 916 10,662 741 2,686 606 2,082 2,256 410
13. oil seed 228 250 4 79 191 141 30 10
14. oil cake 659 735 136 291 324 405 352 194
Source: Notes to Table T-9, Appendix C, p. 795.
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TABLE T-IO
USSR: PROCUREMENT AND EXPORTS OF GRAIN AND RELATED
PRODUCTS QUARTERLY DATA 1924 - 1929
(1000IS metric tons)
Exports Procurements by Planned Agencies a
Year Grain Grain Grain Wheat Rye Oats Barley
and and products products
quarter related only
products
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1923 IV 1242
1924 I 714
II 542
III 190 943 415 371
IV 79 723 596 423
1925 I 79 1195 395 352
II 21 694 289 229
III 606 428 2344 935 688 [876] [551 ]
IV 878 2325 11 72 387 [228 ] [1 76]
1926 I 518 2436 1003 501 [298] [188 ]
II 641 1341 665 278 [ 43] [154 ]
III 637 2448 1561 479 [127] [220]
IV 1176 4714 2663 946 476 205
1927 I 870 261 7 1350 596 368 39
II 385 1062 582 276 96 13
III 2657 1665 678 142 59
IV 2437 1284 51 7 209 39
1928 I 4283 2101 1202 31 7 147
II 896 397 284 66 25
III 2090 1199 314 205 240
IV 3772 2024 368 686 128
1929 I 1585 724 189 399 81
II 1034 335 163 275 67
III 5134 1825 1005 987 1060
IV 7465 2203 1626 2055 694
aplanned agencies referred to "planned (or centrally-controlled) grain
procurement agencie s. II
Source: Notes to Table T-I0, Appendix C, p. 795.
TABLE T-ll
USS R: E XP OR TS 0 F GRAIN AND R ELAT ED PROD U C TS
VALUE AND QUANTITY, 1909-13, 1923/24 - 1927/28
d
VALUE WEIGHT
Millions rubles in Current Prices Thousand Metric Tons
Year a
grain oil seed ~ota1 grain & total grain angrain oil seed
products oil cake related prod. products oil cake related prod.
Russia 1909-13b 676.8 59. 6 735.4 11,915 993 12,792
Sov. c 095.0Ter.1909-13 11,302
Russia 1913 595. 9 60.0 655.9 9,485 985 10,472
Soviet Exports
Actual 1923/24
a
192.0 31. 5 223.5 2,692 370 3,062
Plan 1924/25 26.5 45.7 72.2 819
Actual 1924/25 52. 5 50.4 102. 9 606 515 1, 122
Plan 1925/26 500.0 [6,200] [500] [6,700]
Actual 1925/26 160. 1 38.0 198. 1 2,082 546. 1 2,628
Plan 1926/27 300.0 3,500
Actual 1926/27 208. 1 26. 5 234.6 2,256 383 2,638
Actual 1927/28 40.6 18.4 59.0 410 203 614
as I" bP lt years refer to the econom.ic year. Yearly average.
c Does not include export of grain and related products from. Soviet territory to separated territory. e;-
00
Source: Notes to Table T-ll, Appendix C, p. 796.
TABLE T-12
USSR: PER CAPITA OUTPUT OF GRAIN PRODUCTS,
1913, 1924 - 1938
639
Gros s Harvest Total Population Per Capita Output
Harvest millions Index Jan. 1 of next year kilograms Index
of m. t. 1913 = 100 millions Index 1913= 100
1913 = 100
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1913 80.1 100. 0 139. 7 100. 0 572.5 100. 0
1924 51.4 64.2 140. 0 100. 0 . 367. 1 64.1
1925 72.5 90.5 143. 2 102. 7 504.5 88.1
1926 76.8 95.6 147. 0 105.1 522.4 91.2
1927 72.3 90.3 150.4 107.2 482.3 84.2
1928 73.3 91.5 153. 1 109.4 478.7 83.7
1929 71.7 89.5 155. 6 111.2 460.7 80.4
1930 83.5 104. 2 158. 1 113.0 528.1 92.2
1931 66.0 82.4 160.7 114. 9 410. 7 71. 7
1932 63.0 78.7 160. 6 114. 8 392.3 68.5
1933 67.1 83.8 160.6 114. 8 417.8 73.0
1934 67.3 84.0 160. 5 114. 7 419.3 73.2
1935 69.3 86.5 162. 2 115. 9 427.3 74.6
1936 60.0 74.9 164. 1 117.3 365.6 63.9
1937 91.9 114.4 167. 3 119.6 547.5 95.6
1938 70.7 88.4 170.6 121. 9 414.4 72.4
Source: Notes to Table T -12, Appendix C, p.796.
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TABLE T-13
USSR: FOREIGN TRADE IN CURRENT AND 1913PRICES
1909-13 to 1927/28
(millions of rubles)
Year Borders Current Prices 1913 Pricesa
Imports Balance
a
ImportsExports Exports Balance
of of
Trade Trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
annual
aver.
1909-13 Russia 1487. 2 1140.6 347.0 [1487.2] [1140.6] [347. 0]
Sov. Ter. 1321. 0
1913 Russia 1505. 9 1375. 0 130. 9 1505. 9 1375.0 130.9
Sov. Ter. 1305. 0 1007. 0 298.0 1291. 0 1007. 0 284.0
1922/23 Sov. b [210.6] [187.5] [ 23. II 133.2 148. 6 -15. 4Ter.
1923/24 Sov. Ter. [522. 6] [439.4] [83.2 369. 9 240. 7 129.2
1924/25 SOV. Ter. 558.8 723.4 -163. 6 365.4 411.3 -46.0
1925/26 SOV. Ter. 676.7 756.3 -79.7 464.5 464.5 0.0
1926/27 Sov. Ter. 779.4 713. 5 65.9 566.5 505.5 61.0
1927/28 Sov. Ter. 781. 8 945. 5 -163. 7 592.1 668.2 -76.1
1928/29 Sov. Ter. 877.6 836.3 41.3 709.4 576.8 132. 6
aData exclude platinum.
bData for trade acros s European borde rs only and exclude charitable
famine relief imports.
Source: Notes to Table T-13, Appendix C, p. 797.
TABLE T-14
USSR: ESTIMATES OF SOVIET BALANCE OF PAYMENTS: 1924/25 - 1930/31
( m. i 11 ion s 0 f r u bI e s )
924/25 1925/26 1926/27 1927/28 1928/29 1929/30 1930/31
CURRENT ACCOUNT - Debit (-)
l. Import - cif (official data - m.erchandise) 724 756 714 946 836 1068 1044
2. Postal parcels im.ports - com.m.ercial 3 9 2 6 6
3. Contraband imports 27 30 35 29 35 35 35
4. Brokerage commissions 11 12 14 14 16 18 16
5. Interest payments on credits 6 9 13 17 25 30 35
6. Other administrative expenses abroad 30 23 30 35 42 50 50
7. Foreign labor and technical as sistance 3 5 5 10 15 18 38
8. Non- commercial transactions 8 26 25 21 6 25 30
9. Total debit items on Cur rent Account 812 870 838 1072 975 1250 1254
CURRENT ACCOUNT - Credit (+)
10. Export - fob (official figures) 559 677 780 778 878 1002 890
II. Interest on short-term. deposits 7 5 5 6 6 5 4
12. Profits, dividends, etc. (of Soviet firms) 8 7 5 6 6 5 6
13. rrNon- commercial rr rem.ittances, tourism 43 43 43 35 32 43 55
14. Total credit item.s on Cur rent Account 617 732 833 825 922 1055 955
15. BALANCE OF TRADE (Exports-Im.ports)
-165 -79 -66 -168 +42 -66 -154
16. BALANCE ON CURRENT ACCOUNT
-195 -138 - 5 -247 - 53 -195 -299
ITEMS (Credits - Debits)
TABLE T-14 (continued)
1924/25 1925/26 1926/27 1927/28 1928/29 1929/30 1930/31
CAPITAL FLOWS Credit (+), Debit (-)
17. Net change in foreign debt 69 62 41 120 45 210 230
18. BALANCE OF CAPITAL FLOWS AND -126 -76 +36 -127 - 8 -15 -69
CURRENT ACCOUNT
PRECIOUS METALS, AND FOREIGN
CURRENCY
19. Increase in foreign cur rency (-) 33 27
20. Decrease in foreign currency (+) 62 15
2l. Precious rn.eta1 irn.ports (-)
-46 9 15 3 1
22. Precious rn.eta1 exports (+) t70 81 49 155 70 9 110
23. Net precious rn.eta1s rn.overn.ent t24 t72 t34 t155 +67 + 8 +110
24. BALANCE OF PRECIOUS METALS AND +86 +87 + 1 t155 +40 + 8 +110
FOREIGN CURRENCY FLOWS
25. STATISTICAL DISCREPANCY
-40 tIl +37 +28 +32
-
7 +41
(Row 18 plus Row 24)
Source: Notes to Table T'-14, Appendix C, pp. 798-800.
TABLE T -15
USSR: ESTIMATES OF FOREIGN DEBT 1923-1936
(ITlillions of rubles)
ShenkITlan Data Soviet
Real Debt Contingent Liabilitie s Grand e s tiITlate s
Acceptance Export FirITl Total Bank credits Liabilitie s Total of foreign
Date and other credits credits real secured by for orders debt
bank credits debt warehoused in process
for iITlports goods
Oct. 1, 1923
Oct. 1, 1924 9 15 54 78 20 58 156
Oct. 1, 1925 27 23 98 148 30 35 213
Oct. 1, 1926 53 25 131 209 45 51 305
Oct. 1, 1927 61 30 161 252 50 90 392
Oct. 1, 1928 55 60 255 370 60 55 485
Oct. 1, 1929 86 69 260 415 90 110 615
Oct. 1, 1930 115 80 430 625 101 139 865
Oct. 1, 1931 95 62 698 855 125 315 1,295
July, 1932 85 60 830 975 100 260 1, 335
Jan. 1, 1932 1400
End of 1933 450
Feb. 1935 141
Oct. 1935 139
Nov. 1935 170
July 1936 85
v
_.~.
Source: Notes to Table T-15, Appendix C, p. 800.
TABLE T-16
USSR: ESTIMATES OF EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF
PRECIOUS METALS: 1925 - 1938
(:millions of gold rubles)
Part A. Calendar Year
Net Exports (net i:mports denoted by :minus s i g n)
Net total
b-v :metal
Net :metal Net :metal Net p1atinu:m
exports of exports as % exports as % exports as %
precious gold silver p1atinu:m of total of total of total
:metals exports i:mports exports
1923 1.6 0.0 - 1.6 O. 5 0.9 O. 5
1924
-41. 8 - 18. 1 -30.8 7. 1 - 8. 8 - 8. 5 1.5
1925 53.4 42.2 - 4.6 15. 8 8. 8 6. 5 2. 6
1926 64.6 35. 6 O. 1 28.9 8.9 9.4 4.0
1927 32. 1 6. 7 0.0 25.4 4.3 4.2 3.4
1928 206. 1 196. 6 - 1.8 11. 3 25.7 21. 6 1.4
1929 10. 6 0.0 - 3.4 14.0 1.4 1.2 1.5
1930 5.2 0.0 - 0.8 6.0 O. 5 O. 5 0.6
1931 120.0 114. 6 [0.0] 5.4 14. 8 10.9 O. 7
1932 102.9 89.4 7. 5 6. 0 17. 9 14.6 l.0
1933 110. 6 77.9 26. 5 6. 2 23. 5 31. 8 1.3
1934 119.0 93. 8 22.3 2. 9 28.4 51. 1 O. 7
1935 44.3 28.9 13. 9 6. 5 13. 4 20.4 1.8
1936 18. 5 12.9 0.7 4.9 6. 0 6. 0 1.6
1937 238.5 230.2 [0. -0] 8. 3 63.4 81. 8 2. 2
1938 138. 6 1"33.4 [0. 01 5. 2 47. 3 44.3 1.8 0'~
~
TABLE T-16 (continued)
Econom.ic YearPart B .
Gross Exports Gross Imports
Net export gro s s export gross gold gross gross import gross gold gross
of precious
of precious export platinum. of precious import silver
m.eta1s
m.eta1s (estimate) export metals (e stim.ate) im.port
1924/25 24 70 (51 ) 19. 0 46 (8. 5) 37.5
1925/26 72 81 (54) 26. 6 9 0 9
1926/27 34 49 22 26. 6 15 (13 ) 2
1927/28 155 155 145 9. 8
1928/29 67 70 (58) 12. 1 3 3
1929/30 8 9 ( 0) 9 1 1
1930/31 110 110 0
Source: Notes to Table T-16, Appendix C, p. 801.
TABLET-I7
USSR: ESTIMATES OF SOVIET FOREIGN RESERVES
1924 - 1930
(millions of rubles)
646
Gold Stock Non-gold foreign Total foreignreserves reserves of USSR
As of minimum maximum minimum maximum
January 1st estimates estimates estimates estimates
1923 281 10.0 24.0 291 305
1924 290 70.4 125.1 360 415
1925 330 115.4 209.7 445 540
1926 314 84.4 100.1 398 414
1927 314 93.6 138. 6 408 453
1928 347 96.9 107.8 444 455
1929 187 125.6 141.6 313 329
1930 243 105.4 117.1 348 360
1931 312 77.4 78.6 389 391
1932 289 69.2 358 .
1933
..
304 48.4 352
1934 372 54.2 426 .
1935 478 42.2 520 ,
1936 701 . ..
1937 993 ~ .. .
1938 1075-80 ,• ., • .
Source: Notes to Table T-17, Appendix C, p. 801.
TABLE T-18
USSR: CONSUMER-ORIENTED IMPORTS 1913, 1923/24 - 1927/28
Soviet Adiusted Definition
Definition of Foodstuffs Co1um.n (2)p1us C oluTIln (3) C olum.n (4) +Year Consum.e r r S Fibers, Hides plus Other Raw Co1um.n (5)
Goods Mfg. Dyes and Paper and Materials plusConsum.er RubberImports Goods Tanning Cardboard for Cons. AluTIlinum.Materials
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5 ) (6 )
tf b1M ·11·1 Ion s 0 ru es In curren prices
1913 [489.6] 428.3 729.7 771. 2 777.9 819.4
1922/23 38.2 68.2 74.0 74.3 82.2
1923/24 43.6 131. 2 145.4 148.0 157.3
1924/25 240.8 235.6 496.1 525.4 533. 0 543.5
1925/26 153.5 138.4 415.7 452.9 460.3 488.6
1926/27 80.8 77.4 360. 3 387. 1 392.0 418.3
1927/28 142.3 133. 0 467.6 488.1 495.0 524.9
tt f ttl .p ercen 0 0 a lTIlpOr s
1913 [35.6J 31. 2 53.8 56.1 56.7 59.6
1922/23 25.8 45.9 49.8 50.0 55. 3
1923/24 18.7 56.2 62. 3 63.4 67.4
1924/25 33. 3 32.6 68.6 72.6 73.7 75.1
1925/26 20.3 18.3 55. 0 59.9 60.8 64.6
1926/27 11. 3 10.9 50.5 54.3 54.9 58.6
1927/28 15.1 14.1 49.5 52.6 52.4 55.5
Source: Notes to Table T-18, Appendix C, p. 802.
TABLE T -19
USSR: EXPORTS CLASSIFIED BY PRODUCING SECTOR
1913, 1923/24 - 1927/28
648
Revised Classification
Agricult. Fur and Timber and Mis ce11aneous Total
related fish mining industrial exports
products products products products
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
millions of rubles in current prices
1913 1132. 1 15.2 241.2 117.4 1505. 9
1923/24 229.9 25.1 101 . 2 15. 1 371 . 3
1924/25 274.2 84.7 161.6 38. 3 558.8
1925/26 377.4 89.8 165. 8 43.7 676. 7
1926/27 415.5 104. 5 207.1 52. 3 779.4
1927/28 305.2 138. 8 231 . 3 106. 5 781.8
0/0 of total exports
1913 75.2 1.0 16.0 7.8 100. 0
1923/24 61. 9 6.8 27.3 4.1 100. 0
1924/25 49 . .1 15.1 28.9 6.9 100. 0
1925/26 55.8 13.3 24.5 6.5 100. 0
1926/27 53. 3 13.4 26.6 6.7 100. 0
1927/28 39.0 17.8 29.6
I
13.6 .1 00. 0
Source: Notes to Table T-19, Appendix C, p. 803.
TABLE T-20
USSR: RATIO OF EXPOR TS TO OUTPU T, MARKETING OR PROCUREMENTS FOR
SELECTED COMMODITIES 1909-13, 1913, 1924/25 - 1927/28
(percent)
11909-13 I 1 9 1 3 11924/25 11925/26 11926/27 11927/28
Agricultural Exports
gross exports/output
gross exports/procurements
,Grain products
L gros s exports / output (EY)
2. gross exports/total marketing (AY)
3. gross exports/procurements (AY)
4. gross exports / procurements (AY)
Wheat
,
5. gross exports/out'put
c6. net export/ output
c7. net exports /procurements
Rye
8.
9.
Barley
10. gross exports/output
11. gro s s exports /procurements
Corn
12. gross exports/output
14. 6
18.1
3.6
31. 0
27.7
13.4
14.3
13.7
3.6
36.4
48.5
1.1
4.7
8.7
10.0
1.3
-2.4
-18.8
5.1
1.8
Ill. 1
7.7
2.9 3. 0
16.4 19.4
23.8 24.1
24.7 20.9
3.6 5.0
3.6 5.0
19.5 19.2
0.8 .1.8
8.7 16.8
14.3 8.5
78.5 81. 3
5. 6 9.6
0.6
4.1
0.6
- 0.5
- 2.2
0.5
5.2
0.1
0.0
7.3
TABLE T-20 (continued)
1909-13 1913 1924/25 1925/26 1926/27 1927/28
Oats
13. gross exports/output 7.2 3.9 O. 0 0.1 0.4 0.2
Oil seed
14. exports of seed/output 9. 5 9.0 6.2 2.6
15. exports of all oil seed prod. / output 44.3 24.5 14.0 14.7
16. exports of all oil seed prod. /procureInents 41. 9 54.4 39.6 19.8
Flax
17. exports of fiber and combing/output (80.5) 22.5 23.6 12.9
18. exports of fiber / output 59.8 18.7 19.0 11. 8 9.6
19. exports of all flax prod. / output 67.7 23.3 24.0 16.3 17.9
20. exports of all flax prod. /procurements (74.3)a b 44.8 40.0 35.2 35.2
~
21. exports / output 31. 1 (33.6) 9.9 7.5 9.6 (13. 71)
22. exports/procurement [54. 6] 60.2 58. 3 49.2 59.1
Butter
23. exports / output of large factorie s 38.2 49.4 48.1 51. 4 40.1
24. exports /Inarketing . 54.9 16.0
25. exports /procurements 57.5 55.9 40.2 44.1
Hemp
26. exports / output 15.6 1.2 1.4 1.1
0'-
111
a
TABLE T-20 (continued)
~909-l3Il913 11924/ 25 11925/2611926/27h927/28
Industrial Exports
Tim.ber
27. exports of all tim.ber prod. lindust. tim.ber hauled [25. j 58.0 23.0 14.0 20.0 17.0
28. exports of sawn lum.ber loutput of sawn lum.ber 29.8 12.3 8.6 1.1. 3 10. Z
29. exports of plywood loutput of plywood 16.0 10.5 19.0 23.4
Oil products
30. export/output (Kaufm.an data) 10.2 16.8 17.7 21. 8
3l. export of all oil prod. 1crude oil output 10.8 19.6 17.9 20.5 24.2
32. export of gasoline, naptha/output 97.3 65.7 92.4 86.2
33. export of kero sene 1output 28.9 28.7 29.7 36.2
Manganese ore
34. [97.6J 95.9 77.9 65.4 93. 0 71. 0
Iron ore
35. 5.1 3.5 7.9 4.4 8.5 7.5
Chrornite ore
36. 0.0 0.0 O. 0 O. 0 12..1 11.8
Zinc - lead ore
37. 19.7 0.0 2.2 8.3 21. 9
Asbestos
38. (71) 48.8 48.1 39.2 46.4 4.1. 9
Coal
39. net exports 1outputc -23.6 2.1 0.6 -0.2 .1.4 0'
U1
.....
TABLE T-20 (continued)
1909-13 1 9 1 3 1924/25 1925/26 1926/27 1927/28
Sugar
40. gros s exports /outRut 9.2 [11. 4] 6.4 4.8 14.1
4L c 9.9 -30.9 0.7 13.5 10.1net exports / output
Cotton Cloth
42. c 7.2 -.1. 6 -3. 7 2.1 0.5net exports / output
aSoviet territory.
b Exports exceeded 'tmarketing. II
CMinus sign (-) denotes net import as % of total supply (imports plus output).
Source: Notes to Table T-20, Appendix C, pp. 803 - 811.
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TABLE T-21
USSR: RATIO OF IMPORTS TO TOTAL SUPPLY OF SELECTED
COMMODITIES DURING NEP
(imports as % of total supply)a
1909-13 1913b 1924/25 1925/26 1926/27 927/28
1. Cotton
imports /consumption . 45.2 57.7 38.5 45.1 41.0
2. Wool
gros s imports /net output . 33.6 12.6 14.4 18. 1 20.9
3. imports /net imports and . . 49.4 53.1 51.2 47.2
procurements
4. Copper imports /supply [29.1] 19.8 10.7 36.8 44.7 49.3
5. Lead imports /supply 97.4 93.6 94.4 95.4 95.5--
6. Zinc imports /supply 59.3c 89.1 89.0 92.9 93.2--
7. Nickel, tin, aluminum 100. 0 100. 0 100. 0 100. 0 100. 0 100. 0
8. Rolled ferrous products 2.4 0.4 2.0 0.8 2.8
9. Steel pipe 8.6 6.9 11. 5 18.6 30.0
10. Pig iron imports /supply 0.3 0.2 0.3 o. 9 0.0
II. Paper products . 59.8 62.4 58.0 53.0 45.1
imports /supply
12. Pulp imports/supply 21. 8 43.8 36.5 36.8 30.1
13. Tanning materials . 70.5 70.6 72.3 60.8
14. Rubber 100. 0 100. 0 100. 0 100. 0 100. 0 100. 0
15. Tea 100. 0 100. 010-100.0 .100. 0 100. 0 100. 0--
aFor most commodities, where total supply equals imports plus output.
bFor Rus sian Empire.
cFor Soviet territory alone, assuming all imports into Soviet territory,
the percentage is 90. 5%.
Source: Notes to Table T-21, Appendix C, pp. 811-814.
TABLE T -22
USSR: IMPORT-SUPPLY RATIOS FOR SELECTED TYPES OF MACHINERY DURING NEP
(% of total supply)
Type of machinery Basis of comparison pre-1914 1924/25 1925/26 1926/27 1927/28
l. Industrial and electrical equipment value 25.0 35.0 40.0
2. Inte rnal combustion engine s value 7.2 11.4 9.4
3. Electrical machinery value [27.0]a 24.7 44.3 47.4
4. Stearn turbines value 20.1 33. 3 52.6
5. Metal-working machinery value [67.0]a 71.2 70.6 67.1
6. Metal-cutting tools units 75.6 b 67.8 c 66.4d
7. Textile machinery value [23.0] 36.7 33.8 27.7
8. Automobiles and trucks units 100.0 68.9
9. Tractors units 100.0 93.1 94.4 88.4 74.5
O. Tractors horsepower 100.0 93.3 94.7 88. 7 75.4
l. Agricultural machinery value 45.0 34.7 1 7.5 12.3
12. Railroad equipment value 10.0 0.0 O. 0 0.0 0.0
1
1
a 1913
b1908-13
c1923-27
d1928
Source: Notes to Table T-22, Appendix C, p. 814.
TABLE T-23
USSR: INVESTMENT AND MACHINERY SUPPLY TO INDUSTRY
AND ELECTRIC POWER INSTALLATIONS
(millions of rubles in current prices)
1925/26 1926/27 1927/28 1928/29 1929/30 rPlanl
1. Industrial investment connected 969 1,414 1,754 2,128 3,586
with the demand for machinery
2. Total expenditures on machine ry 318 476 672 840 1,476
in industry, etc.
3. Expenditures on machinery as 33% 34% 38% 39% 41%
% of total expenditure s
4. Domestic production of machinery 226 310 401 610 945
for industry
5. Imports of machinery for 92 166 271 230 338
industry (with tariff)
6. Imports of rnachinery as % of 25% 35% 40% 27% 230/0
total expenditure s on rnachine ry
-0:-.
Source: Notes to Table T-23, Appendix C, p. 816.
U1
U1
TABLE T-24
USSR: VOLUME INDEXES FOR EXPORTS,
1913, 1922/23 - 1927/28
(1913 = 100)
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Year
Exports of Rus sian Empire Soviet Estimates of Exports in
in 1913 = 100 1913 from Soviet Territory = 100
Price Weights Price Weights
1913 1926/27 1927/28 1913 1926/27 1927/28
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1913 100. a 100. a 100. a 100. a 100. a 100. a
1922/23 8.8 11.0 11.8 10.2 12.8 13. 8
1923/24 23.8 25.1 24.5 27.7 29.3 28.5
1924/25 21.9 22.3 21.7 25.5 26.0 25.3
1925/26 29.2 29.4 29.2 34. a 34.2 34.1
1926/27 34.3 34.6 32.9 40. a 40.3 38.3
1927/28 35.4 34.5 32.0 41. 3 40.2 37.3
Source: Notes to Table T-24, Appendix C, p. 816.
TABLE T -25
USSR: VOLUME INDEXES FOR IMPORTS,
1913, 1922/23 - 1927/28
(1913 = 100)
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Year Imports into Russian Empire Soviet Estimates of Imports inin 1913 = 100 1913 into Soviet Territory = 100
Price Weights Price Weights
19J3 1926/27 1927/28 1913 1926/27 1927/28
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1913 100. 0 100. 0 100. 0 100. 0 100.0 100. 0
1922/23 11.0 10.0 10.0 15.0 13.7 13.7
1923/24 20.8 19, 0 20.0 28.3 25.9 27.3
1924/25 38.7 36.8 37.2 52.8 50.2 50.7
1925/26 '48.4 45.9 46.8 66.0 62.7 63.8
1926/27 51.8 47.9 49.1 70.6 65.3 67.0
1927/28 65.5 60.0 59.0 89.4 81.3 80.5
Source: Notes to Table T-25, Appendix C, p. 817.
TABLE T-26
USSR: VOLUME OF EXPOR TS OF SELECTED COMMODITY
GROUPS 1913, 1924/25 - 1929
(1927/28 = 100)
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1927/28 Price Wei yhts
1913 1924/25 1925/26 1926/27 1927/28 1929
l. All exports 312.3 67.9 91. 3 102. 7 100.0 129.0
2. Grain products
a
2192.8 130.1 457.3 550.9 100.0 69. 1
3. Oil seed prod. 487.6 280.0 283.4 200. 1 100.0 158.0
4. Fibers 835.4 140.6 176. 7 106.4 100.0 212.3
5. Animal products 272.5 62. 7 60.7 75.3 100.0 91. 4
6. Timber 247. 8 68.4 63. 1 85. 7 100.0 180.3
7. Oil products 39.2 47.0 53.0 76.6 100.0 135. 5
8. Mining p+od. 168.5 82.5 102. 1 125. 7 100.0 195. 0
(excl. oil)
9.. Fur products [75. 7] 80.2 77.7 81. 8 100.0 99. 7
a1926/27 price weights
Source: Notes to Table T-26, Appendix C, p. 817.
TABLE T -27
USSR: VOLUME OF IMPORTS OF SELECTED COMMODITY
GROUPS, 1913, 1924/25 - 1929
(1927/28 = 100)
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1927/28 price weights
1913 1924/25 1925/26 1926/27 1927/28 1929
1. All Imports 169. 5 63.0 79.3 83.3 100.0 99. 3
2. Machinery 133.0 31.1 70.2 71.6 100. 0 114.5
3. Raw Materials 141. 5 51.1 62.1 95.2 100. 0 103.5
4. Semi-proces sed 302.7 110.3 183.4 93.1 100.0 76.5
5. Non-ferrous 79.4 26.0 40.6 68.7 100.0 98.3
Metals
6. Tropical 224.8 47.7 67.8 83. 3 100.0 103. 6
products
Source: Notes to Table T-27, Appendix C, p. 818.
TABLE T-28
USSR: EXPORT PRICE INDEXES, IMPORT PRICE INDEXES
AND COMMODITY TERMS OF TRADE, 1913, 1924/25-1931
(1927/28 = 100)
1913 Weights 1926/27 Weights 1927/28 Weights
Year Export Import Commodity Export Import C ommodity Export Irnport Comrnodity
Price Price Terms of Price Price Terms of Price Price Terms of
Index Index Trade Index Index Trade Index Index Trade
1913 63.5 69.0 92.0 67.2 71.0 94.6 71.8 75.4 95.2
1924/25 108.5 116. 5 92.9 108.5 112.6 96.4 114.0 113.7 100.3
1925/26 96.5 107.1 90.1 101.5 107.5 94.4 108.0 109.3 98.8
1926/27 92.2 96.0 96.0 97.0 93.0 104.3 99.5 96.4 103.2
1927/28 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1929 90.2 94.4 95.6 94.0 95.7 98.2 95.6 97.3 98.3
1930 64.3 86.7 74.2 72.1 89.0 81.0 81.8 91.1 89.8
1931 46.6 75.1 62.1 51.9 74.7 69.5 60.4 75.8 79.7
Source: Notes to Table T-28, Appendix C, p. 819.
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TABLE T-29
USSR: EXPORT PRICE INDEXES OF SELECTED COMMODITY
GROUPS, 1913, 1924/25 - 1929
(1927/28 = 100)
1927/28 Quantity Weights
1913 1924/25 1925/26 1926/27 1927/28 1929
1. All exports 71.8 114. a 108. a 99.5 100. a 95.6
2. Grain products
a 63.3 94.7 91.6 98.4 100. a 94.3
3. Oil seed pro- 60.9 93.6 68.2 74.1 100. a 95.2
ducts
4. Fibers 51.7 132.4 92.3 72.9 100. a 85.3
5. Animal products 73.8 113. a 118. 1 108.7 100.0 108. 2
6. Timber 76.2 112.4 98.4 99.6 100. a 90.1
7. Oil products 126. 5 138.8 134. 5 109.1 100.0 96.2
8. Mining products 56.7 114. 2 108.4 109.7 100. a 86.3
(excluding oil)
9. Fur products 30.0 [74.2] 81. 3 89.6 100.0 91.5
a1926 /2 7 quantity weights
Source: Notes to Table T-29, Appendix C, p. 819.
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TABLE T -30
USSR: IMPORT PRICE INDEXES OF SELECTED COMMODITY
GROUPS, 1913,1924/25 - 1929
(1927/28 = 100)
1927/28 Quantitv Weights
1913 1924/25 1925/26 1926/27 1927/28 1929
1. All imports 75.4 113.7 109.3 96.4 100.a 97.3
2. Machinery 77.5 97.0 97.5 97.1 100.a 102.4
3. Raw materials 68.8 123.2 115.5 91.8 100.a 92.4
4. Semi-processed 93.0 118.7 123.4 105.6 100.a 93.3
5. Non-ferrous 93.0 117.7 120.6 111.2 100.a 105.7
metals
6. Tropical pro- 100.3 100.7 132.a 105.a 100.a 73.9
ducts
Source: Notes to Table T-30, Appendix C, p. 819.
TABLE T -31
USSR: WHOLESALE PRICE INDEX BY GOSPLAN
(1913 = 100)
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1st Agricultural Industrial Total 1st Agricultural Industrial Total
day Price Price Price day Price Price Price
of Index Index Index of Index Index Index
1923 1925
Jan. 77 120 96 July 186 ..2 189. 8 189.0
Feb. 104 Aug. 161.0 190.3 ~75. 1
Mar. 116 Sept. 154.8 192.7 72.7
Apr .. 83 158 115 Oct. 155. 6 194.9 74.2
May 109 Nov. 156. 3 196.4 75.3
June 126 Dec. 162.6 197. 6 79.3
July 102 207 145 1926Aug. 158 Jan. 169.4 198.2 83.3Sept. 157 Feb. 181 .3 199.6 90.2Oct. 89 276 157 Mar. 187. 8 200. 1 93.9Nov. 149 Apr.Dec. 157 May 190.4 203.3 96.8
1924 June 175. 9 203.5 89.3
Jan. 124.5 229. 3 .168.9 July 164. 3 203.9 ..83. 1
Feb. 153.3 226.9 186. 6 Aug. 161.8 203.5 81 .5
Mar. 170.3 218.7 193.1 Sept. 158.9 203.7 79.9
Apr. 156.5 208 9 180.8 Oct. 156. 6 204.1 78.8
May 150.9 203.4 175.2 Nov. 158. 8 203.7 78.2
June 136 8 201 .3 165.8 Dec. 155. 0 203.9 77.8
July 141.4 202. 1 169.0 1927Aug. 151 .3 203.2 175.4 Jan. 154.5 203.2 77.2Sept. 148 1 200.9 172.4 Feb. 157. 3 202.8 78.6Oct. 136. 0 1 98. 6 164.2 Mar. 159. 5 200.5 78.8Nov. 135.2 198.2 163.6 Apr. 160. 3 196. 1 77.3Dec. 144.8 195.2 168.2 May 158 ..1 194. 3 75.2
1925 June 157.4 192. 6 74.1
Jan. 152. 5 193.9 172. 0 July 156. 9 191.3 73.2
Feb. 164.4 192. 6 178.0 Aug. 155. 6 188.6 71.3
Mar. 176.3 190.6 183.3 Sept. 153.9 188.2 70.2
Apr. 197.9 190.6 194.4 Oct. 154. 3 188.1 70.4
May 202.5 190.8 196.6 Nov. 154. 0 187.8 70.1
June 193.1 189.8 191.4 Dec. 154.4 187. 9 70.3
TABLE T'-3l (continued)
1st Agricultural Industrial Total
day Price Price Price
of Index Index Index
1928
Jan. 155.7 188. 0 171.1
Feb. 155.8 188. 0 171.1
Mar. 155.7 187. 7 170.9
Apr. 155.5 187. 6 170.8
May 155.6 187.4 170.7
June 157.0 187. 3 171.5
July 157.4 187. 3 171.7
Aug. 159.8 187. 5 173.1
Sept.' 160.1 187. 5 173.2
Oct. 165.5 187. 3 176.1
Nov. 166.1 187. 3 176.4
Dec.
Source: Notes to Table T-31, Appendix,C, p. 820.
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TABLE T-32
USSR: RETAIL PRICE INDEX FOR GOODS SOLD IN THE
PRIVATE TRADE: OLD SERIES, 1924 - 1927
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Manufactured Manufactured
Agric. consumer's Total 1st day Agric. consumer's Total1stday price goods price price goods priceof index price index of index price index
index index
1924 1926
Jan. 134 239 180 Jan. 204 248 226
Feb. 159 253 201 Feb. 213 248 230
Mar. 159 255 203 Mar. 219 249 234
Apr. 172 242 207 Apr. 221 262 241
May 187 238 213 May 230 271 250
June 173 243 206 June 218 268 243
July 179 245 210 July 209 266 236
Aug. 183 248 225 Aug. 206 264 234
Sept. 192 248 219 Sept. 201 263 231
Oct. 172 243 206 Oct. 199 264 230
Nov. 167 244 203 Nov. 205 266 234
Dec. 174 240 205 Dec. 205 268 235
1925 1927
Jan. 177 235 205 Jan. 203 270 235
Feb. 185 232 208 Feb. 207 267 236
Mar. 193 229 211 Mar. 209 268 237
Apr. 207 226 217 Apr. 210 268 238
May 217 225 22.1 May 209 240 226
June 217 222 219 June 210 235 224
July 217 219 218 July 220 235 229
Aug. 21 7 221 210 Aug. 220 262 239
Sept. 190 227 208 Sept. 216 260 237
Oct. 192 239 215 Oct.
Nov. 191 245 217 Nov. 228 264 245
Dec. 199 251 224 Dec. 233 266 248
Source: Notes to Table T-32, Appendix C, p. 821.
TABLE T-33
USSR: RETAIL PRICE INDEX FOR GOODS SOLD IN THE PRIVATE TRADE:
NEW SERIES, 1927 - 1928
(1913 = 100)
1st Agricultural goods Manufactured conSUITlers goods All goods (total price index)
day Private Coop State Average Private Coop State Average Private Coop State Average
of Trade Trade Trade Trade Trade Trade Trade Trade Trade
1927
Jan. 198 182 179 188 251 209 204 221 227 197 198 208
Feb. 203 181 180 190 247 208 203 219' 227 196 198 208
Mar. 205 180 173 189 246 205 198 216 227 194 194 205
Apr. 208 176 178 188 242 200 196 212 227 189 191 203
May 209 175 173 188 240 198 194 210 226 188 189 201
June 210 172 168 187 235 194 192 206 224 184 186 199
July 220 172 167 190 235 193 190 205 229 184 185 199
Aug.
····-217- 171 167 189 236 192 198 205 . 228 183 184 19-9
Sept. 214 172 167 188 235. 191 188 204 226 183 188 198
Oct. 214 --173- 189 236 -188- 203 226 -183- 198
Nov. 216 175 169 190 238 189 187 204 228 183 183 199 0'
0'
Dec. 222 176 169 193 240 189 186 204 232 183 183 200 0'
TABLE T -33 (continued)
1st Agricultural goods Manufactured consumers goods All goods (total price index)
day Private Coop State Average Private Coop State Average Private Coop State Average
of Trade Trade Trade Trade Trade Trade Trade Trade Trade
1928
Jan. 225 1 76 1 71 195 240 189 187 204 234 184 183 200
Feb. 226 --178- 197 241 -189-- 205 233 -185-- 202
Mar. 231 --178- 199 242 -189- 205 237 -185- 203
Apr. 233 1 78 1 77 199 242 189 188 205 239 184 185 203
May 249 1 78 1 78 205 242 188 188 205 245 184 185 205
June 260 179 1 78 209 242 189 188 205 250 184 185 206
July 293 -180- 221 243 -188- 205 264 -185- 211
Aug. 287 --180- 219 244 -188- 205 262 -185- 210
Sept. 285 -179- 217 245 -188- 206 262 -185- 210
Oct. 285 -180- 218 247 -188- 206 263 -185- 211
Nov. 289 -183- 222 250 -189- 208 266 -187- 213
Dec. I I I
Source: Notes to Table T -33, Appendix C, p. 821.
TABLE T-34
USSR: . AGRICULTURAL PROCUREMENT PRICES INDEX FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
PURCHASED BY CENTRALLY PLANNED PROCUREMENT AGENCIIES 1924/25 1928/29
(average prices 1909-13 = 100)
Part A. INDEXES FOR COMMODITY GROUPS
Fibers, Meat Animal All
Grain Oil seed sugar bts Eggs Leather Crops Products agriculturaltobacco, Wool (co1s 1- 3)
etc.
Butter (co1s 4-5) products
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1909-13 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100. 0 100.0
['-
1924/25a 124.4 86. 5 148. 1 140.3 141. 1 128. 8 140.8 131. 1N
........... til 1925 IV 121. 9 91. 2 142.9 177 ~ 5 159.0 126. 0 168.3 134.3...o~
~~ 1926 I 140.7 104.4 137. 8 165.6 160.4 136. 6 163. 1 141. 8
...........
I QJ II 125. 2 103.6 137. 0 138.9 166.3 127.2 152.5 132. 1~~ III 106. 8 93.4 134.9 160.4 166.2 114.7 163.3 124.2
........... ~
~ ~ IV 104.2 96. 7 136.0 184.9 166.4 113. 9 175.8 126. 1N ro
o--~ 1927 I 103. 9 108.0 137. 5 194. 5 169.2 115. 3 182.0 128.3...... til
~ II 106.4 113. 3 139.9 174.0 171. 4 117. 9 172.7 128. 7a
U III 115. 8 109. 6 140. 1 169. 1 174.5 123.2 171. 8 132.7
IV 109.4 Ill. 0 140.4 188.8 174.6 119. 7 181. 8 131. 9
co til 1927 IVb 109. 8 113.0 139. 6 186. 1 177.7 121. 5 182.9 142.8
N ~ 1928 I 112. 1 119. 6 140.0 187. 5 177. 8 123.4 183. 8 143.3
........... on['- ..... II Ill. 1 124.0 140.3 174.2 178.0 123.3 175.7 140. 8N QJ
S~ III 139.9 124.8 143. 1 177.0 178.0 140.0 177.4 152.3
0--
TABLE T-34 (continued)
Part A. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
2 .-01928 IVc 138.2 128. 2 144.6 184.9 177. 8 139. 5 182.4 155. 9
~ Q)
OJ)..j.j
.~ ~ 1929 I 138. 2 129. 1 145. 1 193.2 177.8 140.0 187. 6 158. 0
~ en II 137. 5 129.3 145.2 193.0 177. 8 139. 7 187. 5 157. 7
..j.jg III 147.3 129.7 145. 1 194.7 177.8 145. 0 188. 5 161. 4
Part B. INDEXES FOR SELECTED COMMODITIES
Rye Wheat Barley Sunflower Flax Butter Eggs MeatSeed
1909-13 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1924/25 112.9 128.8 133. 8 84.0 185. 7 136. 9 150.4 126. 5
1925 IV 109.3 130. 1 102.0 83.8 164. 5 166.4 211. 0 152. 1
1926 I 140.2 141. 2 112.6 98. 1 140.8 134.2 217.8 171.4
II 121. 3 127. 9 98. 1 97.3 137.0 126. 7 126. 0 200.3
III 95. 8 114.4 83.4 91. 5 137.4 137. 7 109. 3 178.6
IV 96.9 107. 9 87.4 97. 1 "'139. 1 156.4 247.3 163.3
1927 I 97.2 107.9 105. 7 11 L 6 149. 5 180.3 225.4 182. 1
II 100.4 109.3 108.3 114.0 161.2 167. 8 176.3 188. 9
III 103. 8 122.2 120. 7 112. 5 161. 2 155.0 187. 3 180. 5
IV 100. 5 110. 7 12L 4 113. 3 161. 2 177.0 217. 7 174.4
1927 IV 100.2 110. 9 121.5 114. 7 161.2 177. 0 217. 7 174.4
1928 I 103. 0 112.4 135. 3 122.9 161. 2 178.0 229.3 169.7
II 100.3 112. 1 134. 1 127.3 161.2 165.4 184. 1 175.4
III 123.4 145. 1 161. 2 128. 0 183.6 166. 8 192.2 176. 1 0"
TABLE T-34 (continued)
Part B. Wheat Barley Sunflower Flax Butter Egg s MeatRye Seed
1928 IV 129.7 140.7 151. 7 127.6 186.4 198. 7 239.4 165. 3
1929 I 131. 2 139.4 153.4 128. 2 186.4 209. 1 258.0 170. 5
II 129.7 139.2 151. 5 129.0 186.4 196. 7 211. 6 186.0
III 141. 7 150.3 150.9 128.0 186.4 196. 8 232.9 183.4
aConstant weights using average value 1924/25 - 1926/27.
b1927/28 weights.
CWeights not stated.
Source: Notes to Table T-34, Appendix C, p. 822.
TABLE T-35
USSR: PURCHASING POWER OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS IN TERMS OF MANUFACTURED
CONSUMER GOODS SOLD IN THE PRIVATE TRADE 1913 = 100
Price -Index Purchasing Power in Terms of Manufactured Consumer
of Mfg. Goods Sold in the Private Trade 1913 = 100
Consumer or 1909/13 = 100
Goods in A g ric u 1 t u r a 1 _R 0 0 d s sold at Grain sold at Wheat sold a1 Rye sold atPrivate Retail Wholesale ProcuremertIProcurement Procure:rnen1 ProcurementTrade prices prices prices p. a Prices Prices1913 = 100 Var. Wt. rlces
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6 ) (7)
1924 Oct. 226 73 60 45 49.0 37.2
Nov. 222 77 52 48 57.0 39.9
Dec. 217 80 70 52 52.0 42.4
215 84 76 55 63.0 47.2
1925 Jan.
Feb. 212 89 83 62 78.0 58. 3
Mar. 209 97 95 72 95.3 58.3
April 208 102 97 78 ~ 110.1 58.3May 205 104 94 76 58.5 109.9 58.3June 203 105 92 70 100. 6 58. 3
July 204 104 79 67 78.4 86. 3
Aug. 210 89 74 58 73.7 70. 3
Sept. 221 85 70 56 73.4 62. 3
Oct. 227 82 69 50 54.9 53.8
Nov. 232 84 70 53 to 53.2 65.7 54.0
Dec. 229 87 74 55 66.0 57.5
TABLE T-35 (continued)
-J
N
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5 ) (6) (7)
1926 Jan. 229 91 79 57 70.3 65.0
Feb. 230 93 82 60 60.4 72.1 72.4
Mar. 242 90 59 ~ 67.6 70 . .1
April 251 90 76 53 64.6 63.5
May 248 86 71 51 ~ 50.5 63.7 57.3
June 246 83 67 . 52.7 49.2
July 244 83 66 44.0 51. 5 42.9
Aug. 243 81 65 .. 54.3 44.5
Sept. 244 80 64 54.5 45.9
Oct. 246 82 65 53 42.0 51. 5 45.5
Nov. 248 81 63 50 ~ 50.2 45.1
Dec. 251 79 62 50 48.3 44.3
1927 Jan. 247 82 64 50 41. 7 49.4 44.8
Feb. 246 83 65 52 42.8 49.6 45.9
Mar. 242 86 66 55 44.9 51. 4 47.?
April 240 87 66 58 43.5 51. 8 47.4
May 235 89 67 65 47.6 56.3 49.7
June 235 94 67 64 46.1 51.4 44.7
July 236 92 66 63 46.9 54.2 51. 3
Aug. 235 91 65 60 52.0 60.9 51. 6
Sept. 236 91 64 56 49.9 59.2 51. 6
Oct. 238 91 . 58 47.6 54.6 49.0
Nov. 240 93 64 59 45.1 53.8 48.2
Dec. 240 94 65 60 44.3 52.7 48. 3
0'
TABLE T-35 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5 ) (6) (7)
1928 Jan. 241 94 65 55 46.3 55.0 48.6
Feb. 242 95 64 52 45.1 53.1 49.2
Mar. 242 96 64 56 44.9 53.1 49.4
April 242 103 64 67 44.9 53.4 44.5
May 242 107 65 69 45.5 55.9 48.4
June 243 121 65 67 44.0 52.3 49.7
July 244 117 65 70 47.3 56.9 48.5
Aug. 245 116 65 67 59.9 70.2 59. 7
Sept. 247 It5 67 62 57.3 68.4 58.2
Oct. 250 116 66 57 53.2 66. 0 60. 3
Nov. . . . . . . .
Dec. . . . . . .
1929 Jan. 257 120 66 61 51. 2 63.3 58.8
Feb. 261 125 61 50.3 62.5 58. 3
Mar. 268 142 62 50.2 60.4 56.6
a1909-13 = 100
Source: Notes to Table T-35, Appendix C, p. 823.
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TABLE T-36
USSR: PRICES PAID BY PRIVATE TRADERS AND PLANNED AGENCIES
FOR FOUR MAJOR GRAINS 1925/26 - 1928/29
(kopecks per pood)
1925/26 1926/27 1927/28 1928/29
Rye
Gene ra1 procurement price 99 78 79 93
Price of planned agency 93 72 76 87
Price of private traders 118 110 115
Difference between private and 25 38 39
planned agency price s
Wheat
General procurement price 134 107 112 124
Price of planned agency 129 104 109 117
Price of private traders 147 128 137
Difference between private and 18 24 28
planned agency prices
Oats
General procurement price 101 73 82 90
Price of planned agenc y 88 61 68 75
Price of private traders 119 105 113
Difference between private and 31 44 45
planned agency price s
Barley
General procurement price 73 60 86 94
Price of planned agency 71 53 85 91
Price of private traders 92 81 101
Difference between private and 21 28 16
planned agenc y price s
Source: 'Notes to Table T -36, Appendix C, p. 824.
TABLE T-37
WHOLESALE PRICE INDEXES FOR SELECTED TRADING
PARTNERS OF THE USSRa
(1913 = 100)
675
USSR Germany Great Britain Netherland USA
Gosplan Statist. Board of Trade Central Bur. Bureau of
Series Reichsamt Series v. d. Stat. Labor series
Series Series
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1913 100.0 100. 0 100. 0 100. 0 100.0
1922
1923 [135. 0] [150.0] [152. 0]
1924 170.2 137.0 166.0 156.0 140.0
1925 179.2 142.0 159. 0 155.0 148.0
1926 185.6 134.4 148.1 145.0 143.3
1927 175.5 137.6 141. 6 148.0 136. 7
1928 171.5 140. 0 140.3 149.0 138.5
1929 177.3 137.2 136.5 142.0 136. 5
1930 124.6 119.5 117.0 123.8
1931 110.9 97.0 97.0 104.6
1932 96. 5 73.2 79.0 93.0
1933 93. 3 68.7 74.0 75.2
1934 98.4 64.3 78.0 64.0
1935 101. 8 63.4 76.0 68.0
1936 104.1 68.3 75. 0 68. 7
1937 105.9 78.4 78.9 73.4
1938 105.6 74.9 76.1 67.2
aAdjusted for devaluation of currency.
Source: Notes to TableT-37, AppendixC, p. 824.
TABLE T-38
PRICE OF WHEAT ON USSR AND FOREIGN MARKETS
(kopecks per hundred kilograms)
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Date USSR Markets Foreiiln Markets
Wholesale Average Average Price of Price of
Price in Domestic Procurement Soviet Manitoba
Surplus Procurement Price of Wheat on Wheat
Region Price Exported Foreign c. i. f.
{(Khiebprod) Grain Markets London
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1909-13 Av (565)a
1913Av. (493)a
1923 Oct. (378)
1924 Jan. (659)
Mar. (818)
Apr. (757)
July 670
Aug. 726
Sept. 592
Oct. 543
Nov. 854 619
Dec. 996 561
1925Jan. 1067 672
Feb. 1293 812
Mar. 1502 982
Apr. 1707 1129
May 1668 1111
June 1381 1007
July 1325 788 726 1135 1294c
Aug. 862 763 775 1178 1386
Sept. 921 800 800 1068 11"90
Oct. 947 726 763 1038 1074
Nov. 1004 751 830 1105 1197
Dec. 1056 745 800 1245 1349
TABLE T - 38 (continued)
677
Date USSR Markets Foreign Markets
Wholesale Average Average Price of Price of
Price in Domestic Procurement Soviet Manitoba
Surplus Procurement Price of Wheat on Wheat
Region Price Exported Foreign c. i. f.
(khle bprod) Grain Markets London
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1926Jan. 1098 794 806 1227 1349
Feb. 1117 818 861 1221 1306
Mar. 1114 806 855 1142 1245
Apr. 1086 799 836 1184 1288
May 1032 779 775 1178 1288
June 822 638 684 1197 1294
July 833 619 654 1245 1313
Aug. 805 650 671 1190 1263
Sept. 769 656 669 1153 1202
Oct. 744 624 652 1217 1263
Nov. 749 614 629 1228 1269
Dec. 738 597 602 1175 1216
1927Jan. 738 601 601 1140 1198
Feb. 745 602 589 1148 1230
Mar. 759 623 559 1138 1239
Apr. 764 613 581 1141 1219
May 745 652 550 1184
June 750 595 532b 1194
July 779 631 (716 ) 1170
Aug. 776 705 (740) 1192 1288
Sept. 753 689 (702 ) 1123 1228d
Oct. 646b 691 1104Nov. 637 682 1161 1077
Dec. 623 681 1191 1087
1928Jan. 653 681 1189 1080
Feb. 633 677 .1183 1071
Mar. 634 678 1204 1112
Apr. 637 680 1245 1173
May 667 692 1242 1169
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TABLE T -38 (continued)
Date USSR Markets Foreign Markets
Wholesale Average Average Price of Price of
Price in Domestic Procurement Soviet Manitoba
Surplus Procurement Price of Wheat on Wheat
Region Price Exported Foreign c. i. f."'
(khlebprod) Grain Markets London
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1928 June 627 675 1132 1080
July 684 729 1036
Aug. 848 843 921 ,
Sept. 833b 838 912
Oct. 814 1017e
Nov. 798 1021
Dec. 798 1024
1929 Jan. 802 1034
Feb. 804 1067
Mar. 798 1052
Apr. 798 1011
May 800 943
June 801 1012
July 795 1122
Aug. 876 1226
Sept. 861 1176
aSee Table Notes for method of estimating these prices.
bThe bar indicates a change in the sources Or type of data which limits
somewhat the comparability of the data before and after the bar. The
Table Notes should be consulted in each case.
cManitoba No. 1.
dManitoba No.3.
eManitoba No.2. Prices for July, August and September were
1,179,995,952 kopecks per 100 kilograms.
Source: Notes to Table T-38, Appendix C, p. 825.
TABLE T-39
PRICE OF RYE ON USSR AND FOREIGN MARKETS
(kopecks per hundred kilograms)
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Date USSR Markets Foreign Markets
Wholesale Average Average Price of Western
Price in Domestic Procurement Soviet No.2
Surplus Procurement Price of Rye on c.i. f.
Region Price Exported Foreign Hamburg
(khlebprod) Grain Markets
1909-13Av. (446)a
1913Av. (385~
,
1923 Oct. (214) (684)
1924 Jan. (385) (775)
Mar. (440) (725)
Apr. (415) (696~
July
Aug.
Sept.
324bOct.Nov. 543 341
Dec. 659 354
1925 Jan. 714 391 . . ,
Feb. 810 476 .
Mar . 963 . .
Apr. 1157 . . . .
May 1265 . .
June 1167 . .
July 1111 678 629 897 873
Aug. 657 568 556 861 879
Sept. 616 530 531 757 781
Oct. 626 470 464 690 733
Nov. 676 482 531 739 763
Dec. 717 507 574 806 .
TABLE T -39 (continued)
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Date USSR Markets Foreign Markets
Wholesale Average Average Price of Western
Price in Domestic Procurement Soviet No.2
Surplus Procurement Price of Rye on c.i.f.
Region Price Exported Foreign Hamburg
(kh1ebprod) Grain Markets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1926 Jan. 771 574 604 818 .
Feb. 875 641 543 751 .
Mar. 869 653 464 818 .
Apr. 85.1 5.14 , 855 .
May 786 547 50.1 824 .
June 644 466 421 836 .
July 592 403 398 849 910
Aug. 557 416 419 832 891
Sept. 545 431 432 891 897
Oct. 505 431 436 933 938
Nov. 515 431 435 940 943
Dec. 519 428 432 906 906
1927 Jan. 522 426 441 943 944
Feb. 523 435 442 977 981
Mar. 532 440 429 944 947
Apr. 519 438 439 943 952
May 523 450 419 1025 .10.12
June 522 456 419b 1004 984
July 539 466 . 904 893
Aug. 545 467b 478 876 862
Sept. 533 . 466 919 897
Oct. . 449 459 905 877
Nov. 445 457 955 923
Dec. . 446 462 987 956
1928 Jan. . 451 477 986 964
Feb. 458 . 997 976
Mar. . 460 482 1068 .1049
Apr. . 415 455 1136 1119
May . 451 462 1161 1142
June . 465 454 1063 1048
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TABLE T -39 (continued)
Date USSR Markets Foreign Markets
Wholesale Average Average Price of Western
Price in Domestic Procurement Soviet No.2
Surplus Procurement Price of Rye on c.LI.
Region Price Exported Foreign Hamburg
(khle bprod) Grain Markets
1928 July 456 456 978 966
Aug. 563 594 906 903
Sept. 553b 587 869 853
Oct. 580 934 919
Nov. 569 929 913
Dec. 580 940 926
1929 Jan. 582 947 934
Feb. 586 949 940
Mar. 584 927 927
Apr. 559 882 881
aSee Table Notes for method of estimating price for 1909-13 and 1913.
bThe bar indicates a change in the sources or type of data which limits
somewhat the comparability of the data before and after the bar. The
table notes should be consulted in each case.
Source: Notes to Table T-39, Appendix C, p. 827.
TABLE T-40
PRICE OF BARLEY ON USSR AND FOREIGN MARKETS
(kopecks per hrmdred kilograms)
682
Date USSR Ma rket Foreign Market
Procurement Price Average Price of Canadian Barley
of Exported Barley Russian Barley c. i. f. London
(1) (2) (3)
1909-13 (375)a
1913 (344)a
1925
July 446 885 940
Aug. 476 867 904
Sept. 464 714 763
Oct. 378 696 751
Nov. 341 684 739
Dec. 347 726 763
1926
Jan. 385 690 732
Feb. 397 665
Mar. 391 653 684
Apr. 391 739 739
May 354 714 733
June 305b 726bJuly 279c 714 745
Aug. 304 695 726
Sept. 317 732 756
Oct. 318 777 793
Nov. 323 806 857
Dec. 344 803 817
1927
Jan. 360 854 846
Feb. 359 859 854
Mar. 372 850 855
Apr. 914 899
May 960 958
Jrme 963 1012
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TABLE T-40 (continued)
Date USSR Market Foreign Ma rket
Procurement Price Average Price of Canadian Barley
of Exported Barley Russian Barley c. i. f. London
(1) (2) (3)
1927
July 885 886
Aug. 445 889 887b
Sept. 448 880 907
Oct. 455 884
Nov. 909
Dec. 930
1928
Jan. 938
Feb. 945
Mar. 980 927
Apr. 480 975
May 456 992
June 486 963
July 570 866 852
Aug. 600 785 783
Sept. 602 754 754
Oct. 831
Nov. 803
Dec. 803
aSee Table Notes for method of estimating these prices.
bThe bar indicates a change in the sources or type of data which limits
somewhat the comparability of the data before and after the bar. The
Table Notes should be consulted in each case.
cProcu'rement price of all barley.
Source: Notes to Table T-40, Appendix C~ p. 828.
TABLE T-41
PRICES OF FLAX ON USSR AND FOREIGN MARKETS
(rubles and kopecks per 100 kilograms)
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Date USSR Market Foreign Markets Dundee c. i. f. Feifets Data
Group IV Russian BKKU Baltic "Foreign Price"
1 Sort Shwanenburg
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1909 -13 (29.41 )
1913 (29.23)
1924
Jan. (52.50) 83.60
May (50.10) 109. 90
Aug. (53. 70) 112. 90
Oct. (59.80) 115.40
1925
Jan. (53.70) 120. 90
May (58.00) 89.80
Aug. (56.20) 92.80
Oct. (54. 30) 88 . .10 86.08
.
92.80
1926
Jan. (43.40) 75.82 79.42 79.40
May (38.50) (73. 93)a (71.73)a 79.40
Aug. (39.70) 73.20
Oct. 40.87 61.89 63.85 67.20
Nov. 40.87 61.26 59.22
Dec. 40.87 60.08 57.99
1927
Jan. 42.74 60. 39 62.15 67.20
Feb .. 47. 74 67.5.1 71.87
Mar. 47.62 79.53 87. 61
Apr. 47.62 77.99 86.46
May 47.62 83.95 91.86
June 47.62 102. 00 105. 98
Ju.1y 47.62 .105.88 1.11.28
Aug. 47.62 106.07 109. 79
Sept. 47.62 .110.00 1.10.59
TABLE T -41 (continued)
Date USSR Market Foreign Markets Dundee c.i.f.
Group IV Russian BKKU Baltic
1 Sort ShwanenburQ
(1) (2) (3)
1927
Oct. 48.00 112. 29 110.62
Nov. 48.00 103 . .1 7 102.42
Dec. 48.00 92.37 92.37
1928
Jan. 48.00 99. 35 99.81
Feb. 48.00 109.03 108.94
Mar. 48.00 108. 66 .107. 08
Apr. 48.00 105.87 .106.33
May 48.00 104.74 .105.41
June 48.00 103.54 103. 99
July 48. 00 101 . 67 .102. 34
Aug. 55.00 101 . 21 100.41
Sept. 62.00 95. 99 95.64
Oct. 88.64 89.67
Nov. 86. 04 89.48
Dec. 88.64 96. 37
aJune 1926.
bThe bar indicates a change in the sources or type of data
which limits somewhat the comparability of the data before
and after the bar. The table notes should be consulted in
each case.
Source: Notes to Table T -41, Appendix C, p. 828.
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TABLE T-42
PRICES OF BUTTER AND EGGS ON USSR AND FOREIGN MARKETS
Butter (rubles per 100 kg) Eggs (rubles per box)
USSR Foreign Markets USSR Foreign Markets
Market London, c. i. f. Market Quoted Prices
Procurem't Quoted Prices Procurem't London, c. i. f.
Prices in Russian New Prices in
Export (Siberian) Zealand Export Russian Danish
Regions or Danish Regions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1909-13 (77.79) (23.25)
1913 (79.01 ) (24. 57)
1925
Oct. 167.88 210.43a
Nov . 128. 30 158.11 201 .58 48.63
Dec. .138.64 178 .08
1926
Jan. 134.12 167.33
Feb. 97.2 142.55 181 .37 50.17
Mar. 147.86 177. 41 66.83 106.47Apr. 147.43 168. 92
May 97.5 138.52 163. 66 29. 04
June 142. 06 163. 91
July 134.18 163.24
Aug. 102.1 131.25 165. 56 43.25
Sept. 124.17 168.12
118.43 c 137.28:g 52.92c 70.94c cOct. 115.12
Nov. 119.4 119. 91 135. 78 67.58 80.90 141.70
Dec. 139. 91 155. 35 67.69 81.74 151.80
1927
Jan. 151.38 159.72 54.64 75.93 109.88
Feb. 131.9(Y 151.38 159. 56 62. 77 98.22
Mar. 132. 30 143.11 49.98 72.06
Apr. 131.26 140. 39 142. 06 43.86 69.00
May 122.10 141.72 148.14 40. 34 47.09 71 .93
June 120. 57 143.55 151 .55 38.77 47.02 73.53
July 117. 58 131.09 148. 39 37.82 47.32 75.24
Aug. 120. 78 132.65 155. 54 42. 35 50.76 82.77
Sept. 123.13 148. 85 167.17 57.73 99.72
Oct. 132.20 144.88 165.09 49.55 63.85 110.55
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TABLE T -42 (continued)
Butter (rubles per 100 kg) Eggs (ruble s per box)
USSR Foreign Markets USSR Foreign Markets
Markets London, c. i. f. Markets Quoted Price s
Procurem't Quoted Prices Procurem't London, c. i. f.
Prices in Russian New Prices in Russian Danish
Export (Siberian) Zealand Export
Regions Regions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1927
Nov. 135. 90 145.63 161. 64 52.12 71.52 146.73
Dec. 138. 80 142.27 151. 95 61.02 80.17 150.48
1928
Jan. 140.10 140.83 148.23 72.68 141. 36
Feb. 137. 03 145.49 154.19 60. 97 94.22
Mar. 134. 70 155. 03 161. 00 49.42 73.61
Apr. 131. 40 147. 76 157. 55 47.87 54.64 71.52
May 130. 94 142.47 155. 31 42.01 48.24 73.84
June 125.25 142.47 160. 89 39.84 43.70 71.84
July 123.17 144. 80 167. 63 38.72 41 .43 73. 03
Aug. 129.40 147. 14 170.61 42.92 55.20 89.91
Sept. 149. 19 170.80 48.61 61.99 92.09
Oct. 148.23 170.11 67.55 103. 08
Nov. 152. 51 159. 78 69.82 139. 34
Dec. 163.41 168. 81 72.98 135. 08
1929
Jan. 168.22 171.60 66.13 116. 50
Feb. 165. 16 68.12 106. 06
Mar. 155.59 82. 30
Apr. 144.02 152.42 72.23
May 144.34 154. 65 72.74
aDanis h butte r.
bNew Zealand butter.
cThe bar indicates a change in the sources or type of data which limits
somewhat the comparability of the data before and after the bar. The
table notes should be consulted in each case.
Source: Notes to Table T-42, Appendix C, 829.
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TABLE T -43
USSR: ESTIMATES OF PROFITABILITY OF GRAIN EXPORTS
(ALL GRAINS) 1923/24 - 1926/27
(kopecks per 100 kilograms)
1923/24 1924/25 1925/26 1926/27
Average foreign price 812 1007 916 977
Domestic price 324 549 629 537
Marketing costs 457 418 384 366
Total cost of grain marketed 781 967 1013 903
abroad
Profit (+) Or loss (-) on sale +31 +40 -97 +74
of grain abroad
Total marketing costs 457 418 384 366
Incurred from purchase to £o.h 243
Incurred from £oh. to sale abroad 123
Difference between foreign price 488 458 287 440
and domestic price
Source: Notes to Table T-43, Appendix C, p. 829.
TABLE T-44
USSR: ESTIMATES OF PROFITABILITY OF FLAX EXPORTS
(rubles per 100 kilograms)
1924 1925 1926
Average foreign price 100.73 97.68 76.31
Domestic price 51.89 54.95 40.90
Marketing costs 47. 01 24.05 21.98
Total cost of flax marketed abroad 98. 90 78.99 62.88
Profit (+) or loss (-) on sale of flax abroad +1.83 +18.68 +13.43
Total marketing costs 47. 01 24.05 21.98
Incurred from purchase to f. o. b. 17.88 15.57
Incurred from f. o. b. to sale abroad 6.16 6.41
Difference between foreign price and 48.84 42.73 35.41
domestic price
Export duty on flax 3.11
Source: Notes to Table T-44, Appendix C, p. 830.
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TABLE T -45
USSR: ESTIMATES OF PROFITABILITY OF BUTTER EXPORTS
(rubles per 100 kilograms)
1913 1923/24 1924/25 1925/26
Average foreign price .106.70 138.4.1 151.72 .138.16
Domestic price 87.23 84.68 109.80 97.60
Marketing costs 14.03 34.34 37.76 34.77
Total cost of butter marketed 101 .26 1.19.02 .147.56 132. 37
abroad
Profit (+) Or .1os (-) On sale .J+5.44 +19.89 +4 ..16 + 5.79
of butter abroad
Total marketing costs 14.03 34. 34 37.76 34.77
Incurred from purchase to f.o.b . .10.26 24.41 26.86 22.77
Incurred from f. o.b. to sale abroad 9.93 10.90 .12.00
Difference between foreign price and 54.23 41.92 40.56
domestic price
Source: Notes to Table T-45, Appendix C, p. 830.
TABLE T-46
USSR: ESTIMATES OF PROFITABILITY OF EGGS EXPORTS
(rubles per box of .1440eggs)
Average foreign price
Dome stic price
Marketing costs
Total cost of eggs marketed abroad
Profit (+) or loss (-) on sale of eggs abroad
Total marketing costs
Incurred from purchase to f.o.b.
Incurred from f. o.b. to sale
Difference between foreign price and
domestic price
1925 1926
58.00 69.00
32.00 42.00
27.74 30.68
59.74 72.68
-1 .74 -3.68
27.74 30.68
20.04 23.00
7.70 7.68
26.00 27.00
Source: Notes to Tab.1e T-46, Appendix C, p. 830.
TABLE T-47
IMPORT TARIFFS FOR RUSSIA AND THE USSR ENACTED
IN 1903, 1922, 1924, 1927
(rubles)
:method of
assessing 1903 1922 1924 1927
tariff
Luxury Articles
Cosmetic preparations kilogram 1. 45- 3. 20 7.30-12.20 7.40-13 70-175
Toilet soap 100 kg 73.0 122 122 750
Clothing from silk kilogram 36.90 97.60 122 175
Leather suitcases, briefcases kilogram 2. 55. 7. 30 7.50 25
Various haberdashery kilogram 1.10-7.30 3.65-24.40 3.70-25 30-100
Foodstuffs
Grain, potatoes 100 kg a a ad. f. 0.03-0. 12 d. f. d. f.
Rice 100 kg 6.40 6. 10 6. 0 6. 0
Tea 100 kg 69-192 97.60-244 67-148 70-200
Coffee 100 kg 36-55 73.20-109.80 37-74 240-285
Spices kilogram O. 43-1. 98 1. 22-12. 20 1. 20-12 0.40-100
Fruit and citrus fruit 100 kg 9.60-11 24.40-61 12-74 36-100
Tobacco kilogram 2.10-17.55 1. 80-24. 40 2.44-30 2.25-30
Sugar 100 kg 27.50-36.60 15.25-24.40 18-27.50 10-18
Herring, dried cod 100 kg 3.70 3. 05 3.00 9.00
Wine 100 kg 55-153 73.20-305 122-670 550-800
Liquor 100 kg 153-183 183-305 214-335 550-800 0'
'"o
TABLE T-47 (continued)
method of
assessing 1903 1922 1924 1927
tariff
Consumers I Goods, Household Articles
Cotton cloth 100 kg 239-624 341. 60-1012. 60 470-1850 220-2000
Woolen cloth 100 kg 549 732-976 650-850 1000-1300
Footwear kilogram. 4.76 9.52 3.63-8.55 5-9.80 25-50
Eyeglasses, binoculars kilogram. 1. 83 2.45 2.50 75
Pencils, pens kilogram. 1. 60 0.60 0.60 3
Knife s, tableware, razors kilogram. 1. 46-3.66 1.67-4.88 2.44-5.49 10-100
Iron (cooking) utensils 100 kg 9.15 9.15 12 30
Glassware 100 kg 5.50-101 9.15-366 9-366 12-360
Porcelain goods 100 kg 58-231 61-723 61-750 100-700
Transport Equipment
Rail 100 kg 3.50 0.30 6 6
Locomotives b 100 kg 22.30 19.50 29 50
Railway cars 100 kg -- - - - - 22-75
Automobiles b, c 100 kg
-- - - - -
12 - 50% c
Raw Materials
Coal 100 kg O. 36 0.12 0.45 0.60
Iron in ingots 100 kg 5. 50 0.12 6 6
Steel and sheet steel 100 kg 5.50-9.15 3. 05".;6 ...70 7. 50-13. 70 $
Copper, aluminum, nickel 100 kg. 30.50-43.3C 3.05-1980 37-61 37-72
Rubber and guttapercha 100 kg 48.80-122 9.15-122 6-170 30-200
Paper pulp 100 kg 1. 10-3.60 1.10-3.05 1. 50-12 1-6
Paper 100 kg 36.60 12. 2 0 - 79. 30 12-40 12. 50-40
TABLE T-47 (continued)
m.ethod of
asse ssing 1903 1922 1924 1927
tariff
Raw Materials (continued)
Cotton 100 kg 24.40 24.40 6 21
Cotton Yarn 100 kg 50-186 6.1. 345.25 39-475 52-455
Wool (com.bed, spun) 100 kg 5031-14.30 94.55-244 61-238 130-340
Hides and leather 100 kg 2.40-137.20 0.60-366 0.0-488 6-800
Production Equipm.ent
Machine s and apparatus 100 kg 15. 50~55 12. 80~42. 70 20.74 6-110
Hand tools 100 kg 12.80-16.80 9.15 19.25 75-150
Electrical Eguipm.ent
Dynam.os, electrical m.otors 100 kg 5.1. 80 61 91 180
Transform.ers 100 kg 5.1. 80 61 12 -110 12 -110
Copper wire 100 kg 44.80-72.30 18.30-42.70 61-110 65 -115
Producers I Goods for Agriculture
Agricultural m.achineryd 100 kg 6.40 1. 53-4-56 4.50 7
Agricultural im.plem.ents 100 kg 12.80-18.30 9 . .15 9-18 14-17
Fertilizer 100 kg O. 18 -0.46 0.015-0.43 d. f. 0.25-3.50
Chem.icals
Boric acid, borax 100 kg 11-21-95 11-18-30 28 45
Am.m.onia com.pounds 100 kg 5-13-60 2.44-18.30 2.50-25 3-40
Soda 100 kg 5.50 5.50 5.50 4
Calcium. chloride 100 kg 7.10 4.27 23 23
Sulfuric acid .100 kg 2. 20~10 1. 83-3. 66 2.50-5.20 2-10 0'
\
TABLE T-47 (continued)
:method of 1903 1922 1924 1927
as se s sing tariff
Che:mica1s (continued)
Ch1orofor:m 100 kg 100. 60 122 122 400
Aniline 100 kg 24.40 48.80 85 140
Synthetic dye s 100 kg 155. 50 244-305 244-305 300-400
Source: Notes to Table T-47, Appendix C, p. 830.
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TABLE T-48
USSR: POPULATION, TOTAL, URBAN, RURAL 1913 - 1939
Date
Part A.
Borders
Soviet Estimate s
Po ulation (millions)
Total Urban Rural
Per cent
Urban
Estimates" by W. Eason
l. Russia (1913)
2. Sov. Terr. "1913"
3.Sov. Terr. Jan. 1, 1914
4. Sov. Terr. Jan. 1, 1924
5.Sov. Terr. Jan. 1, 1925
6.Sov. Terr. Jan. 1, 1926
7. Sov. Terr. Dec. 17
8.Sov. Terr. Jan. 1, 1927
9.Sov. Terr. Jan. 1, 1928
10.Sov. Terr. Apr. 1,1928
11.Sov. Terr. Jan. 1, 1929
12.Sov. Terr. A r. 1 192
Part B. "We ste rn
165.7
139.3 24.7
139.7 25.8
137.0 22.1
140.0 23.2
143.2 24:5
147.0 '26.: 3
(147.2) (26.4:)
(150.4) (27.5)
151.3 27.9
(153.9) (28.7)
154.8 2 .0
114.6
113.9
114.9
116.8
118.7
120.7
(120. 8)
(122.9)
123.4
(125.1)
17. 7
18.5
16.1
16.6
17.1
17. 9
(17. 9)
(18. 3)
18.4
(18. 6)
Sov. Terr. Jan. 1, 1910 130.1 18.6 Ill.8
Sov. Terr. Jan. 1, 1914 139.9 20.4 119.5 14.6
Sov. Terr. Mar. 15,192: 133.5 21.4 112.0 16-.1
Sov. Terr. De c.17,1926 147.0 26.3 120.7 17'. 9
Sov. Terr. Jan. 1, 1928 149.9 27.6 122.3 18.4
Sov. Terr. Jan. 1, 1929 153.1 29.2 123.9 19.1
Sov. Terr. Jan. 1, 1930 155.6 30.9 124.7 19.9
Sov. Terr. Jan. 1, 1931 158.1 32.0 126.0 20.2
Sov. Terr. Jan. 1, 1932 160.7 36.3 124.4 22.6
Sov. Terr. Jan. 1, 1933 160.6 39.7 120.9 24.7
Sov. Terr. Jan. 1, 1934 160.6 41.0 119.5 25.6
Sov. Terr. Jan. 1, 1935 160.5
Sov. Terr. Jan. 1, 1936 162.2 47.0 115.2 29. 0
Sov. Terr. Jan. 1, 1937 164.1
Sov. Terr. Jan. 1, 1938 167.3
Sov. Terr. Jan. 1, 1939 170.6 56.1 114.4 32.9
Source: Notes to Table T-48, Appendix C, p. 831.
TABLE T -49
USSR: ESTIMATES OF LIVESTOCK
(millionsof head)
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June- Cattle SheepJuly Horses including Cows Swine Goatscensus cows
'.
1916 35.8 60.6 26.0 20.9 121.2
1921 29.6 50.8 27.2 19.4 110.9
1922 24.1 45.8 24.8 12.1 91.1
1923 24.6 52.9 26.1 12.9 95.3
1924 25.7 59.0 27.1 22.2 109.0
1925 27.1 62.1 28.6 21.8 122.9
1926 29.2 65.5 29.7 21.6 132.5
1927 31.6 68.0 29.9 23.2 139.7
1928 33.5 70.5 30.7 26.2 146.7
1929 34.6 67.1 30.4 20.4 147.0
1930 30.2 52.5 26.7 13.6 108.8
1931 26.2 47.9 24.4 14.4 7.7.7
1932 19.6 40.7 21.0 11.6 52.1
1933 19.6 38.4 19.6 12.1 50.2
1934 15.7 42.4 19. 5 17.4 51.9
1935 15.9 49.2 20.1 22.5 61.1
1936 16.6 56.7 22.1 30.5 73.7
1937 16.7 57.0 23.3 22.8 81.3
1938 17.5 63.2 25.2 30.6 102.5
Source: Notes to Table T-49, Appendix C, p. 831.
TABLE T-50
USSR: GROSS CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN FIXED CAPITAL
IN THE SOCIALIST SECTOR 1923/24 - 1938
(billions of rubles in prices of current year)
,t aIdpliN1 d'IIAp art nvestment nc u Ing On- rO uctlve nvestment
Economic Sectors Social All
Bv Sector Total Cultural Sectors
Industry Agriculture Transport Communications Trade Economic Administrative
Sectors
1923/24
1924/25 0.416 0.068 0.272 O. 019 0.040 0.815 0.395 1.210
1925/26 0.846 0.120 0.523 O. 021 0.051 1 .561 0.577 2.138
1926/27 1.553 0.201 0.860 0.043 0.078 2.735 0.928 3.663
1928 1.687 0.364 0.905 O. 054 0.065 3.075 1.014 4.089
1929 2.308 0.808 1.179 0.070 O. 099 4.464 1.341 5.805
1930 3. 507 2.309 1.660 0.123 0.1 74 7.773 1.892 9.665
1931 6. 341 3.353 2.694 0.184 0.260 12.832 2.669 15.501
1932 8.794 3.466 3.472 0.186 0.351 16.269 3.598 19.867
1933 8.207 3.503 2.825 0.189 0.21 7 14.941 4.603 19.544
1934 9.921 4.254 3.982 0.261 0.443 18. 861 6.136 24.997
1935 n. 305 4.783 4.948 0.281 O. 522 21. 839 7.461 29. 300
1936 13. 701 6.336 6.398 0.294 0.957 27.686 10.414 38.100
1937 12.880 7.088 5. 341 0.228 0.835 26. 372 9.928 36. 300
1938b 14. 650 7.218 6.126 0.356 0.698 29.048 10.552 39.600
TABLE T-50 (continued)
"
Idp'IN1 d't EIBp art nve s trn.en xc u Ing On- rO uctlve nve strn.ent
Econorn.ic Sectors Social All
BV Sector Total Cultural Sectors
Industry Agriculture Transport Corn.rn.unications Trade Econorn.ic Adrn.inistrative
Sectors
1923/24 0.355 0.056 0.214 0.861
1924/25 0.481 0.071 0.272 0.019 0.040 0.883 0.327 1.210
1925/26 0.972 0.126 0.523 0.021 0.051 1.693 0.445 2.138
1926/27 1.760 0.213 0.860 0.043 O. 078 2.954 o. 709 3.663
1928 1.880 O. 384 0.905 0.054 0.065 3.288 0.801 4.089
1929 2.165 0.804 1 .179 0.070 0.099 4.803 1.002 5.805
1930 4.114 2. 590 1.660 0.123 0.174 8.661 1.004 9.665
1931 7.407 3.645 2.694 0.184 0.260 14.190 1 . 311 1 5. 501
1932 10.431 3. 821 3.472 0.186 0.351 18.261 1.b06 19.867
1933 9.890 3.795 3.015 0.202 0.238 17.140 2.404 19.544
1934 11 . 868 4.672 4.250 0.278 0.486 21.554 3.443 24.997
1935 13. 024 5.093 5.455 O. 300 0.562 24.434 4.866 29.300
1936 15.969 6.484 6.91 7 0.310 1.046 30. 726 7.374 38.100
1937 15.012 7.246 5.774 0.246 0.913 29.191 7.109 36. 300
1938 17.075 7.349 6.623 O. 376 0.763 32.186 7.414 39.600
a
"Non-productive investrn.ent" refers to housing, club houses, etc.
b 1938 inve strn.ent evaluated at 1936/37 price s .
Source: Notes to Table T-50, Appendix C, p. 832.
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TABLE T-51
USSR: EXPORT, OUTPUT, PROCUREMENTS AND MARKETING
OF SELECTED AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS:
1909-13,1913, 1924/25 - 1927/28
1909-13 1913 1924/25 1925/26 1926/27 1927/28
Grain
(millions of m. t.)
1. gross harvest 81.6a 80. 1a 51. 4 72. 5 76.8 72.3
2. total market (A Y) , . 8. 6 12. 2 13.4 12.2
3. procurements (AY) . . 4. 6 8.4 10. 8 10. 3
4. procurements (EY) . . 6.0 8. 5 11. 0 9. 7
5. exports (A Y) . . 0.4 2.0 2. 6 .
6. exports (EY) 11. 9b 10. 7b o. 6 2. 1 2. 3 0.4
Wheat
(millions of m. t.) 26.4b7. gro ss harve st 26.2a 13. 1 20.7 24.4 21. 6
8. procurements . . 1.7 3. 8 6. 3 4.9
4. 77b b9. gross exports 3.74b O. 17 O. 75 1. 21 O. 1410. gross imports . O. 14 0.49 0.01 0.00 0.25
~
(millions of m. t.)
11. gross harvest 27. 9 21. 3 18. 8 22.8 23. 7 24.2
12. procurements . . 1.37 1.83 2. 50 2.32
13. gross exports O. 77 O. 77 0.07 O. 16 0.42 O. 12
Barley
(millions of m. t.)
14. gross harvest 13. 1 10. 8 4.4 6. 6 5. 5 4. 5
15. procurements . , O. 18 1.07 0.32 0.43
16. gros s exports 3. 72 3. 93 0.20 0.84 0.26 0.00
Oil seed
(millions of m. t.)
17. gross harvest . 2.24 2. 12 3.99 2. 58 .
18. c (1. 24) (1.03) (0.96) (1.06)procurements . .
19. exports of oil seed . 0.21 O. 19 0.25 0.07 0.01
20. exports of oil seed . 0.99 O. 52 O. 56 0.38 O. 21
and prod.
TABLE T- 51 (continued)
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1909-13 1913 924/25 1925/26 1926/27 1927/28
Flax
(thousands m. t. )
21. gross harvest 454 240 300 270 240
22. procurements (246) (125) (180) (125) 122
23. exports-flax only 272 45 57 32 23
24. exports - all flax 307 56 72 44 43
products
~
(billions of eggs)
25. net output
10.971 8. 79 9. 63 9. 65 9.9126. procurements [ 6 70 1. 18 1. 03 1. 81 2.30
27. exports . 3.66 O. 71 0.60 0.89 1. 36
Butter
(thousands of m. t. )
28. factory output 134b [49. 6] [56. 7] [58. 9] [82.1]
29. market 142 206
30. procurements
78. 'Ob
42.6 48.8 75. 1 74.6
31. exports 68. 1 24.5 27.3 30.3 32.9
Cotton (unginned)
(thousands of m. t. )
32. e 740 340 540 540 720output
33. procurements 359 572 522 637
Wool
(thousands of m. t. )
34. procurements 15 17 27 39
Sugar beets
(thousands of m. t. )
35. procurements 2916 7438 6123 9870
Hides (large)
(thousands of hides)
36. procurements 6904 4957 7270 10, 598
Skins (small)
(thousands of skins)
37. procurements 13, 909 15,332 16, 500 24,012
as ..OVlet ter rltory.
TABLE T- 51 (continued)
bR . E .USSlan mplre.
cDefinition of oil seed changes.
dTota1 marketing.
eFirst year of split-year.
Source: Notes to Table T-51, .Appendix C, p. 833.
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APPENDIX A
TECHNICAL NOTE ONE: SOURCES OF SOVIET
FOREIGN TRADE STATISTICS
In Technical Note 1 we outline (1) the meaning of "rubles" as used
in Soviet foreign trade statistics and how it affects the use of various
sources of Soviet foreign trade statistics and (2) the major sources of
Soviet foreign trade statistics and their differences.
Ruble valuation in EOviet foreign
trade statistic s
Soviet foreign trade statistics for the inter -war period were re-
corded and published in rubles by the Soviet Customs Department. The
ruble value was based on the invoices for customs declaration and
was calculated with reference to the value of the export (f. o. b.) or im-
port (c. i.f.) in foreign currency rather than domestic ruble values.
The ruble value of Soviet foreign trade statistics was calculated by
converting the value in foreign currency into rubles at the Ilofficial ex-
change rate." The official exchange rate (since late 1924) was based
on the gold content of the ruble relative to the gold content of other
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currencies convertible to gold at the official parity rates or on the
cross-exchange rate of a fluctuating currency to a convertible currency
such as the dollar (to 1933) and franc (from 1933 to 1936) and again the
1
dollar after 1937.
The Soviet ruble attained limited convertibility during the mid-
1920 IS, and was even quoted on several foreign exchanges, but for all
practical purposes the ruble was an inconvertible currency because of
the foreign trade monopoly and the foreign exchange monopoly of the
2
State Bank. Thus, the rubles used in official Soviet international
transactions were essentially units of account based on gold and were
used to convert transactions denominated in various foreign currencies
into a common denominator -- the ruble of a specific gold content.
Hence, some non-Soviet writers described the ruble used to record
international transactions as the "foreign trade ruble. 11
3
The gold content of the ruble was changed several times after
1922 so that the official exchange rate of the ruble also changed, and
ruble valuations of international transactions changed even though the
original foreign currency values and physical quantities remained
1
See Notes to Table A. 1a.
2 Aizenberg-62, p. 31, and Table VIII.3.
3 E. g., Birmingham-32a, p. 4. According to Aizenberg-62 (p.
31), some Soviet economists considered the ruble as purely an "internal
currency. II
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4unchanged (Table A. 1a and Notes to Table A. 1a).
The Soviet foreign trade statistics published during any period
usually used the ruble values based on the contemporary gold content
of the ruble; time series of Soviet foreign trade involving data from
periods with different gold contents of the ruble wer e adjusted by a
conversion coefficient of the ratio of the prevailing gold content to the
past gold content, so that the ruble value in most Soviet publications of
Soviet foreign trade refers to rubles of a specific gold content; this
procedure eliminates changes in the measured value of Soviet foreign
trade due to changes in exchange rates but not due to prices.
Ruble values in this study and conversion coefficients.
In this study, references to ruble valuation refer to rubles of the
gold content prevailing between 1922 and 1936 (and also in the Tsarist
period), that is, to the so-called gold ruble. Any values originally
cited in source materials in terms of rubles with a gold content differ-
ent than the gold ruble have been converted to (gold) rubles on the
4 The legal gold content of the new chervonets ruble issued by the
State Bank in late 1922 was identical to the gold content of the ruble of
Tsarist Russia between 1897 and 1914 (Holzman-60, pp. 427-428, Ar-
nold-36, pp. 146 ff., and Aizenberg-62). The gold content of the rubles
was changed either legally or de facto in 1936, 1937, 1950 and 1960
(Table A. 1a). The devaluations of 1936 and 1937 were de facto and not
"legal, " for the "official parity" with other currencies was changed
(pegged to the franc and their dollar again) but the "legal" gold content
of the ruble was not changed.
Fluctuations of the franc (used for cross -exchange rates on
ruble) against the stable devalued dollar resulted in some fluctuation
in the actual gold content of the ruble during late 1936 and early 1937
(Notes to Table A. 1a).
TABLE A.la
USSR: FOREIGN TRADE RUBLES AND CONVERSION COEFFICIENTS
Gold C oeffic'ient to Convert to
De s ignation Content Dates Used
of ruble graITls per gold ruble 1936 FTR 1937 FTR 1950 FTR 1961 FTR
ruble
gold ruble · 77423 Dec. 1, 1922 - 4.3800 4.61 78 3.4851 . 78410
-April 1, 1936
1936 FTR .176765 April 1, 1936 - .22831 - 1 .0543 .7957 .23122
, July 1, 1937
1937 FTR · 167692 July 19, 1937 - .21659 .94849 - .75472 .21935
March 1, 1950
1950 FTR .222168 March 1, 1950 - .28695 1.2568 1.3250 - .2250
Jan. 1, 1961
,
(old)
1961 FTR .0987412 Jan. 1, 1961 .l. 2753 5.58617 5.8882 4.4444(new) -
· 987412
Notes to Table A. 1a follow on pp. 705-707.
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Notes to Table A.1a
Comments on use of table
1) The conve rsion coefficients are us ed to convert Soviet trade data
reported in a ruble based on a specific gold content into ruble s of dif-
ferent specific gold content. F or example, to convert data recorded in
1936 FTR into gold rubles:
Trade data in
1936 FTR x
conversion coefficient
of 1936 FTR into gold
rubles (.22831)
=
trade data in
"gold ruble s"
2) The term "1936 foreign trade ruble," etc., refers to the gold con-
tent of the ruble used to evaluate foreign trade in the particular set of
trade statistics rather than a price level or a set of constant prices.
The year refers to the year in which the gold content of the ruble was
fixed.
3) Until April 1936, the terms "ruble," "gold ruble" and "chervonetz
ruble" were used interchangeably in discussing Soviet foreign trade and
referred to a ruble with a "gold content" of 0.77423 grams per ruble,
i. e., to a "ruble" with the identical gold content of the pre -1914 ruble
of Tsarist Russia.
Sources
Gold Ruble. Pre -1914 gold ruble contained 17. 424 dolias (0. 77423
grams) per ruble (Arnold-36, p. 14 n. 12). The Council of People's
Commissars decreed on October 11, 1922 that Gosbank had the right
to issue banknotes in the denominations of 1,2,3,5,10,25 and 50
chervontsy, where one chervonetz was "equal to ten rubles of the former
Russian coinage," that is, to 7.7423 grams of gold (Arnold-36, p. 148).
The chervonets was not convertible legally to gold at the time of is sue,
but it was stipulated that the government could make the chervonets
convertible to gold at some later date (Arnold-36, p. 148). When re-
ferring to "ruble transactions" carried out in chervontsy during 1922-
24, these rubles were referred to as "chervontsy-rubles" (Arnold-36,
p. 176), and one chervontsy-ruble legally contained 0.77423 grams of
gold (even though it was not convertible). For the "free Moscow mar-
ket" exchange rate for the new (ten ruble) chervonets in terms of old
Tsarist gold ruble coin during 1923-1924, see Arnold-36, pp. 162-163
and Aizenberg-62, p. 235. Finally, in the spring of 1924 "State
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treasury notes" were issued in denominations of one, three, and five
"gold" rubles, and silver coins were minted in various denominations
which were exchanged at par with the chervonets, so the gold parity of
the "ruble" became that of the "chervontsy ruble," i. e., 0.77423
grams of gold (Arnold-36, pp. 200-215). Up until April 1, 1924, the
chervonets rate for the dollar, as quoted by the "Securities Department
of the Moscow Produce Exchange, It fluctuated above the parity ex-
change rate of one dollar = 1.934 rubles (Arnold-36, p. 232); see Table
VII.2 of this study and Aizenberg-62, p. 235). But after April 1, 1924,
the official exchange quotations (Moscow Commodity Exchange) of the
chervonets -dollar rate were close to parity and the chervonets rate for
other currency was calculated usually at a cross -exchange rate of the
currency in question to the dollar. For a brief period, the exchange
rate of the chervonets for both gold and for the dollar were quoted at
near parity on the "free Moscow market" (black bourse) largely be-
cause of intervention by the State Bank (Table VllI.2, Arnold-36, p.
232 and STAT-25, p. 683).
When the dollar left the gold standard in early 1933, the exchange
rate of the ruble to other currencies was set on the basis of a cros s-
exchange rate of the currency in question to the French franc, with one
ruble = 13.1 francs (Aizenberg-62, p. 237) so that the legal gold con-
tent of the ruble (and hence the parity exchange rates) were maintained
on the basis of one ruble = 0.77423 grams of gold.
1936 FTR
In November 1935, the selling rate of the ruble for non-trade
transactions (i. e., for tourists) was set at one ruble = 3 francs, and by
a decree of February 1936, all foreign exchange transactions after
April 1, 1936, were made at this rate, so that the de facto gold content
of the ruble based on its official exchange rate with the franc became
0.176765 grams per ruble (League-37a, p. 90, Aizenberg-62, pp. 113-
116, and Arnold-36, p. 448). Aizenberg-62 (p. 227) noted that the
legal gold content of the ruble was not changed in 1936 or 1937. Thus,
the exchange rate becarDe one dollar = 5.08 rubles or one ruble =
$0.197 (Arnold-36, p. 448). The ruble exchange rates were based on
the franc until it devalued on October 29, 1936. Then the State Bank
changed the exchange rate to one ruble = 4. 25 francs, thereby main-
taining roughly the new "de facto gold parity" of O. 176765 grams per
ruble, although in fact, the fluctuations in the rate of the franc on the
now stable dollar made the actual gold content of the ruble fluctuate
from 0.1645 grams per ruble to 0.1875 grams per ruble (based on
Arnold-36, p. 448, and Aizenberg-62, p. 114).
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1937 FTR
No exchange rate quotations were available from July 1 to July
19, 1937. On July 19, 1937, the ruble exchange rate was based on the
dollar (at $35 per troy ounce) at the rate of one dollar = 5 rubles, 30
kopecks (one ruble = $ o. 1887). Thus, the de facto gold content of the
ruble declined further to 0.167692 grams per ruble (Aizenberg-62,
p. 114).
1950 FTR
(Aizenberg-62, p. 127). This was an "official devaluation of the
ruble" to a new official gold content of 0.222168 grams per ruble,
which was 32.5% above the de facto gold content of the 1937 ruble.
1961 FTR
VTSSSR-65, pp. 5-6. See also Aizenberg-62, p. 144. From
April 1957 to the end of 1960, tourists could buy ten rubles per dollar
-- again a partial devaluation (Aizenberg-62, p. 131). In the 1961 de-
valuation, the ruble was redefined as one ruble equalled 0.987412
grams gold (one dollar = 90 kopecks), but internally old rubles were
exchanged at the rate of 10 old rubles for one new ruble, and all price s
were reduced by a factor of ten (Aizenberg-62, pp. 138-139).
Conversion coefficient
Based on relative gold contents.
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basis of the conversion coefficients cited in Table A. 1a. The terms
1936 FTR, 1937 FTR, 1950 FTR, and 1961 FTR refer to rubles with
the gold content prevailing in 1936, 1937, etc. The conversion coef-
ficients, for example, of 1936 FTR into gold rubles, is merely the
ratio of the gold contents, that is, of the gold content of the 1936 F TR
to the gold content of the gold ruble; data in 1936 FTR are converted to
gold rubles by multiplying the ruble valuation in 1936 FTR by the re-
sultant conversion coefficients (Note to Table A. 1a). Similar conver-
sion coefficients were used by the compilers of the major statistical
source for this study (VTSSSR-60).
Major source of Soviet foreign trade statistics for this study.
Unless otherwise noted, the statistics for Soviet foreign trade between
1918 and 1940 are from VTSSSR-60. Since the ruble values for the en-
tire period 1918-40 (during which the gold content changed several
times) have been converted to 1950 FTR in this volume (i. e., gold con-
tent of ruble in 1950), all the ruble values have been "reconverted" to
gold rubles by the coefficient 0.28695 (see Table A. 1a).
VTSSSR-60 has at least three idiosyncrasies. First, it did not
contain country summaries of Soviet trade with Latvia, Estonia or
Lithuania. This caused no problems for this study because the ag-
gregate data for all trade and by"products did include trade with these
Baltic states.
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Second, VTSSSR-60 was inconsistent in its inclusion or
exclusion of trade in precious metals and especially platinum. Thus
the aggregate data used from VTSSSR-60 has been adjusted to exclude
trade in all precious metals in unworked or industrial form by sub-
tracting SOVTC 28 "Precious Metals" from the totals as explained in
Appendix A, Technical Note 2. (The term "SOVTC" is explained be-
low.) Platinum and precious metal trade are discussed in Appendix D.
Third, Soviet foreign trade by product was clas sified by the "uni-
fied trade classification system" in effect in 1960, rather than the sys-
tems used in the 1920's and 1930's. This classification system is de-
scribed brieflyiu:Appendix A, Technical Note 5. Data from VTSSSR-
60 on specific commodity groups, products, etc., are referred to by
the term "SOVTC" (for Soviet trade classification) and the identifying
commodity group number, product number, etc.
Other sources used in this study. Because sources and class-
ification systems differed from period to period, other statistical
sources were also used in this study. The more important of these in-
clude Vissarionov-28, Kutusov-28, VTSSSR-33, and VTSSSR-39. Other
sources occasionally used included the SUYB series and Stat-36. The
differences between these sources are discussed in Appendix A, Tech
nical Note 3. The trade classification system used for Vissarionov-28
and Kutusov-28 is described in Appendix A, Technical Note 4.
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All these sources except VTSSSR-39 recorded the value of trade
in current prices in gold rubles. VTSSSR-39 recorded trade in 1936
FTR and did E2..!. adjust for further devaluation in 1937 (Appendix A,
Technical Note 3). VTSSSR-33 included all but the last few days for
the year 1932 so that the data for this year differed from other sources
(VTSSSR-33, p. v.). In these sources, the treatment of platinum and
silver trade was also inconsistent, and data used from these sources
have been adjusted to exclude trade in silver and platinum.
Quarterly and monthly Soviet foreign trade statistics. There
are no longtime series of monthly or quarterly data published, al-
though the monthly and quarterly data for several months or quarters
were published in ST, VT, or SUA from these and other sources. I
have compiled quarterly and monthly data for the period from the early
1920's to the mid-1930's. Quarterly and monthly data for Soviet ex-
ports and imports and their sources or methods of estimation are in
Table A. Ib (quarterly data) and A. lc (monthly data), and the accom-
panying table note s.
TECHNICAL NOTE 2: RELIABILITY AND RELATED
PROBLEMS IN USING SOVIE T FOREIGN TRADE STATISTICS
In Technical Note 2 we describe the basic statistical procedures
used to compile Soviet foreign trade statistics during the inter -war
period, and discuss special problems in using these statistics including
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TABLE A.1b
USSR: EXPORTS, IMPOR TS, AND BALANCE OF TRADE ACROSS
ALL BORDERS: QUARTERLY DATA 1924 - 1938
(current prices, millions of rubles)
Expo~t Import
Trade
Export Import
Trade
Balance Balance
1924 I 130. 5 . . 1931 I 196.0 251. 0 - 55. 0
II 105.1 . . II 179.0 266.0 -87.0
III 130.5 . . III 227.0 287. 0 -60.0
IV 131.0 115. 0 +16.0 IV 209.0 301.0 -92.0
1925 I 126.0 154.0 -28.0 1932 I 144. 5 192. 1 -47.6
II 138.0 244.0 -106.0 II 130. 5 213. 1 -82.6
III 181. 0 207. 0 - 26. 0 III 135. 7 147.6 -11.9
IV [182. 0] 219.0 -37.0 IV 153.0 145. 8 + 7.2
1926 I 153.0 194.0 -41. 0 1933 I 112. 1 88.4 +23.7
II 158.0 172.0 -14.0 II 112.5 102. 5 +10.0
III 175.0 171.0 + 4.0 III 142.8 83.0 +59.8
IV 229. 1 151.2 +78.9 IV 128.3 74.3 +54.0
1927 I 185. 1 136.9 +48.2 1934 I 84.6 49.5 +35. 1
II 162.7 218.3 - 55. 6 II 96.9 61. 1 +35.8
III 190.9 205.9 - 14. 7 III 120.6 60.5 +60. 1
IV 194.7 195.4 - O. 7 IV 117.8 61. 3 +56.5
1928 I [172.4] [225.0] [-52.6] 1935 I 68. 1 49.0 +19.1
II [188.6] [224. 6] [-56.0] II 81. 9 62.9 +19.0
III 218.2 273.8 - 55. 6 III 108. 7 42.3 +66.4
IV 216.5 203.3 +13.3 IV 108. 7 67.2 +41. 5
1929 I 197.8 175. 9 +21. 9 1936 I 51. 1 61. 6 -10.5
II 207.8 215. 7 - 7. 9 II 78.2 89.4 -11.2
III 255.5 241.4 + 14. 1 III 100.2 79.4 +20.8
IV 262.6 247.6 +15. 0 IV 81. 3 78.4 + 2.9
1930 I 236.8 273.7 - 36. 9 1937 I 58. 5 76. 3 -17.8
II 227.6 282.0 -54.4 II 86. 5 77. 5 + 9.0
III 275.4 265.5 + 9.9 III 133.3 77.4 +55.9
IV 296.7 237.7 +59.0 IV 98.0 60.3 +37.7
TABLE A. lc
USSR: EXPORTS, IMPORTS AND BALANCE OF TRADE,
MONTHL Y DATA
(millions rubles, current prices)
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European Borders Total Traop-
Trade Trade
Export Import Balancp Export Import Balance
1924
Jan.
Feb.
Mar.
Apr.
May
June
July
Aug.
Sept.
Oct. 42.0 36. 8 + 5.2
Nov. 32.8 27.9 + 4.9
Dec. 44.6 36.4 + 8.2
1925
Jan. 41. 0 31. 8 + 9.2
Feb. 37. 8 45. 3 - 7.5
Mar. 32.9 54.9 -22. 1
Apr. 29.7 62.8 -33. 1
May 38.6 87. 8 -49.2
June 50.8 60.9 -10. I
July 36. 1 66. 7 -30. 5
Aug. 51.7 45. 7 + 6.0
Sept. 70. 1 76.3 - 6.2
Oct. 76. 5 82. 5 - 6.0
Nov. 53.9 66.6 -11.2
Dec. 42.4 56.0 -13.6
1926
Jan. 34.8 61. 2 -26.4
Feb. 43.2 53. 6 -10.4
Mar. 57.4 57.0 + 0.4
Apr. 48.7 62.9 -14.2
TABLE A. Ie (continued)
713
Euro)ean Borders Total Trade
Export Import Trade Export Import TradeBalance Balance
1926
May 38.3 41. 5 - 3.2
June 51. 8 40.7 + 1.1
July 45.9 49.6 - 3. 7
Aug. 49.3 52. 1 - 2.9
Sept. 54. 7 50. 8 + 3.9
Oct. 65. 5 58. 1 + 7.4 72.4 64.9 + 7.5
Nov. 66. 2 39. 0 +27.2 73.2 47.2 +25.9
Dec. 76.6 34.8 +41.8 83. 5 39.0 +44.5
1927
Jan. 55. 1 38. 5 +16.6 63.3 46. 5 +16. 7
Feb. 49. 1 37.3 +11.8 56. 1 43.7 +12.3
Mar. 57. 5 40.6 +16. 9 66.2 47.0 +19. 2
Apr. 51. 4 49. 1 + 2.4 57. 6 56. 8 + 0.8
May 50. 1 73.0 -22.9 56.8 78. 5 -21.7
June 42.8 73. 6 -30.8 48. 8 81. 6 ~32.8
July 55. 6 52.8 + 2.8 64.2 61. 2 + 3.0
Aug. 49.4 63.9 - 14. 5 58.4 72.8 - -14.4
Sept. 58. 1 62. 6 - 4. 5 40. 1 73.3 - 3. 2
Oct. 65. 1 57. 1 + 7. 9 73.9 69. 2 + 4. 7
Nov. 50. 5 45.6 + 4.9 59.3 56.9 + 2.4
Dec. 49.4 57.5 - 8. 1 61. 6 69.6 - 8. 0
1928
Jan. 43.9 58. 2 -14.3 54.8 68.0 -13.2
Feb. 41. 9 62.9 -21.0 53. 8 74.5 - 20. 7
Mar. 50.2 71. 6 -21.4 64. 7 81. 0 -17.0
Apr. 45.4 59. 5 - 14. 1 57. 2 75. 3 - 18. 1
May 50.3 84.4 - 34. 1 58. 8 94.6 - 35. 8
June 59.9 72.6 - 12. 6 71. 5 81. 5 -10.0
July 62.3 87. 7 -25.4 76. 7 96. 6 - 19. 9
Aug. 62. 1 95.4 -33.3 77. 1 105. 8 - 28. 7
Sept. 54.8 60. 5 - 5. 7 68.4 71. 8 - 3.4
Oct. 67. 1 57. 3 + 9.8 78.8 70.0 + 8.8
Nov. 46. 7 61. 6 -14.9 60.3 73. 5 - 13. 2
Dec. 65.6 47.9 -17.6 77.4 59. 8 +17.6
TABLE A. Ie (continued)
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European Borders Total Trade
Export Import Balance Export Import Balance
1929
Jan. 52.3 52.0 + 0.3 66.0 62.8 + 3. 1
Feb. 48.6 37. 8 +10.7 60.0 47.8 +12.2
Mar. 60. 5 54.4 + 6. 1 71.4 65.6 + 5.8
Apr. 57.8 59.8 - 2.0 69. 5 70.6 - 1.2
May 50.3 61.0 -10.6 60.4 73.0 -12. 6
June 67. 8 63. 6 + 4.0 78. 2 71. 6 + 6.6
July 69.8 63.0 + 6.8 79.8 72.4 + 7.4
Aug. 67.7 68.4 - 0.7 83.3 80.0 + 3.3
Sept. 67. 5 72.2 - 4.7 92.6 89. 1 + 3.4
Oct. 75. 6 69.4 + 6.2 95.3 84. 5 +10.8
Nov. 69.4 64.2 + 5.2 79.2 77.4 + 1.8
Dec. 78. 5 70.6 + 7.9 90.2 83.9 + 6.3
Total Trade Total Trade
Export Import Balance Exnort Imnort Balance
1930 1931
Jan. 80.3 81. 3 - 1.0 June 56. 8 75. 6 -18.8
Feb. 74.0 88. 5 -14. 5 July . . .
Mar. 82.4 106. 1 -23. 6 Aug. 70.9 111.3 -40.4
Apr. 68.2 112.0 -43.8 Sept. . . .
May 75.9 87.9 -12.0 Oct. 80.2 116.3 -36.1
June 83.3 82.0 + 1.3 Nov. 63. 1 99.2 -36.1
July . . . Dec. 65. 7 85. 5 -19. 8
Aug. 84.7 90. 2 - 5.5
Sept .
1932. . .
Jan. 58. 9 80. 1 -21.2Oct. 125. 5 93.0 +32. 5
Nov. 92.6 79. 7 +12.6 Feb. 40. 1 52. 5 -12.4
Dec. 78.6 65.0 +13.6 Mar. 45.5 59.4 -13.9
Apr. 43.9 65. 7 -21.8
1931 May 47. 3 78.0 -30. 7
Jan. 60. 1 61. 5 - 1.4 June [39.3] [69.4] -30.6
Feb. 68. 1 62.9 + 5.2 July 36.0 47.4 -11.4
Mar. 67. 7 126.7 -59. 1 Aug. 47.9 53.9 - 6.0
Apr. 55.2 89. 1 -33.9 Sept. 51.8 46.3 + 5.5
May 58.2 101.2 -43. 1 Oct. 50. 5 44.2 + 6.3
TABLE A. 1c (continued)
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Total Trade Total Trade
Exnort Imnort Balance Exnort Imnort Balal1C'f>
1932 1935
Nov. 49. 7 50. 7 - 1.0 July 36.9 19. 7 +17.2
Dec. 52.8 50.9 + 1.9 Aug. 33.3 23. 7 + 9.6
1933 Sept. 38. 5 19.0 + 19. 5
Jan. 45.9 41. 6 + 4. 3 Oct. 41. 2 23.4 +17.8
Feb. 35. 1 24.3 +10.8 Nov. 31. 1 18.4 +12. 7
Mar. 31. 1 22. 5 + 8. 6 Dec. [36.3] [25.4] +10.9
Apr. 43.9 39.2 + 4. 7 1936
May 32.0 41. 5 - 9. 5 Jan. 14.3 17. 7 - 3.4
June 36. 5 21. 8 +14. 7 Feb. 16.4 17. 5 - 1. 1
July 38.0 30. 3 + 7.6 Mar. 20.4 26.4 - 6.0
Aug. 53.0 25. 5 +27.5 Apr. 18. 7 37.0 -18. 3
Sept. 51. 9 27. 2 +24.7 May 26. 9 27. 7 - O. 8
Oct. 53.9 22.4 +31. 5 June 32.6 24. 7 + 8.0
Nov. 39.4 20. 7 +18.8 July 36. 5 22.8 +13.6
Dec. [34.8] [31.2] + 3.6 Aug. 32. 1 31. 4 + O. 7
1934 Sept. 31. 6 25.2 + 6.4
Jan. 33. 6 16. 9 +16.7 Oct. 28.3 27. 7 + 0.6
Feb. 21. 3 14. 6 + 6. 7 Nov. 25. 1 19. 8 + 5.3
Mar. 29. 7 18.0 +11.6 Dec. 27.9 30.9 - 3.0
Apr. 27.7 17. 9 + 4.7 1937
May 31. 7 23. 1 + 8.6 Jan. 18.4 24.2 - 5.8
June 37.4 20. 1 +17.3 Feb. 14.9 20.0 - 5.2
July 40.9 18.4 +22.6 Mar. 25. 2 32. 1 - 6.9
Aug. 44.3 21. 9 +22.4 April 18.3 27. 8 - 9. 5
Sept. 35.4 20. 2 + 15. 2 May 27.8 29.0 - 1.2
Oct. 41. 8 18.7 +23. 1 June 40.4 20.7 +19.7
Nov. 34. 7 16. 9 +17.8 July 44. 1 28.0 +16. 1
Dec. 41. 3 25. 7 +14.6 Aug. 43. 1 26. 5 +16. 6
1935 Sept. 46. 1 22.9 +23.2
Jan. 23.4 14. 7 + 8. 7 Oct. }98.0) }60.3) } 37. 7)Nov.Feb. 20. 1 13. 6 + 6. 5 Dec.Mar. 24.6 20. 6 + 4.0
Apr. 20.3 20. 1 + 0.2
May 28. 8 17. 8 + 11. 1
June 32. 9 25. 0 + 7.9
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Notes to Table A. 1b
Quarter data for Soviet foreign trade across all borders was pieced to-
gether from many sources. The basic sources were SUA (various is-
sues), ERSU (various issues), and ST (various issues-y:-Frequently,
quarterly data were the sum of the monthly data as presented in
Table A. 1c. Estimates or residuals (annual data minus data for three
quarters) are bracketed. Other sources included Kon-26 (p. 125),
Badmas -32 (p. 59), VTSSSR-60. Silver exports were included in data
for 1933.
Notes to Table A. 1c
European borders only: monthly data - 1924-1926
Data from October 1924 to September 1926 were available only for
Soviet trade across European borders. These data are from EIKSSSR,
p. 47 and Sobolev-26b, p. 33. Estimates of some months were cal-
culated as a residual by subtracting data for two months from quarterly
data.
Post-1926
Data from October: 1926 to December 1929 from ERSU (various issues)
and League-32b. Data for post-1929 from SUA (various issues). Some
estimates for total trade were calculated as the sum of trade across
European and Asian borders. Estimates of some data were calculated
as a residual by subtracting data for two months from quarterly data.
Data for some months were not available. Separate data for Soviet
trade across European borders alone were not available after 1929.
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(1) the special characteristics of Soviet foreign trade statistics from
1918 to 1924, (2) the treatment of Soviet trade in precious metals, and
(3) the problems of interpreting the Soviet valuation of current exports
(due to warehousing abroad).
Basic procedures used in recording
Soviet foreign trade statist ic s
5
Value. The value of goods was entered in the following way: im-
ports by the value C.I.F. or franco border USSR and exports by F.O.B.
or franco border USSR. The value of goods are entered in current
prices and are expressed in rubles at the current exchange rate. Only
for the period 1918- 1923/24 are the value s not in current price s but in
the average prices of 1913 and are of a "conditional character" not re-
flecting the actual value of trade.
Commodities included in accounts. Imports included all com-
modities released from Customs for domestic use (VTSSSR-60). Thus,
we are not certain if goods imported and then re-exported on a com-
mercial basis are included or excluded from Soviet foreign trade sta-
tistics. Examination of Soviet foreign trade statistics suggests that
goods imported for commercial re-export (especially from the Eastern
border) were in fact included, so that Soviet imports are not strictly
5 Based on VTSSSR-60, pp. 7-10, VTSSSR-33, pp. v-viii, and
Vissarionov-28.
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II special trade" which would exclude imports for re-export. The quan-
tities involved, however, appear to be negligible. Recorded imports
specifically excluded imports not having commercial significance such
as goods of foreign representatives, passenger baggage, parcels for
consumption, returned exports, and other non-commercial freight.
Recorded exports included the exports of domestic origin or the
commercial re-export of goods of foreign origin (VTSSSR-60, pp. 8-9).
Export statistics did not include passenger baggage, parcel post, re-
turned imports, etc. Precious metals (especially platinum) were in
theory not included, but see below. Transit trade was not included in
imports and exports.
Moment of recording of exports and imports. Exports were re-
corded according to the moment the exported commodity crossed the
border or the ship departed from port. This procedure greatly com-
plicates the estimating of current export receipts, because some Soviet
goods were exported to warehouses abroad to be sold at a later date.
This problem is discus sed below.
Imports were recorded according to the moment of release from
Customs to the addressee from 1923 through 1932, and after 1932, ac-
cording to the moment of the crossing of the Soviet border.
Borders. Beginning with 1923/24, figures include trade across
all Soviet borders. The period 1918-1922/23 is discussed below.
719
Weight, designation of country of export and import. See intro-
duction to VTSSSR-60 for discussion of these subjects. Before 1930,
the weight was recorded as net or gross weight, depending on the way
the tariff was assessed (for goods subject to duty), or according to the
way it was shipped. After 1930, all goods were entered as net weight.
Special peculiarities of Soviet foreign trade statistics 1918 -1924.
Soviet foreign trade statistics for the period 1918-1924 are recorded
in gold rubles at 1913 prices. The borders over which trade was re-
corded vary during this period.
For the period 1918-19, figures are given for the trade of
the Soviet Republic including all European territory on
which there existed an established Soviet power. For
1920 -23 information is provided on foreign trade of the
Soviet Republic across the European frontier including
Novrossiisk, Astrakhan, and Makhach-Kala but not in-
cluding the coast of the Black Sea in the Caucasus (Batum,
Pot, etc.).6
There were also slight differences in the moment of registering imports
during this period.
Estimates of 1922/23 and 1923/24 trade in current prices.
Several estimates of Soviet foreign trade in current prices have been
made for the years 1922/23 and 1923/24 (in millions of rubles):
6 VTSSSR-60, p. 8.
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1913 Prices Current Prices Source
Export Import Export Import
1922/23 133. 19 148.54 210.60 187. 5 Kauf rnan - 29d, p. 7
210.61 187.4 Krasin-28, p. 143
1923/24 371.27 233.51 522.6 439.4 Kaufman-29d, p. 7
Precious metals in Soviet foreign trade statistics
Platinum. The Soviet government considered platinum and silver
to be a monetary reserve metal to be used as part of the monetary base
for domestic currency issue and to be used in international payments;
after 1929 data for platinum production and exports apparently became
a state secret and no official data have been found. Estimates of plati-
num export and production after 1928/29 have been based on indirect
information (recipient countries' trade statistics). Similarly for silver.
The treatment of platinum exports in the official Soviet trade sta-
tistics was __inconsistent so that these data must be adjusted in order to
compare trade data over time for the same source and among sources.
In the major statistical source for this study, VTSSSR-60, platinum and
silver exports and imports were handled in an inconsistent manner;
platinum exports were included for 1922/23-1927/28 and omitted for the
years 1918-1921/22 and October-December 1928 to 1940. Trade in
precious metals, if reported at all in VTSSSR-60, was reported under
the classification SOVTC 28 {Precious metals and articles from precious
TABLE A. 2a
USSR: EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF PRECIOUS METALS
REPORTED IN VTSSSR-60 FOR THE COMMODITY
GROUP SOVTC 28 "PRECIOUS METALS"
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Exports Imports
metric tons 1000IS rubles metric tons 10001s rub.1es
1913 6 14,117
1918 a
1919
1920
1921
1921/22
1922/23 3 676 2.0 91.a
1923/24 1 1,896 0.3 53.9
1924/25 3 19,all 0.1 32.1
1925/26 4 26,640 0.1 54.5
1926/27 5 26,570 0.3 74.9
1927/28 2 9,821 0.1 58.3
1928b 0.0 3.4
1929 0.1 28.1
1930 0.1 34.1
1931 0.0 .1.1
1932
1933 1,536 26,022 0.0 8.0
1934
1935 a 0.3
.1936 0.0 0.0
.1937 a 1.4
1938
Source: VTSSSR-60, Values in .1950FTR converted to gold rubles.
aA blank entry indicatesthatno trade was recorded for thatyear.
bOctober - December .1928.
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metals for production purposes). 7 Thus, SOVTC 28 (Precious Metals)
as presented in Table A. 2a was subtracted from the total value of ex-
ports and of imports reported in VTSSSR-60 in order to derive the
time serie s for Soviet trade which specifically excluded precious
metals (Table A. 3a, cols. 3 -4). Although it is possible that the value
of total exports included platinum for the years other than 1922/23-
1927/28, but did not specifically separate it out in the commodity
classification, indirect evidence suggests that platinum exports were
not included in any official custom statistic s published during the inter-
war years. ARCC-36 (p. 344) stated that platinum exports are not in-
cluded in the custom statistics; the value of total ~xports in Mishustin-
38b (p. 11) is identical to the VTSSSR-60 series adjusted to exclude
8
SOVTC 28 (Precious Metals) for all the years except 1933 and 1937.
Platinum exports are specifically excluded from exports in VTSSSR-33
(p. vi). Platinum exports ar e discus sed in Appendix D.
Silver. The USSR imported large amounts of silver in the mid-
1920's and exported large quantities of silver in the mid-1930's (Table
D. 3); most of the se trans actions are incompletely reported in official
Soviet foreign trade statistics. The isolated instance of reporting
7 See Appendix A, Technical Note 5 for description of SOVTC
system.
8 For 1933, see "Silver" below; for 1937, see Notes to Table
A.3a.
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large silver exports in 1933 made the data on the value of exports and
imports inconsistent. I concluded that silver was included in SOVTC 28
(Preciou's Metals) in 1933 for several reasons (Table A. 2a). First,
STAT-36 (p. 679), whose export data agree with VTSSSR-60, specific-
ally stated that exports of silver and precious metals waste were not
included in 1934 and 1935, implying that they were included in 1933.
Second, the quantity and value recorded in SOVTC 28 for 1933 far ex-
ceeded known platinum exports for 1933 (Tables D. 4 and D. 5). Third,
the unit value of SOVTC 28 (Precious Metals) in 1933 approximates the
average annual silver prices in London. Fourth, the importing coun-
tries I statistics (Table D. 3) recorded almost the identical value of
silver imports from the USSR (26,500,000 rubles) as stated under
SOVTC 28 (Precious Metals) in 1933 in VTSSSR-60 (26,020,000 rubles).
Thus I concluded that the precious metal exports reported for 1933 in
VTSSSR-60 included just silver. The other large Soviet silver exports
in 1932, 1934-36 were not reported in Soviet foreign trade statistics
(Table D. 3).
The large quantities of silver imported in 1923-25 and 1928-30
for monetary purposes (coinage) were not reported in VTSSSR-60 under
SOVTC 28 (Precious Metals), which is where they would be reported
under normal circums tances (other than in a special bullion account).
The value of imports reported in this category during this period is
negligible both with re spect to the total imports and known imports of
724
These negligible amounts possi bly refer to imports of precious metals
for production; nevertheless, SOVTC 28 was also subtracted from the
total value of imports reported in VTSSSR-60. League -28a (p. 699)
and League -31a (p. 258) specifically noted that specie and bullion
movements were not published, although nothing is noted in the foreword
to the important sources of Soviet foreign trade statistics (VTSSSR -60,
VTSSSR-39, and VTSSSR-33). In VTSSSR-33 (p. vi) it was noted that
data on platinum exports and gold and coin were specifically excluded
from the reported statistics, but no mention was made of silver.
Gold. Gold exports and imports were not reported in Soviet for-
eign trade statistics.
Problem s in valuation of exports and imports
Exports.
9
The basic problem in accurately estimating the value
of exports that cros sed the border at a specific time is that a subs tan-
tial share of Soviet exports (especially oil, timber, furs, flax) were
shipped from the USSR on consignment. These exports were frequently
shipped to a warehouse abroad (often to serve as security for credits
from foreign banks) from which they were sold at some later date or
these exports were sold "from the ship" after leaving port. Thus, the
valuation of these exports on custom documents was not based on the
9 See Birmingham-32a, p. 18 ff and Shanin-,26a, p. 39, for dis-
cussion of inventories of Soviet exports warehoused abroad and balance
of payments estimates.
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value of a sales contract, but rather on the estimated sales value made
by the exporting agency. VTSSSR-33 described the method of valuation
for goods exported on consignment as being recorded at the time of
shipment and valued" .•• at the average sales price of the previous
month, minus all expense s incurred abroad in the sale as recorded by
the exporting organization ..• in the latter case export on consign-
ment the value of goods necessarily bears an approximate character.l;to
The above procedure distorts exports statistics (and balance of
trade and payments statistics) in two important ways -- the time dis-
tribution of export receipts in any given year and the actual amount of
receipts eventually received in foreign exchange.
Accumulation of stock in the warehouse during any period me ans
that current receipts from exports were being overestimated so that
the recorded "balance of trade" -- and the pressure on the balance of
payments - - was underestimated. Stocks of warehoused goods abroad
increased during the 1920's and early 1930's. Indirect evidence is that
the value of bank credits secured by Soviet export goods warehoused
abroad rose continually during 1924-1931 (Table T-15). Part of the
rise might have resulted from a larger share of the warehoused goods
being used as security; this must be counterbalanced by the decline in
prices for major warehoused goods -- especially in the late 1920's and
early 1930's.
10 VTSSSR-33, p. viii.
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Estimates of goods warehoused abroad during the mid-1920's are
the following (prices unknown):
Date
October 1, 1923
October?, 1924
October 1, 1924
July 1, 1925
October 1, 1925
October 1, 1925
July 1, 1926
Value
(millions of ruble s)
38
45.9
58.7
32
72.3
80
98
Source
Krasin-28, p. 179
Krasin-28, p. 179
Engeev-27a, p. 67
Krasin-28, p. 179
Engeev-27a, p. 67
Ekon. Zhisn, 9/1/26
Ekon. Zhisn, 9/ 1/26
Thus, the balance of trade in terms of export receipts was overstated
during the 1920's; the effect of accumulation of warehoused goods
abroad on the total quantity of foreign exchange available for foreign
payments was partly offset by increased bank credits secured by these
warehoused goods.
The process of warehousing of Soviet goods abroad probably re-
suIted in a permanent overstatement of export receipts received from
exports during the inter-war period in Soviet foreign trade statistics
(even if all the warehoused stocks were sold). The major source of
permanent overstatement was that stocks of goods warehoused abroad
were generally sold in a declining market and almost completely liqui-
dated in the depth of the Depression, so that the average sale price of
a warehoused good was less than the Customs valuation at the time of
shipment. Second, the cost of warehousing and deterioration of goods
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in the warehouse reduced the net receipts from warehoused goods in
II
the long run.
TECHNICAL NOTE 3: DIFFERENCES IN RECORDED AGGREGATE
STATISTICS OF SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE
In Technical Note 3 we present the various time series for total
exports and total imports of the USSR published in the source s cited in
Technical Note 1, point out the differences between the various series,
and explain the reasons for these differences where possible. In Table
A. 3a data on total exports and imports are presented from VTSSSR-60,
STAT-34, SUYB-30, STAT-36, VTSSSR-39, Vissarionov-28, and
Kutusov-28.
The benchmark series of data against which all other data are
compared is the VTSSSR-60 data for total exports and imports, con-
verted to gold rubles by the conversion coefficient 0.28695. Three
series based on VTSSSR-60 data are presented in Table A. 3a. In col-
umns 1 and 2 the original data are pr esented without any adjustment for
partial inclusion of precious metals; in columns 3 and 4 the same data
II Birmingham-32a (p. 2) attributed the overvaluation to four
causes: deliberate overvaluation of exports by Moscow as a means of
exerting control over the trade agencies abroad, inadequate market in-
formation in Moscow, badly packed non-seasonal shipments, which re-
mained in storage too long, and the policy of underselling. Birming-
ham-32a (p. 18) estimated that for the period 1924-31 reported export
values "permanently overstated actual export receipts by 2 to 5 % of
total exports and 10-15% in the case of individual commodities.
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are presented excluding any recorded trade in precious metals (see
Table A. 2a); in column 5 we have added estimated value of platinum
exports to the export series in column 3 (which specifically excluded
recorded exports of precious metals). The platinum export series is
from Table D. 5. Silver imports and exports have not been included in
the VTSSSR-60 based data in column 5. Most differences between pub-
lished Soviet trade data occurred for exports during 1913, NEP and
1933 and were due to the erratic treatment of platinum and silver ex-
ports in the original serie s.
The STAT-34 and STAT-36 series presented in columns 6 and 7
are virtually identical to the original VTSSSR-60 data presented in col-
umns 1 and 2 and hence suffer the same defect, namely the erratic
treatment of precious metal imports and exports.
The export series of SUYB-30 in column 8 differed several times
from both the VTSSSR-60 exports series including platinum and the
VTSSSR-60 export series excluding platinum (especially 1926/27 and
1927/28) and is inconsistent in its treatment of platinum exports. The
explanation for the low export figures in 1926/27 in both this SUYB-30
series and in the Kutusov-28 series (column 13) is not known.
The VTSSSR-39 series in columns 10-11 was virtually identical
to the VTSSSR-60 series excluding pre.cious metals except for 1933
when VTSSSR-39 included silver exports (compare columns 3 and 10).
The difference for 1937 is the result of a mistake by the compiler of
TABLE A. 3a
USSR: DATA FOR TOTAL EXPORTS AND TOTAL IMPORTS
REPORTED IN SELECTED SOURCES, 1913, 1920 - 1930
(millions of gold ruble s)
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VTSSSR- 60 DATA STAT-34
Original Without Precious nc. Plat. STAT-36
Series Metals metals
Export Import Export Import .Exports Export Import
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1913 1520 1375 1505. 9 1375. 0 1520 1520. 1 1375. 0
1920a, b 1.4 29 1.4 28.7
1921a, b 20 211 20.2 210. 7
1921/22a, b 63 271 63.45 27 1. 11 63.4 27 1. 1
1922/23a, b 134 149 133. 19 148. 54 133.9 148. 6
1923/24a
373 234 371.27 233.51 373.2 233.5
1924/25 578 723 558.78 723.41 577.8 577.8 723.4
1925/26 703 756 676.65 756.32 703.3 703. 3 756.3
1926/27 807 714 779. 41 713.52 806. 0 806.8 7 13.6
1927/28 792 946 781.79 945.52 791. 6 791. 6 945.5
1928/29 877.6 836.3
1929 924 881 923.75 880.65 937.7 923.7 880.6
1930 1036 1059 1036. 42 1058. 84 1042.4 1036. 4 1058.8
1931 811 1105 8 11. 25 1105.09 816. 7 811.2 1105.0
1932 575 704 574.97 704.07 580.9 574.9 704.0
1933 496 348 469.66 348.23 475.9 495.6 348.2
1934 418 232 418. 34 232.44 421. 2 a 418. 3 232.4
1935 367 241 367.43 241. 39 373.9 a 367.4 241. 4
1936 310 309 3 10. 32 308.82 315. 2
1937 376 291.5 376.34 291. 50 384.7
1938 293 312.8 293.09 3 12. 78 298.3
'(3,Q
TABLE A. 3a (continued)
SUYB-30 VTSSSR-39 Visario- Kutusov - 28
nov
Export Import Exports Imports Exports Export Import
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
1913 1520. 1 1374. 0 1506. 0 1375. 0 1520. 1
1920a,b 1.4 29.3 1.3 28.6
1921a, b 20.2 210. 0 9. 9 158. 1
1921/22a,b 63.4 271. 0 81.6 63.9 270.9
1922/23a,b 133. 1 148.6 212. 7 133.2 249.9
1923/24a 371.2 233.4 569.2 369.2 233.5
1924/25 575.3 719.9 558.7 723.4 575.3 558.6 723.5
1925/26 676.6 756.4 676.6 756.3 676.6 676.6 756.3
1926/27 770.5 7 13. 7 780.2 7 13. 6 770.5 7 12. 7
1927/28 777.8 945.5 781.7 945.5
1928/29 877.6 836.3
1929 923.7 880.5
1930 1036. 3 1058. 7
1931 811.2 1105. 0
1932 574.9 703.9
1933 494.8 348. 1
1934 418. 3 232.4
1935 367.4 241. 3
1936 310. 2 308.7
1937 394.6 306.2
1938
aValued in average 1913prices. c1922. d1923.
bSee Appendix A, Technical Note B for border coverage from 1920 to
1922/23.
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Notes to Table A. 3a
VTSSSR Data
Original series: VTSSSR-60, p. 13. Converted to gold rubles.
Excluding precious metals: Original series minus SOVTC 28. Con-
verted to gold ruble s.
Including platinum metals: Exports excluding precious metals plus
platinum exports from Table D. 5. Converted to gold rubles.
STAT-34, -36 Data
STAT-34, pp. 377-380 for all years except 1929, 1934, 1935.
STAT-36, p. 679 for 1929, 1934, 1935. Identical data for all other
years except 1933. STAT-36 gives 494.9 million rubles for 1933.
Note to table specifically noted that exports of silver and slag of
precious metals were not included in 1934 and 1935.
SUYB-30 Data. Data from SUYB-30, p. 286. Typographical error
corrected for 1928/29.
VTSSSR-39 Data
VTSSSR-39, p. 11. Converted from 1936 FTR by dividing by 4.38, the
coefficient cited in VTSSSR-39, p. 7. The original entry for 1937 was
obviously erroneous when compared to other available data; converting,
the original entry recorded, presumably in 1936 FTR into gold rubles
by the above coefficient, gives us 394. 5 million rubles for exports and
306.2 million rubles for imports. These figures are too high, if com-
pared with the VTSSSR-60 series. The compilers of VTSSSR-39 failed
to adjust the 1937 foreign trade returns for the further devaluation
which occurred in 1937. Converting VTSSSR-39' s figures for 1937 by
the conversion coefficient for 1937 FTR (4.6178) gives us the correct
figures, namely 374.5 million rubles for exports and 290.3 million
rubles for imports (conversion coefficient of 1937 FTR into gold rubles
from Table A. 1a). Failure to note the further devaluation of the ruble
in 1937 misleads the user as to the actual volume and behavior of trade
in 1937.
Vissarionov Data
Data from Vissarionov-28, pp. 494-495.
Kutusov-28 Data
Data from Kutusov-28, pp. 298-299.
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the VTSSSR-39 volume in estimating the ruble value in 1936 FTR
(Notes to Table A. 3a).
Import series differed very little.
TECHNICAL NOTE 4: CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM USED TO
RECORD AND PLAN SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE DURING THE
1920's AND EARLY 1930's
The classification system used in published Soviet foreign trade
statistics and foreign trade planning during the 1920's and early 1930's
differed considerably from the so-called "unified commodity classi-
fication systems" for Soviet foreign trade systems adopted on January 1,
1934, and in 1954 and 1963.
12
The basic source of Soviet foreign
trade statistics used in this study, VTSSSR-60, classified commodity
trade according to the classification system adopted in 1954; this latter
classification system is outlined in Appendix A, Technical Note 5. The
relationship between the various clas sifications used during the 1920' s
and the unified commodity classification adopted in 1954 is described
12 For discussion of shortcomings of the trade classification
system used until January 1, 1934, and for a brief description of major
classifications of the "unified commodity classifications for the accounts
of foreign trade of the USSR," see S. Bakulin, "0 novoi edinoi tovarnoi
nomenklature dlia ucheta vneshnei torgovli SSSR," V'I; Vol. IV, No. 8
(1934), pp. 13-14. A new system was adopted in 1954 (Edinaia
tovarnaia nomenklatura vneshnei tor ovli. Moscow: Vneshtorgizdat,
1954) and was modified slightly in 1962 Edinaia tovarnaia nomenklatura
vneshnei torgovli. Moscow: Vneshtorgizdat, 1962).
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in "Notes to Table T-2" and "Notes to T-5" (pp. 791 and
792 ).
The difficulties encountered in working with the trade clas sifica-
tion system used during the 1920's were the following. First, exports
were classified in a different manner than imports. Second, the class-
ification systems used by various governmental agencies and various
authors differed occasionally. Third, the classification of various
item s (oil cake, flour, etc.) varied over time; the tendency was to
shift items in the export clas sification from "agricultural exports" to
"industrial exports." The "Notes to Table A. 4a and A. 4b" describe in
detail the various differences in the clas sification system used during
the 1920's.
Classification of exports. In the 1920's, Soviet exports were
usually clas sified as either agricultural exports or industrial exports.
Agricultural exports were in turn classified into three groups: agri-
cultural crops, animal products and products of the fur and fishing in-
dustries. Occasionally, the fir st group - - agricultural crops - - would
be restricted to the major exports of field crops (denoted by an asterisk
in Table A. 4a) while the remaining agricultural crop products would be
classified as a separate fourth group, "other agricultural exports. "
The Soviet term "industrial exports" was not synonymous with the term
"manufactured product exports"; "industrial exports according to the
Soviet definition included raw materials produced in the rnineral and
735
timber "industries," as well as semi-processed and manufactured
products. The bulk of Soviet "industrial export" during the inter -war
period consisted of raw materials and semi-processed goods.
The major peculiarities of this export commodity classification
system were (1) the classification of fur and fish product exports as
"agricultural exports, (2) the classification of sugar, vegetable oil and
canned foods as industrial exports, and (3) the occasional classification
of oil cake, flour, and combed flax as industrial products. The differ-
ences between the American and the Soviet definition of "agricultural
exports" is discussed in "Notes to Table T-19" in Appendix C, pp.803.
Clas sification of Imports. In the 1920' s Soviet imports were
classified into three basic groups: producers' goods, consumers'
goods and other. "Producers' goods" were in turn classified into five
sub-groups: (1) machinery for industry and transportation, (2) raw
materials, (3) semi-processed products, (4) solid fuels, and (5) agri-
cultural producers' goods. Consume rs ' goods were classified as con-
sumers I goods for mass consumption (subdivided into foodstuffs and
manufactured consumer goods), articles for public health and articles
for cultural use. The category "other" was undefined and it was es-
sentially a re sidual of imports which could not be placed into one of the
above categories (such as luxury goods); the value of "other" imports
varied greatly from source to source.
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TABLE A. 4a
USSR: BASIC COMMODITY CLASSIFICATION FOR SOVIET
EXPORTS USED DURING THE 1920's AND EARLY 1930's
1. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCT EXPORTS
A. agricultural crops a
b
~:~grain products
~:~oil seed
e* oil cake
~:~flax in various forms
~:~hemp in various forms
* tobacco
wheat
rye
barley
oats
cflour
corn.
millet
buckwheat
legumes
brand
herbs
seeds (excluding oil seids)
fruits in various forms f
vegetables in various forms
honey
nuts
cotton
spices
tea
B. animal products
eggs
butterf
meats
poultry, dead or alive
livestock
silkworms and coccoons
milk products
(other than butter)
hides
bristles
horsehair
guts, hoofs, horns
feather s and down
animal fat
wool
C. products of fur and fishing industries
fur, raw and processfd
fish in various forms
D. other agricultural productsg
737
Table A. 4a (continued)
II. INDUSTRIAL PRODUCT EXPORTS
A. timber products
h
raw timber (round)
sawn timber
B. mineral industry products
plywood
staves and manufactured wood
products
petroleum, crude
petroleum products, refined
mangane se ore
zinc -lead ore
chr omi te or e
C f d .. d d,e,f• 00 -processlng ln ustry
sugar
canned goods of all type s
corn starch products
vegetable oil
tobacco products
flourf
D. textile industry
cotton fabric
linen fabric
industrial textiles
E. chemical industry
matches
fertilizer s
rubber goods
F. other industries
porcelain products
metal and metal products
machinery
electric lamps
asbestos
apatite ore
coal
other ore s, me tallic
other minerals, non-metallic
margarine
macaroni
corJ.fectione;ry
beverages d
(oil cake and bran) , e
yarn of various fiber s
cotton down .
1
combed flax
industrial chemicals h
products of wood distillation
coke by -products
handicraft products
rags
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Notes to Table A. 4a
Source: Export Commodity Classification
This table was drawn up on the basis of several publications including
Vissarionov-28, STAT-32 (pp. 388-393), VTSSSR-33, and Kutusov-28,
pp. 3 17-318.
The commodities classified as "agricultural exports" are based on
commodities listed under "agricultural exports" in b().thKutusov-28,
pp. 317-318 and STAT-32, pp. 388-393, and Vissarionov-28. The
subclas sification of agricultural products was done partly on the basis
of the order of listing in Vis sarionov-28, partly on the nature of the
product, and partly on the detailed listing of products in VTSSSR-33.
The significant difference between VTSSSR-33 and the other sources is
that VTSSSR-33 (and other publications of Soviet export statistics after
1933, such as STAT-34, STAT-35, and STAT-36) classified oil cake,
flour, and bran as "industrial exports" of the food industry; and the
difference in classification accounts for almost the entire difference
between the various estimates of "agricultural exports" and "industrial
exports" reported in various sources or by various government agencies.
VTSSSR-33 gave the most detailed list of items in each commodity
group. This table is not a complete listing but is intended to give the
reader a general idea of the classification system used during the
1920's.
Explanatory notes to Table A. 4a
Item a. "Agricultural crop" occasionally included the more important
exports of field crop products (identified by the asterisk), while the
remaining products were placed in a fourth category, "other agricul-
tural exports." The treatment of hemp and related products and to-
bacco was inconsistent in this respect and was on occasion considered
a "major agricultural crop export. "
Item b. "Grain products" as defined in Appendix A, Technical Notes 6,
but see below for the inconsistent treatment of flour and bran.
Item c. "Flour" was usually clas sified as a "grain product" export
during the 1920's, and as product of I'food industry'l after 1933 and for
some planning purposes for foreign trade plans during the First FYP.
Item d. "Bran" was usually classified as a Ilgrain product'l export.
See Item c above.
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Notes to Table A. 4a (continued)
Item e. "Oil cake" was usually clas sified as an IIagricultural product
export and frequently as a "grain export" along with oil seed. See
Appendix A, Technical Notes 6 for analysis of the Russian term
khlebprodukt (grain products) as used in Soviet export statistics.
Item f. Excluding any of these products in canned form.
Item g. See above, "Item a."
Item h. "Products of the wood distillation industry" were occasionally
included as exports of the "timber industry" rather than as exports of
the "che mical indus try. "
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TABLE A.4b
USSR: BASIC COMMODITY CLASSIFICATION FOR SOVIET
IMPORTS USED DURING THE 1920ls AND EARLY 1930ls
1. PRODUCERS 1 GOODS
A. amachinery and fittings
industrial machinery
transport equipment
electrical equipment
pipes and cylinder s
wire articles
ferrous metal articles
cable
metal storehouses
rubber articles for
industrial purposes
electric lamps
B . I a. raw materla s
cotton
wool
silk
hides
rubber
non-ferrous metals
cork
wood pulp
pig iron and scrap
ferro -alloys
steel ingots
rolled steels
raw timber
indus trial fats
copra, palm seeds, etc.
metallic and non -metallic
ores
C . d . 1 a. seml-processe materla s
article s from wood for industry
explosives, building materials
vegetable oils
cotton yarn
woolen yarn
leather
chemicals,
film
dyestuffs and tanning
materials
paper; and cardboard
wire
D. solid fuels (excludes oil products)a
coal wood
E. aagricultural producers 1 goods
agricultural machinery
tractors
implements
fertilizer s
seeds
feed
animals
silkworms
insecticides
binding twine
fishnet
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Table A. 4b (continued)
II. CONSUMERS' GOODS FOR MASS CONSUMPTION
a
A. foodstuffs
grain products
oil- seed
coffee
tea
spices
sugar
fish
meat
fruits, etc.
beverages
tobacco, etc.
B. manufactured consum er goods, non-food
cloth and clothing
shoe sand habe rdashery
stationery, writing implements
household wares
matches
artisan instruments
furs, worked
C. goods for public health
medical instruments, medicinal raw materials, medicine
D. cultural goods
books, etc.
films
III. OTHER
luxury goods
musical instruments
film projectors
Notes to Table A. 4b
Source: Import Commodity Classification
This table was drawn up on the basis of seve ral publications of Soviet
imports including STAT-32, p. 395 and Kutusov-28, pp. 329-333.
The classification of imports in VTSSSR-33 was based on the classifica-
tion system used by the Chief Customs Administration and differed
significantly from classification system presented in Table A. 4b and
used during the 1920's for analyzing and planning the composition of
imports. The classification of imports in Table A. 4b into various sub-
groups was based largely on Kaufman-29a, p. 86 and the grouping of
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commodities in Kutusov-28, pp. 329-333. Apparently, the classifica-
tion of imports varied more from government agency to government
agency than the clas sification of exports. Since the detailed list of
commodities in each subgroup was not available, some commodities
were classified according to the nature of the commodity rather than
direct information.
Explanatory note s to Table A. 4b
Item a. Based on commodities listed together in Kutusov-28, pp. 329-
332.
Item b. "Wire" was listed within a group of semi-processed materials,
but it would be more logically placed with "machinery and fittings" or
possibly raw materials.
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TECHNICAL NOTE 5: UNIFIED CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM
FOR SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE STATISTICS USED IN VTSSSR-60
The commodity classification of Soviet foreign trade statistics
from 1918-1940 published in VTSSSR-60 was according to the "Uniform
Commodity Nomenclature for Foreign Trade" adopted in 1954 (VTSSSR-
60, p. 9). Commodities are listed and identified in the following way:
"In front of the commodity is a number for indicating its nomenclature.
The first number indicates the division; the first two numbers together
indicate the commodity group; the first three numbers, the sub-group;
the fourth and fifth numbers the commodity item, and the sixth number,
the sub-item. Items having fewer digits include the subsequent items
with a greater number of digits" (VTSSSR-60, p. 10).
Table A. 5 lists all division and commodity groups and also all
sub-groups, items and sub-items cited in this study.
TECHNICAL NOTE 6: USAGE OF THE EXPRESSION 'IKHLEBNYE
EKSPORT11 (GRAIN EXPORT) IN SOVIET AND RUSSIAN
FOREIGN TRADE STATISTICS
The Russian expres sion khlebnye eksport is loosely translated
into English as grain export and into German as Getreideexport.
Similarly, the Russian expression khlebnye produkt is translated loosely
as grain products. The Russian expression khlebnye eksport usually
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TABLE A. 5
SUMMARY OF UNIFORM COMMODITY NOMENCLATURE
USED IN VTSSSR-60
1. Machinery and equipment
10 metal-working equipment
11 power and electro-technical equipment
12 mining, metallurgical and petroleum industry equipment
13 hoisting and transporting equipment
14 equipment for food-proces sing and light industry
15 equipment for chemical, woodpulp-paper, construction, etc.
16 equipment and materials of completely equipped enterprises
17 apparatus, laboratory and medical equipment, bearings,
instruments, abras ive s
18 tractors and agricultural machinery
19 transport equipment
2. Fuels, minerals, metals and related irtdustrial products
20 coal and other solid fuels
20000 bitiminous coal
20001 anthracite
21 crude oil
22 petroleum products
220 gasoline, naptha, etc.
223 kerosene
224 diesel oil
225 mazut
226 lubricating oils
227 greases
23 natural gas and electrical power
24 metallic ores and concentrates
24000 iron ore
24001 manganese ore
24204 tungsten concentrate
25 non-metallic minerals
25000 asbestos
26 ferrous metals and related industrial products
260 pig iron
261 ferro-alloys
26101 ferro silicone
26102 ferro chrome
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TABLE A. 5 (continued)
26103 ferro vanadium
26104 ferro tungsten
262 iron scrap
264 rolled cast iron products
26406 beams, channel bars
26407 structural steel
26410 steel plate
265 products for further conversion of common and quality
rolled stock
26503 tin plate
266 tubes and pipes
268 metal articles
26800 wire
26806 nails
26812 cables
27 non-ferrous metals and alloys
27000 copper
27003 zinc
27004 lead
27005 tin
27006 nickel
27007 aluminum
28 precious metals for industrial use
29 cable and electric wire including bare and insulated wire
3. Chemicals and related products
30 chemicals
30100 caustic soda
30101 soda ash
30315 coa 1, tar, pitch
30500 ethyl alcohol
31 dyestuff, paint, varnish and tanning materials
32 explosives and pyrotechnical products
33 photographic materials
34 fertilizers and pesticides for agriculture
34000 apatite concentrate
34004 superphosphate
34005 phosphorite
34200 ammonia sulfate
35 rubber and rubber-asbestos products
35000 natural rubber
TABLE A. 5 (continued)
4. Construction materials
40 building materials
41 pre-fabricated materials
42 metal warehouses, etc.
5. Industrial materials
50 forest products and cellulose-paper articles
500 raw timber
50100 sawn timber, softwood
50101 sawn timber, hardwood
50102-07 other sawn materials
50108 boxes
502 veneer products
50200 plywood
503 staves and other wood articles
50307 staves
504 cork, bark, etc.
505 wood pulp and cellulose
50500 wood pulp
50502 cellulose
506 paper
51 textile raw materials and intermediate products
51000 cotton
51003 flax fiber
51004 flax tow
51006 hemp
51008 hemp tow
51009 jute
51010 sisal
51013 hemp combings
51014 rags
511 wool
512 silk
51200 natural raw silk
514000 cotton thread
514001 flax yarn
514004 woolen yarn
51401 woolen tops
52 furs
520 furs, raw
521 furs, dressed, natural
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TABLE A. 5 (continued)
522 furs, dressed, dyed
53 hides, skins, leather
530000 hide s of long-horned cattle
530011 sheep skins
530012 calf skins
530013 goat skins
53100 leather for soles
53101 leather for uppers
54 raw tobacco
54000 raw tobacco
55 seeds and planting mate rial
56 essential oils, exotic resins, gums, medicinal, etc.
56322 licorice root
57 fats and oils, industrial
58 feeds, concentrated and bulky
580 oil cake
59 animal and agricultural materials not included elsewhere
59000 down feathers
59001 horsehair
59006 down
59008 guts
6. Animals, not for food
7. Unproces sed foodstuffs
70 grains
70000 wheat
70001 rye
70002 barley
70003 oats
70004 corn
70104 rice
71 livestock for slaughter
71000 cattle, long-horned
71001 cattle, short-horned
72 oil seeds and other unprocessed foodstuffs
72001 soya beans
72003 flax seed
72004 sunflower seed
72007 copra
72100 natural coffee beans
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72101
72103
TABLE A. 5 (continued)
cocoa beans
tea
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8. Foodstuffs, proce s sed
80 meat, dairy, and poultry products
80001 poultry
800036 bacon
80100 butter
803 eggs
81 fish and fish products
810 fish, fresh and frozen
811 salted fish
811022 salted her ring
813 fish, canned
81500 crabmeat, canned
81600 black caviar
81601 red caviar
82 products of the flour and bean milling industry
82000 wheat flour
82003 hulled grains
82101 peas
82102 lentils
83 vegetables, fruits, berries and produce
84 agricultural products, not elsewhere specified
84000 sugar
84107 olive oil
84108 sunflower seed oil
9. Manufactured consumers I goods
90 cloth excluding cloth for industrial purposes
900 cotton cloth
901 woolen cloth
903 linen cloth
904 carpeting
91 clothing
92 haberdashery
93 footwear
931 footwear, rubber
94 household utensils and tableware
941000 porcelain tableware
942 glas s tableware
TABLE A. 5 (continued).
95 furniture
96 medicine, sanitary and hygienic articles, cosmetics
97 cultural and household appliances
98 miscellaneous manufactured consumers I goods
98207 matches
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encompasses more types of products than the English and German
equivalents, and this difference in definition can be misleading in inter-
preting Soviet foreign trade statistics. The broadest definition of
khlebnye eksport includes not only grains in the traditional sense but
also beans, peas, lentils, flour, bran, oil cake, oil seed, and occasion-
ally other types of seeds (sugar beets). Thus, for the purpose of this
study we have adopted the following terms and define precisely the types
of products included in each term .
. 13
bread gralns :
grain products:
grains and related
products:
wheat, rye, barley, oats, buckwheat,
rice, corn, sorghum, and millet
bread grains plus peas, haricot beans,
beans, lentils, flours of bread grains
and bran
grain products plus oil seed and oil
cake
The usual distinction in Soviet trade statistics, if any is made,
is between grain products and grains and related products, i. e. ,
the inclusion or exclusion of oil seed and oil cake.
oil seeds: sunflower seed, lin seed (flax seed),
cotton seed, rape seed, peanuts,
mustard seeds, castor -oil seeds,
colza, soyabeans, tung oil
13 R. A. Smith, A Russian-English Dictionary of Social Science
Terms (London: Butterworths, 1962).
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APPENDIX B
NOTES TO TABLES IN CHAPTERS I TO XIV
Notes to Table III. 1
Foreign trade data. Pasvolsky-24, p. 27. Figures for 1887-1891 are
annual average exports.
Grain export data. Pokrovskii-47, pp. 348-349. Data covered only
'Igrain products" (see Appendix A, Technical Note 6) and excluded
exports of oil seeds, oil cake, and possibly legumes so that this
series was lower than the series for exports of "grain and related
products" in Table III. 6.
Value of non-grain exports. Col. 1 minus Col. 5.
Notes to Table III. 2
Export data. Adapted from Vissarionov-28, pp. 494-497. Exports
over all borders at current prices in gold rubles. Platinum exports
are excluded and account for the difference between value of total
exports cited in Table III. 1 and Table III. 2.
Explanatory notes .
Item a. "Agricultural exports" and "industrial exports" were classi-
fied according to the system used by Soviet economists in the 1920's
(see Appendix A, Technical Note 4) with the following exceptions:
vegetable oils, oil cake, all meat and fish (including canned meat and
fish) were clas sified as "agricultural exports. "
Item b. "Crops" included grains, oil seed, oil cake, all other seeds,
flax, hemp, tobacco, nledicinal herbs and licorice root, fruits,
vegetables and potatoes.
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Item c. "Grains" excluded oil seed, oil cake and include beans,
legumes and flour. See Appendix A, Technical Note 6.
Item d. "Flax and hemp" included fibe r, tow and combings.
Item e. "Other crops" included non-oil seed seeds, medicinal herbs,
licorice root, fruits, vegetables and potatoes.
Item f. "Animal products" included butter, eggs, meat, raw hides,
horsehair, bristles, wool, dead poultry, guts, horns and hooves, down
and feathers, silkworm grains, cocoons, and wool.
Item g. "Other agricultural products" were calculated as the residual
of total agricultural exports minus crops, animal products, furs and
fish. It includes live animals (consisting mostly of horses, pigs and
gee se) and vegetable oil.
Item h. "Industrial exports II as stated in Vis sarionov-28 adjusted for
platinum exports.
Item i. "Other mining" was the sum of cement, asbestos, coal and
coke, and unworked metal and scrap. It most likely understated total
exports of mining products.
Item j. "Other industrial exports" equalled total industrial exports
adjusted for platinum minus total forest and mining exports.
Notes to Table III. 3
Source. Calculated from Table III. 2.
Notes to Table III. 4
Source. Vissarionov-28, pp. 494-477.
Item a. See Appendix A, Technical Note 6 for description and varying
usage of term "grain exports. "
Notes to Table III. 5
Source. Groman-28, p. 223, accompanied by the following methodo-
logical note.
"1) On the basis of figures from "Materialov k prodovol'-
stvennomy planu. Proizvodstvo, perevozki i potreblenie
khlebov v Rossii" [Material for the Foodstuffs Plan.
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Production, Shipment and Consumption of Grains in
Russia published by the Ministry of Agriculture.
2) A correction of 19%in the gross harvest figure, con-
sisting of a 90/0underestimate of the yield per desiatin
(according to Ivantsov) and a 90/0correction for under-
estimation of sown area (according to estimates of the
Stat. -Econ. Section of Gosplan).
3) Flour converted into grain according to the following
estimates: 1pood rye flour = 100/90 pood grain,
1pood of millet = 100/60 pood of grain, 1 pood of wheat
flour = 100/75 pood of grain, 1 pood of hulled buck-
wheat = 100/80 pood of grain [pood = 16.3805 kilo-
grams J.
Notes to Table lIT.6
Col. 1. Exports. Liashchenko-28, p. 204, except for 1912, which is
from Vissarionov-28, p. 494.
Col. 2. Per cent of total grain exports by weight. Exports of various
grains divided by total grain export.
Col. 3. Per cent of harvest exported. Liashchenko-28, p. 205.
Number of guberniia covered varies: 1891-1895, 50 guberniias; 1896-
1910, 53 gub. ; 1911-1913,unspecified, presumably entire Russian
Empire (excluding Finland) or possibly only 53 guberniias.
Col. 4. Harvest. Timoshenko-32, p. 524. Harvest for 72 European
and Asiatic provinces. Exports lag harvest because of the slow pur-
chasing and shipment of grain in Russia. Hence, the decline in wheat
exports due to the poor 1911harvest shows up largely in 1912, while
wheat exports in 1911are dominated by an extremely high harvest in
1910.
Col. 5. Total railway shipments. Liashchenko-28, p. 202. Freight
loadings of-various grains destined for export and domestic markets.
Sum of railway shipment to domestic and foreign markets.
Col. 6. Per cent of railway shipments destined for export.
Col. 7. Total grain exports. Wheat, rye, barley, oats, buckwheat,
corn, peas, beans, lentils, millet, bran, but not oil seed or oil cake.
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Notes to Table III. 7
Source. Timoshenko-32, pp. 524 and 552. Harvest of 72 European
and Asiatic provinces uncorrected for understatement of yield and
sown area.
Notes to Table III. 8
1909-13
All data from Pokrovski -47, pp.
Item a. Denotes data from Mishustin-35a, p. 8.
Item b. Denotes data from Prozorovskii-32, pp. 129-130.
Item c. Equipment. Several figures were stated for equipment.
Mishustin-3.5a, stated the "machinery and equipment" equalled
14. 6% of annual average imports from 1909-1913 (that is 166.7 million
rubles). Prozorovskii-32, p. 129 stated that equipment imports were
226.0 million for the same period. The lesser of these two figures
was chosen as being consistent with the definition in this table. See
Appendix A, Technical Note 4.
Item d. Raw materials. Sum of nine items listed under heading and
probably understates total value of raw. materials imports because of
omission of less important raw materials.
Item e. Semi-processed. Sum of six items under heading. Dyes and
tanning materials not included in sum because they are already in-
cluded most likely in chemical. This estimate probably understates
total value of semi-processed materials imports because of omission
of less important semi-processed materials.
Item f. Foodstuffs. Calculated as a residual of total imports minus
equipment, raw materials, semi-processed materials, fuels, and
manufactured consumers' goods.
Item g. Manufactured consumers' goods. Prozorovskii-32, p. 129.
"Objects of Ccnsumption" (predmety potrebleneniia) assumed to include
only manufactured products for consumption.
Comment. The averages for these categories for 1909-1913 agree more
or less with similar categories calculated for 1906-1910 and 1911-1913.
1913
All data from Tables T -5 and T -7, and VTSSSR -60.
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Notes to Table Ill. 9
Source. Adapted from Kaufman-29d, p. 3. Note the "Producers I
goods" were estimated as the remainder of total imports minus
consumers 1 goods imports.
Notes to Table III. 10
Row 1.
C01. I.
Cotton
Ioffe-38, p. 54.
Cols 2-3. Mishustin-38, p. 202. Assumed to be for Russian Empire.
Col. 5. This rough calculation is intended to estimate the import
requirements of the cotton textile industry remaining within the USSR
territory if producing at 1913 levels using all of the cotton produced
within the territory and covering the balance with imports. According
to NBER-56a, Series 1208.6, 271, 000 m. t. of yarn was spun in 1913 in
the territory comprising the USSR in 1925, and 365,800 metric tons
in the Rus sian Empire. Thus, it was as sumed that 710/0of the total
fiber supply in 1913was used in the USSR territory, and 71%of the
total fiber supply to the Russian Empire (420, 000 m. t. ) was 298,200
metric tons, of which 223, 000 m. t~ was domestically produced.
Therefore, 75, 000 m. t. would be imported, or about 25% of total
supply to firms on USSR territory. Cotton fabric output of the USSR
territory would be 29% less than in the Russian Empire.
Row 2. Wool
Col. 1. Ioffee, p. 54.
Cols 2-3. Holzman-63, p. 299. Presumably for the Russian Empire,
adjusted for exports.
Col. 6. Includes yarn imports in total wool imports and total wool
supp~y.
Comments
Note 1. Considerable spinning and weaving capacity was located in
Poland and the Baltic states. See Tables III. 20 and III. 21 on territorial
adjustments.
Note 2. Large -scale woolen yarn spinning was based extensively on
imported high-quality wool. See text and Table III. 10.
Row 3. Silk
Col. 1. In 1912, silk winding of dome stic cocoons yielded 10, 332 m. t.
of raw silk thread; imports of raw silk (grege) were 26, 617 m. t. giving
a supply of 36, 949 m. t. (EIKSSSR, p. 453). One half of dome stically
produced cocoons were exported because of the inadequate silk-winding
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capacity; raw silk thread (grege) was then "reimported" to be spun
into silk yarn for weaving (EIKSSSR, pp. 451-453). Silk wadding and
waste were also imported.
Col. 6. Pokrovskii-47, p. 353.
Row 4. Copper
Col. 1. EIKSSSR, p. 365. Assumed to be for Russian Empire.
Col. 2. Holzman-63, p. 299. Assumed to be for Russian Empire,
apparentlyfor electrolytic copper.
Col. 3. "Notes to Table T -20, row 4. Copper," and is based on
adjusted blister output and imports of rolled and ingot copper and
excluded copper wire, etc. Blister output included scrap, which,
however, was not an important factor.
Col. 5. Table T -21, Table Notes.
Comment. Ioffe-38 (p. 55) stated that 68% of demand in 1913was
covered by imports; this seems too high.
EIKSSSR, p~ 369.
"Notes to Table T -21, row 6. "
Row 5.
Col. 1.
Col. 3.
zinc.
Col. 4.
Col. 5.
Zinc
EIKSSSR, p. 369.
Table T -21, row 6. Zinc imports included slabs and rolled
Comment. Ho1zman-63, p. 299 stated 100% import dependence for
zinc, but this is clearly in error.
Row 6. Lead
Col. 1. EIKSSSR, p. 367.
Col. 2. Holzman-63 (p. 299). Presumed to be Russian Empire, but
no or '.little lead was produced in separated territory.
Cols 3 and 5. Table T-22, row 5. Imports included ingot and rolled
lead.
Row 7. Aluminum
All columns. Mishustin-38a, p. 192 and many other sources.
Row 8. Nickel
All columns. Mishustin- 38a, p. 192, etc.
Row 9. Aluminum
All columns. Mishustin-38a, p. 192, etc.
Row 10.
Col. 3.
Pig iron
From Table T -21, row 10.
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Row 11. Rolled ferrous metals
Col. 3. From Table T -21, rOw 8. See Notes to Table T -21, row 8
for method of estimating share.
Row 12. Pipes and tubes
Col. 3. From Table T -21, row 9. See Notes to Table T -21, row 9
for method of estimating share.
Row 13. Paper and cardboard consumption dependent on imports
including imports of wood pulp
Cols 3 and 5. Table T -21, row 11. See "Notes to Table T -21, row 11"
for method of estimating.
Rows 14-16. Paper, newsprint, wrapping paper.
Col. 5. EIKSSSR, p. 533.
Note 1. About 35% of Russian papermaking capacity was separated
from Rus sia into Poland, and the Baltic states, according to EIKSSSR,
p. 533.
Row 17.
Col. 5.
All cardboard
EIKSSSR, p. 535.
Row 18. Wood pulp
Col. 3. EIKSSSR, p. 537. Does not include cellulose. Before World
War I, 98,300 m. t. of cellulose were consumed within the territory
comprising the USSR; 57, 300 m. t. of this was obtained from the
"Border" states.
Row 19. Cellulose and wood pulp. Ioffe - 38, p. 55.
Row 20. Rubber. Mishustin-38', p. 200
Row 21. Leather. Many sources including SUYB-29
Row 22. All chemicals by value
Col. 3. EIKSSSR, p. 487. "Chemicals II undefined.
Row 23. All chemicals by weight. See Row 23.
Row 24. Acids, alkaloids, salts
Col. 3. EIKSSSR, p. 487. "So-called basic chemicals, i. e., in the
branch producing acids, alkaloids, salts."
Note 1. EIKSSSR, p. 487, implied that rapid relative import substitu-
tion was occurring in the field of basic chemicals, with output growing
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rapidly and imports growing slowly.
Row 25. Individual chemicals
All trade data from VTSSSR 18-40. Assumed "pure chemicals imports."
Item a. Sulfuric acid. Imports; SOVTC 30000. Output; NBER-56a,
Series 401. 3, "100%H2S04. "
Item b. Hvdrocholoric acid. Imgorts; SOVTC 30001. Output; NBER-
56a, Series 403.5 "100%HCl; -18 Baume."
Item c. Soda ash. Imports; SOVTC 30101. Output; NBER-56a, Series
406. 1. Soda ash 95%.
Item d. Copper sulphate. Imports; SOVTC 30242 Copper sulphate.
Output; NBER-56a, Series 419. 5.
Item e. Aluminum sulphate. Imports; SOVTC 30200 Aluminum sul-
phate. Output; NBER-56a, Series 427. 5.
Item f. Borax. Imports; SOVTC 30265 (Bura). Output; NBER -56a,
Series 429.5 Borax. Borax output for 1913thought to be insignificant
at least in USSR, because only 1 - 6 m. t. was produced (from Crimean
mines) in 1926 and almost all was imported (Shimkin-52, p. 253).
Item g. Super phosphate 14%P205. Imports; SOVTC 34004. Super
phosphate. Assumed to be 19%and hence raised by 35.7% to make it
equivalent to domestically produced super phosphate. Output; NBER-
56a, Series 409. 3.
Item h. Ground Phosphate rock and Thomas slag. Imports; SOVTC
34005, Phosphorite including Thomas slag. Output of Thomas slag
in 1913(Shimkin-52, p. 256) was 32,800 m. t. Output of ground Phos-
phate rock in USSR territory was 8, 000 m. t. These two figures are
simply summed and used as an order of magnitude. Thomas slag came
from Polish Russia. Phosphate fertilizers were used largely in Baltic
and Western provinces of Russia (Shimkin-52, p. 256).
Item i. Potash fertilizer. Imports; SOVTe 341, Potash fertilizer.
Output; NBER-56a, Series 412.4. First produced from sylvinite in
1913. Sylvinite output; NBER -56a, Series 412.4.
Row 26. Dyes. EIKSSSR, p. 493. "Before the war no independent
dye industry existed in Russia. The production of aniline dyes was
concentrated in the hands of concerns organized by foreigners, which
actually were the branches of German and Swiss firms. These fac-
tories manufactured dyes from semi':processed products imported
principally from Germany. Thus the dye industry in Rus sia worked
upon imported raw materials. II The only intermediate product
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produced in Russia was aniline.
Rows 27 and 28. Aniline and aniline salts. Imports and output;
EIKSSSR, p. 493. Output in 1913was 1000 tons of aniline and 748
of aniline salts, and imports of aniline and aniline salts were 1000
tons, of which we know that aniline alone equalled 258 m. t. (VTSSSR-
60, p. 218).
Row 29. Pigments varnishes. All data for 1912. All data from
EIKSSSR, p. 497.
Row 3.0. Coal tar. EIKSSSR, p. 501.
Row 31. Rosin (kanifol, garpius). EIKSSSR, p. 503.
Row 32. Chemical-pharmaceutical products. EIKSSSR, p. 511. "Pre-
war" probably 1913. Some factories detached in Poland and Baltic
states. Iodine, quinine, caffeine, semi-alkaloids of opium and deriva-
tive s of salicylic acid.
Rows 33 and 34. Soap and glycerine. EIKSSSR, p. 477-479. The
soap industry, howeve r, depended on imported copra, palm oil, and,
to a lesser extent, animal fat.
Row 35. Tea. Ioffe-38, p. 54.
Row 36. Cotton yarn. EIKSSSR, p. 443, "Cotton yarn before the war
used to be imported ... to an extent of 12 - 13%of Rus sian production."
Row 37. Coffee. EIKSSSR, p. 545.
Row 38. Cocoa. EIKSSSR, p. 551. In form of finished product
Row 39. Jute. EIKSSSR, p. 445. Jute was apparently entirely
imported, but in some cases it was mixed with flax.
Row 40. Copra and palm oil. EIKSSSR, p. 483. Apparently entirely
imported.
Row 41. Animal fat. EIKSSSR, p. 481.
Row 42. Coal. Pasvolsky-24, p. 120 citing Narodnoe Khoziastvo,
1913, pp. 303-305. "Pre-war" ratio was for 1910-1913and equalled
sum of imports divided by the sum of imports and production.
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Notes to Table ill. 11
1876-1895
Pokrovskii -47, p. 354.
1913
Net exports of cotton cloth, linen cloth, sugar, oil for Table T -20 Or
VTSSSR-60. Data for pig iron, steel and copper from Table T -21.
Notes to Table 111.12
Prokrovskii data. P rokrovskii-4 7, p. 352.
SUA data. SUA, Vol. 5, No. 20 (1926), p. 27.
Pasvolsky data. Pasvolsky-24, p. 116.
Notes to Table III. 13
Col. 1. EIKSSSR, p. 447; 1912estimated from partial data on page 449.
Col. 2. Nutter-62, p. 415. Datum for 1909 is arthmetic average of
1908 and 1910(70.2 and 73.8 thousand metric tons). Woolen yarn
output in 1913in territory making up the DSSR in 1925: 46,500 metric
tons (Nutter-62, p. 457). See also EIKSSSR, p. 451.
Col. 3. Col. 1minus col. 2.
Col. 4. Col. 1 divided by col. 2.
Notes to Table ill. 14
A. 1 Pokrovskii-47, p. 358. "Total value of production of all types
of machines reached 101.9 million rubles in 1910, 123.3 million
rubles in 1911,and 136.7 million rubles in 1912. In these same
years the import of machines was 113.4, 147.2 and 150.5 million
rubles. II The definition of "machines" is not clear. Using this
value data we obtain the following percentage of import in total
machinery supply: 52.7%, 54.4%, 52.4%.
B. 1 Pokrovskii-47, p. 358. Apparently on value.
B.2 Rozenfeld-61, p. 105. Apparently on value. Unofficial value of
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metal-working equipment output in 1913was 5.5 million rubles,
while imports of metal-working equipment (VTSSSR-60, SOVTC
10) equalled 12.8 million rubles or 70% of total supply.
B.3 EIKSSSR, p. 377. "Output in 1913... amounted to about
5 million ruble s. II
C Electrical:
Rows .1 through 9. EIKSSSR, p. 417.
Comments: Share of foreign capital in public power stations
was 51%and in electrical technical enterprise "up to 70%." In
'tramway concerns 93%of capital was Belgian, while in telephone
enterprises Swedish capital amounted to 62%and Danish about
25% (EIKSSSR, p. 417). The distinctive feature about the pre-
war electrical industry was the dependence upon foreign electri-
cal enterprises ... horne production ... confined merely to
simple and heavy machinery parts, the more important and
complex parts being imported from abroad and then as sembled
in Russia into finished articles ... no scientific research ...
required number of drawings imported from abroad" (EIKSSSR,
p. 417). Tariff and government purchase policy stimulated
domestic production or as sembly from parts, but lack of experi-
enced technical personnel and skilled workers, and supporting
industries hindered development of domestic industries. Foreign
engineers and specialists occupied "responsible administrative
posts" (EIKSSSR, p. 419). "Ninety percent of entire imports of
electrical materials carne from Germany" (EIKSSSR, p. 431).
D.l Woodworking machinery and saw frames. EIKSSSR, p. 379.
Domestic output in 1912was about 1,269,000 rubles.
D.2 Textile machinery. EIKSSSR, p. 379. Sum of value of imports
in 1913plus value of output in Russian Empire in 1913. Ratio of
imports for Russian Empire to output and supply in 1913in the
Soviet borders of 1925 is much higher (32%). Imports in previous
years were much higher (1908 - 3.64 million rubles, 1910- 2.57
million rubles, 1913- 1. 36 million rubles) so that the import
supply ratios were much higher in previous years. If we as sume
domestic output in 1908 to be equal to 1913, then the import supply
ratio was 44%.
D.3 Papermaking machines. EIKSSSR, p. 379. Value of imports
in 1913and by value of output in 1912.
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D. 4 Printing machine r~ EIKSSSR, p. 381. Value of 1913imports
divided by sum of output in 1912and imports in 1913.
D. 5 Precise mechanics (watches, microscopes, eye glasses,
cameras, etc.). EIKSSSR, p. 397. High value for USSR
boundaries (EIKSSSR, p. 399).
D.6 Automobiles. EIKSSSR, p. 519. Automobiles were assembled
in Riga from imported parts (Rozenfeld-61) •. Based
on 1913imports and 1912output, imports supplied 96. 50/0of
imported finished automobiles. 1913imports of 17.4 million
.rubles, of which 15.9 million rubles were for passenger autos,
1. 45 million rubles for trucks and O.0 million rubles for auto-
buses.
D. 7 Motorcycles. EIKSSSR, p. 519. Based on 1913 imports and
1912output.
D. 8 Bicycles. EIKSSSR, p. 519. Based ~n 1913imports and 1912
output.
D. 9 Tractors (excluding garden tractors). NBER-56a, Series 902.6
lists "zero" tractor output.
D.I0 Combines. NBER-56a, Series 905. 2 lists zero combine output.
D.ll Chemical equipment. Gwyer-55b, p. 10, citing the Soviet trade
journal Khimicheskoe Mashinostroenie, Nos. 2-3, 1933, p. 1,
and No.8, 1933, p. 1.
D.12 Railroad equipment. Ioffee-38, p. 55.
E. 1 Metal rope and rigging. EIKSSSR, p. 383. Based on 1913
imports and 1912production in Russian Empire (low figure)
and bounda rie s of USSR (high figure).
E. 2 Cotton cards. EIKSSSR, p. 383.
Note s to Table III. 15
Source. Bogdanov-28, p. 22. Presumably current prices.
763
Notes to Table III. 16
Source. E1chibegoff-55a, pp. 16-17, citing Znabzhenie krest'ianskogo
nase1eniia se1-kh. mashinami i orudiiami (1925), pp. 12-17.
Notes to Table 111.17
Row 1. NBER -55a, Series 902. 6. Tractors (excluding garden tractors)
units.
Row 2. NBER-55a, Series 905.2. Combines (grain combines) units.
Row 3. NBER-55a, Series 1015.4. Water wheels and turbines.
Row 4. NBER-55a, Series 1017.5. Coal cutting machines (units).
Row 5. NBER-55a, Series 1022.2. Excavators units. But 25 steam
excavating shovels, weighing 70 tons each, on railroad tracks, with
scoop capacities of 2.29 cubic meters were produced before 1915
(Gwyer-55b, p. 7).
Row 6. NBER-55a, Series 1307. 2. Phonographs.
Row 7 and 8. Rozenfe1d-61, p. 190. Steam turbines.
Complex parts for telephone exchange.
Turbogenerators, etc.
1250 kwt max.
2000 kwt ..max.
10, 000 kwt max.
22,000 kwt max. (two)
first high pressure turbines (30 atmospheres)
Metal working ("new types of machines'?
Looms, etc., not produced before
Pre-war
1922/23
1925/26
1926
1926/27
Row 9. Rozenfe1d-6l, p. 192.
Row 10. Rozenfe1d-6l, p. 192.
World War I.
Row 11. Rozenfeld-61, p. 193.
Row 12. Rozenfe1d-61, p. 193.
Row 13. Rozenfe1d-61, p. 193.
Row 14. Rozenfeld-61, p. 194.
Row 15. Rozenfe1d-61, p. 194.
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Row 19. Ibid.
Row 20. Gwyer-55a, p. 5. "Blooming mill, first ever built in USSR."
Row 21. STAT-35, p. 52.
Notes to Table III. 18
Source. Engeev-28b, p. 82. Cited in Liashchenko -49, p. 718.
Notes to Table III. 19
Paper rubles. Foreign trade in current prices. Data for 1909-1913
to 1913from SUYB-27, p. 221.
Gold rubles. Foreign trade in 1913prices. Data for 1913-1917from
K.ustusov-28, p. 10, who cited Groman-23, p. 39. Data for 1918-1924
from SUYB-27, p. 220.
Notes to Table ill. 20
Based on NBER-56a. Series number given in left hand side. "% loss"
is calculated by dividing 1913output in Soviet territory 1925 by 1913in
Rus sian Empire and subtracting from one hundred.
Notes to Table III. 21
Additional comments on sources: Statistical adjustment
12. "Value of home production about 70 million rubles [context
implied Russian Empire] gross output of finished articles
... in 1913(within the boundaries of the USSR) ... 60, 000, 000
ruble s" (EIKSSSR, p. 421).
13. Based on total number of spindles, hand and mechanical, available
in 1912(EIKSSSR, p. 447). For me chanical spindle s alone the
figure is 67. 8%.
14. Based on total number of looms, hand and mechanical, available
in 1912(EIKSSSR, p. 447). For mechanical looms alone the
figure is 61%.
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Notes to Table III. 22
Sown area. Johnson-60, pp. 228-229.
Output and livestock. Johnson-60, pp. 230-235.
Notes to Table III. 23
Item a. Mikoian-28a, pp. 17-18. Grain (khlebprodukt) includes oil
seed and oil cake as implied in comparison of other grain statistics
for USSRcited in same sentence.
Item b. Includes oil cake and oil seed. Mikoian-28a, pp. 17-18.
Item c. Mikoian-28a, p. 17. For a discussion of pre-19l4 flax and
hemp exports, see EIKSSSR, pp. 219-227. Marketing of flax excluding
Baltic states equalled 311,000 metric tons per year during 1909-1913
(Mikoian-28a, p. 17).
Item d. From Table. III. 2. Assumes identical definition of term
"sel' skokhoziaistvennyi eksport. "
Item e. From Table III. 2. Sum of yearly averages for 1909-1913of
flax, butter, eggs and furs.
Item f. Residual.
Item g. Assumed to be for period 1909-1913.
Item h. From Table III. 2.
Item i. EIKSSSR, pp. 243-247.
Note s to Table III. 24
Source. League-30c, p. 262.
Notes to Table IV. 1
Gols 1 - 3. SUYB-26, pp. 58-59. Gal. 1 included agriculture and
forestry.
Gol. 3. "Output of registered industry. "
Gals 4 - 5. League-28a, p. 694. Data in 1913prices.
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Notes to Table V. 1
Source. Adapted from Krasin, p. 176.
Notes to Table V. 2
Source. Krasin-28, p. 175. Converted from poods. "Timber" (lec)
substituted for "flax" (len) in the original table. It was apparently
a typographical error. "Output" possibly refers to "net output. "
Export as % of output (co!. 6) calculated from cols 1 and 4.
Notes to Table VI. 1
Planned and actual exports 1923/24 - 1927/28. Data from Baksht-28a,
p. 25. No information was given about prices, but presumably these
prices were current prices rather than pre-19l4, so that the unit
values for planned exports are indicative of the planners' price
expectations.
Actual exports 1909-1913 (annual average). Vissarionov-28. "Grain
products'l in plan assumed to include those items defined by the term
"grain and related products" as used in this study (see Appendix A,
Technical Note 6).
Notes to Table VI. 2
Total imports. Data for actual total imports from 1923/24 - 1927/28
from Table T-l and include the grain and manufactured goods imports
as part of the program of "goods intervention 1924/25 - 1925/26. "
The plan figures for 1923/24 - 1927/28 for total imports did not pro-
ject any such grain or "purposeful imports" for this pe.riod. Thus,
Baksht compared actual total imports excluding these imports for
the "goods intervention" to the planned total imports (in row two).
Total imports (excluding special imports of grain and consumer
goods). Baksht-28a, p. 26.
Producers' Imports and Consumer Goods Imports. Baksht- 28a, p. 26.
Baksht's figures for planned and actual consumer goods imports do not
include "purposeful imports" of "consumer goods for the goods inter-
vention" during 1924/25 and 1925/26. Total imports of manufactured
consumer goods and foodstuffs (including "purposeful imports") from
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1923/24 to 1927/28 were about 684 million rubles (Table T-5) or about
390% of the projected imports of these products (Table VI. 2); Baksht
recorded only 430 million rubles (excluding purposeful imports) of
foodstuffs and manufactured goods from 1923/24 - 1927/28 (Table VI.2).
Average annual imports 1911-1913. Kaufman-29d. l'Agricultural
machinery and fertilizers" included only agricultural machinery for
1911-1913.
Notes to Table VII. 1
Col. 1. Planned Exports Across European Borders 1924/25. Figures
for the value from Krasin-28, p. 177. Figures for quantity and for
the value of total agricultural exports and secondary exports from
Kaufman-26c, pp. 11-15. "Other Industrial" is a residual.
Col. 2. Planned Exports for 1924/25 as a % of Actual Exports in
1923/24. Comparison of figures in column 1 with figures for 1923/24
in current prices fror.n Kutusov- 28, p. 34.
Col. 3. Structure of 1924/25 Export Plan. Value of planned exports
for individual groups as percentage of total value of planned exports.
Col. 4. Exports in 1924/25. Figures from Kutusov-28, pp. 42-43.
Col. 5. Exports in 1924/25 as a percentage of 1923/24 Exports.
Figures from Kutusov-25, pp. 42-43.
Col. 6. Structure of 1924/25 Exports. Value of exports for individual
groups as percentage of total value of exports 1)924/25.
Col. 7. Fulfillment of Plan. Column 4 divided by column 1.
Notes to Table VIII. 1
The figures are in millions of rubles at current prices. Plan figures
for 1925/26 most likely refer to the foreign trade plan presented as
"orientation figures" in July 1925 by NKVT.
Exports
Col. 1. Exports in 1924/25. Figures from Kutusov-28, p. 42 and
Table T- 2. "Other Agricultural Products" derived as a residual by
subtracting "Grain and Related Products, Fur and Non-canned Fish,
and Animal and Poultry Products" from" Total Agricultural Exports"
cited in Kutusov-28, p. 42. "Timber products" were subtracted from
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"Total Industrial Exports" to get 110ther (Industrial) Exports." See
Appendix A, Technical Note 4 for description of classification.
Col. 2. Planned Exports in 1925/26. Figures for export plan from
Sobolev-26a, p. 72, except that lIOther Industrial Exportsll derived
as residual by subtracting the plan figures for other groups from
111925/26 Plan B Export Planll in Table T-l. These figures are
approximations.
Col. 3. Exports in 1925/26. Figures from Kutusov-28, p. 49.
Procedure similar to that in Col. 1.
Col. 4. Fulfillment of 1925/26 Export Plan. Col. 3 as a percentage
of Col. 2.
Col. 5. Percentage Change of Exports in 1925/26 Compared to Exports
in 1924/25
Imports (Similar to Exports)
Cols 1 - 3. Imports. Figures from Kutusov-28, pp. 45 and 51.
Col. 2. Planned Imports in 1925/26. Figures for imports plan from
Sobolev-26a, p. 72. He also stated that lIConsumer Goods" imports
planned for 1925/26 were 19% of total planned imports; Plan B 1925/26
in Table T-l was used for total imports.
Notes to Table VIII. 2
Source. Adapted from Aizenberg- 62, p. 235.
Notes to Table VIII. 3
Exchange rate of chervonetz on foreign exchanges. High and low
quotations during period from October 1, 1924 to October 1, 1925
from Aizenberg- 62, p. 235.
Monthly data from 1926 and 1927. Data from Economic Survey (in
English) published by the State Bank of the USSR in Moscow. Since
March 1927, no data were published on the exchange rate of chervonetz
on these "free" markets abroad. The export of chervonetz was pro-
hibited by a decree of July 9, 1926 and the import of chervonetz was
prohibited by a decree of March 21, 1928 (Economic Survey, Vol. IV,
No. 27-28 [July 31, 1929], pp. 1-2, published by the State Bank of the
USSR in Moscow). These decrees were intended to reduce the finan-
cing of contraband trade and especially illegal imports. The
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chervonetz continued to be quoted on the "black markets" abroad, but
after July 1926 the State Bank ceased to support the exchange rate
through purchases of chervonetz on foreign exchanges. The decree
prohibiting the import of chervonetz was intended to prevent tourists
and other persons who might be able to make payments in chervonetz-
ruble from purchasing the chervontez at below parity rates (as well
as to further reduce the demand for chervonetz on foreign money
markets).
Note s to Figure VIII. 1
Price of Soviet wheat on foreign markets. Col. 4 of Table T- 38.
Average domestic procurement price of wheat purchased by Kh1eb-
produkt. Col. 2 of Table T- 38.
Wheat procurements by planned procurement agencies. As cited in
SUA, various issues (1926-1928).
Note s to Figure VIII. 2
Price of Soviet rye on foreign markets. Col. 4 of Table T- 39.
Average domestic procurement price of rye purchased by Kh1eb-
produkt. Col. 2 of Table T- 39.
Rye procurements by planned procurement agencies. As cited in
SUA various issues (1926-1928).
Notes to Figure VIII. 3
Price of Soviet barley on foreign markets. Col. 2 of Table T-40.
Procurement price on dome stic markets of exported barley. Col. 1 of
Table T-40.
Barley procurements by planned procurement agencies. As cited in
SUA, various issues (1926-1928), and ERSU, various issues (1926-1929),
and Stat. Oboz. (1927-1929).
Notes to Table IX. 1
Plan 1926/27. Based on plan fulfillment figures and export data cited
in Kaufman-28c, pp. 104-106. Industrial export plan is residual based
770
on agricultural export plan and the assumption that Kaufman is refer-
ring to the final revised export plan (Plan D, 1926/27 in Table T-l).
For estimate of grain export plan, see text,
Actual Exports 1925/26 and 1926/27. Kaufman-28c, pp. 104-106 and
Tables T- 2 and T- 3.
Note s to Figure X. I
Source. Table T- 34, Part A.
Notes to Table XI. 1
Row 1. Gross harvest. Data from Table T-8. This series corre-
sponds roughly with the "low series" cited by Karcz-67 (p. 408).
Row 2. Decline (or increase) in harvest from 1913 levels. Figure
for 1913 subtracted from data for other years.
Rows 3 and 4. Total and rural population from Table T-48, Part A,
except that the figure for 1909-13 is a rough average of 1910-1914 figures
from Table T-48, Part B, centered on mid-19l2.
Rows 5 and 6. Row 1 divided by row 3 and row 4.
Row 7. Additional grain required by rural population to maintain
per capita levels. Figure for 1913 in row 6 subtracted from other
data in row 6.
Row 8. Sum of figures in rows 2 and 7.
Notes to Table XII. I
Indexes based on indexes cited in Tables T-24 and T-25, and
data in current prices cited in Tables III. 23, III. 24, T-2 and T- 5.
See notes to these tables for description of territorial adjustment.
Note s to Table XIII. 1
Source. Geller-28a, p. 41. Probably in current prices.
Note s to Table XIII. 2
Source. Geller-28a, p. 41. Probably in current prices.
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Notes to Table XIII. 3
Copper
Rows 1 - 3. Data for 1913, 1927/28 and 1932/33 Plan from Ge11er-28a,
p. 42. Output projected by VSNKh. Figures for 1932 and 1933 from
corresponding columns in rows 4, 5 and 6 of this table.
Rows 4 - 6. Data for 1913, 1927/28,1932 and 1933 from Table XIV. 11
under heading "Copper." Output is difference between supply and
imports. Other Soviet sources cited different shares for imported
copper in 1927/28 (Anders-29a, p. 13 cited 42%; Gosp1an-30b, p. 210
cited 49.9%). Plan - 1932/33 figure from Kaufman-29a, p. 91, and
Gosp1an- 30b, p. 210, which stated that imported copper would satisfy
41. 0% of total consumption; the target for copper output in the optimal
variant was 84, 700 m. t. (Za1eski- 62, p. 303), which implied pro-
jected copper imports of 55,800 m. t. Anders-29a (p. 13) stated that
domestic copper output was to cover 73% of demand in 1932/33.
Row 7. Row 5 divided by row 6.
Zinc
Rows 8 - 9. Data for 1913, 1927/28 and 1932/33 Plan from Ge11er-28a,
p. 42. Output projected by VSNKh. Figures for 1932 and 1933 from
corresponding columns of rows 10 and 13 of this table.
Rows 10 - 12. Actual data (1913, 1927/28, 1932 and 1933) from Table
XIV. 11under heading 11 Zinc." Output is difference between supply
and imports. Planned figures for 1932/33 Plan from Kaufman-29a
(p. 91), and Gosplan- 30b (p. 210) which stated that impo rted zinc
would satisfy 20. 5% of total consumption. Output target in optimal
variant for 1932/33 was 77,400 m. t. (Zaleski-62, p. 32), which
implied imports of 19, 900 m. t. Output targets for 1932/33 for the
basic variant was 38,000 m. t. (Zaleski-62, p. 32).
Row 13. Row 11 divided by row 12.
Lead
Rows 14 - 16. Data for 1913, 1927/28, 1932 and 1933 from Table XIV. 11
under heading IILead, II and is basically from Mishustin-38a, p. 195.
Output is difference between total supply and imports. Planned figures
for 1932/33 - plan from Gosplan-30b (p. 210), which reported a planned
share of imports of 61. 0% and planned output of 38,500 m. t. in 1933.
Row 17. Row 15 divided by row 16.
Aluminum
Rows 18 - 20. Data for 1932 and 1933 from Mishustin-38a, p. 196. No
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output in 1913 and 1927/28, so that total supply comprised of imports
(VTSSSR-60). Plan - 1932/33 data is from following sources. No
output target for aluminum was originally planned for the FYP; it
was later set by a decree on August 2, 1929 (c ited in Direktivy
KPSS ... Vol. II, p. 91 as cited in Zaleski-62, p. 318; also cited
in Go splan- 30b, p. 58).
Row 21. Row 19 divided by row 20.
Nickel
Row 22. Data for 1913, 1927/28, 1932 and 1933 from Table XIV. 11.
No output targets were given in the FYF for 1932/33 according to
Zaleski-62, p. 303. This contradicts the estimate that imports were
to supply only 44.4% of demand in 1932/33 as cited in Gosplan-30b,
p. 210.
Cotton
Rows 23 - 25. Data for 1913, 1927/28, 1932 and 1933 from Table XIV. 11;
see Note s to Table XIV. 11 for discus sion of data sources. Plan target
for 1932/33 from following sources. Output of cotton fiber for 1932/33
Plan from Zaleski-62, p. 305. Zaleski-62 (p. 309) cited a target
output figure for seed cotton of 1,907,000 m. t. for 1932/33, of which
1,870,000 m. t. were to be marketed. The ratio of ginned cotton to
seed cotton is about 30 - 32% of weight of seed cotton. Several targets
for shares of imported cotton fiber in 1932/33 supply have been cited
including 19.5% (Kaufman-29a, p. 91), "about 10%" (Gosplan-30b, p.2ll)
and 25% (Anders-29a, p. 13). Kaufman's estimate is used here; this
implied a total supply of 684, 700 m. t. and imports of 78, 700 m. t.
Fine wool
Row 27. Gelle"r- 28a, p. 42.
Wool
~28. Figure for 1927/28 from Kaufman-29a (p. 91); figure for
share of imports in total industrial supply. Anders-29a (p. 13) and
SUA (Vol. VIII, No. 13 [1929]) stated that wool supplied 80% and 90%
of total consumption in 1927/28. Planned output of wool for 1932/33 -
Plan was 220,000 m. t. in optimal variant and only slightly lower in
the basic variant (Za1eski-62, p. 309). Planned imports of wool for
1932/33 - Plan were to be 36.1% of total supply (Kaufman-29a, p. 91)
implying a total supply target of 297, 700 m. t. and an import target
of 77, 700 m. t.
Leather
Row 29. Geller-28a, p. 42.
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Industrial machinery
Row 30. Kaufman-29b, pp. 17-18. Estimates based on value. See
also Table XIII. 4 and table on p. 534.
Agricultural machinery and tractors
Rows 31 - 32. Based on data cited in Kaufman-29b (pp. l7-l9), and
SUA (VA1. VIII , No. 13 [1929], p. 33) .
Notes to Table XIII. 4
Data for 1909-13. Average annual exports excludingpl~tinum, from
Table III. 2. Average annual imports from Table III. 8. Classification
for imports for 1909-13 are approximate estimates for these categories.
See notes to Tables III. 2 and III. 8. See Appendix A, Technical Note 4
for description of goods included in each classification.
Data for 1926/27 and 1927/28. Export data from Table T-2. Agricul-
tural exports plus industrial exports do not add to total exports becaus e
of small amounts of unallocated exports. Import data from Table T- 5.
Kaufman-29, p. cited slightly different figures for exports for
1927/28: total exports were, according to this source, 773.9 million
rubles, of which 382.3 million rubles were "agricultural exports,"
and 391. 6 million rubles were "industrial exports. "
Data for annual targets for foreign trade during the FYP and for
total foreign trade during FYP.
Total annual exports plan. Derived by using an annual index of
foreign trade projected in the FYP and Torgplan's projection for
export in 1932/33 of 2047. 5 million rubles, both from Kaufman-29a,
pp. 90, 93. Kaufman's index is presented below:
llDynamics of Exports and Imports"
(1928/29 = 100)
Exports
Imports
1928/29
100
100
1929/30
118. 5
125. 9
1930/31
139.8
161. 7
1931/32
192. 7
205.4
1932/33
225.0
225.9
The reliability of this index was checked by summing the annual
figures calculated on the basis of this index and checking against the
sums for the entire FYF cited in the same article. Figures for
1932/33 and for the entire FYF are directly from Kaufman-29a.
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Agricultural and industrial exports. Data for 1932/33 and FYP cited
in Kaufman- 29a, p. 89, but see note s to Table XIII. 7 for discus sian
of Kaufman data. Data for 1928/29 - 1932/33 calculated from struc-
tural coeffic ients for share of agricultural and industrial exports
cited in Table XIII. 7.
Total annual imports planned for first FYP. Data for planned annual
imports based on Kaufman's index "Dynamics of Export and Import"
cited above in this note and Torgplan Is projections for imports in
1932/33 of 1705 million rubles (this figure for total planned imports
for 1932/33 was cited in numerous sources including Anders-29a,
p. 7, SUA, Vol. VIII, No. 13 (1929), p. 10, and Vop. Torg., (May,
1929), p. 101. The estimates for annual planned imports summed to
value of total imports planned for the entire first FYF cited in
Kaufman-29a, p. 93 and Vop. Torg., (May, 1929), p. 101. Annual
plan data has been rounded to neare st million.
Producers' goods and consumers' goods planned for first FYP.
Figures for planned imports for 1932/33 and planned imports for
entire FYF from Vop. Torg. (May, 1929), p. 101. Similar data cited
in SUA, Vol. VIII, No. 13 (1929), p. 31, and Kaufman-29a, p. 91. No
data for annual import plans for 1928/29-1931/32 for reasons discussed
below for IrAll other imports. "
Annual imports of industrial and transportation equipment planned for
first FYP (excluding agricultural equipment). Figure for 1932/33 from
SUA, Vol. VIII, No. 13 (May 1929), p. 31. Imports planned for 1928/29-
1931/32 based on index labeled "Imports of industrial and transport
equipment and agricultural equipment 1928/29 - 1932/33" (cited in
Angers-29a, p. 13) and the above noted figure for planned imports of
industrial and transportation (but not agricultural equipment).
Summing the annual plan figures so derived yields 1784 million rubles
for the FYF, which is exactly the total planned imports for the entire
FYF for industrial and transport equipment alone. Two conclusions
are possible: 1) projected imports of agricultural machinery was to
grow as fast as industrial and transport machinery, or 2) the table
was most likely mislabeled.
Annual imports of raw materials planned for firstFYF. Figure for
planned raw material imports for 1932/33 from SUA, Vol. VIII, No.
13 (May, 1929), p. 31. Figures for raw material imports planned
for 1928/29 - 1931/32 based on annual index of raw materials for
1928/29 - 1932/33 (cited in Anders-29a, p. 13) with the value of raw
material imports planned for 1932/33 (cited in Kaufman-29a, p. 9l).
Summing the annual plan figures for 1928/29 to 1932/33 so derived
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give s us 2046. 4 million rubles, the figure cited as total imports of
raw materials planned for the entire first FYP (in Kaufman-29a,
p. 91). VSNKh had projected raw material imports for 1932/33 at
577 million rubles as compared to Torgplan's projection of 523. 3
million rubles (Kaufman- 29a, p. 91).
Annual imports of Ilall other goods" (which includes "se.mi-processed
materials, II fuels, agricultural producers' goods, consumers' goods
and "other imports") planned for first FYF. Figure for 1932/33
based on sum of individual components (listed in parentheses) from
data in Table XIII. 10. Figures for 1928/29 - 1931/32 derived as a
residual from planned total annual imports minus planned annual
imports of "machinery" and "raw material." No data has been
located on the annual imports planned for these years of the FYF
for these particular import classifications. See notes to Table XIII. 10
for discussion of the large sum allocated to the "other" component of
this group as compared with previous years.
Note s to Table XIII. 5
Data for index numbers for 1913 in current prices (Foreign trade for
Russia). Index for exports based on data in Table T~2. Total exports
in 1913were 1505. 9 million rubles (excluding platinum) of which 1014.2
million rubles were "agricultural exports" and 383. 9 million rubles
were "industrial exports." Total imports (from Table T- 5) in 1913
were 1374. 0 million rubles, of which 884. 4 million rubles were
producers' goods (including 172.4 million rubles of industrial and
transportation equipment, 343. 1 million rubles of raw materials,
212.4 of semi-processed materials, 91. 3 million rubles of fuel and
6. 54 million rubles of agricultural producers' equipment). 392. 0
million rubles were consumers' goods and 97. 6 million rubles were
"otherl! (unclassified). Us ing Soviet adjustments of foreign trade in
1913 for territorial loss (from Table Ill. 24), total exports were 1305.0
million rubles, total imports were 1007.0 million rubles and the
corresponding indexes are (1927/28 = 100) 166.9 and 106. 6 (current
prices).
Data for index numbers for 1913 foreign trade in constant prices.
Index numbers (1927/28 = 100) for total exports and total imports in
1913 unadjusted for territorial loss are from Tables T-25 and T-26.
1913 Rus sian Empire 1913 Soviet Territory
776
P rice Weights
1913
1926/27
1927/28
Exports
282.3
289.6
312. 3
Imports
152. 6
167. 8
169. 5
Exports Imports
241.4 113.4
247.6 124. 7
267.0 125. 9
Index number (1927/28 = 100) for total exports and total imports in
1913 us ing Soviet adjustment of 1913 foreign trade for te r ritoria1 10s s
based on 14. 5% reduction of exports in 1913 and 26.7% reduction of
imports in 1913 (Table III. 24), but see text, pp. 157 ff for relevance
of such adjustment.
Data for 1926/27 and for planned annual trade 1928/29 - 1932/33.
Based on Table XII. 4.
Note s to Table XIII. 6
Average Annual growth rates 1900 - 1913. Based on values in current
prices of total exports and total imports cited in Table III.1. See text
for discussion of long-term growth rates of imports and exports,
pp. 94-97.
Average annual growth rates 1923/24 - 1927/28. Based on values in
current prices for total exports and total imports cited in Table T-1.
Remaining figures for annual growth rates based on Table XIII. 5.
Notes to Table XIII. 7
Source. Based on Table XIII. 4 with following exception. Targeted
shares for 1928/29 - 1932/33 from Anders-29a, p. 10 an~ p. 13.
Notes to Table XIII. 8
Data for rows 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10. From Table XIII. 4.
Data for row 3. Grain exports. Actual exports of grain and related
products for 1927/28 from Table T- 11. Value of grain exports
planned for 1932/33 based on Kaufman-29a (p. 88), which stated that
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grain exports would be 21. 4% of total exports in 1932/33 and 11. 6%
for the entire 1st FYP. Total exports planned for 1932/33 were
2048 million rubles and total exports planned for entire 1st FYP
were 6971 million rubles (Table XIII. 4). Thus, the value of grain
exports planned for 1932/33 was 438 million rubles and for the entire
1st FYF was 809 million rubles. We used these estimates based
on Kaufman-29a for this table. Vop. Torg. (May, 1929, p. 92),
however, stated that grain exports for 1932/33 would be 24.7% of
total exports planned for 1932/33; this implies a higher figure for
grain exports planned for 1932/33 -- 506 million rubles -- but this
figure of Vop. Torg. was higher than an estimate of grain exports
planned for 1932/33 which can be estimated indirectly from data in
the same article in Vop. Torg. and which is almost identical to the
estimates based on Kaufman's data. This discrepancy in estimates
of grain exports planned for 1932/33 might result from different
definitions of "grain export" or reference to different grain export
plans.
The distribution of planned grain exports over the 1st FYP
is based on the following information. We know that grain exports
planned for 1932/33 were about 440 million rubles (see above).
Izve stia (June 6, 1929) stated that no grain exports were planned for
the first two years of the 1st FYP, so we have assumed that planned
grain exports were zero for 1928/29 and 1929/30; since the definition
of khlebeksport was imprecise (Appendix A, Technical Note 6) some
exports of "grain and related products" (which included oil seed and
oil cake and bran) were expected, but these probably were not large
enough to affect the basic trends portrayed in this table. The restor-
ation of grain exports was projected for the third year of the FYP in
the maximum variant and in the fourth year of the FYP in the basic
variant (Gosplan-29b, p. 99). Anders-29a (p. 10) reported that grain
exports would again be substantial in volume in 1931/32 and 1932/33,
and :only moderate grain exports were to be undertaken in 1930/31.
Of the 809 'million rubles of grain exports planned for the 1st FYP,
440 million rubles were planned for 1932/33, so that 369 million
rubles of grain were to be exported during 1930/31 and 1931/32.
Anders-29a suggested that the bulk of this 369 million rubles of grain
exports were planned for 1931/32. I have arbitrarily allocated 20% of
this amount to 1930/31 and 80% to 1931/32.
Row 7. Exports excluding projected grain exports. Row 1 minus
row 3.
Row 8. Agricultural exports excluding projected grain exports. Row 2
minus row 3.
Row 11. Balance of trade excluding proj ected grain exports. Row 7
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minus row 10.
Notes to Table XIII. 9
Explanatory Note s
~:~"Secondary agricultural exports." See source note below.
~:(~:~"Secondaryindustrial exports." See source note below.
a)Data for actual exports in 1927/28 by commodity group and for
total exports are from Vop. Torg. (May, 1929), p. 94 and from
Kaufman-29a, and therefore differ slightly from totals cited in
Table XIII. 4 and elsewhere in this study.
b)"Grains" includes grains, oil seed and oil cake, seeds, legumes,
and bran, i. e., "grain and related products. "
c)Flax, combed and tow, and flax waste. Does not include pressed
flax.
d)Excluding canned fish, which is an "industrial export. "
e)Izvestia Q"une4, 1929) stated that the industrial exports in
1932/33 were to be 1,200 million rubles which is 185.5 million
rubles higher than NKVT' s estimate of 1014. 5 million rubles sub-
mitted in March or April. It may be Gosplan's version of the plan
or an upward revision of NKVT' s plan; since it is 58.1% of total
exports~ It implies a total export of 2065 million rubles, which is
only 18 million rubles higher; this could be explained by a lowering
of agricultural export targets and/ or a switch in the clas sification
of ce rtain goods (such as oil cake, flour).
Sources
Agricultural Exports. A. 1-4 and B. 1-3 from Vop. Torg. (May 1929)
p. 94. A. la (Grain) from Table XIII. 8.
Flax (I. A. lb) included flax, combed, and "tow, " and "flax
waste" but excluded other flax products, also denoted by "flax, combed'
and also "flax, yarn." The second "flax, combed" is more processed
and is classified under "industrial exports"; the first is crudely
combed by the peasants (SUYB-30, pp. 306-311). The estimate for
projected flax exports in 1932/33 was derived by multiplying the flax
exports in 1927/28 (24.2 million rubles, according to SUYB-30,
p. 306) by a ratio (2.739) of the projected Soviet market share in
world flax exports in 1932/33 (40%) to the 1927/28 market share (14.6%),
both cited in Kaufman- 29a, p. 90. This gave us 66. 3 million rubles.
This estimate for projected flax exports was indirectly corroborated
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by subtracting the sum of all the other commodities included under
the "major crop'! category from the total projected exports of major
crops; the remainder thus would be the value of projected flax exports.
All other commodities under major crops were estimated independently;
And indeed, the remainder equals 66. 5 million rubles almost identical
to the estimate for flax exports based on the increase in market
shares.
Data for bacon, eggs, and butter export in 1927/28 from
VTSSSR-60.
IISecondary agricultural exportsl~ Denoted by asterisk were obtained
from the following: actual figures for 1927/28 from VTSSSR- 60;pro-
jected figures for 1932/33, 2343 calculated by multiplying the struc-
tural coefficients for secondary agricultural exports cited in Vop.
Torg. (May 1929) p. 94 by the total projected value of secondary
agricultural exports (166.5 million rubles) cited in Kaufman-29a,
p. 89. Since secondary agricultural exports in 1927/28 must have
been 90 million rubles, the consistency of the data cited for the plan
by Kaufman (op. cit.) and Vop. Torg. (op. cit.) was unexpectedly
confirmed by summing the specifically denoted secondary agricultural
exports for 1927/28 (from VTSSSR-60) and subtracting from the implied
total of secondary agricultural exports in 1927/28 (90 million rubles)
leaves a remainder of 19. 9 million rubles; the projected residual
"other" of secondary agricultural exports in 1932/33 was 40. 0 million
rubles. These two estimates are almost identical to the figures cited
for the major subheading 1I0ther agricultural exportsll (Row A. 4 in
our table) '. so that it is assumed that the category 1I0ther" under
secondary agricultural exports is identical to the category "other"
in the basic export groups. The other secondary exports are listed
under the appropriate subheading.
Industrial Exports. Forest and mining, food industry, and other (B. 3)
from Vop. Torg. (May 1929), p. 95. A plan for secondary industrial
exports was published also in Vop. Torg. (May 1929), p. 95 which
enabled us to calculate indirectly the value for several other commod-
ities. The plan for secondary export is presented below:
Exports of the:
Food processing industry
(excluding sugar)
Mining industry
(excluding oil and ores)
Chemical industry
Textile industry
(excluding cloth)
Other industries
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(millions of rubles)
Actual }=>lanned
1927/28 1932/33
14.3 60.8
17. 0 46.5
21. 4 70. 5
13. 5 40. 5
28.2 45.6
94.4 263. 8
Thus, we calculate planned sugar exp orts (B. 2a) as the differ ence
between the planned export of the food processing industry with and
without sugar. From Izvestia (June 4, 1929) we find that the oil seed
pressing industry (B. 2b) and the canning industry (B. 2c) will export
24.4 and 25% of total processed food products in 1932/33. Other
proces sed food exports (B.2d) is a residual of total food product
exports minus the above three. Figures for these industries for
1927/28 from SUYB-30. Mining - other (B.ld), chemical industry,
textiles (without cloth) and other miscellaneous are chemicals, and
other miscellaneous from the group "Other" (B. 3) (which is made
up of only those three industries). Value of lumber", oil, and ores in
industrial exports was found by subtracting B. ld from B. 1 (sum of
forest and mining). B.ld (other mining excluding oil and ores) was
determined from the table above. A check of this data against trade
statistic data indicates that the only ore excluded was manganese
ore while the definition of forest exports excludes wood distillation
products (which are chemical exports). (Checked against data in
SUYB- 30. )
Totals for FYP. Total exports, total agricultural and total industrial
exports for FYP: Table XIII. 4. Total wood and oil exports for FYF:
Kaufman- 29a, p. 88 stated that total wood and oil exports would be
32. 4% of total exports during the FYF. Total grain exports for FYF:
Kaufman- 29a, p. 88, "share of grain products will achieve 11. 60/0in
total exports for the entire FYF. "
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Note s to Table XIII. 10
Total Imports. Table XIII. 4
A. Producers' Goods. SUA, Vol. VIII, No. 13 (1929), p. 30.
Machinery for industry alone for the entire FYP will equal 1390
million rubles, while machinery for transportation, municipal and
other non-industrial purposes will equal 394 million rubles. SUA,
Vol. VIII, No. 13 (1929), pp. 33-34.
Kaufman-29b, p. 19, stated that agricultural producers' imports
in 1932/33 would equal 173 million rubles and would total 622.3
million ruble s for the FYP.
B. Consumer Goods. SUA, Vol. VIII, No. 13 (1929), p. 30.
C. Diverse Goods. SUA, Vol. VIII, No. 13 (1929), p. 30.
Notes to Table XIII. 11
Source. Table XIII. 4 and Gosplan-30b, pp. 230-233.
Notes to Table XIV. 1
Plan. Values from Table XIII. 8. Quantity estimate of grain exports
in the optimal variant of the foreign trade plan from Kaufman- 28f,
p. 9.
Actual. Data for 1927/28 and 1930-34 from VTSSSR-60 and includes
SOVTC 70 (grains), 58202 (bran, etc.) and 82 (£lour and legumes).
See Appendix A, Technical Note 6 for discus sian of definition of
grain products. Data for 1928/29 and 1929/30 from ~RSU, Vol. VI,
No.3 (February 1, 1931), p. 56. Exports in 1928/29 were mostly
legumes (Ibid.). Grain exports in 1930 were 4.86 million m. t.
valued at 210 million rubles in 1927/28 prices.
The value in 1927/28 prices is very rough and based on values
of Soviet grain exports in cur rent price s deflated by a price index
of 1927/28 = 100 constructed using 1926/27 quantity weights of Soviet
grain exports.
P rice index of Soviet grain exports. See Appendix F. Grains included
in index listed in Notes to Table T-26, row 2, and used 1926/27
quantity weights.
Gross harvest. From Johnson-60, p. 231.
782
Notes to Table XIV. 2
Row 1. From Table XIII. 4. Figure for 1927/28 is actual imports.
Row 2. Figure for 1927/28 from Table T- 5. Figure for 1928/29
from STAT-34, p. 381. Figure for 1929/30 from ERSU, Vol. VI,
No.3 (1931), p. 57. Sum of "Industrial, Agricultural and Automotive
Equipment" minus all agricultural- related equipment plus manufac-
tures of copper, iron and steel, wire and tin. (See Appendix A,
Technical Note 4, for Soviet definition of "Machinery and Transport
Equipment. ") Value of machinery and transportation equipment
import in 1930 was 440 million rubles according to STAT-36, p. 57l.
Figures for 1931, 1932, 1933 from STAT-36, p. 571.
Row 3. From Row 1. May also be interpreted as a volume index if
the Soviet planners assumed little price change.
Row 4. From Row 2.
Row 5. Row 2 divided by Row 6.
Row 6. P rice index of German industrial machinery excluding
agricultural and automotive equipment, from STAT JAHR.
Row 7. Value in Row 2 divided by total imports in their respective
sources.
Notes to Table XIV. 3
Source. Based on Table A. 3a, III. 23, III. 24. Data for 1922/23 and
1923/24 in current prices are approximate.
Note s to Table XIV. 4
Source. See Appendix F for description of indexes and statistical
methods.
Notes to Table XIV. 5
Source. See Appendix F for description of indexes and statistical
methods.
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Notes to Table XIV. 6
Source. See Appendix F for description of indexes and statistical
methods.
Notes to Table XIV. 7
Source. See Appendix F for description of indexes and statistical
Ire thods.
Notes to Table XIV. 8
Source. Based on Tables XIV. 6 and XIV. 7. Export price indexes
divided by import price indexes.
Notes to Table XIV. 9
Source. See Notes to Table T- 26, Appendix C, 817p••
Notes to Table XIV. 10
Source. See Notes to Table T-27 and Notes to Table T-18 for iteoms
included in each category. Statistical methods are discus sed in
Appendix F.
Notes to Table XIV. 11
Cotton Fiber. Data from Mishustin-38a, p. 202. Figures for
1924/25 - 1932 are identical to and presumably based on STAT-34,
p. 136, Table 8. STAT-34 noted that 1) figures for consumption
(of fiber) included consumption by all textile industry, 2) figures
were based on shipments plus charge in inventory (i. e., actual
consumption rather than supply), 3) figures for consumption contained
element of double- counting because of inter-plant shipments of cotton
fiber and would therefore exceed factual consumption.
Mishustin's figures for imports differs from that series
cited in VTSSSR- 60, and doe s not include yarn or Soviet cotton fibe r
exports:
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Gross Fiber Net Fiber and Yarn
Mishustin's Imports: VTSSSR-60 Imports: VTSSSR-60
Data Fiber Yarn Fiber and Yarn
1913 197.0 197.2 4.7 201. 3
1923/24 100.3 O. 1 160.4
1924/25 122.0 107. 1 1. 1 108.2
1925/26 102.6 103.2 7. 7 100.8
1926/27 138.2 162.7 0.8 163.4
1927/28 145.0 145.2 O. 3 145. 5
1929 ~:q26. 8 ~:(123. 0 o. 6 123.6
1930 :;:< 62. 7 57. 9 O. 5 48.0
1931 47.6 53.8 0.4 14.0
1932 21. 0 24.3 6.4
1933 10. 5 22.6 22.0
1934 24.0 24.9 17.9
1935 44.0 44.2 44.0
1936 15. 0 16. 7 16. 6
1937 22.0 -19.6 (net exports)
1938 16. 5 - 3. 7 (net exports)
Paper and Cardboard. Share of imports of paper and paper produced
with imported pulp, in total supply of paper (paper included both
paper and cardboard. Imports of paper (SOVTC 506), cardboard
(SOVTC 507) and industrial paper (SOVTC 508) from VTSSSR- 60
except 1928/29 which is from SUYB-30, p. 335. Domestic output of
paper and cardboard from Nutter- 62, p. 426. Total supply of paper
and cardboard is sum of import of paper, etc., plus dome stic output.
Large quantities of wood pulp were imported into Russia
and the USSR, so that the paper supply was more dependent on imports
than indicated by only the imports of paper, etc. Imports of woodpulp
and cellulose (SOVTC 505) from VTSSSR-60, except for 1928/29,
which is from SUYB - 30, p. 335. Dome stic output of woodpulp and
cellulose from NBER-56as-N0.451. 5 "All woodpulp." Total supply of
woodpulp to domestic papermaking industry is sum of domestic output
and imports, and we have assumed that the weight of paper produced
from a unit of weight of cellulose and of woodpulp, imported or domes-
tically produced, is identical, and that all woodpulp and cellulose was
used by paper industry. "Cellulose" actually refers to "chemical
woodpulp.l' Then, fraction of domestic paper, etc., produced from
imported pulp was assumed to be the ratio of the weight of imported
pulp to total supply of pulp. The weight of the domestic paper output
produced with imported pulp was estimated by multiplying total
domestic paper output by the fraction of imported pulp to total pulp.
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The total supply of paper based directly or indirectly on imports
equalled the sum of 1) imports of paper, etc., and 2) the domestic
paper output produced with imported pulp. The fraction of the
domestic paper supply dependent on imports was estimated by
dividing the supply of paper based directly or indirectly on imports
by the total supply of paper, etc.
Tanning Materials. Data cited in de Tchikatchef-55a, p. 126, from
Soviet sources.
Wool. Net supply to state industry. Net imports of fiber and yarn
plus state (planned procurements). Net imports of wool in fiber
and yarn equal net imports (imports minus exports) of fiber (SOVTC
511) plus imports of yarn (SOVTC 514004) from VTSSSR- 60. Planned
procurements by the state agencies for 1926/27 and 1927/28 from
SUYB-29 (p. 239). Data for state procurement for 1928 - 1938 from
Nimitz- 54, p. 35. Procurement data is in unwashed equivalents,
import data in washed equivalents - - they differ by about 5%.
Copper. Imports as share of total supply of electrolytic copper to
economy. Copper imports from VTSSSR- 60 and include copper
(SOVTC 27000) and rolled copper (SOVTC 27200). Imports do not
include copper wire, etc. Output of blister copper from Nutter- 62,
p. 420 reduced 5% for los s in converting blister copper into electro-
lytic as estimated in Turgeon-53, p. 33.
Lead. Imports as share of total supply to economy. Total supply
equal output plus imports. Imports of lead (SOVTC 27004) from
VTSSSR-60. Output of lead from .NBER-56a, No.209.1. Data for
1929 and 1930 interpolated and basis of data for 1928/29, 1929/30,
1931 in same series.
Zinc. Imports as share of total supply to economy. Total supply
equals output plus imports. Imports of zinc (SOVTC 27003 and SOVTC
27206 rolled zinc) from VTSSSR- 60; does not include zinc imported
in galvanized objects, babbit, paint, bronze, brass. Output of zinc
from NBER~56a, No. 210.1. Data for 1929 and 1930 interpolated on
basis of data for 1928/29,1929/30, 1931 in same series.
Nickel. Share of imports of unalloyed nickel to nickel supply in
unalloyed form (i. e., excludes nickel imported in stainless steel
and other alloys as well as nickel content of naturally alloyed are
used domestically. Imports from VTSSSR- 60 include unworked
nickel (SOVTC 27006) and rolled nickel (SOVTC 27208). Output from
Shimkin-52, p. 74.
Tin Imports. VTSSSR- 60. Includes only tin in raw form (SOVTC
27005) and does not inc lude tin imports in other forms such as
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tinplate, bronze, chemicals, etc.
Rolled Ferrous Metals. Imports of rolled steel and allied products
(pipe, metal article s) as percent of total supply of total rolled steel
and pipe and imported ferrous metal articles (metizy). Imports from
VTSSSR-60 and include rolled steel (SOVTC 264), ferrous metal for
further processing and quality steel (SOVTC 265), pipes and cylinders
(SOVTC 266-267), and metal articles (metizy) (SOVTC 268-269).
Output data from Gerschenkron-53a, p. 19, p. 31 and NBER-56a, No.
108. 1. Sum of "total rolled steel including forgings and pipe from
ingot" and "cast iron pipe." Data for total rolled steel for 1929 and
1930 from STAT-60, p. 254; estimates for cast pipe in 1929 and 1930
roughly interpolated from data for 1928/29 and 1929/30.
Notes to Table XIV. 12
Source. See Notes to Table T- 18, Appendix C.
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APPENDIX C
NOTES TO TABLES IN TABULAR SECTION
Notes to Table T-l
Actual foreign trade data
1922/23 and 1923/24. Kaufman-29d, p. 7. Estimates of trade in cur-
rent prices based on revaluation of official data recorded in 1913
prices. See Appendix A, Technical Note 2, p. 710.
1924/25 - 1927/28. Export data from Table T-2. Import data from
Table T -4.
Foreign trade plans
1922/23 Plan. See text, p.181-182.
1923/24 Plan A. Export and import plan from a report made by Krasin
in January, 1924, as cited in Krasin-28, pp. 141-142. Krasin stated
that exports would be IIgreater than one -half billion rubles" and the
import would be "hardly greater than 300-350 million rubles. "
1923/24 Plan B. Export and import plan from Sobolev-26a, p. 72.
Sobolev-26a (p. 66) reported that the original plan was confirmed on
September 7, 1923, and that subsequent revisions were confirmed on
February 15, 1924 and again on June 2, 1924.
1924/25 Plan A. Export and import plan from EIKSSSR, p. 45. No
date was given, but apparently the date was September, 1924.
1924/25 Plan B. Export and import plan in final revised version from
Sobolev-26a, p. 72. Sobolev-26a (p. 66) stated that the original plan
was confirmed on September 29, 1924, the first revision was confirmed
in March, 1925, and the final revision was confirmed on June 17, 1925.
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1925/26 Plan A. Gosplan's original control figures for exports and
assuming Plan B's figures for imports. Gosplan's estimates cited in
EIKSSSR, p. 57.
1925/26 Plan B. Import and export plan cited in Rykov-26a, p. 9.
These figures are probably the orientation figures presented by NKVT
and confirmed on July 31, 1925 according to Sobolev-26a, p. 72. The
figures cited by Rykov-26a (p. 9) are more or less confirmed by Sobo-
lev-26a (p. 72), who described the export plan as being higher than one
billion rubles and the import plan as being somewhat less (than one
billion ruble s ? ) .
1925/26 Plan C. Import and export plan cited in EIKSSSR, p. 57.
These estimates are significantly lower than the plans cited above and
may be an intermediate revision made in the fall of 1925 before the
January revisions discussed below. Sokolnikov still counted on a total
export of the value of 800 million rubles at the end of November 1925
(as cited by Carr-58, p. 445 from G. Sokolnikov, Finansovaia
Politika Revoliutsii , Vol. III (1928), p. 231).
1925/26 Plan D. Sobolev-26a, p. 73. This version is probably a pre-
liminary estimate of the final revised plan adopted in January, 1926.
1925/26 Plan E. Sobolev-26b, p. 30. Also reported in Rykov-26a,
p. 9 and Ekon. Zhisn I, September 1, 1926, p. 1.
1926/27 Plan A. Sobolev-26b, p. 27, citing Gosplan-26 (original con-
trol figures for 1926/27). No page reference for Gosplan-26.
1926/27 Plan B. Gosplan's revised control figures for foreign trade
cited Sobolev-26b, p. 32.
1926/27 Plan C. NKT's original plan as reported in Kaufman-26b
(cited by Sobolev-26b, p. 32). The Commissariat of Finance projected
even lower figures for exports (Sobolev-26b, p. 32).
1926/27 Plan D. NKT's final revised plan (?) reported by Baksht-27a,
p. 43.
1927/28 Plan. Little is known about the 1927/28 foreign trade plan.
These estimates are probably projections of imports and exports made
some tim~ after the beginning of the economic year. See text, pp.
396-398 for the basis of these rough estimates.
Notes to Table T-2
The basic source for Table T-2 was the reclassification of Soviet
export data from VTSSSR -60 to make it conform more or les s with the
export classification during the 1920's as described in Appendix A,
Technical Notes 4, Table A. 4a. Since no data in current prices wer e
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available for 1923/24, we have used the rough breakdown presented in
Kutusov-28, p. 34; the structure of 1923/24 exports in 1913 prices is
presented in an explanatory note below (Item 6 on p. 791.)
Commodities in VTSSSR-60 were classified according to the
SOVTC system described in Appendix A, Technical Note 5, Table A. 5.
Thus, exports in VTSSSR -60 had to be reclas sified into the following
groups according to the distribution of commodities listed in the table
below. The SOVTC numbers are listed after a short descriptive title
of commodity groups.
Reclassification of VTSSSR-60 Data for Soviet Exports
to Conform with Export Classification System Used During the 1920'sa
I. AGRICULTURAL EXPORTSb
A. agricultural crops
grains 70
oil seed 720
legumes 821
bran 581
oil cake 580
flour 820
B. animal pr oducts
butter 80100
animal lard and fats 80101
milk products, other 802
eggs 803
poultry, bacon, other
meats (800-80005)d
animals for slaughter 71
C. fur and fish
fur 52
D. agricultural - other
fats and oils, industrial 57
tea 72103
spices 722
flax and hemp 51003, 004, 006,
008, 013
tobacco 54
other seeds 55
herbs and medicinal crops 56
animals not for food 60
wool 511
silk 512 d
hides and skins (53-531)
other inedible animal products
(59 -591-592)d
d
fish, non-canned (81-813 -81500)
raw materials - edible other
726
vegetables, not canned
(83-834)d
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II. INDUS TRIAL
A. forestry
forest products 50
B. mining products
solid fuels 20
crude oil 21
oil products 22
c. food industry
corn starch 723
margarine 725
canned products 834, 80005,
813, 81500
sugar, etc. 840
edible vegetable oils
841, 842
D. other industries
1. textile industry
cloth 90
clothing and linen 91
yarns 514
metallic ores 24
non-metallic ores 25
proces sed fruit, etc. 843
alcoholic products 844
tobacco 846
flavoring and foodstuffs 847
industrial textiles 592
cotton down 51001
rags 51014
2. metallurgical and metal-working
machinery 1
ferrous metals 26
3. chemical industry
chemicals 3
4. other
non-ferrous metals 27
wire 29
matches 98207
building mate rials 4
leather 53100,53101
manufactures not elsewhere
specified (9-90-91-98207)d
a
See Table A. 4a.
b
Commodities listed in groups A-D make up "agricultural exports."
c
Included SOVTC numbers 70, 581, 820, 821, and therefore included
some manufactured macaroni products.
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Table Notes (continued)
d Minus sign (-) indicates that the value was derived by subtracting
selected commodities (identified by SOVTC number) from a more ag-
gregate group of commoditie s.
The resulting reclassification fitted fairly well with the classi-
fication presented in Kutusov-28, pp. 317 -319 (millions of rubles).
1913 1923/24 1924/25 1925/26 1926/27
Agricultural exports
VTSSSR-60 reclass'd
Kutusov-28
Industrial exports
VTSSSR-60 reclass ld
Kutusov-28
1114.5
1121.9
391.4
384.0
250.7
248.4
120.9
120.8
338.1
342.4
220.7
216.2
430.6
429. 1
246. 1
247.5
476.8
471.7
302.6
298.8
The discrepancy in 1926/27 was due largely to the lower figur e for total
exports cited by Kutusov. The discrepancy between these series and
the series cited in STAT-34 was due largely to the classification of
flour, oil cake, and br an as "indus trial exports. I'
Explanatory notes to Table T -2
Item a. Total exports from Table A-3a, col. 3, in Appendix A, Tech-
nical Note 3a, pp. 728 ff. except export figures in current prices for
1923/24, is from Kutusov-28, p. 34.
Item b. The classification of exports in 1923/24 is based on partial
data in current prices available in Kutusov-28, p. 34. "Agricultural
exports" and "industrial exports" are taken directly from Kutusov-28,
p. 34. "Agricultural crops" is sum of khlebprodukt, len i kudel', and
pen 'ka i paklia." "Animal products" included maslo, iaitsa, shetina,
and konvolos. "Fur and fish products" included only pushnina. There
was a substantial sum included in "other" under agricultural products,
which implied that the above three categories were understated. "Oil
seed" included all seeds. "Mining products" included only oil products
and manganese ore.
The data for 1923/24 in VTSSSR-60 were recorded only in 1913
prices, but were also reclassified according to the same system de-
scribed above. The results of this reclassification are the following
(in millions of rubles in 1913 prices and percentage of total exports):
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Total exports 371.3 100% Industrial 120.9 32.6%
Agricultural 250.7 67.5% exports
exports Timber 48.3 13.0%
Crops 184.9 49.8% Mining 52.8 14.2%
Animal products 39.5 10.6% Food 4.7 1.3%
Fur and fish 25.4 6.8% Textiles 2.4 0.6%
Other agricultural 0.9 0.0%
Item c. "Grain products" included SOVTC numbers: 70, 820, 581 (es-
sentially grains, flour, and bran). See Appendix A, Technical Note 6.
Item d. Raw furs from VTSSSR -60, SOVTC 520. Caviar from
VTSSSR-60, SOVTC 81600, 81601.
Item e. "Industrial exports" shown in Table T -2 were calculated as a
residual by subtracting "agricultural exports" from "total exports"
and differ slightly from the value of exports.
Note s to Table T-3
Source: Data for the quantities of individual commodities exported were
taken from VTSSSR -60. Entries for some commodities may include
more than one SOVTC classification (for example, for flax), in which
case, the SOVTC classifications included for any single commodity are
listed in the table in Notes to Table T-2. "Grain products" included
SOVTC numbers 70, 580, 820, and 821; data are from Table T-9.
Notes to Table T-4
Source: Based on Table T -2. See Notes to Table T -2 for meaning of
brackets in series for 1923/24.
Notes to Table T-5
Source: All data from Kaufman-29a, p. 86, with the following excep-
tions. Figure s for the following commodities were taken from
VTSSSR-60 as identified by their SOVTC number: rubber (35000), fruit
(83), cloth (90), non-ferrous metals for 1913 (27), grain products (70
plus 820 plus 821).
Explanatory note: See Table A. 4b for detailed description of com-
modities clas sified under each heading.
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Notes to Table T-6
Source: All data taken from VTSSSR-60. Each commodity is identi-
fied by the SOVTC number.
cotton, 51000
wool, 511
hides, 530
rubber, 35000
non-ferrous metals, 27
ferrous metals, 26
paper, 506, 507, 508
leather, 531
coal, 200
tractors and agricultural
machinery, 18
tea, 72103
herring, 811022
fruit, 83
sugar, 84000
grain products, 70, 820, 821
cloth, 90
Note s to Tabl e T -7
Source: Based on Table T-5.
Notes to Table T-8
Col. 1: Year of harve st.
Col. 2: Split-year refers to either the agricultural year running from
July 1 to June 30th, or economic year running from October 1 to Sep-
tember 30th, as may be indicated in the column.
Col. 3: Gross harvest: figures for Sov. Terr. 1909-1930 from Dia-
mond-55, pp. 27 -30, which cited Gosplan-29a, p. 414 for adjusted pre-
1914 production figures. Pre-revolutionary production figures were
adjusted upward by 19% for a 90/0underestimate in acreage and a 9%
underestimate in grain yields. See Diamond-55, p 4 and Jasny-49, pp.
725-726. Diamond-55 took data for 1922-1930 from STAT-35, p.
301 and STAT -36, p. 343.
Col. 4: Net harvest: Johnson-60, p. 234. Net harvest is basically
gross harvest minus grain required for seed and feed.
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Gol. 5: Estimates for all years except 1923/24 based on estimated
share of planned agencies in total grain purchases and data for grain
procurements cited in Timoshenko-32, p. 464, where he compares
these figures to Gosplan's estimates of grain delivery to cities:
Timoshenko Data
(millions of metric tons)
1924/25
1925/26
1926/27
1927/28
1928/29
Procurements Procure-
by planned a- ment by
gencies as planned
fraction total agencies
marketings
55% 4.6
65% 8.4
75-80% 10.8
85% 10.3
Derived
estimate
for total
marketing
8.0
12.2
13.4-13.9
12.2
10.8
Gosplan's
estimates of
deliveries
to cities
9.4
9.8
8.3
8.3
Data for 1923/24 from Balaban-28, p. 211. Balaban's figures for
1924/25 are similar but slightly higher than those derived from Timo-
shenko's data. Balaban's cited purchases by planned agencies at 4.6
million tons, and total grain marketing by peasants at 8.68 million
tons, purchases by planned agencies comprised 530/0of the crop.
Gol. 6: Data for 122/23 - 1927/28 from Timoshenko-32, pp. 462-463,
550, 551. Figures for 1922/23 and 1923/24 included payments of
taxes in kind. Data for 1924/25 - 1927/28 were adjusted to include
organizations, which were later added to list of planned grain procure-
ment agencies. Data for 1928/29 were summed from quarterly data
in Table T-I0.
Gol. 7: Exports of grain products in agricultural year. Figure for
1924/25 from Balaban-28, p. 213. Oil seed and oil cake exports were
492, 000 m. t. in 1924/25. Figures for 1925/26 were from Balaban-28,
p. 216. Oil seed and oil cake were 619, 000 m. t. in 1925/26. Figure s
for 1926/27 from Kovner -27 a, p. 7.
"Export of grain and related products" in agricultural years were
2,985,200 m.t. in 1923/24 (AY), 885,300 m.t. in 1924/25 (AY),
2,643,000 m. t. in 1925/26 (AY), and 3,068, 000 m. t. in 1926/27 (AY).
Data were from Kutusov-28, p. 65.
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Gal. 8: Sum of quarterly data from Table T-I0. Similar data cited
for 1924/25 and 1925/26 from SUA, Vol. V, No. 22 (1926), p. 9, for
1926/27 to 1928/29 from SUYB-30, p. 269.
Gal. 9: Figures for 1913, 1922/23 - 1927/28, 1929, 1930 from
VTSSSR-60. Sum ofSOVTG 70, 581, 82. Figure for 1909-1913 from
Table III. 4.
Notes to Table T-9
Years 1914, 1922/23 to 1927/28 Figures from VTSSSR-60
Row Item SOVTG Row Item SOVTG
1 grain 70 8 from row 1
3 wheat 70000 9 bran 581
4 rye 70001 10 other(flour) 820
5 barley 70002 11 sum of rows 12-14
6 oats 70003 12 from row 7
7 sum of rows 8-10 13 oil seed 720
14 oil cake 580
See Appendix A, Technical Note 6 for definition of grain, grain products
and grain and related products.
Year 1909 -1913 figures from Table III. 4.
Notes to Table T-I0
Gal. 1: Data for third quarter 1925 to second quarter 1927 from
Kovner -27 a, p. 7.
Gal. 2: Data for fourth quarter 1923 to third quarter 1925 from
Kutusov-28, p. 40.
Gals. 3-5: Data for 1924-3 to 1928-2 from Timoshenko-32, p. 551,
and are adjusted for changes in the definition "planned organization. "
Data for 1928-3 to 1929-4 from SUYB-30, p. 271, under "Purchases
of grain products by principal planning and purchasing organizations."
For overlapping dates these data coincided closely with data cited by
Timoshenko.
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Cols. 6-7: Data for third quarter 1925 to third quarter 1926 from
Vinogradski-27, p. 10, and SUA, Vol. VI, No.9 (1927), p. 34.
Second quarter estimated by subtracting from totals. Data for fourth
quarter 1926 to fourth quarter 1929 from SUYB-30, p. 271.
Notes to Table T -11
Actual exports
1909 -13 yearly average. Data for value and quantity for Russia from
Vissarionov-28 (see Table III. 2 and III. 4). Data for Soviet territory
from Table III. 23. See Appendix A, Technical Note 6 for definition of
"grain products" and "grain and related products. "
1913, 1923/24 - 1927/28. All data from VTSSSR-60. "Grain products"
included SOVTC classifications 70, 581, 820, 821. "Grain and related
products" included "grain products," oil cake (SOVTC 580) and oil
seed (SOVTC 720). Values in current prices for 1923/24 are from
Kutusov-28, p. 34.
Planned exports
1924/25. Table VlI-1 (for European borders only).
1925/26. See text, p. 263 and Table VIII. 1.
1926/27. Table IX. 1.
Notes to Table T-12
Col. 2: Data for 1913-1930 from Table T-8. Data for 1931-38 from
Johnson -60, p. 231.
Col. 3: Index based on "1913 equals 100" for data in col. 1.
Col. 4: Data for 1913, 1925-1928 from Table T-48, Part A. Data for
1929-1938 are estimates by Eason-63 (pp. 72-73), which are presented
in Part B of Table T-48.
Col. 5: Index based on "1913 equals 100" for data in col. 4.
Col. 6: Col. 1 divided by col. 4.
Col. 7: Index based on "1913 equals 100" for data in col. 6.
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Explanatory Note: Timoshenko-32 (p. 411) cited a similar series
based on Gosplan-29a (pp. 408-412) and Gosplan's Control Figures for
1929/30.
Harvest Population Per Capita Harvest
million 1913=100 millions kilograms 1913=100
m. t.
1913 81. 6 100.0 140.0 584. 1 100.0
1925 74.7 91.3 144.5 518.5 88.8
1926 78.4 96.0 147 .9 532.3 91. 1
1927 73.6 90.2 151.3 489.6 83.8
1928 72.7 89. 1 154.8 469.4 80.4
Notes to Table T-13
1909-13. Foreign trade of Russian Empire in current prices and 1913
prices assumed to be identical. Annual average exports for 1909-13
from Vissarionov-28, pp. 494-497. Annual average imports from
Prozorovskii in Varga-32, p. 129.
1909 -13. Exports from Soviet territory in 1909 -13 from III. 23.
1913 Foreign trade of Rus sia. Data from VTSSSR-60 excluding plati-
num exports. See Appendix A, Technical Note C.
1913 Foreign trade of Rus sia in 1913 from future Soviet territory of
1925. Estimates of foreign trade in 1913 from III. 24. Assumed all
platinum exports from Soviet territory. For other estimates, see
League-28, p. 684.
In current prices
1922/23 and 1923/24. Estimates from Kaufman-29d, p. 7.
1924/25 - 1927/28. VTSSSR-60, adjusted to exclude platinum exports.
See Appendix A, Technical Notes 2 and 3.
1928/29. League-32b, p. 259.
In constant prices
1922/23 (European borders) and 1923/24 - 25/26. Data from League-
28a, p. 694.
1926/27 - 1928/29. Data from SDYB-30, p. 286.
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Notes to Table T -14
Row 1. Imports of merchandise, c. i. £. Official data for 1924/25-
1927/28 are from column 4 of Table A. 3a. Official data for 1928/29-
1930/31 are based on quarterly data in Table A. lb. The import data
are identical to the import data cited in Shenkman-32a, p. 539.
Row 2-6. Data from Shenkman-32a, p. 539.
Row 7-8. Data from Shenkman-32a, p. 553.
Row 9. Total debit items on current account. Sum of rows 1 through 8.
Row 10. Exports of merchandise, £. o. b. Official data for 1924/25-
1927/28 from column 3 of Table A. 3a. Official data for 1928/29-1930/31
are based on quarterly data in Table A.lb. These export figures are
based on official data and are not revised downward for possible over-
valuation which might have been caused by exports of commodities to
warehouses abroad. Shenkman-32a (pp. 536-538) and Birmingham-32a
(pp. 2 - 3, 18) conside red the official valuation of Soviet exports to be
too high because large quantities of goods were shipped abroad unsold
and then sold at lower prices than recorded on the export invoice.
(Appendix A, Technical Note 2 (pp. 710 ff. ) discussed the problem of
valuing exports which were warehoused abroad.) Shenkman-32 and
Birmingham- 32a the refore revalued Soviet exports (according to a
procedure described in Birmingham-32a, p. 18); these estimates are
compared with the official data below. Both sets of data are from
Birmingham- 32a (p. 3).
Soviet Exports
(millions rubles)
24/25 24/25 25/26 26/27 27/28 28/29 29/30 30/31
Revised data 530 650 735 743 840 965 836
Official data 559 677 780 778 878 1002 890
Difference -29 -27 -45 -35 -38 -37 -54
In estimating the Soviet balance of payments, Shenkman-32a
(p. 539) and Birmingham-32a (p. 5) used these revised (lower) export
data, so that their estimates of the Soviet balance of trade and Soviet
balance on current account would show larger deficits (smaller sur-
pluses) than indicated in Rows 15 and 16 of Table T -14. These differ-
ences are illustrated below:
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Balance of Trade (Surplus +, Deficit - )
(millions of ruble s)
1924/25 25/26 26/27 27/28 28/29 29/30 30/31
a
-165 - 79 +66 -168 +42 - 66 -154Table T -14
b
-106 +21 -203 + 4 -103 -208Shenkman-32a -194
Balance on Current Account (Surplus +, Deficit - )
(millions of rubles)
1924/25 25/26 26/27 27/28 28/29 29/30 30/31
c
- 195 -138 - 5 -247 -53 -195 -299Table T -14
d
-224 -165 -50 -282 -232 -353Shenkman- 32 -91
a Row 15 of Table T -14.
b
"Revidierte Zahlen, Warenausfuhr" minus "Wareneinfuhr" in
Shenkman-32a, p. 539.
cRow 16 of Table T -14.
d Row 16 of Table T -14 plus difference between "official data" and
'Shenkman's revised data" for Soviet exports as shown above.
Thus, the estimate s of the balance of trade and balance of pa yments
in Table T -14 are conservative compared to Birmingham-32a and
Shenkman-32a. Our estimates also omitted "smuggled exports"
because the receipts were not accessible to the official authorities for
making international payments; smuggled imports are included in our
accounts because of the net expenditure of foreign exchange (especially
in the mid-1920's) to support the exchange-rate of the ruble on domes-
tic and foreign markets.
Row 11-13. From Birmingham-32a, p. 13, items II. 3, II. 4, and III.
Row 14. Total credit items on current account sum of rOws 10 through
13.
Row 15. Balance of trade. Row 10 minus rOw 1.
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Row 16. Balance of current accounts. Row 14 minus rOw 9.
Row 17. Net change in outstanding Soviet foreign debt from October 1
to September 30 (increases in foreign debt are a credit [+]). Birming-
ham-32a, p. 13, item 11.1 under "Incomes".
Row 18. Balance of net capital flow and current accounts. Row 16 plus
row 17.
Row 19. Increase in foreign currency reserves. Birmingham-32a,
p. 13.
Row 20. Decrease in foreign currency reserves. Birmingham-32a,
p. 13.
Row 21. Precious metal imports including silver and gold (debit [-]).
Birmingham-32a, p. 13. See also Table T -16 and Appendix D.
Row 22. Precious metal exports including gold, platinum, and silver
(credit [+]). Birmingham-32a, p. 13. See also Table T -16 and
Appendix D.
Row 23. Net precious metal movement. Net exports are denoted by
a plus sign (+). Sum of rOws 21 and 22.
Row 24. Net balance of pre cious metal movement and change s in
Soviet foreign currency reserves. Sum of rOws 19, 20 and 23. These
figures represent the net expenditure of foreign reserve holdings to
cover that portion of the deficit on current account, which was not
financed by increases in Soviet foreign debt (as indicated in Row 18).
Row 25. "Statistical discrepancy." Sum of rOw 18 and row 24. This
item is analogous to the item IV. "Items not accounted for under above
headings" in Birmingham- 32a, p. 13, and to "Sonstige Posten" in
Shenkman-32a, p. 553. The differences between these estimates and
the "Statistical Discrepancy" listed in Row 25 of Table T -14 are ac-
counted for by the different (official) export figures used for Table T -14
and by the omission of "smuggled exports."
Notes to Table T -15
Shenkman Data. All data from Shenkman-32a, p. 547.
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Real Debt. "Real debt" referred to 1) acceptance and other bank
credits for import financing (for imports already delivered) including
credits granted to the Soviet "Cooperative Wholesale Society" and to
Soviet banks in foreign countries, 2) bank and broker's advances for
exports, and 3) bills drawn by foreign suppliers of imports (for im-
ports already delivered).
Contingent liabilities. "Contingent liabilities" referred to 1) credits
extended to the USSR and secured by commodities warehoused abroad,
2) liabilities incurred in connection with orders placed but not deliv-
ered.
The implied difference between "real debt" and contingent
debt" is that increases in "real debt" reflected a capital mOvement to
cover a balance of payments deficit (estimated in the traditional man-
ner) while contingent liability reflects 1) credits extended against
Soviet commodities already exported (and, hence, cannot be consid-
ered available to finance the balance -of-payments deficit, and 2) cre-
dits granted to the Soviet importers, for commodities and machine ry
on order but not delivered. In fact, however, if such credits against
goods were not received, and foreign firms required a deposit for
goods lion order, II the pressure on the Soviet balance of payment
would be even worse than indicated in Table T -14.
Soviet estimates of Soviet foreign debt
January 1, .1932. Rozengolz-35a, p. 9.
January.1, 1933. ARCC-36, p. 343.
February.1935. New York Times, February 21, .1935.
October 1, 1935. Rozengolz-35a, p. 9.
November 1, .1935. Rozengolz-36a.
July 1, 1936. Rozengo.1z-36a.
Notes to Tab.1e T -16
Part A. Appendix D, Table D. 8, pp. 851 ff.
Part B. Appendix D, Table D. 9, pp. 852ff.
Notes to Table T -17
See Notes to Table E. 3, pp. 869 ff.
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Notes to Table T -18
Col. 1: Soviet definition of consumer goods imports. From Table T -5.
Figures for 1913 included "other" which probably consisted of unallo-
cated consume r goods. Consume rs I goods imports alone equalled
392.0 million rubles and 28.5% of total imports in 1913.
Col. 2: Commodities imported for consumption without any Or little
additional proces sing. This category included the following commod-
ities identified by saVTC number (all data from VTSSSR -60).
54 tobacco
70 grain
71 livestock for slaughter
72 other edible vegetable
prod. (tea)
8 foodstuffs
90 cloth
91 clothing
92 haberdashery
93 footwear
94 housewares
95 furniture
96 medicines
97 appliances (except 971,
e Ie ctric lamps)
98 miscellaneous consumer
goods
Col. 3: Imports of commodities for direct consumption (col. 2) plus
raw and semi-processed materials used to produce manufactured
consumer goods.
510 natural crop fibers 53 hides, skins and .leathe r
511 wool 310 dyestuffs
512 silk 312 tanning materials
514 thread, yarn, etc. 313 tanning extracts
Col. 4: Imports of commodities for direct consumption and imports
of raw materials and semi-processed materials for manufactured
goods (col. 3) plus paper and related products.
505 pulp 507 cardboard
506 paper 508 other paper products
Col. 5: Above listed imports for consumption (col. 4) plus other raw
material which are used to produce consume r goods.
560
561
563
570
natural aromatic prin-
ciples
artificial aromatic
principles
medicinal raw materials
apimal fats, industrial
(soap)
571 fish oil
590 bristles, animal hair, etc.
307 intermediate products for
aniline dye industry
23 photographic materials
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Col. 6: Above list imports (col. 5) plus rubber (SOVTC 35000) and
aluminum (SOVTC 27007) which were used extensively for producing
consumers I goods in 1913 and during the NEP. See Marbury-55, p. 31
and Zec-55, p. 72 for uses of rubber and aluminum for producing
consumers I goods.
Notes to Table T -19
Soviet exports during NEP have been reclassified into mOre
precisely defined "producing sectors" to aid in analyzing the problems
of restoring Soviet exports to pre -1914 levels. The Soviet definition
of agricultural exports was peculiar in that it included fur and fish
exports and excluded sugar and vegetable oil and (at various times)
flour, bran, and oil cake.
Col. 1: Agricultural exports and exports of products produced directly
from agricultural produce. The definition of "agricultural exports" is
based on the Soviet definition of "agricultural exports" (as de scribed
in Table A. 4a in Technical Note 4 of Appendix A) with the following
exceptions. Fur (SOVTC 52) and fish (SOVTC 81) exports were ex-
cluded and exports of sugar (SOVTC 84000-001), vegetable oil (SOVTC
841), flour (SOVTC 820), bran (SOVTC 581) and oil cake (SOVTC 580)
were included. The last three items we re also included in the data
for "agricultural exports" in Table T -2. The data for col. 1 is based
on the data for agricultural exports in Table T -2 minus SOVTC 52 and
81 and plus SOVTC 84000-001 and 841.
Col. 2: Fur and fish. From VTSSSR-60 and included SOVTC 52 (Furs)
and SOVT C 81 (Fi sh).
Col. 3: Timber and mining products. Figures from Table T -2.
Col. 4: Miscellaneous industrial products (includes cloth, machines,
chemicals). Col. 5 minus sum of col. 1, col. 2, and col. 3.
Col. 5: Total exports. From Table T -2.
Notes to Table T -20
General comments. This table, unless otherwise specified, shows
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gros s exports of selected products as a % of gros s output marketing
Or "procurements by centrally controlled planned procurement agen-
cies (during the NEP}." Percentages, unless otherwise specified,
were calculated on the basis of annual averages for 1909-13, the calen-
dar year 1913, and the economic years 1924/25-1927/28. Economic
years are denoted by EY and agricultural years, when used as the
basis of calculation, are denoted by AY.
Basic source for export-output ratios. Unless otherwise noted in notes
for individual products, data for 1909-1913, 1924/25, 1925/26, 1926/27
from M. Kaufman, "Eksport i narodnoe khoiaistvo, " Voprosy Torgovli
No.1, 1928 as cited in Mikoain.28a, p. 19 and is cited elsewhere in this
study as Kaufman-28f. Some of Kaufman-28f's yearly average export
data do not coincide with the averages calculated from Vissarionov-28.
It is not known if these ratios refer to Russia or to Soviet territory of
Russia in 1909~13 and 1913.
Grain products
Row 1. Exports of grain products as % of gross harvest in economic
year. Data based on rows 1 and 6 of Table T -51.
Row 2. Exports of grain products as % of "total marketing" in agri-
cultural year. Data based on rows 2 and 5 of Table T -51. Page 265,
n. 50 discusses concept of gross, total and net marketing. No
data is available for pre-1914 period. See Table III. 5 for exports as
fraction of "shipments on domestic transportation. "
Row 3. Exports of grain products as % of "procurements by planned
agencies," in agricultural year. Data based on rows 3 and 5 of Table
T -51. No data available for 1909-13, 1913, 1927/28.
Row 4. Exports of grain products as % of "procurements by planned
agencies" in economic year. Data based on rows 4 and 6 of Table
T -51.
Wheat
Row 5. Gross exports as % of gross output. Data based on rOWS7 and
9 of Table T -51. Figure for 1909-13 for Russian Empire. Mishustin-
38b (p. 94) cited 17.4% for 1909-13. Figure for 1913 based on output of
Soviet territory and exports of Russian Empire and would normally
tend to overstate the export-output ratio; recall that the separated
territories were probably large net importers of wheat from the rest
of Russia.
Row 6. Net expo rts as % of gros s output. Data bas ed on row 7
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divided into the remainder of row 9 minus row 10 in Table T -51. See
comments for Row 5.
Row 7. Net exports as % of "procurements by centrally planned agen-
cies." Data from rOw 8 and the remainder of row 9 minus rOw 10 in
Table T-51. No comparable data exists for pre-1914 years. Gross
exports of wheat as a % of shipments of wheat on domestic transport
was 34.5% in 1909-13 (Table III. 5). A minus sign indicates net imports
and is imports as a percentage of the procurements by centrally planned
agencies.
~
Row 8. Gross exports as % of gross output. Data for 1909-13 and
1924/25-1926/27 from Kaufman-28f. Mishustin-38b (p. 94) cited 2.8%
for 1909-13. Figure for 1913 compared rye exports from Russian Em-
pire to output of Soviet territory; the separated territories were large
exporters of rye. Data for .1913and .1927/28 are based on rOws 11and 13
of Table T -51.
Row 9. Gross exports as % of procurements. Gross exports as % of
shipments of rye on domestic transport was 18.2% during 1909-13 (Table
III. 5). Percentages for 1924/25 are based on rows 12 and 13 of Tab.1e
T -51.
Barley
Row .10. Gross exports as % of gross output. Data for 1909-13 and
1924/25-1926/27 from Kaufman-28f. Mishustin-38b (p. 94) cited a
figure of 34.0% for .1909-.13. Data for .1913and .1927/28 based on rOws
14 and 16 of Table T -51. Figure for 1913 compared barley exports from
Russian Empire to output of Soviet territory; the separated territories
were significant producers and exports of bar.1ey (Groman-28a).
Row 11. Gross exports as % of procurements. Percentages for 1924/25-
1927/28 are based on rows 15 and .16of Table T -51. Gross exports of
barley exceeded shipments of bar.1ey on domestic transport during
1909-13 (Table III. 5).
Corn
Row 12. Gross export as a % of gross output. Data from Kaufman-28f.
Mishustin-38b (p. 94) cited a figure of 48.3% for 1909-.13. Figure for
1913 and 1927/28 based on data from Diamond-55 (p. 62) and VTSSSR-60
(figure for 1913 compared exports of Russian Empire to output of Soviet
te rritory).
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Oats
Row 13. Gross exports as % of gross output. Data from Kaufman-28f.
Mishustin-3Bb (p. 94) cited a figure of 6.7% for 1909-13. Figures for
1913 and 1927/2B based on data from Diamond-55 (p. 57) and VTSSSR-60
(figure for 1913 compared exports of Russian Empire to output of
Soviet territory).
Oil seed
Row 14. Exports of oil seed as a % of gross output. Data from Kaufman-
2Bf. Definition of "oil seed" not given.
Row 15. Export of all oil seed products including oil seed, oil cake, and
vegetable oil as % of gross output. Data from rows 17 and 20 of Table
T-51. EIKSSSR (pp. 337-343) cited 67% and 70% as share of exports of
oil seed and oil cake in total output of flax seed and sunflower seed in
1912.
Row 16. Export of all oil seed products including oil seed, oil cake and
vegetable oil as % of procurements. Data from rOws 1B and 20 of Table
T -51.
Flax
Row 17. Export of flax fiber and combing as % of output. Data from
Kaufman-2Bf. Kaufman's data for share of flax crop exported (BO. 5%
during 1909-13) differed from an estimate of 67.4% based on data cited
in EIKSSSR (p. 221), which stated that average annual output was
419,200 m. t. and average annual exports were 2B2, BOO m. t. during
1909-13. Pasvolsky-24 (p. 9B) cited pre-1914 flax exports about 1/3 -
1/2 of crop.
Row lB. Exports of flax fiber as % of gross output. Data from rOWS
21 and 23 of Table T -51.
Row 19. Exports of all flax product including fiber, tow, combings,
yarn and cloth as a % of gros s output. Data from rOw 21 and rOw 24 of
Table T -51.
Row 20. Exports of all flax products including fiber, tow, combings,
yarn and cloth as a % of procurements by planned agencies. Figure for
1909-13 for Soviet territory based On "marketing" and export data cited
in Mikoian-2Ba (p. 17); data are only for .1en (flax) and do not include
kudel (combings).
~
Row 21. Exports as % of output. Figures for 1909-.13 and 1924/25-
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1926/27 from Kaufman-28f. Data for 1913 and 1927/28 based on net
output figures of eggs in billions cited in Johnson-60 (p. 235) in calendar
year and export of eggs in weight from VTSSSR -60, converted into
billions (number) of eggs by the coefficient, 1 m. t. of eggs equals
14,400 eggs (cited in SUA, Vol. IX, No. 3/4 (1930), p. 58). Figure for
1913 for Russia. Other estimate calculated by the same method are
8.0% for 1924/25, 6.2% for 1925/26, 9.20/0 for 1926/27.
Row 22. Exports as % of procurements. Data from rows 26 and 27 of
Table T -51.
Butter
Row 23. Exports as % of factory output (does not include output of
small factories or individual peasants). Data from rows 28 and 31 of
Table T -51.
Row 24. Exports as % of marketing. Data from rOws 29 and 31 of
Table T-5l.
Row 25. Exports as % of procurements by state and cooperative agen-
cies. Data from rows 30 and 31 of Table T -51.
Hemp
Row 26. Exports as % of output. Data from Kaufman-28f.
Timber
Row 27. Exports in cubic meters as % of "industrial timbe r hauled in
cubic mete rs." Figure for 1909 -13 is from a diffe rent source than the
other figures in row 27; the figure of 25% for 1909-13 was cited in
Pasvolsky-24 (p. 100) from H. Kasperowicz, Forestry: Russia, its
Trade and Commerce (in Russian?), 1918.
Method and SOurces of estimates of exports and output (industrial timber
hauled) in units of "solid cubic meters. "
Output. ,Output 'f industrial timber (excluding firewood) is reported in
cubic meters (m). A series for 'Iindustrial timber hauled from State
Forest Reserve" was used as our basic time series (NBER -56a, Series
701.1) which is identical to the data for "Hauling of Timber, Commer-
cial Timber (mill. solid cubic meters)" in STAT -60, p. 312. Thus we
presume that the adjustment of volume for airspaces and stacking of
round logs had been made.
Exports. Exports of all types of wood we re reported by weight. Some
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series were also reported on the basis of volume (cubic meters). The
relationship of volume to weight for all forms of soft wood (based on
data in 1930-l~34 in VTSSSR-60,p. 139) was 1. 667 cubic m3ters per
metric ton (m /~. t.). For sawn hardwood 1was 1. 243 m /m. t. in
19~6/27, 1. 255 m /m. t. i~ 1927 /2 8, 1. 267 m / m. t. in 1932, 1. 249
m /m. t. in 1933, 1. 247 m /m. t. in 1934. We have used 1. 24 as the
coeffici~nt for converting ~awn hardwood into cubic meters.
Plywood was about 1. 43 m /m. t. for glued plywood for the years 1930-
1934. We assumed that veneer (SOVTC 502) was made from softwood
and staves and other wood products (SOVTC 503) were made from
hardwoods. A problem in comparing the output of "industrial timber
hauled" and export of timber products is that the production of sawn
wood and wood articles resulted in the loss of SOme part of the timber.
"The conversion rate from saw logs to sawn wood is assumed to have
been 1. 55 to 1 in all yearsll (Powell-59, p. 29). We use the same ratio
here to convert sawn wood and all wood products such as veneer, ply-
wood, and staves into saw log equivalents.
Roundwood. SOVTC 500. We assumed that all roundwood was soft
wood. By the conversion coefficient we know that most was soft wood.
Sawn wood. Export data were given in thousands of cubic feet for all
categories (SOVTC 50100, 50101, 50102 -07 and 50108 [hexes]). Sum of
SOVTC 50100, 50101, 50102-07, and 50108, were converted to round
wood equivalents by coefficient 1. 55 (see above).
Plywood. Export data (SOVTC 502) for plywood were given by weight
and were assumed to be all soft wood. They were converted to cubic
meters by the coefficient 1. 43 and to round wood equivalents by the
coefficient l. 55. See above for sources.
Other wood articles for productive purposes (excludes paper and pulp).
Articles in this category (SOVTC 503) are usually made from hard woods
(barrel staves, bobbins, etc.); the export data were conve rted to cubic
meters by coefficient 1. 25 and to round wood equivalents by coefficient
1. 55.
The sum of timber exports converted to solid cubic meters of round
wood were divided by the figures for I'industrial timber hauled. II
Row 28. Exports of sawn timber as a % of sawn timber output. Output
data are for "large-scale industry; figure for 1913 is from NBER -56a,
Series 703.1 and is for Soviet territory of 1925. Data for 1924/25-
1927/28 are from SUYB-29, p. 149 and are the sum of the output of
"sawn timberl! and "sawn wood" by State trusts; these figures approxi-
mate the figures for large -scale industry cited in NBER -56a, Series
703.1. Output data for 1913, 1924/25-1927/28 (in millions of cubic
meters) were 11.9, 7.40, 9.77, 10.89, 13.07 (aU for Soviet territory).
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Gross exports of sawn timber in millions of cubic meters were
3.44 in 1913 (Russian Empire), 0.91 in 1924/25, 0.84 in 1925/26, 1. 23
in 1926/27 and 1. 33 in 1927/28 (VTSSSR-66, SOVTC 501). Mishustin-
38b (p. 94) cited an export-output ratio of 30.2% for 1913.
Plywood
Row 29. ,Exports as % of output of large-scale factory output. Exports
of plywood (SOVTC 502) from VTSSSR -60 were converted into cubic
meters by 1. 43 (see notes to rOw 27 of this table) which implicitly
assumed that plywood and veneer were soft wood. Output in cubic
meters from NBER-56a, Series 702.1, col. 5.
Oil Products
Row 30. Export as a % of output ratios. The data for export-output
ratios were incorrect as cited in Kaufman-28f if they were based on
weight as cited: they were recalculated using Kaufman's data for
exports and for output.
Row 31. Gross oil product exports as a % of crude oil output. Gross
oil product exports (SOVTC 21 and 22) from VTSSSR -60. Output data
for crude oil for 1913 from ST, Vol. II, No. 43 (1927), p. 60. Output
data for crude oil for 1923/24-1927/28 from SUYB-30, p. 147.
Row 32. Exports of gasoline and napthaas % of output. Figure for 1913
from Mishustin-38b (p. 94). Export data for 1925/26-1927/28 is from
VTSSSR-60 (SOVTC 220). Output data for 1925/26, 1926/27 for three
major trusts from ERSU Vol. III, No. 14-15 (August 1, 1928), p. 259.
Output figure for 1927/28 from Gerschenkron-52, p. 8.
Row 33. Exports of kerosene as % of output. See notes to rOw 32 for
source of output data. Export data from VTSSSR -60 (SOVTC 223).
Figure for 1913 from Mishustin- 38b (p. 94).
Manganese ore
Row 34. Exports as % of output. Data for 1913, 1924/25-1927/28 from
VTSSSR -60 (SOVTC 24001) and NBER -56a, Series 212.3. Kaufman-28f's
data for 1924/25-1926/27 were similar: 84.10/0, 69.4%, 94.0%. Figure
1909-13 from Kaufman-28f.
Iron Ore
Row 35. Net exports as % of output. Output data from NBER -56a,
Series 101. 3. Export data from VTSSSR -60 (SOVTC 24000).
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Chromite Ore
Row 36. Gross exports as % of output. Output data from NBER -56a,
Series 602.3. Export data from VTSSSR -60.
Zinc-Lead Ore
Row 37. Gras s exports as % of output. Output data from NBER - 56a,
Series 211. 6. Export data from VTSSSR -60 (SOVTC 24101 and 241071).
Asbestos
Row 38. Gross exports as % of output. Figures for 1909-13 from data
of 15,840 m. t. average yearly production during 1909-13 and average
annual exports of 11,319 m. t. during 1909-13 (EIKSSSR, p. 323).
Figures for 1913, 1924/25-1927/28 based on output data from NBER -56a,
Series 731. 3 and export data from VTSSSR -60 (SOVTC 250001).
Coal
Row 39. Net exports as % of output or net imports as % of total supply.
Output data from NBER -56a, Series 303. 1. Net export or net import
data is sum of SOVTC 20000, 20001, 201, 20002 for imports (-) and
exports (t) from VTSSSR -60. The relevant figure for 1913 is in ques-
tion. Should the large net coal imports (largely for the Baltic region)
be compared to output of Russian Empire or Soviet territory of 1925?
Output in 1913 was (in millions of m. t. ) 36.0 for Russian Empire and
28.0 for Soviet territory. Net imports into "Russian Empire" were
8.6 million m. t. in 1913; the corresponding ratios of net imports as a
% of total supply was 19.3% (Russian Empire) and 23.6% (Soviet terri-
tory) .
Sugar
Row 40. Gross exports as a fraction of output. Figure for 1913 from
Mishustin-38b (p. 94), possibly only for Soviet territory. Figures for
1909-13, 1924/25-1927/28 from Kaufman-28f.
Row 41. Net exports as % of output Or net imports as % of total supply.
Export and import data from VTSSSR -60 (SOVTC 84000 and 84001).
Figures for granulated sugar output from NBER -56a, Series lU6 . .l.
Note that there were net sugar imports in 1924/25.
Cotton Cloth
Row 42. Net exports as % of output or net imports as % of total supply.
Figure for 1913 from Mishustin-38b (p. 94) possibly only for Soviet
territory. Figures for 1924/25-1927/28 based on output data from
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NBER-56a, Series 1205.1 for "large-scale industry" (in millions of
meters): 2,224 (Soviet territory) and 2,667 (Russian Empire) in 1913,
1,524 in 1924/25, 2,065 in 1925/26, 2,370 in 1926/27 and 2,607. Net
exports or imports are the difference between exports and imports
of cotton cloth (SOVTe 900 in VTSSSR -60). Meters of cotton cloth
exports in 1913measurement was based on conversion coefficients of
one m. t. equal to 10,000 meters (based on conversion coefficients in
later years implicit in data in VTSSSR -60).
The export-output ratios in 1913 using exports of Russian Empire
(including large textile mills in Polish territory) and total output of
Russian Empire and Soviet territory was 5.0% and 6.0%. These
figures are lower than those cited in this table.
Notes to Table T -21
The percentages in Table T -21 are usually calculated on the
basis of imports (net) as a % of total supply, which is defined as output
plus imports. Quality differences between imported commodities and
domestically produced commodity (such as for cotton) mean that the
import-supply ratios tend to understate the importance of imports in
maintaining both volume and quality of output. Accumulation or deple-
tion of stocks would tend to overstate Or understate the importance of
imports in total consumption in any given year because of the method
of calculating imports -supply on the basis of output and imports rathe r
than import and consumption.
Cotton
Row 1. Imports as a % of consumption of fiber. Figures from
Mishustin-38a, p. 202; Mishustin 38a apparently based his estimates
On figures cited in STAT-34, p. 136, Table 8, in which it was noted
that 1) figures for consumption of fiber included consumption by entire
textile industry, 2) figures were based on shipments plus change in
inventory and 3) figures for consumption contained an element of
double counting because of inter-plant shipments of cotton fiber (i. e. ,
these ratios would tend to understate importance of imported fiber
in the total cotton suppl y).
My estimates (which included imports of cotton yarn as well
as fiber) were slightly high for 1913 but almost identical for other
years. Other estimates of the import-supply ratios for cotton fiber
can be found in Holzman-63 (p. 299), STAT -36 (p. 193, Table 158),
SUA (Vol. V, No. 20 (1926), p. 27).
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Wool
Row 2. Gross imports as a % of net output of fiber (washed basis).
The basis of comparison is difficult to choose in this case because the
USSR both imported and exported wool during 1913 and the NEP.
(l000 m. t. )
1913 1924/25 1925/26 1926/27 1927/28
Imports of wool fiber
and yarn (SOVT C 511
and 514004)
Exports of wool
(SOVT C 511)
Net imports of wool
fibe r and yarn
61. 9
17.5
44.4
18.4
7.0
11. 4
22.6
2.2
20.4
30.4
1.6
28.8
36.5
1.8
34.6
Total imports of wool fiber and yarn (which were of higher qual-
ity) for the economic years 1924/25-1927/28 were compared to the net
output of wool for the calendar year corresponding to the latter part of
the split-year. Figure for 1913 is for Russian Empire. Output data
from Johnson-60, p. 235. Import and export data from VTSSSR -60
(SOVTC 511 and 514004).
Row 3. Net imports as a % of net imports plus procurements by state
agencies. Import data from VTSSSR -60. Procurement data for state
agencies in 1924/25 and 1925/26 from SUA, Vol. V, No. 22 (1926), p. 9,
for 1926/27 and 1927/28 from SUYB-29, p. 239. This ratio is indicative
of the dependence of large-scale industry on imported wool.
Copper
Row 4. Imports of ingot and rolled copper as a % of the total supply
including imports and output of bliste r coppe r adjusted for 5% los s in
further (electrolytic) refining. Figure for 1909-13 from Ho1zman-63,
pp. 299 and 331. The original data for Holzman's estimate were from
Shimkin-53 and VTSSSR -60; no definition of "copper" was given.
Figures for 1913, 1924/25-1927/28 based on output data cited in Nutter-
62, p. 420 (reduced 5% for loss in converting blister copper into electro-
lytic copper (Turgeon-53, p. 33). Import data from VTSSSR-60 (SOVTC
27000, 27200). Method assumed that all imports of copper were into
Soviet territory so that the figure in the table for 1913 is based on these
imports plus output on Soviet territory (29,700 m. t.). The import-
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supply ratio in 1913 based on total output of Russian Empire (33,100
m. t. ) is 18.2% (output figure for 1913 from NBER -56a, Series 205.6).
Lead
Row 5. Imports as a % of total supply. Import data is from VTSSSR-60
(SOVTC 27004) and output data from NBER-56a, Series 209 . .1. Small
amounts of lead were produced in the separated territories. Method of
comparison assumes comparable quality of imported and domestic lead.
Zinc
Row 6. Imports as a % of total supply. Import data are from VTSSSR-
60 (SOVTC 27003 and 272006) and does not include zinc imported in
galvanized objects, babbit, paint, bronze Or brass. Output data are
from NBER -56a, Series 210.1; most zinc was produced in separated
territory. In 1913, 19,360 m. t. of zinc were produced in Russian
Empire, of which 2,947 m. t. were produced in the Soviet territory
of 1925.
Nickel, Tin, Aluminum
Row 7. Imports supplied all domestic needs before 1914 and during the
NEP. See Shimkin-52.
Rolled ferrous metals
Row 8. Imports as a % of total supply of rolled ferrous metals (inclu-
ding pipe and metal articles). See Notes to Table XV.l.l
for discussion of sources. The important point of this series is that
Russia and the USSR during NEP were almost entirely independent of
impo rts fo r fe r rOus metals.
Steel tubing and pipes
Row 9. Import data from VTSSSR -60 (SOVTC 266-267) assumes that
all imported pipe was steel pipe (i. e., no cast iron pipe was imported).
Output data from STAT -36, p. 133 and is assumed to include only steel
pipe (see also Clark-56, p. 11). The output figure for 1913 does not
specify if it was for the entire Russian Empire Or for Soviet territory;
a large fraction of capacity for welded pipe and for drawn pipe was
located in Poland (35% and 900/0, see Table III. 21). About 56% of welded
and drawn pipe (57,000 m. t.) was produced in 1912 in the Soviet terri-
tory of 1925 (EIKSSSR, p. 385). The figure for 1913 in the table is
estimated for the Russian Empire on the basis of an estimate of output,
in which it was assumed that 77,700 m. t. were produced on Soviet terri-
tory in 1913, and equalled 56% of the output of the Russian Empire. If
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we assumed that all pipe was imported into the Soviet territory and
compare imports with supply of pipe based on the estimated output of
the Soviet territory, then the import-supply ratio in 1913was 14.4%.
Pig iron
Row 10. Imports as % of total supply of pig iron. Output data from
NBER-56a, Series 102.1. About 10% of pig iron in 1913was produced
in the separated territory, but this does not change significantly the
import-supply ratio for 1913 because imports were relatively small.
Import data are from VTSSSR -60 (SOVTe 260).
Pape r products
Row 11. Imports of paper and paper produced from imported pulp as
a % of total paper supply. See "Notes to Table XIV. 11, pp. 784-785.
"Paper and cardboard" for sources and methodology.
Pulp
Row .12. Imports of pulp as % of total supply of pulp. For sources,
see "Notes to Tab.1e XIV. 11, pp. 784-785.
Tanning mate ria.1s
Row 13. Data cited in de Tchihacheff-55a, p . .125from Soviet sources.
Based on content of tannin.
Tea and rubber
Row 14-.15. Before .19.14and during the NEP, the USSR imported virtually
their entire supply of tea and rubber. Some portion of rubber was
supplied through "reclaimed rubber" (Marbury;... 55a, p . .15). The domes-
tic tea growing industry was still insignificant in the total supply of tea
despite the publicity given to domestic tea growing (ERSU, Vol. IX,
No. 11, (1934), pp. 238 -239) .
Notes to Table T -22
This table is incomplete in the sense that it does not include
many types of machinery not produced at all in pre -1914 Russia Or the
USSR during the NEP (or produced only in experimental quantities),
such as metallurgical, chemical and paper-making equipment and air-
planes.
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Import-supply ratios based on value tend to understate the share
of imports in total machinery supply because Russian prices were
7-10% higher in the pre-19l4 period and as much as 25 to 30% higher
during the NEP (Gosplan-29a, p. 396). Industrial goods prices
accounted for most of the price differential (Ibid. ).
Row 1. Machinery for industry and electric power industry. Imports
valued at current prices (with tariff) as a % of total expenditure On
machinery in current prices. Since prices of imported machinery even
including tariff were often less than the price of similar domestic
machinery, this type of comparison tends to understate importance of
imported machinery in total machinery supply. Figures from Row 6
of Table T -23.
Row 2. Internal combustion engines. The value of imports as a % of
the total value of supply.at current prices. Figures from Gosplan-29a,
p. 395. Source noted that figures for 1927/28 based On actual imports
for first half of 1927/28 and 50% of the production plan for 1927/28.
Value in current prices, but no indication is given about the inclusion
Or exclusion of the tariff in valuation of imports.
Row 3. Electrical machine rYe The value of imports as a % of the total
value of supply at pre-19l4 prices (with no information about the treat-
ment of tariffs Or relative prices). Figures for 1924/25-1926/27 from
Gosplan-29a, p. 395. Figure for 1913 from Table III. 14.
Row 4. Steam turbines. See notes to row 2 of this table.
Row 5. Metalworking machinery. See notes to rOw 2 of this table for
source for 1924/25-1927/28. Figure for 1913 from Table III. 14.
Row 6. Metal-cutting tools. Percentages based on number of units
and takes no explicit account of differences in quality and capacity of
imported machinery as compared to domestic machinery. Data from
STAT -35, p. 72.
Row 7. Textile machinery. See notes to rOw 2 of this table. Figure
for 1913 fro m Tab 1e III. 14.
Row 8. Automobiles and trucks. Number of units imported as % of
total supply. Adapted from Mishustin-38a, p. 178.
Row 9-10. Tractors. Imports as % of total supply based On units and
horsepower. Adapted from data presented in STAT -35, p. 303.
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Row 1.1. Agricultural machinery. Value of imported machinery to
value of total supply. Figure for 1913 from Table III. 16. Figures for
1925/26-1927/28 from Gosplan-29, p. 395. See notes to row 2 of this
table.
Row 12. Railroad equipment. Figure for 1913 based on value and is
from Table III. 14. Little railroad equipment was imported during the
period 1924/25-1927/28 (VTSSSR-60).
Notes to Table T -23
All figures from Paskov-30, pp. 46-47.
Row 1. The figure for investment is limited to "investment connected
with a demand for machinery and equipment" in industry and regional
power plant for "new construction, reconstruction, and capital repairs. If
It excluded expenditures for living quarters, agriculture, transport,
etc.
Row 2. "Expenditure for machinery, instruments, and equipment" at
prices adjusted for transport, installment expenses, i. e., £o.b. factory.
Corrected for typographical error.
Row 3. Row 1 divided by rOw 2.
Row 4. Domestic production included production of machinery, con-
struction apparatus, instruments, precise equipment, etc., for industry
and regional power stations by the machinery-building industry planned
by VSNKh and by other miscellaneous producers of machinery.
Row 5. Imports of machinery, apparatus, precise instrument and
equipment (including electric machines) at prices c. i. f. border,
including tariff.
Row 6. Row 5 divided by row 2.
Notes to Table T -24
Cols 1-3: From Table XV. 2 and Appendix F.
Cols 4-6: Estimates of recovery of exports on Soviet territory based
817
on volume indices on left with the base year (1913) reduced according
to the Soviet estimates of the percentage reduction in exports (14.2%),
which would be necessary for territorial loss (see Table III. 24). See
Chapter III, pp. 157 ff for discussion of the problems in interpre-
ting Soviet adjustments; these adjustments tended to overstate the
reduction in export capacity.
Notes to Table T -25
Cols 1-3: From Table XV. 2 and Appendix F.
Cols 4-6: Estimates of recovery of imports on Soviet territory based
on volume indices on left with the base year (1913) reduced according
to the Soviet estimates for the percentage reduction (26. 7%) in the
value of imports, which would be necessary to adjust for territorial
loss (see Table III. 24). See Chapter III pp.157 ff for discussion
of the problems in inte rpreting Soviet adjustments, which tended to
overstate the reduction in import requirements.
Notes to Table T -26
Row 1. From Table XV. 4. See Appendix F for method.
Row 2. Volume index of exports of grain products using 1926/27 price
(unit-value) weights. Volume index is type described in Appendix F,
p. 873 based on data from VTSSSR -60 and including the following
commodities (identified by SaVTC number): 70000, 70001, 70002,
70003, 70004, 82000, 82101, 82102. This volume index is not adjusted
for change s in cove rage, but the major export grains are represented.
The unit-value weights for .1926/27 were used for the volume
index (as well as 1926/27 quantity weights for the price index) becaus e
relatively large grain exports during 1926/27 made the unit-values mOre
representative of the true relative price structure in 1926/27 than the
unit-values based on the meage r 1927/28 grain exports would be of
1927/28 relative price structure. Similarly for quantity weights.
Row 3. ail seed products. See notes to Row 2 of this table. Volume
index used 1927/28 unit-values and included the following commodities:
SaVTC 72001, 72003, 72004, 580.
Row 4. Fibers. Volume index of crop fibers (excluding wool and silk)
inc.1uded the following commodities: saVTC 51000, 51003, 5.1004, 51006,
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51008, 51013. Flax was the most important fiber export during NEP.
Row 5. Products of animal husbandry. Volume index of animal pro-
ducts included the three maj Or animal product exports, butte r, eggs
and bacon (SaVTC 800030, 80100, 803) and several minor animal pro-
duct exports (SaVTC 5.11, 53000, 5300.ll, 530012, 530013, 59000, 59001,
59006, 59008, 80001. No adjustment was made for changes in coverage
of all animal product exports.
Row 6. Timber. Volume index of timber exports included the following
commodities: SaVTC 500, 50100, 50200, 50307. Not adjusted for
changes in coverage of all timber products exports.
Row 7. ail products. Volume index of oil product exports included
the following commodities: SaVTC 21, 220, 223, 224, 225, 226. These
items covered all significant exports of oil products.
Row 8. Mining products (excluding oil products). Volume index of
mining product includes the following commodities: SaVTe 20000,
20001, 24000, 24001, 25000. Changes in coverage of mining product
exports not adjusted for in this index.
Row 9. Fur products. See Table F. 14, p. 914
Notes to Table T -27
Row 1. Total imports adjusted for changes in coverage. From Table
XIV. 5. See Appendix F for method.
Row 2. Machinery. From Table F.18, co1. 3. See Appendix F,
for explanation of method used in computing this index.
This index used German machinery prices as the deflator for the major
component. The definition of machinery used for this index is limited
to SaVTC I as described in Table A. 5, Appendix A, Technical Note 5,
and does not include products included in the Soviet definition of
machinery as described in Table A. 4b., Appendix A, Technical Note 4
Row 3. Raw materials. Index is the normal type described in Appendix
F, p. 873 and uses 1927/28 unit-value weights and quantity data
based on import data from VTSSSR -60. The volume index for raw
materials included the following commodities (by SaVTC number):
24204, 26101, 26102, 26103, 26104, 26406, 26407, 26410, 26503, 27000,
27003, 27004, 27005, 27006, 27007, 35000, 504, 51000, 51009, 51010,
51014, 51200, 51401, 530000, 530011, 72007. This list covers most of
the commodities listed in Table A. 4b under "raw materials. "
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Row 4. Semi-processed commodities. See notes to rOw 3 of this
table for general comments. The coverage of this index leaves much
to be desired and included only paper and pulp, leather, and yarns.
The index did not include chemicals (especially tanning and dyeing
materials). The specific commodities in this index are (by SOVTC
number): 50500, 50504, 506, 514000, 514004, 53100, 53101.
Row 5. Non-ferrous metals. See notes to rOw 3 of this table for
general comments. Commodities in this index included (by SOVTC
numbe r): 27000, 27003, 27004, 27005, 27006, 27007.
Row 6. Tropical products. See notes to rOw 3 of this table for general
comments. Commodities in this index (by SOVTC number) are: 35000
(rubber), 504 (cork), 51009 (jute), 51010 (sisal), 70104 (rice), 72007
(copra), 72100 (coffee), 72101 (cocoa beans), 72103 (tea).
Notes to Table T -28
Export price indexes are from Table XIV.•6. Import price
indexes are from Table XIV. 7. Commodity terms of trade are simply
the export price index divided by the import price index and are also
found in Table XIV. $.
Notes to Table T -29
Export price indexes are based on unit-value of Soviet exports
as described in Appendix F, p. 873 Index for all exports is
from Table XIV. Q. Indexes for selected commodity groupings in rows
2 -9 are simple price indexes weighted by exported quantities in
1927/28 (1926/27 for grain products) of the commodities listed for each
group (see Notes to Table T -26 for these commodities listed by SOVTC
number).
Notes to Table T -30
Import price indexes are based on unit-values of Soviet imports as
described in Appendix F, p. 873 Index for all imports from
Table XIV. 7. Indexes for selected commodity groups in rOws 2-6 are
simple price indexes weighted by imported quantities in 1927/28 of
commodities listed for each group (see Notes to Table T -27 for these
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commodities listed by SOVTC number).
Notes to Table T -31
Gosplan's indices of wholesale prices were calculated on the
basis of price quotations in 62 towns and included 69 commodities with
an aggregate weight of 10,000 units distributed as follow s:
Produce of forestry, fisheries and hunting.
Produce of agriculture
rye .. 675
whe at 640
beef 690
Industrial goods ....
565
5000
4435
This last group also included processed agricultural commodities such
as sugar, vegetable oil and tobacco. The index underwent several
revisions. (Birmingham Bureau of Research on Russian Economic
Conditions Memorandum No.7, iii, Indices of Wholesale Prices.
Birmingham: Russian Department, University of Birmingham, October,
1932, pp. 13-15.)
Jan. 1923 to Dec. 1923. Data for total wholesale price index cited by
Arnold-36 (p. 168) from Economic Bulletin of the Institute for the Study
of Economic Conditions (N. D. Kondratiev, ed., (Moscow) Commissariat
of Finance, No.1, 1925, pp .. 4-5 [in Russian]). Data for agricultural
and industrial price index cited by Arnold-36 (p. 173) from L. N. Yurov-
sky (ed.), Nashe denezhnoe obrashchenie: sbornik materialov po
istorii denezhnogo obrashchenia v 1914-1925 gg (Moscow: Commissariat
of Finance, 1926).
Jan. 1924 to Dec. 1925. Data cited by Arnold-36 (p. 230) from Yurovsky
Nashe denezhnoe obrashchenie ... (see above), pp. 250-252.
Jan. 1926 to Dec. 1928. Data taken from statistical section of SUA
(various issues) under heading "Grosshandels index der Staatplankom-
ission (Am Monatsersten). According to SUA (Vol. VI, No. 4/5 [1927]
p. 29) the responsibility for estimating the wholesale price index was
transferred from Gosplan to the Central Statistical Administration in
early 1927. Many other sources (ERSU and Ekon. Oboz.) also reported
Gosplan's wholesale price index.
821
Notes to Table T -32
Two series of retail price indexes were calculated during 1923-
1927. The Konjuncturinstitut under the Commis sariat of Finance and
headed by Kondratiev calculated the "All-union retail price index. "
This index was a weighted index of the prices in private trade for 35
commodities; "industrial goods" made up 51%of the composition of the
goods in the index (ERSU, Vol. II, No. 15 [August 1,1927] pp. 3-4).
This index was the most widely cited index and is presented in Table
T -32. This is the so-called "old retail price index. "
The TsSU (Central Statistical Administration) also calculated
a "budget retail price index, " the composition of which varied consid-
erably because of varying coverage (Birmingham Bureau of Research
on Russian Economic Conditions. Memorandum No.6, Wages of
Industrial Workers in the USSR, Birmingham: Russian Department,
University of Birmingham, July 1932, pp. 20-24). This index is not
shown here.
Jan. 1924 to Jan. 1926. Cited in Arnold-36 (p. 230) from Yurovsky,
Nashe denezhnoe obrashchenie ... (see Notes to Table 31), pp. 250,
252.
Jan. 1926 to Dec. 1927. Data from SUA (various issues in 1926, 1927,
1928) from Table "Konjunktur der Valkswirtscheft." In early 1927, the
Konjunktur institut changed its method and composition of the retail
price index (as described in Notes to Table T -33). The index after
April 1927 is bas ed on the private trade component of the new retail
price index. In the ove rlapping months, this private trade component
in the new retail price index was lower than the old price index (based
On private trade alone). Compare figures for January-April 1927 in
Tables T -32 and T -33.
Notes to Table T -33
The Konjunkturinstitut revised the basis of calculating the retail
price index in early 1927. The basic reaSOn for changing the index was
to make the new index reflect the movement of prices in state and
cooperative retail stores, where the prices were lower and controlled
by the government. Thus, decreed lowering of retail prices in the
state and cooperative stores would result in a decline in the retail
price index even though demand was not satisfied at those prices.
The "new retail index" was a weighted average of retail prices
in state, cooperative and private trade. The new index was based on
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43 commodities divided into 19 groups as against 35 products previously
used. The industrial goods component was assigned the weight of 69
and the agricultural goods component was as signed the wieght of 31 as
compared to the weights of 51 and 49 respectively for the old index.
Furthermore, some pre-1914 prices were "corrected." The new price
index was about 15% lower than the old price index based On private
trade alone (ERSU, Vol. II, No. 14 [August 1, 1927], p. 3).
Jan. 1927 to Sept. 1927. Buchter-27, p. 64.
Oct. 1927 to Nov. 1928. All data from SUA (various issues).
Notes to Table T -34
Sources for Part A and Part B
1924/25 -1926 /27
Indexes of procurement prices of planned agencies based on prices for
the five years, 1909-1913. Constant weights based on values of commod-
ities procured during 1924/25-1926/27. Data for Part A and Part B
from ST, Vol. III, No. l.l, p. 36. See also article on the methods used
in constructing these indexes by G. Popov entitled "Indeks planovykh
zagotovitel'nykh tsen Narkomtorga" (Index of Planned Procurement
Prices of Narkomtorg) in ST, Vol. III, No. 1.1, pp. 10-12. Grain included
rye, wheat, oats, barley, corn, hulled grains, pulses. Oil seeds in-
cluded sunflower seeds, £.lax seed, hemp seed. Technical crops inclu-
ded flax and flax tow, hemp, cotton, sugar beets, tobacco, makhorka.
Edible animal products included butter, eggs and meat. Raw materials
from livestock included large hides, small hides (skins), and spring
wool.
1927/28
Weights based on the value of 1927/28 procurements. Data for Part A
and Part B from ST, Vol. III, No. 45/46, p. 67. Same comments apply
as for 1924/25-1926/27.
1928/29
Weights not stated, but most likely the weights are based on the value
of 1928/29 procurements. These indexes differed from the above in
the following manner: pulses not included in grain index; hemp seed
not included in oil seed index; fall wool is added to raw materials from
livestock index. Similar for total indexes. Data for Part A and Part B
from ST, Vol. IV, No. 45/46, p. 62.
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Comment
See article by G. Popov, "Index planovykh zagotovitel!nykh tsen
Narkomtorga, " ST, Vol. III, No. 11 (1928), pp. 10-12, in which the
statistical procedures and weights are described.
Notes to Table T -35
Col. 1. Price index of manufactured consume r goods in private trade,
1913 100. This time series is based on two price indexes for manu-
factured consumer goods sold in the private trade as calculated by the
Konjuncturinstitut of the Commissariat of Finance. The figures for
October, 1924 to December 1926 are based on the manufactured consumer
goods component of the "old" retail price index (Table T - 32); the origi-
nal figures were reduced by 7.5% to adjust for the average difference
between the higher figures for the !Iold" index and the lower figures for
the "new revised index" in the first three months of 1927, when both
indexes were calculated.
Retail price index of manufactured consume r goods
sold in private trade
1913 = 100
Feb. 1927 Mar. 1, 1927
!IOld index!1
"New revised index"
Dec. I, 1926
268
Jan. I , 1927
270
251
247
247
268
246
In Table T -35, the entry for a given month refers to the price index as
of the first day of the following month.
The figures for January, 1927 to November, 1928 are the price
index of manufactured consumer goods sold in the private trade as
shown in Table T -33.
Col. 2. Purchasing power of agricultural goods sold at retail by pri-
vate trading establishments in terms of manufactured consumer goods
sold by private retail stores. The index of agricultural prices in pri-
vate retail trade is based on the "old" and the "new revised" retail
price indexes calculated by the Konjunkturinstitut. See Tables T -32 and
T -33 and note to col. 1. The two indexes were linked on the basis of the
average difference between the two indexes in January - March 1927:
the "old retail price index for agricultural goods sold in private trade"
(October, 1924 - December, 1926) was reduced by 2%. This index was
divided by col. 1.
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Col. 3. Purchasing power of agricultural goods sold at wholesale in
terms of manufactured consumer goods sold by private retail stores.
Wholesale price index for agricultural goods as calculated by Gosplan
(Table T -31) divided by col. 1 of this table.
Col. 4. Purchasing power of agricultural goods sold at procurement
prices in terms of manufactured cOnsumer goods sold by private retail
stores.
Oct. 1924 - May 1926. Preliminary figures for price index of procure-
ments; "pre-war prices" = 100. Weights are most likely variable ( i. e. ,
from month to month). Procurement index (cited by Oganovskii-26, p.5)
di vided by co1. 1.
Oct. 1926 - Oct. 1928. Data from SUA (various years). 1909-13 = 100
Col. 5. Purchasing power of "grain products" sold at procurement
prices in terms of manufactured consumer goods sold by private retail
stores (1909-13 = 100).
Annual and quarterly data 1924/25-1926. Figures in col. 1 of Table T-34
divided by arithmetic averages of figures in co!. 1 of Table T -35.
Monthly data 1927-1928. Data for "Beschaffungspreise - Getreide
1909-13 100" from SUA (1928-1929).
Col. 6. Purchasing power of wheat sold at procurement prices in terms
of manufactured consumer goods sold by private retail stOres. Col. 2 of
Table T - 38 divided by col. 1 of this table and conve rted to an index. See
Table T -38 for discussion of sources for monthly data of wheat prices;
the data up to Novembe r 1927 are not strictly comparable to the data
after November 1927.
Col. 7. Purchasing power of rye sold at procurement prices in te rms
of manufactured consumer goods sold by private retail stores. Col. 2
of Table T -39 divided by co!. 1 of this table and converted to an index.
See Table T -39 for discussion of sources for monthly data of rye prices.
The data up to Novembe r 1927 are not strictly comparable to the data
after November 1927.
Notes to Table T -36
Source: Gosplan-29a, pp. 504-505.
Notes to Table T -37
General comment. 1. All indexes adjusted for devaluation Or
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depreciation of curency on basis of gold parity in base year (as stated
in STATJAHR).
2. Index data from STATJAHR-29, 35, 38; data for 1938 are
average for first seven months.
Col. 1. USSR. Wholesale price index calculated by Gosplan. Data for
economic year ending in year stated in side tab (e. g., 1924 = 1923/24).
Data for 1923/24 - 1928/29 from SUYB-30, p. 267. No data available
after 1928/29. Figure for 1923 from Aizenberg-62, p. 244; which also
cited 174 for 1924, 182 for 1925, 177 for 1926 (with 1913 = 100).
Col. 2. Germany. Wholesale price index calculated by Statistisches
Reichsamt. Data from STATJAHR, "Internationale Uebersichten"
(various year s).
Col. 3.
Trade.
years).
Great Britain. Wholesale price index calculated by Board of
Data from STATJAHR, "Internationale Uebersichten" {various
Col. 4. Netherlands. Wholesale price index calculated by Central. Bur.
v.d. STAT. Data from STATJAHR, "Internationale Uebersichten"
(various years).
Col. 5. USA. Wholesale price index calculated by Bureau of Labor
Statistics. Data from STATJAHR, llInternationale Uebersichten"
(various years).
Notes to Table T- 38
Col. 1. Data from SUA (various issues during 1926-28) from the series
"Grosshandelspreise der Ueberschusszone: Weizen" appearing in the
section "Wirtschaftliche Umschau, Die Konjunktur der Volkswirtschaft
im ... " Series no longer published after September 1927.
Col. 2. Data for 1909-13 and 1913 are derived by using quarterly average
grain prices for 1927 and the quarterly index of wheat prices published
in ST, Vol. III, No. 11 (1928) pp. 36- 37. According to an article by
G. Popov ("Indeks planovykh zagotovitel'nykh tsen Narkomtorga, II ST,
Vol. III, No. 11 (1928), p. 11), the grain prices used for the 1909-13 and
the 1913prices were autumn grain prices, when grain prices were nor-
mally low. This procedure tended to make Soviet grain prices appear
relatively better than if average annual grain prices had been used as
the base price of the index. Thus, the price for wheat for 1909-13 and
826
1913 is actually the autumn price of wheat in these years. The 1909-13
and 1913 prices were based on this price index and the "average domes-
tic procurement prices of wheat purchased by Kh1ebproduct" (col. 2 of
this table) for the first, second, and third quarters of 1927: the resul-
tant implied 1909-13 prices were 552, 567, and 564 kopecks per hundred
kilograms and the implied 1913 prices were 476, 493 and 493 kopecks
per hundred kilograms.
Data for October 1923 to April 1924 are from Aizenberg- 62,
p. 243.
Data for July 1924 to October 1927 are from SUA (various issues
during 1926-28) from the series "Durchschnittl. Beschaffungspreis des
'Ch1eboprodukt'" appearing in the section "Wirtschaftliche Umschau.
Die Konjunktur der Vo1kswirtschaft im ..• " Series no longer published
after October 1927.
Data for November, 1927 to September, 1929 are approximate
and were estimated using an index of all-union wheat procurement price
based on 1909-1913 wheat prices and linked at October, 1927 on the
average domestic procurement price paid for wheat by Kh1ebprodukt
for 100 kilograms (col. 2 of this table) in October 1927. The all-union
wheat price index from October 1927 to September 1928 was weighted
with 1927/28 quantity weights and is from ST, Vol. IV, No. 45/46, p. 62.
Thus, price changes within those three periods are comparable but com-
parisons between these three periods must be considered approximations.
Col. 3. Procurement prices of grain loaded for export. Data for July
1925 to June 1927 from ST, Vol. I, No. 11 (1926), p. 64 and ST, Vol. II,
No. 43 (1927), p. 71. Data from July 1927 to September 1928 from ST,
Vol. III, No. 45/46 (1928), pp. 70-71; this series specified only that it
was the procurement price of wheat on the domestic market and not that
it was the procurement price of wheat purchase for export (of which
there was very little in 1927/28). Thus, that data after July 1927 is not
strictI y comparable to the data before that date. In fact, the data for
the two overlapping months (July and August) differ slightly in the two
sources (ST, 1927 and ST, 1928) cited above.
Col. 4. Data for July 1925 to June 1926 are the weighted average sale
price of Eksportkh1eb (the Soviet grain export agency) and is from ST,
Vol. I, No. 11 (1926), p. 64. Data for July 1926 to September 1927 are
the arithmetic average of quotes for Russian wheat, c. i. f. Hamburg
for "Russian, 78/79 kgr." and are from ST, Vol. III, No. 45-46 (1928),
p. 71 and are for "Russian Niko1aevskaia, c. i. f., Hamburg. II
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Col. 5. Data for July 1925 to September 1927 are for Manitoba, No.1,
c. i. f., London and are from ST, Vol. I, No. 11 (1926), p. 64 and ST,
Vol. II, No. 43 (1927), p. 71. Data for October 1927 to September 1928
are for Manitoba, No.3, c. i. f., London and are from ST, Vol. III,
No. 45-46 (1928), p. 71. Data from October 1928 to September 1929
for Manitoba, No.2, c. i. f., London, and are from ST, Vol. IV,
No. 45-46 (1929), p. 62-63.
Notes to Table T- 39
General comments. The sources for each column and individual dates
as well as the basic methodology and general comments for Table T-39
are identical to those cited from analogous column in Table T- 38 and
are not repeated here. The reader is refer red to Table T- 38 for the se
references. We have noted here only those comments specifically
applicable to time series for rye prices.
Col. 1. Data from SUA (various issues) from the series "Grosshandel-
preise der Ueberschusszone: Roggen."
Col. 2. Data for 1909-13 and 1913 derived by method described in
Notes to Table T-38, col. 2. The implicit price for 1909-13 and 1913
were identical usind either first or second quarter data and index
numbers for 1927.
Data from October, 1923 to August, 1927 are for sources cited
for similar period for col. 2 from Table T- 38.
Data from October, 1927 to April, 1929 computed using the pro-
curement price index in ST, Vol. III, No. 45/46 (1928), p. 67, and ST,
Vol. IV, No. 45/46 (1929), p. 62 and the estimated price for 1909-13.
Col. 3. See Notes to Table T-38 for col. 3.
Col. 4. Weighted average sale price of Eksportkhleb for July 1925 to
June 1926 from ST, Vol. I, No. 11 (1926), p. 64. Data for July 1926 to
April 1929 are from sources cited in Table T- 38 for wheat. Data is
for arithmetic average of quotas for Russian rye, c. i. £., Hamburg.
No quotes are available for May - September 1929.
Col. 5. Quotes are for "Western No.2, c. i. £. Hamburg. II See
Table T- 38 for source notes to col. 5.
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Notes to Table T-40
Col. 1. Estimates for 1909-13 and 1913 based on indexes of procure-
ment prices for barley published in ST, Vol. Ill, No. 11 (1928), pp. 36-
37. See comments about this method in Notes to Table T-38, col. 2.
Estimates used these indexes and average quarterly price of barley
purchased for export in the third quarter of 1926. Using prices of
procured grain in the fourth quarter of 1926 and the price index results
in implicit price of 350 in 1909-13 and 330 in 1913 as compared to 375
and 344 (kopeck per hundred kilograms) using third quarter 1926 prices.
Data for July 1925 to June 1926 from ST, Vol. I, No. 11 (1926)
p. 64 and are the procurement prices weighted by loading for export.
Data for July 1926 to September, 1928 from ST, Vol. II, No. 43
(1927), p. 71 and ST, Vol. Ill, No. 45/46 (1928), p. 71. These data
do not necessarily reflect the procurement price of exported barley
and were merely cited as export prices.
Col. 2. Data for July 1925 to June 1926 from ST, Vol. I, No. 11 (1926),
p. 64 and are the "weighted average sales price of barley sold by
Eksportkhleb." Data for July 1926 to September, 1928 from ST, Vol. II,
No. 43 (1927), p. 71 and ST, Vol. III, No. 45-46 (1928), p. 71 and are
for "Russian barley, c. i. £., Hamburg."
Col. 3. Sources are identical to those for col. 2. "Canadian barley
c. i. £., London" was cited from July 1925 to August 1927. "Danubian
barley, c. i. f., London" was cited from September 1927 to December
1928. For the two overlapping months in July and August the compara-
tive prices of Danubian barley and Canadian barley were 864 and 886
in July and 928 and 887 in August (kopecks per 100 kilograms).
Notes to Table T-41
General comments. Deriving an internally consistent price series and
comparing domestic and foreign flax prices are made more difficult
because of the large number of different grades and standards used
to grade flax. It is thought that Group IV, 1 Sort (domestic) and the
"Russian BKKU" are more or less similar types or grades of flax
fiber.
Col. 1. Data for 1909-13 and 1913 based on third and fourth quarters
procurement prices for Group IV, Number 1 Sort (col. 1 of this table)
and the price index for "flax and combing" (len l kudel) from ST, Vol. I,
No. 11 (1926), p. 36 and 37. The representativeness of these estimates
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for the grade "Group IV, 1 Sort" in 1913 and 1909-13 depends on the
construction of the index for flax and the movement of prices for other
grade s of flax.
Data for January, 1924 to August, 1926 for "flax" (len) as cited
in Fe if et s - 28a , pp. 158-160 .
Data for October, 1926 to September, 1928 from ST, Vol. II,
No. 43 (1927), p. 71 and ST, Vol. III, No. 45-46 (1928), p. 70. Prices
are the average prices of "Group IV, 1 Sart'! flax, weighted by procure-
ments.
Co1s 2 and 3. Data for October 1925 to December 1928 from ST, Vol. II,
No. 43 (1927), p. 48, ST, Vol. II, No. 43 (1927), p. 71, ST, Vol. III,
No. 45-46 (1928), p. 70, and ST, Vol. IV, No. 45-46 (1929), p. 62.
Notes to Table T-42
Butter and Eggs
Data for 1909-13 and 1913 based on second or third quarter pro-
curement prices in 1927 (col. 1 and col. 4 of this table) and price index
for same quarter from ST, Vol. III, No. 11 (1928), pp. 36 and 37.
October,1925 - December, 1926. Domestic procurement prices (col. 1)
are prices for all butter procured in the RSFSR. All data for butter
from ST, Vol. III, No. 43 (1928), p. 44. Data for eggs are from ST,
Vol. III, No. 43 (1928), p. 46.
October 1926 - September 1927. Data from ST, Vol. II, No. 43 (1927),
p. 71.
October 1927 - September 1928. Data from ST, Vol. III, No. 45-46
(1928), p. 62.
October 1928 - May 1929. Data for foreign market prices from ST,
Vol. IV, No. 45-46 (1929), p. 70.
Notes to Table T-43
Source. Feifets-28a, pp. 153-154.
Comments. Data is average for all grains and is estimated for the
agricultural years 1923/24 - 1926/27.
Data has been converted from kopecks per po ad to kopecks per
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100 kg. by coefficient 6.104. "Marketing costs" include all cost
incurred from time of purchase from peasant to time of delivery to
foreign buyer and involve a distribution of "overhead" of the trading
organization as well as transportation, insurance, brokerage, etc.
Notes to Table T-44
Source. Feifets-28a, pp. 154-156.
Comments. Estimates are for BKKU flax (bezhetskii len) for calendar
years 1924-1926. Note that these marketing costs include an export
duty, which was reduced and then abolished. See Arvatov- 28. See
Notes to Table T-43 for further comments.
Notes to Table T-45
Source. Feifets-28a, pp. 158-159.
Comments. The type of butter was not specified, but presumably the
butter was the so-called "export grade" of butter. The data are esti-
mated for the economic years 1923/24 - 1925/26. See Notes to Table
T-43 for further comments.
Notes to Table T-46
Source. Feifets-28a, p. 160. Data available only for 1925 and 1926.
Comments. See Table T-43 for comments about !'marketing costs. "
Notes to Table T-47
Source. Czechowicz-29a, p. 2213.
Comments. In rubles, unless otherwise noted, for 100 kg. gross
weight on the basis of official publication of customs tariff and assessed
in 1903 in pre-19l4 rubles, in 1922 in "gold rubles", and in 1924 and
1927 in chervonetz rubles. Tariff for 1903 and 1922 was converted
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from poods to kilograms at the ratio of 6. 1 poods = 100 kilograms. If
two figures are given, they are considered to be for the lowest and the
highest category of that commodity group, so that equality of the group
composition is preserved for all tariffs.
Explanatory Notes.
a
Duty-free.
bTariff duties not comparable due to changes in the basis of
assessment.
cAd valorem tariff.
d
For 1913, these agricultural machines were specially listed
and duty- free.
Notes to Table T-48
Part A: Soviet Estimates
Rows 1 and 2: Data for Russian Empire (excluding Finland) and for
Soviet territory of pre-1939 borders in 1913 from STAT-60, p. 3, and
p. 6.
Rows 4-7, 10, 12: Data from SUYB-30, p. 21. December 17, 1926 was
the date of the census.
Row 8: Estimate based on quarterly compounded growth rate of roughly
7/12 % for total population, 1 3/16 % for urban population and 5/12 % for
rural population assuming steady growth between December 17, 1926
and April 1, 1928.
Row 9: See Row 8.
Row 11: Estimates based on quarterly compounded growth rates of
roughly 7/12 % for total population, 1% for ur ban population and 1/2 %
for rural population.
Part B: "Western estimates" by Warren Eason
Eason-63, pp. 72-73.
Notes to Table T-49
Source. Diamond-55, pp. 140, 142, 144, 147, 149.
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Notes to Table T -50
Part A. USSR: Gross Capital Investment in Fixed Capital in the
Socialist Economy 1923/24-1938 (Including Non-productive Investment)
Source. All figures from Kaplan-51, p. 52, in which was noted the
following:
The coverage of the sectors may be summarized
as follow s:
a. "Industry" includes mInIng, manufacturing,
and most electric power stations. Municipal electric
power stations are included in "Social-Cultural Services
and Administration"; rural electric power stations are
included in "Agriculture. 11
b. "Agriculture" include s state farms, colle c-
tive farms, machine-tractor stations, and such general-
ized agricultural investments as irrigation and land
improvement measure s.
c. "Transport" includes railroad, water, land
and air transportation. Urban trolley systems and sub-
ways are included in "social-cultural services and admin-
istration." The construction of nationally important
roads is inc luded in "transport"; the construction of local
roads is included in "social-cultural services and admini-
stration. "
d. "Communications" includes mail, telephone,
telegraph, and radio.
e. "T rade and Procurement" include s retail
trade and "wholesale 11 procurement organizations.
f. "Social-Cultural and "Administration" includes:
1. Hous ing;
2. Education and public health;
3. Municipal services, which in turn includes
subways and trolley systems, municipal land transport,
water supply, sewage systems, city sanitation, bath houses
and laundries, municipal electric power stations, gas
works, and local roads and bridges;
4. Administration and the military e stab-
lishment.
Fixed capital according to Soviet definition includes: "(I) construc-
tion; (2) assembly of equipment; (3) purchase of equipment and imple-
ments; (4) design, geological, and prospecting work connected with a
given object of construction; (5) land betterment, irrigation, and
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drainage; (6) formation and re placement of draft and producti ve live-
stock herds; and (7) certain expenditures not connected with an increase
of fixed capital" (Kaplan-51, p. 1).
Economic enterprises often invest funds in "non-productive
fixed capital. II "Productive fixed capital" consists of the durable
assets of industrial, agricultural, transport, communications, commer-
cial and supply enterprises including the office, administrative and
warehouse premises of these enterprises. "Non-productive fixed
capital" consists of Ilhousing, hospitals, schools, municipal services
and other constructions which are devoted to the cultural and social
needs and welfare of the population and to the needs of government
administrationll (Kaplan-51, p. 16).
Part B. USSR: (Gross) Capital Investment in Fixed Capital in the
Socialist Economy 1923/24-1938 (Excluding Non-productive Investment)
Source. All figures from Kaplan-51, p. 58. See notes to Part A of
this Table. See also Kaplan1s discussion of non-productive investment
in Kaplan-51, p. 53.
Notes to Table T -51
Grain. All data from Table T-8. The years 1909-13 and 1913 refer to
calendar years.
Row .1. Gros s output of grain products (excluding oil seed) from col. 3
of Table T -8. Data for 1909-13 and 1913 I'adjusted" for underestimates
in Tsarist data and change in boundaries,. Harvest data for split years
are for the fall of the first of the two years.
Row 2. "Total marketing of grainll from co!. 3 of Table T -8.
Rows 3 and 4. Procurements of grain products by IJplanned procurement
agencies'l in agricultural year and in economic year. Data from Table
T-8, cols. 6-7.
Rows 5 and 6. Gros s exports of grain products in agricultural and
economic years. Exports for 1909-13 and 1913 are exports of Russian
Empire. Gross exports of grain from Soviet territory (to foreign coun-
tries and to separated territories) were larger than from the entire
Rus sian Empire (11.2 - .1.1. 7 million m. t. compared to 10. 7 mi.l.lion m. t.
in 1913) because the separated territories were net importers of grain
(see above,
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Wheat
Row 7. Gross harvest on Soviet territory. Diamond-55, p. 33. Aver-
age annual for Russian Empire for 1909-13 from Table Ill. 5.
Row 8. Procurements by planned procurement agencies. No equivalent
data is possible for 1909-13 and 1913, and, unfortunately, no data is
available 'for gross, total or net marketings of wheat during NEP. Data
for wheat procurements based on Table T -10.
Row 9. Gross exports of wheat and wheat flour (adjusted to grain equiv-
alents by the ratio 1. 33 as cited in Groman-28a, p. 221. Data for 1909-
1913 from Vissarionov-28a. Data for 1913, 1924/25 - 1927/28 from
VTSSSR-60 (SaVTe 70000 and 82000).
Row 10. Gross imports of wheat and wheat flour (adjusted to grain
equivalents by the ratio 1. 33 as cited in Groman-28a, p. 221. Data
for 1913, 1924/25 - 1927/28 from VTSSSR-60. Assumed that aU flour
imports were wheat flour.
~
Row 11. Gross harvest on Soviet territory from Diamond-55, p. 48
except that data for 1909-13 are annual averages for Russian Empire
from Table III. 5 (adjusted for understatement in Tsarist statistics).
Row 12. Procurements by planned procurement agencies. No equivalent
data is pas sible for 1909 and 1913. Data for rye procurements bas ed on
Table T-10.
Row 13. Gross exports of rye and rye flour (adjusted to grain equiva-
lents by coefficient 1.11 cited in Groman-28a, p. 223). Data from
VTSSSR-60 (SaVTe 70001 and 82001). Data for 1909-13 from Table III. 5.
Barley
Row 14. Gross harvest on Soviet territory from Diamond-55, p. 53
except that data for 1909-13 are annual averages for Russian Empire
from Table III. 5.
Row 15. See note for Row 12.
Row 16. Gross exports of barley. Data from VTSSSR-60 and Table
III. 5; data for years 1909-13 and 1913 are for Russian Empire.
Oil seed
Row 17. Gross harvest of oil seed from Kaufman-28f.
Row 18. Procurements by planned agencies. Data for 1926/27 and
1927/28 from SUYB-29, p. 238, for sunflower, flax and hemp. Data
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for 1924/25 and 1925/26 for oil seed from SUA, Vol. 5, No. 22 (1926)
p. 9.
Row 19. Gross exports of oil seeds from Kaufman-28f and VTSSSR-60.
Exports of oil seed (SOVTC 720) in VTSSSR -60 differed from figures
cited in Kaufman-28f, which cited 250 (in 1000's m. t. ) in 1913, 191 in
1924/25, 141 in 1925/26, 30 in 1926/27.
Row 20. Gross exports of oil seed products including vegetable oil,
oil cake and oil seed. Sum of SOVTC 720, 580 and 841 from VTSSSR -60.
Flax
Row 21. Gross harvest of flax fiber. Data from Diamond-55, p. 85.
Net output is about 5% lower (Johnson-60, p. 235). Figures for 1913
for present boundaries (which approximates the boundaries of the
Russian Empire). Output in 1913 for Soviet territory of 1925 was
330, 000 m. t.
Row 22. Procurements of flax by planned agencies. Data for 1924/25
and 1925/26 from SUA, Vol. V, No. 22 (1926), p. 19. Data for 1926/27
and 1927/28 from SUYB-29, p. 289 and includes flax and tow. Figure
for 1913 was for "marketingl! of Tsarist Russia; the figure is from
Jasny-49 (p. 78) citing Socialist Agriculture USSR 1938, p. 89. The
state monopsonized purchases of flax during the NEP. The figure
cited by Jasny-49 (p. 73) for marketing of flax in 1927/28 was 120,000
m. t. (and excluded purchases by rural population).
Row 23. Export of flax fiber. Data from VTSSSR -60 and includes only
SOVTC 51003.
Row 24. (Net) export of all flax products including flax fiber, tow, and
combing and linen yarn and fabric. Figures from VTSSSR -60 and include
SOVTC 51003, 51004, 51013, 514001 and 903.
~
Row 25. Net output in billions. Figures from Johnson-60, p. 235.
Figure for 1913 cited in table was for post-World War II borders which
closely approximates borders of Tsarist Russia. Output in 1913 for
territory comprising the USSR in 1925 was 9.38 billion eggs.
Row 26. Procurement of eggs by planned agencies. Total marketing
of eggs in 1913 (Russian Empire) and 1927/28 were 6.7 and 3.9 billion
eggs. Procurements of eggs by centrally planned agencies for 1924/25
and 1925/26 from SUA, Vol. V, No. 22 (1926), p. 19. Data for 1926/27
and 1927/28 from SUYB-29, p. 239. Data converted from wagons and
cases into units by the coefficients 129,600 and 1440 (coefficients given
in SUA, Vol. IX, No. 3/4 (1930), p. 58).
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Row 27. Egg exports. Data in weight as cited in VTSSSR -60 converted
into units by coefficient "1 m.t. eggs = 14,400 eggs" {SUA, Vol. IX,
No. 3/4 (1930), p. 58}.
Butter
Row 28. Output of butter in (state and coope rative) factories. Data
from NBERa, Series 1105.1. Data are rough estimates and the entry
for 1927/28 is for the calendar year 1928. According to SUYB-30
(pp. 116-1l7), Rus sia produced about 152,416 m. t. of butter in 1913-14
(AY?) and exported about one -half of output. Output of "marketable
butter" was 43,550 m. t. in 1924, 64,500 m. t. in 1925, 70,000 m. t.
in 1926, 114, 200 m. t. in 1927 and 112,300 m. t. in 1928 (SUYB-30, p . .117).
Row 29. Total marketing of butter. Data for 1913 and 1927/28 from
STAT-28, pp. 268-269.
Row 30. Procurements by planned procurement agencies. Data for
1924/25 and 1925/26 from SUA, Vol. V, No. 22 (1926), p. 9: purchases
by state and coope rati ve agencie s . Data fo r 1926/27 and 1927 /28 from
SUYB-29, p. 239.
Row 31. Exports of butter. Data for 1909-13 (average annual exports)
from Table III. 4. Data for 1913, 1924/25 - 1927/28 from VTSSSR -60.
Cotton
Row 32. Output of unginned cotton. Data from Diamond-55, p. 73.
Row 33. Procurement by centrally planned agencies. Data for 1924/25
and 1925/26 are from SUA, Vol. V, No. 22 (l926), p. 9. Output was
less than marke ting according to these data; the pos sible explanations
are underestimates of output Or reduction in stock. Data for 1926/27
and 1927/28 are from SUYB-29, p. 238.
Wool, Sugar Beets, Hides, Skins
Rows 34 -37. Procurements by centrally planned agencies. Data for
1924/25 and 1925/26 are from SUA, Vol. V, No. 22 (1926), p. 9. Data
for 1926/27 and 1927/28 are from SUYB-29, p. 239.
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APPENDIX D
ESTIMATES OF SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE IN
GOLD , SILVER AND PLATINUM
The purpose of Appendix D is to present estimates of Soviet ex-
ports and imports of gold, silver and platinum, and to briefly describe
the methodology and sources used for compiling these estimates. These
estimates are (1) for determining the importance of platinum exports in
inter -war Soviet foreign trade, (2) for determining the value of Soviet
foreign reserve holdings and (3) for determining the precious metal
component of the Soviet balance of payments. The tables and accom-
panying table notes for Appendix D are placed after the text to Appendix
D on pp. 843 and 853.
Soviet gold exports and imports. Soviet gold exports financed a
substantial share of Soviet imports and invisibles on current account
during both the NEP and during the first two FYP's. Estimates of the
quantity of gold exports in metric tons are pre sented in Table D. 1 and
estimates of the value of gold exports in gold rubles are presented in
Table D. 2.
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Since all information on gold production and export was a state
secret in the USSR (especially since 1926) the basic sources for all
estimates of Soviet gold exports were the recipient countries' trade
statistics, so that most non-Soviet estimates of Soviet gold exports are
similar. The difference can usually be explained by country coverage
(Golow atscheff' s data are most complete) or by the failure to take into
account the re-export of Soviet gold to the USSR or to a third country
(as in the Davidoff series).
Data on Soviet gold exports from 1920 to 1924 are at best esti-
mates and are discussed in Appendix E when discussing the initial stock
of gold on January 1,1923.
Soviet imports and exports of silver. Data on Soviet imports and
exports of silver are based on the trade statistics of three countries --
Great Britain, United States, and Germany. The quantity and value of
Soviet trade in silver from 1920 to 1937 are presented in Table D. 3.
The value in gold rubles of Soviet silver trade has been based on the
value of the silver trade in the currency of the USSR's trading partner
converted at the current exchange rate of that currency for gold ruble s
(Table D. 7).
Much silver and silver coin were imported in the mid-1920's to
supply coinage as part of the monetary reform and as a source of
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revenue for the Treasury. In 1932, however, the USSR began to ex-
port silver in much larger quantities than both current production and
the sum of all past Soviet production. I suspect that the Soviet govern-
ment melted down existing silver coins, including coins (especially
Tsarist silver coinage) received through its system of foreign currency
stores (Torgsin), and also coins withdrawn from circulation through
normal banking operations. This suspicion is reenforced by the decree
of February 27, 1932 which authorized the Commis sariat of Finance to
2
issue 10, 15 and 20 kopeck coins made of nickel. Ostensibly the
"nickel coin decr ee" was aimed at combatting the "s mall-change fam-
ine" which reached its peak in the summer of 1930 and which was at-
tributed to "counter -revolutionary" hoarding by speculator s. It was
probably partly caused by hoarding due to inflation and the intrinsic
value of silver coin (a phenomenon which also occurred during World
1 Table D. 3 and Spasskii-62, p. 212. Silver coins were com-
missioned in several British mints (Ibid., p. 212). Silver coins of one
ruble and of fifty kopecks contained 90% pure silver which was worth
about two-thirds of the nominal value. Silver coins of 10, 15, and 20
kopecks were 50% pure silver and were worth in 1926 about one -third
of the nominal value. The coins were identical in all ways except de-
sign to pre -revolutionary coinage. Based on L. Jourowsky, "The
Monetary System of the Soviet Union" in EIKSSSR, pp. 101-103.
2
Arnold-36, p. 427.
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3
War I). By 1932, however, I suspect that the Soviet government also
realized that the days of the circulating silver coin were numbered and
decided to withdraw them from circulation and to replace them with
token coin. The silver from the coin could then be exported to help
meet the severe balance of payments crisis in 1931-33. During 1932,
the "small-change famine" got so bad that "paper bons" had to be is-
sued.4 There is not definite proof, however, that the Soviet govern-
ment smelted Tsarist and Soviet silver coinage for silver exports ex-
cept for the above decrees and the extremely large silver exports in
1932-35.
Soviet platinum exports. 5 Platinum metals were considered to
be a foreign reserve metal by the Soviet government and platinum ex-
ports were an important source of foreign exchange during the inter-
war period and especially during the mid-1920's when annual platinum
exports accounted for 3.0 - 3.8% of total exports (Table D. 8).
Estimating the quantity and value of platinum exports was dif-
ficult both because of the secrecy which shrouded platinum exports in
the 1930's and the problem of definition of platinum. "Platinum" can
3 Arnold-36, pp. 425-427.
4 Arnold-36, p. 427.
5 Articles on Soviet platinum exports include the following: A. C.
"Russkaia platina po mirovom rynke," Ekon. Oboz., Vol. VI, No. 1
(January, 1928),pp. 166-170; "Die Platinin Industrie, " SUA, Vol. VII,
No.4 (1928), pp. 31-33; Gustav MUnzer, "Die Edelmetalle in der
sowjetrussisch-deutschen Handelsbilanz," SUA, Vol. VIII, No. 14
July, 1929), pp. 37 -41. --
841
be defined as the pure metal alone or as including all the allied plati-
num metals such as palladium, iridium, osmium, rhodium and ruth-
enium. Crude platinum usually contains some of the se allied metals.
Since we had no information on the Soviet definition of "platinum ex-
ports" (as reported, for example, in ERSU, Vol. IV, No. 9 (May 1,
1929), p. 178), and since we are interested in total contribution of
platinum metals and all precious metals to the Soviet balance of pay-
ments, we as sumed that the Soviet definition of "platinum exports" in-
cluded all allied platinum metals in all forms (sponge, ingot, drawn,
rolled) except jewelry. Occasionally, the weights of these allied plati-
num metals were not included separately in the recipient countries I
foreign trade statistics, but omitting the weight of these secondary
platinum metals did not greatly affect the weight totals because they
were several order s of magnitude smaller (Table D. 4). The source
notes for each recipient country define the term "platinum" used for
each country. The platinum export figures cited in ERSU are assumed
to include allied metals (Tables D. 4 and D. 5).
Value of Soviet platinum exports. The value of Soviet platinum
exports for the economic years during the NEP were Soviet estimates
of the value of platinum exports and were accepted unchanged, although
they probably overstated the final export receipts from the exported
platinum because a large portion of this platinum was exported to Ger-
many to a Soviet platinum marketing corporation in 1926 and was used
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as security for bank loans and sold at a later date after platinum prices
had fallen. The recipient country's trade statistics suffer, however,
from the same problem.
The value of Soviet platinum exports was reconstructed in most
cases by converting the value of platinum imports from the USSR re-
ported in the recipient country's currency into gold rubles at the then
prevailing exchange rate. The value in this case was usually C.1. F.
border of recipient country rather than F. O. B. Soviet border so that
Soviet platinum exports are overvalued in terms of F.O.B. Soviet bor-
der (the conventional way of recording Soviet exports) by using recipi-
ent countries' foreign trade statistics. The relative importance of the
difference between F. O. B. and C. I. F. is thought to be small because
of the high value to weight ratio.
In some cases -- Germany, France and Japan -- direct informa-
tion on the value of the platinum imports from the USSR are not avail-
able for some years. The notes to Table D.S explain the method of
estimating the value of Soviet platinum exports in these cases.
TABLE D. 1
EXPOR T AND IMP OR T OF GOLD FROM THE USSR
REPORTED BY OTHER COUNTRIES 1920-1938
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Net Gold Export by USSR
Total Total Weight (m. t. )
Calendar Value Weight to to to to
Year (millions (m. t. ) United Great Germany other
gold States Britain countries
rubles)
(1) (2 ) (3) (4) (5 ) (6)
1920 45. 1 34.9 . . . 12.0 ... 22. 9
1921 17.0 13. 2 . . . 4. 1 ... 9. 1
1922 1.7 1.3 ... . . . 0.0 1.3
1923 0.0 0.0 ... . .. 0.0 0.03
1924a
- 18. 1 -14.0 ... -14.0 0.0
1925 42.2 35. 8 ... +27.8 8. 0
1926 35.6 27.6 ... +12.4 15. 2
1927 6. 7 5. 2 ... - 10. 3 15. 5
1928 196.6 152.2 [ 8. 0] 28.4 123.8
1929 0.0 0.0 ... . .. 0.0
1930 0.0 0.0 ... . . . 0.0
1931 114. 6 88. 7 ... . . . 88. 7
1932 89.4 69.2 0.0 0.0 69.2
1933 77.9 60.3 0.0 ... 60.3
1934 93.8 72. 6 0.9 ... 71. 7
1935 28.9 22.4 16. 1 0.8 5. 5
1936 12. 9 10.0 10. 0 . . . ...
1937 230.2 178.2 O. 5 177. 7 ...
1938 133.4 103. 3 0.0 103.3
aMinus sign (-) denotes net imports of gold into the USSR.
TABLE D.2
USSR: ESTIMATES OF THE VALUE OF GOLD EXPORTS
(Millions of gold rubles)
844
Value of Soviet Gold Exports
As Estimated By
Recipient League
Countries I of
Year Trade Data Nations Davidoff Golowats cheff
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1920 45. 1 121. 6
1921 17. 1 297.3
1922 1.7 150. 1
1923 0.0 - 1
1924 - 18. 1 -16.9
1925 42.2 46 46.6
1926 35. 6 34 33.8
1927 6. 7 20 6.4
1928 196.6 210 207. 1
1929 0.0 45 0.0
1930 0.0 50 0.0
1931 114. 6 114.6 114 114.6
1932 89.4 93.3 90 90.6
1933 77. 9 77.7 78 78.3
1934 93.8 99. 1 99 99. 1
1935 28.9 29. 1 29 29.2
1936 12. 9 13. 6 12 12. 8
1937 230.2 229.3 230 229. 7
1938 133.4 120 -
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TABLE D.3
USSR: EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF SILVERa 1924-1937
(Imports designated by minus sign)
Value in millions of gold ruble s Weight in metric tons
Year Exports to ExPorts to
Total Great United Germany Total Great United Ger-
Value Britain States Weight Britain States many
1923 . . . ... . . . . .. . . . . . .
1924 -30.8 -30.8 ... . . . - 686. 1 - 686. 1 . . . . . .
1925 - 4.6 - 4.6 ... . . . -162.9 -162.9 . . . . . .
1926 O. 1 0.0 ... O. 1 O. 2 0.0 . .. 0.2
1927 0.0 0.0 ... 0.0 O. 1 0.0 . . . O. 1
1928 - 1.8 - 1.8 ... . . . - 50.0 - 50.0 . . . .. .
1929 - 3.4 - 3.4 ... .. . - 105. 3 - 105. 3 . . . ...
1930 - 0.8 - 0.9 O. 1 ... - 29.3 - 32.6 3. 3 . . .
1931 . . . . . . ... .. . . . . . . . .. . . . .
1932 7. 5 2. 9 ... 4. 5 855.2 263.4 . . . 591. 8
1933 26. 5 11. 0 ... 15. 5 2013.9 763.3 . . . 1250.6
1934 22. 3 10.0 O. 1 12. 3 3146.6 567.0 3.9 2575.7
1935 13. 9 11. 7 2.2 . 567.4 473.9 93. 5
1936 O. 7 0.0 O. 7 . 31. 7 O. 2 31. 5 .
1937 . .. .. . 0.0 . 2.2 ... 2.2
a
Silver in bars and coin. Russian and Soviet coins contained 50% silver
in smaller denominations and 90% in the larger denominations.
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TABLE D.4
USSR: EXPORT OF PLATINUM BY WEIGHT
(kilograms)
Exports Exports according to trade statistics of importiq2; countlY
According Soviet Platinum exPorts to
to Soviet Sum of United Great Germany France Japan Other
Data Trade States Britain (Sweden)
Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1922 a 42 42
1922/23 299
1923 a 215 15 200 0
1923/24 838
1924 999 999 0
1924/25 2925
1925 2579 2579 n. r.
1925/26 4098
1926 4420 4321 99
1926/27 5073
1927 5306 130 240 4742 194.0
1927/28 2455
1928 2324 186 517 1309 312.0
1928/29 [2919]
1929 n. p. 3592 435 2899 258.0
1930 n.p. 2265 448 1427 127 263.0
1931 n.p. 2264 211 784 493 161 615.0
1932 n.p. 2916 2 2469 175 270.0
1933 n. p. 4701 683 182 2439 655 742.4
1934 n. p. 2202 358 0 534 652 657.5
1935 n. p. 5254 694 3019 745 326 470.4
1936 n.p. 3554 140 1843 [ 93] 858 619.5
1937 n.p. ~ 4787 466 3033 112 730 n. p.
1938 n.p. 4516 978 2648 n. p. 890 n. p.
aConsiderable quantities of platinum may have been exported through the
Baltic countrie s.
bMay be understated because of lack of information from Germany and
Japan.
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TABLE D.5
USSR: ESTIMATES OF THE VALUE
OF PLATINUM EXPORTS 1922-1938
(Thousands of rubles)
A. SEMI-OFFICIAL SOVIET DATA
Year 1922/23 1923/24 1924/25 1925/26 1926/27 1927/28 1928/29
Value 1867 5733 19010 26639 26569 9820 12106
B. ESTIMATES BASED ON IMPORTING COUNTRIES' STATISTICS
(Includes platinum and allied metals)
Estimated Value of Platinum Imports from the USSR to
Total Great
Year Value USA Britain Germany France Japan
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5 ) (6 )
1923 1559.9 104. 5 1455.4 ... . ..
1924 7111. 7 7111. 7 ... . . .
1925 15,805. 6 15,805. 6 ... . . .
1926 28,862. 0 28,304. 7 557. 3 ...
1927 25,448. 3 729.4 1293.5 22,497. 1 928. 3
1928 11,357. 7 896.8 2508.9 6687.0 1265.0
1929 13,991. 3 1933. ] ... [10,934.5J . . . 1123.7
1930 5968.9 1222.6 ... [ 3634.2] 317.8 794.3
1931 5413.2 572.2 1887. 1 [ 987.0] 297.3 1669.6
1932 5952. 5 19. 6 ... [ 5051. 8] 330.0 551. I
1933 6218.3 1097. 1 275.2 [ 3012.4J [ 773.2J 1060.4
1934 2923.8 515. 9 O. 3 [ 783.9] [ 777.4] 846.3
1935 6514. 1 974.0 3766.7 [ 832.0] [ 364.6] 576. 8
1936 4905. 7 238.2 2591. 3 [ 130.9] [1165.2] 780. 1a
1937 8377.8 991. 3 5961. 8 [ 189.1] [1235.6]a
1938 5243. 7 1088.9 3109.9 . [1044.9]
a
Possibly understated because of lack of information
TABLE D. 6
UNIT VALUES AND NEW YORK PRICES OF PLATINUM
($/troyounce)
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1918
1919 114. 61 103. 1 5
1920 110.90 99. 81
1921 75.03 67.53
1922 97.62 87.86
1923 116.54 1 00. 00 109.10 104. 89
1924 11 8. 82 114.94 106. 94
1925 119.09 98.34 107. 18
1926 113.27 (104. 98) (89. 91 ) 101. 94
1927 84.64 66.49 (82. 96) (76. 05) 76.18
1928 78.58 74.99 68.48 77.92 (74. 18) (36.40) 70.72
1929 67.66 65.00 61.46 (63. 66) 60.89
1930 45.36 35. 51 38.52 (39. 98) 40.82
1931 35.67 32. 21 30.06 (38.43) (29. 56) 32.10
1932 36.46 (44.73 ) (30.07) 32. 81
1933 30.99 29.00 29.88 27.89
1934 36.47 35.24 33.45 32.82
1935 34. 15 33.49 31. 04 30.73
1936 42.93 38.24 38.64
1937 51.77 46.34 46.59
1938 35.90 30.65 32.31
TABLE D. 7
USSR: ANNUAL AVERAGE EXCHANGE RATE AT OFFICIAL
RATE IN RUBLES
London New YorK Paris ~sterdarr Riga Rome Stockholm Berlin Japan
1~ 1 $ 100 FranCE 100 Florin 100 Lat 100 Lire 100 Kronel 100 Mark 1 yen
Parity 9.458 1. 943 37.498 78. 116 37.498 37.498 52.080 46.29 • 9685
( 1) (2) (3) (4) (5 ) (6 ) (7) (8) (9)
1923 9. 53 2. 12
1923/24
1924 8.80 ) 1. 945
1924/25 1.945
1925 9. 36 1. 945 .7986
1925/26
1926 9.43 1. 945 6. 16 77. 68 37.21 7.65 53. 11 · 9165
1926/27 9.44 1.945 7. 32 77.66 37. 14 9.46 51. 87
1927 9.45 1. 945 7. 55 77.79 37. 10 10.01 51. 95 46.21 · 9218
1927/28 9.46 1. 94 7. 61 78. 19 37.37 10.29 52. 11 45.88
1928 9.45 1. 94 7.62 78. 18 37.46 10. 21 52.09 45. 89 .9023
1928/29 9.42 1. 94 7.60 77.83 37.43 10. 17 52.00 46.23
1929 9.43 1. 94 7.61 77. 92 37.45 10. 17 52.06 46.29 .8968
1929/30 9.45 1. 94 7.63 78.20 37. 51 10. 18 52. 21 46.42
1930 9.44 1. 94 7.62 78. 15 37.47 10. 17 52. 18 46.36 • 9605
00
~
TABLE D. 7 (continued)
London New Yor~ Paris ~sterdam Riga Rom.e Stockholm. Berlin Japan
1.£ 1 $ 100 Francs~OO Florin::: 100 Lat 100 Lire 100 Kroner 100 Mark 1 yen
Parity 9.458 1.943 37.498 78. 116 37.498 37.498 52.080 46.29 .9685
( 1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6 ) (7) (8) (9)
1931 8.83 1. 94 . 9508
1932 6.79 1. 94 7.58 77.69 37.00 9.86 35.68 45.98 .5495
1933 6.38 1. 56 7. 51 77.25 37. 12 9.96 33. 18 45.60 .3923
1934 5.80 1. 14 7. 50 76. 70 9.80 29.79 45. 17 .3450
1935 5. 58 1. 12 7. 50 76. 91 9.41 28.66 45.84 . 3315
1936 5. 60 1. 15 7. 61 78.23 9.25 46.34 .3345
1937 5. 73 1. 13 .3345
1938 5. 73 1. 13
00
\Jl
o
TABLE D.8
USSR: NET EXPOR TS OF PRECIOUS
METALS: 1923-1938
a
(millions of gold rubles)
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Total Net Soviet Exports of Net exports of Net Platinum
Net Gold Silver Platinum precious metals exports as
Exports as % of % of total
Total Total exports
exports imports
( 1) (2) (3) (4) (5 ) (6) (7)
1923 1.6 0.0 . 1.6 O. 50/0 o. 90/0 O. 50/0
1924 - 41.8 - 18. 1 -30.8 7. 1 - 8•.80/0 - 8. 5% 1. 5%
1925 53.4 42.2 - 4. 6 15. 8 8. 80/0 6. 5% 2. 60/0
1926 64.6 35. 6 O. 1 28.9 8. 90/0 9. 4% 4. 0%
1927 32. 1 6. 7 0.0 25.4 4. 30/0 4. 2% 3. 4%
1928 206. 1 196.6 - 1. 8 11. 3 25. 70/0 21. 6% 1. 4%
1929 10. 6 0.0 - 3.4 14.0 1.4% 1. 2% 1.5%
1930 5. 2 0.0 - O. 8 6. 0 O. 5% O. 50/0 o. 6%
1931 120.0 114. 6 ... 5. 4 14. 80/0 10.9% O. 7%
1932 102.9 89.4 7. 5 6. 0 17. 90/0 14. 60/0 1. 0%
1933 110.6 77.9 26. 5 6.2 23. 50/0 31. 8% 1. 3%
1934 119.0 93.8 22.3 2.9 28. 40/0 51.1% O. 7%
1935 49.3 28.9 13. 9 6. 5 13. 40/0 20. 4% 1. 8%
1936 18. 5 12. 9 O. 7 4.9 6. 0% 6. 0% 1. 6%
1937 238. 5 230.2 ... 8. 3 63. 40/0 81.8% 2. 2%
1938 138. 6 133.4 . 5. 2 47.3% 44. 3% 1.8%
a
Minus sign (-) denote s net imports.
TABLE D.9
USSR: EXPOR TS AND IMP ORTS
OF PRECIOUS METALS
(millions of ruble s)
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Net Gross Exports of Gross Imports of
Economic export of exports of Gold Platinum impor!s of Gold Silver
year precious precious precious
metals metals metals
( 1) (2) (3) (4) (5 ) (6) (7) .
1924/25 24 70 [51.0] 19.0 46 [8.5] 37. 5
1925/26 72 81 [ 54. 4] 26. 6 9 0.0 9.0
1926/27 34 49 [ 22. 4] 26. 6 15 [13 ] 2.0
1927/28 155 155 [145. 2] 9. 8
1928/29 67 70 [ 57.9] 12. 1 3 ... 3.0
1929/30 8 9 [ 0.0] 9. 0 1 ... 1.0
1930/31 110 110 0 ...
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Notes to Tables in Appendix D
Notes to Table D. 1
Col. 1: Column 2 mul tiplied by 1, 291, 590 rubles, which is the value
of one metric ton of gold in gold ruble s.
Col. 2: Sum of columns 3 through 6.
Col. 3: Soviet gold exports to the USA from FCNUS (various years).
Eight metric tons of gold were sent by the USSR to the USA in March
1928, but because of legal claims of ownership made by the French
government, this gold was re-exported by the USSR to Germany. For
a description of this incident, see ERSU, Vol. III, No.7 (April 1,
1928), pp. 114-115, and ERSU, Vol. III, No.8 (April 15, 1928), pp.
134-135.
Col. 4: Soviet gold exports to and imports (denoted by minus sign)
from ASTUK (various years).
Col. 5: Soviet gold exports to Germany. Figures for 1920-1925 from
AHD (various years). Figures for 1926-1929 from STATJAHR-31,
p. 213; for 1929- 1930 fro m STAT JAHR - 35, p. 30; fo r 193 1- 1937 fro m
STATJAHR-38, p. 252.
Col. 6: Soviet gold exports to other countries. Gold exports direct
from USSR to Sweden reported in SCB -67. Japan: No gold was ex-
ported to Japan according to a letter of 24 November 1967 from
Laurence Vass, Minister for Economic Affairs, Embassy of the United
States of America, Tokyo, Japan. His information was based on dis-
cussion with research personnel in the library of the Ministry of
Finance.
Notes to Table D. 2
Col. 1: Other countries I trade data. From column 1 of Table D. 1.
Col. 2: League of Nations I data (1931-1937). League -38a, pp. 13-14.
Nations. Money and Banking 1937/38: Volume I: Monetary Review
(1938), pp. 13-14. Data converted from "old dollars" into gold rubles
at the parity exchange rate of one dollar equals 1.9434 gold rubles.
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This source commented that: "These figures take into account the gold
recorded in Customs returns of other countries - - mainly Germany,
the United Kingdom, and the United States -- as imported from the
USSR. It is probable that the quantity of gold which left the USSR has
been larger than these figures suggest."
Col. 3: Davidoff data. Figures from Davidoff-39, pp. 292-293.
Col. 4: Golowatscheff data. Figures for gold exports from Soviet
holdings for 1920-1922 from Golowatscheff-38, p. 465. Figures for
1923 and 1924 from Golowatscheff-38, p. 465. Figures for 1925-1930
from Golowatscheff-38, pp. 522-523. Figures for 1931-1937 from
Golowatscheff-38, pp. 381-383.
Notes to Table D. 3
Source by country
Great Britain: ASTUK (various years). Converted to gold rubles at the
following exchange rates: 1924, 1.1:= 8.5878 gold rubles and others
listed in Table D. 7.
United States: FCNUS (various years). Converted to gold rubles at
the exchange rates listed in Table D. 7.
Germany: Figures for 1925-1927 from AHD (various years). Figures
for 1930-1934 calculated as a residual of a series including both silver
and gold in coin and bars (STATJAHR-32, p. 219, STATJAHR-35, p.
230) minus a series including only gold (STATJAHR-38, p. 252). The
weight of Soviet gold exports from Table D. 1 was subtracted from
weights in metric tons cited in the first series. The Reichsmark's
values are converted into rubles by an unweighted average exchange
rate for the year (Table D. 7) of 45. 63 kopecks per mark for 1931,
45.95 kopecks per mark for 1932 and 45.57 kopecks per mark for 1933.
Notes to Table D. 4.
Col. 1: Soviet sources: Figures for 1922/23 -1927/28 from ERSU, IV,
9 (May 1, 1929), p. 178; for 1928/29 from League-31a, p. 261, where
the remaining figures for exports of crude platinum agreed with the
above source.
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Col. 2: Sum of platinum imports reported directly from the USSR by
the United States, Germany, Great Britain, France, Japan. Incom-
plete for 1937-38.
Col. 3: United States. FCNUS (various years from 1920 to 1938).
Weight refers only to United States imports of ingot and sponge plati-
num. Value includes imports of platinum in other forms (wire, sheet,
etc.) and platinum allied metals. The United States imported large
amounts of platinum from Estonia and Latvia in the early 1920's which
probably came from the USSR either as part of the original peace
settlement in 1920 or as indirect imports through middlemen.
Col. 4: Great Britain. ASTUK (various years from 1920 to 1938).
Weight and value refer to imports of platinum (wrought or unwrought)
and rare metals. Great Britain imported substantial amounts of plat-
inum fr am Latvia and Estonia during the early 1920' s which pro babl y
came directly or indirectly from the USSR.
Col. 5: Germany. Figures for 1912-29 from AHD (various years).
Weight and value includes rare metals. For 1929 -1939 from Minerals
(various years).
Col. 6: France. Assumed to be zero for 1922-1927. Data for 1928-
1938 from TGCE (various years). Weight and value included "plati-
num, en masses, barres, bijous casses."
Col. 7: Japan. Information for 1922-38 from Vass-67.
Col. 8: Other (Sweden) SCB-67.
Notes to Table D. 5
A. Semi-official Soviet data. Figures for 1922/23 - 1927/28 from
ERSU, Vol. 4, No.9 (May 1, 1929), p. 178. Figures for
1928/29 from League-31b, p. 261.
B. Estimates of Soviet platinum exports based on recipient countries t
statistic s.
Col. 1: Total value of Soviet platinum exports as reported in recipient
countries' statistics (United States, Great Britain, Germany, France,
Japan): Sum of columns 2 through 7. Usually include s all form s of
platinum and platinum metals, but coverage varies slightly from
856
country to country. Estimates for early years may understate signif-
icantly total Soviet platinum exports due to exports through Baltic
countries.
Col. 2: Soviet platinum exports for 1922-1938 to USA. Data from
FCNUS (various years). Included both platinum and allied metals in
ingot, sponge and other forms. U.S. dollar value converted to gold
rubles according to exchange rates in Table D. 7 except 1935-1938 when
they were converted at parity.
Col. 3: Soviet platinum exports to Great Britain. Data from ASTUK
(various years). Included platinum and allied metals. Converted into
gold rubles according to the exchange rates in Table D. 7.
Col. 4: Soviet platinum exports to Germany. Figures for 1923-1928
from AHD (various years). Included platinum and allied metals and
excluded "finished products" from the "noble metals." Reichsmarks
value converted to gold rubles according to exchange rates in Table
D. 7. Figures from 1929 to 1937 from Mineral (various years) from
the section on "Platinum," and the table heading "Platinum imports
into Germany from the USSR." Presumably these data were based on
data from ARD. Only quantity was cited, so that the "value in gold
rubles" for Soviet platinum exports to Germany was obtained by multi-
plying the quantity in troy ounces times the "adjusted New York price"
(Table D. 6) times the exchange rate into gold rubles per dollar in
Table D. 7. This method assumed that the shipments to Germany were
sold at an average price in Reichsmarks of 900/0 of the New York annual
yearly price converted to Reichsmarks at the average exchange rate.
The actual price may be substantially different. Ruble values estima-
ted in this manne r are identified by brackets.
Col. 5: Soviet platinum exports to France. No data located for years
1923-1927. Figures for 1928-1932 from TGCE (various years). Value
in gold rubles calculated by assuming that the unit value of platinum
imported into France from USSR was identical to unit value of total
platinum imports into France and converting the value of French plati-
num imports from the USSR estimated in francs on the above assump-
tions into gold rubles according to the exchange rate in Table D. 7.
Included platinum in "masses, barres" and "bijous casses." Figures
from 1933 to 1938 from Mineral (various years); weight of platinum
imports into France from USSR in troy ounces converted into gold
rubles according to the same method used for German imports of
platinum from the USSR from 1929 -1937.
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Col. 6: Soviet platinum exports to Japan. Weight and value in yen
from Vass-67. Yen values converted into gold rubles on the exchange
rate cited in Table D. 7 .
Notes to Table D. 6
1. USA (New York Price). Average yearly price for sales in mis-
cellaneous small lots at New York in dollars per troy ounce.
(Average computed with equal weights for each month.) Quoted
price.
1919 -1927: Mineral-27, p. 466. In 1927, "the open market
price for large lots was fairly uniform at $6
under the quoted pric e. "
1928-1935: Mineral-35, p. 469. In 1935, "it is understood
that wholesale transactions between dealers and
refiners are at price s 10% lower. "
1936- 1938: Min er al- 38, p. 499.
2. USA: Unit value of platinum sponge imported into USA from
USSR (dollars/troy ounce). Dollar values divided by weight in
troy ounces. Source: FCNUS (various years).
3. USA: Unit value of platinum ingots, etc. Same procedure and
source as column 2. 1932 price based on very small value and
quantity of imports.
4. United Kingdom: Unit value of platinum (wrought and unwrought)
imported into the United Kingdom from the USSR, converted
from pounds to dollars at average exchange rate as reported in
FRB. Included rare metals until 1937. See source notes to
TableD.5.
5. Germany: Unit value of platinum imported into Germany from
the USSR converted from Reichsmarks to dollars at average ex-
change rate as reported in FRB. Included rare metals wrought
and unwrought. See source notes to Table D. 5.
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Notes to Table D. 7
Parity exchange rates of rubles for selected currencies based on legal
gold contents. Data from SUYB-30, p. 419 and STAT-25, p. 782.
A new parity of the ruble for the franc was established in 1933.
Average exchange rates. Unweighted average of official exchange
rate on the last (trading) day of each month. Exchange rates for 1926
were based on last five months of 1926. Exchange rates for 1931 were
not calculated for most currencies because of lack of data. It was as-
sumed that the dollar was quoted at parity. The average exchange rate
for the British pound sterling was estimated as the unweighted average
of 9.43 rubles/.1: for the months of January to August and 9.38, 7.42,
7.24, and 6.45 rubles/! for the months of September to December.
Exchange rate for 1935 was based on first eleven months of 1935. Of-
ficial Soviet data were not located for post-1935 period. U. S. dollar
and British pound sterling exchange rates for 1923-1925 were based on
unweighted averages of data cited in Table VIII. 3. Data for 1936 were
adapted from Aizenberg-62, p. 238. Data for U. S. dollar and for
British pound sterling for 1937 and 1938 based on new parity rates
established by the USSR in 1937 (see Notes to Table A. 1a). All data
for Japanese yen were based on the parity of the yen cited in STAT-25,
p. 782 and the relation of the yen to its gold parity as stated in
STATJAHR (various years).
Sources: The underlying monthly data were from the following publica-
tions. Figures for August 22, 1922 to February 28, 1931 were from
Monthly Survey (various months), published in Moscow by the State
Bank of the USSR (Gosbank). No data were located for period from
February 28, 1931 to September 20, 1931. Data for 1930-1931, when
published, were from Bank of Russian Trade Review, London. Data
for 1932-35 were from the Monthly Review, published by the Moscow
Narodny Bank, Ltd., London.
Notes to Table D. 8
Col. 1: Total net exports of precious metals. Sum of columns 2
through 4.
Col. 2: Net gold exports. Figures of trade data from column 1 of
Table D. 2.
Col. 3: Net silver exports. Figures from column 1 of Table D. 3.
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Col. 4: Net platinum exports. Figures from column 1 of Part B of
Table D. 5.
Col. 5: Net precious metal exports as % of total exports. For 1923
and 1924 the value of annual exports in current prices is assumed to be
the same ratio to the value in 1913 prices as the values of annual ex-
ports for 1922/23 and 1923/24 in current prices are to the values in
1913 prices. The values for the calendar years 1923 and 1924 probably
include platinum (VTSSSR-60). See Appendix A, Technical Note 2 for
estimates of 1922/23 and 1923/24 trade in current prices. The ratio
for 1922/23 is 1.5811 and for 1923/24, 1.4076, for exports, and 1. 26
and 1.88 for imports. VTSSSR-60 states that exports in 1923 and 1924
were 218 and 337; imports were 143 and 250, so that estimates for
1923 and 1924 are 345 and 474 for exports and 180 and 489 for imports.
Figures for 1925-1929 from VTSSSR-39 are known to exclude
platinum exports. Figures for 1930-1938 are from VTSSSR-60, and
exclude trade in precious metals (Appendix A, Technical Note 3,
Table 3a).
Col. 6: Net precious metal imports as % of total imports. Imports in
current prices for calendar years 1923 and 1924 estimated by pro-
cedure described for exports (in col. 5 above). Imports in current
prices for calendar years 1925-1938 from VTSSSR-60; data converted
to gold rubles. Column one was divided by the resultant time series
for imports.
Col. 7: Column 4 divided by export series described in column 5.
Notes to Table D. 9
Col. 1: Column 2 minus column 5 or Shenkman-32, p. 553.
Col. 2: Birmingham-32a, p. 13 and Shenkman-32a, p. 553.
Col. 3: Column 2 minus column 4. Assumed no silver export during
period.
Col. 4: Figures from Table D. 5, Part A.
Col. 5: Birmingham-32a, p. 13 or Shenkman-32a.
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Col. 6: Gold imports for 1924/25 from Great Britain from League-
26a, p. 80. The gold import from Great Britain in 1927 (Table D. I)
was presumed to have occurred during 1926/27. No other gold im-
ports occurred during thi s period as far as can be determined.
Col. 7: Column 5 minus column 6.
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APPENDIX E
ESTIMATES OF SOVIET FOREIGN RESERVE HOLDINGS
Virtually no information has been published by official Soviet
authorities about the total foreign reserves held by the USSR during the
inter -war period. The published balance sheet of the State Bank of the
USSR was not an accurate indicator of both the absolute level of Soviet
foreign reserves and changes in the level of Soviet foreign reserves.
During NEP, the total foreign reserves held by the State Bank tended
to understate the actual Soviet foreign reserves because the Commis-
sariat of Finance and other institutions held foreign reserves, which
were potentially or actually available for international payments. After
1930, the State Bank's published total reserves -- and especially the
gold stock component - - rapidly outpaced even the most optimistic es-
timates of the possible gold stock, which led the League of Nations to
suggest that the Soviet State Bank's estimates included gold shipped
. 1
abroad in pledge for payments for imports and credIts.
1
League-37a, p. 139.
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Method used for our estimates of
total Soviet foreign reserves
The estimates for total Soviet foreign reserves (Table E. 3) are
based on independent estimates of the gold stock held within the USSR
(Table E. 1) combined with estimates of non-gold foreign reserves held
by the Soviet State Bank (Table E. 2). All tables and table notes for
Appendix E are at the end of the text of the appendix on pp.
Estimates of the Soviet stock of gold must take into account
(1) initial stock of gold, (2) expenditure of gold, (3) production of
domestic gold and (4) purchases and requisitions of gold from the popu-
lation and from abroad.
Estimating the initial stock of Soviet gold for January 1,1923 is
complicated and subject to many uncertainties because of the problems
in determining the disposition of the original gold stock of about 1292
million rubles inherited by the Soviet government in October 1917. 2
Part was paid in compensation to Germany and the border states; part
was seized and spent by the White forces, and a large part was shipped
3
abroad in 1920-1922 in payment for imports and famine relief. Golo-
watscheff's estimates of the Soviet gold stock for January 1, 1923 were
the most reliable estimates, I think, because he correctly identified
2
Golowatscheff-38, p. 461. Also in many other sources.
3 For example, see Golowatscheff-38 (pp. 457-465) for a descrip-
tion of the disposition of the Tsarist gold stock during the period 1917-
1923. Many other author s have attempted to estimate the disposition of
the Tsarist gold stock during this period, including FRB, October,
1922, p. 1202, Baikalov-34, p. 33, Davidoff-39, p.---z9Tff.
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the actual disbursements of gold (especially for treaty obligations) by
Soviet authorities; these disbursements I have verified in other sources.
Golowatscheff estimated that the Soviet stock of gold on January 1,
1923, was 281 million rubles, not including the 118 million rubles in
gold sent by the Rumanian government to Russia in 1916 for safekeep-
ing and not returned by the Soviet government.
4
Golowatscheff's e s-
timates of the Soviet gold stock are used as the gold stock estimates
for my estimates of total Soviet foreign reserves (Table E. 1).
Other economists and organizations have attempted to estimate
Soviet gold output, Soviet gold exports and Soviet gold stocks: two
major studies of Soviet gold stocks are Davidoff-39 and Baikalov-34. 5
The Director of the U. S. Mint also presented estimates in their Annual
Reports which are representative of the other estimates of Soviet gold
output during this period; this series is also presented for comparison
with Golowatscheff Is data in Table E. 1. An alternative series for the
gold stock is als 0 shown in Table E. 1.
Soviet" expenditure s of gold" were largely for covering the bal-
ance of payments and these exports (and imports) of gold by the USSR
can be reasonably well reconstructed from the recipient countries'
trading statistics (Table D. 2). The State Bank or the Commissariat of
4 Golowatscheff-38, p. 429.
5
See footnote 7 on page 864.
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Finance also spent gold on the domestic "free exchange" market in
order to support the exchange rate of the chervonets ruble in terms of
gold and foreign currency during the period 1924-1926, but this sum is
thought to be insignificant compared to Soviet gold exports.
Estimates of Soviet gold output since 1926 are difficult to make
because of the secrecy of the Soviet government about the absolute
quantity of gold produced and because of the uncertainty about the Soviet
definition of "gold produced." The issue centered on the inclusion or
exclusion of gold refined from old gold turned in (for example, at the
Torgsin stores) or confiscated by the government. 6 By using Golo-
watscheff1s estimates of Soviet gold stocks, we implicitly accepted his
estimates of Soviet gold output. In comparison with the estimates of
other sources, Golowatscheff1s estimates tend, on the average, to be
7
slightly on the high side. Golowatscheff1s estimates for Soviet gold
output after 1926 (as are all other estimates) are based on statements
about relative gold output in the Soviet pres s rather than official Soviet
figures on absolute quantity of gold output.
6 For description of Torgsin foreign currency stores, see Aizen-
berg-62, p. 65 and Arnold-36, pp. 415-416, 447 -448, and 520-521.
7 Golowatscheff1s estimates are close or identical to Davidoff-39
(pp. 266-270). Both these series are slightly higher than Prokopovich-
40 (pp. 484-490), Baikalov-34, Arnold-36 (p. 416) and League-37a
(p. 59). Thus, the increase in gold stocks and total reserves used for
the text of this study may be overstated. See Table E. 1.
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Estimates of non-gold Soviet
foreign reserves
I have not found any official information about Soviet holding s of
non-gold foreign reserves which included platinum, silver, foreign
currency, deposits in correspondent banks abroad and foreign bills of
exchange. The only available indicator of the magnitude of these non-
gold foreign reserves appears to be the non-gold holdings of the State
Bank of the USSR (Table E. 2). A breakdown of the foreign exchange
holdings of the State Bank is available only for the Issue Department
(for the chervonets -ruble banknotes) of the State Bank and the total
foreign reserves "assigned" to the Issue Department as "firm cover"
for the chervonets were frequently Ie s s than the total foreign re serve s
of the State Bank. Therefore, the composition of the foreign reserves
held by the State Bank but not assigned to the Issue Department is un-
known and could be either all gold or all non-gold foreign reserves.
Because of these uncertainties, two series of estimates for non-gold
foreign reserves were calculated. The "minimum series" of non-gold
Soviet foreign reserves are simply the series of platinum, silver, and
foreign exchange assigned to the Issue Department. In the "minimum
series" it is implicitly assumed that all foreign reserves held by the
State Bank but not assigned to the Issue Department were gold. In the
"maximum series" of non-gold Soviet foreign reserves it is assumed
that all gold in the State Bank was assigned to the Is sue Department so
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that all foreign reserves held by the State Bank but not assigned to the
Issue Department were non-gold foreign reserves. For the maximum
series, the gold stock of the Issue Department was subtracted from the
total foreign reserves held by the State Bank. This method assumed
that all non-gold foreign reserves were held in the State Bank and that
the data of the State Bank for non-gold foreign re serves were not "in-
flated" in the post-1929 years (State Bank's figures for gold holdings
are thought to be exces sively high after 1929.).
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TABLE E.l
USSR: STOCK OF GOLD BASED ON
GOLOWATSCHEFF1S STUDY
(millions of rubles)
Golowatscheff' s estimates of Estimate of Alternative
As of Soviet Soviet Soviet Soviet gold estimate of
January gold gold b net gold output gold stock
fir st
a
Dir. UbS.stock output exports
Mint
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1923 281 10 - lc
1924 290 23 - 17c
1925 330 31 46.6
1926 314 34 33. 8 35. 9 314.0
1927 314 39 6.4 32. 5 316. 1
1928 347 47 207.0 36. 1 342.2
1929 187 56 0.0 43.6 171.3
1930 243 69 0.0 57.6 214.6
1931 312 82 114. 5 68.3 272.5
1932 289 96 90. 7 79. 9 226.3
1933 304 136 78.4 107. 1 213.5
1934 372 195 99.0 154. 9 242.2
1935 478 242 29.2 192. 1 298. 1
1936 701 305 12.9 210. 1 461. 0
1937 993 310- 230.0 215.2 658.2
1938 1075- 315 210.3 643.4
80
a
Does not include unreturned Rumanian gold of 118million rubles. See
Table Note
b .
Calendar year of year cited for January first gold stock.
cMinus sign denotes net imports.
Source: Note s to Table E. 1 are on page 871.
TABLE E. 2
USSR: ESTIMATES OF FOREIGN RESERVES EXCLUDING GOLD BASED ON
NON-GOLD RESERVES OF STATE BANK (GOSBANK)
(m.illions of rubles)
Foreign Reserves of State Bank of USSR Estim.ates of
As Total As signed to Issue Department Non-gold Foreign
of Foreign
Total II Firm Gold Platinum Foreigne Reserves
Jan. Reserve Cover" of Assigned to As signed to Exchange
Holdings Issue Issue Issue Assigned to in iniIr.diin· maxim.um1st
of State Bank Department Department Department ~s sue Depart. estimate estimate
(1) (2) (3) (4 ) (5) ( 6) (7)
1923 29. 1 15. 1 5. 1 10. 0 10.0 24.0
1924 212.6 148.0 87.5 1. 1 69.3 70.4 125. 1
1925 351. 7 257.4 142.0 13. 0 102.4 115. 4 209. 7
1926 282. 5 266.8 182.4 33. 7 50. 7 84.4 100. 1
1927 303.0 258.0 164.4 30.4 63.2 93.6 138. 6
1928 296.4 285.5 188. 6 20. 7 76.2 96.9 107.8
1929 320. 1 304. 1 178. 5 44.4 81. 2 125. 6 141. 6
1930 402. 8 391. 1 285.7 34.6 70. 8 105.4 117. 1
1931 562.2 561. 0 483. 6 22.3 55. 1 77.4 78.6
1932 b 707. 1 637.9 22.8 46.4 69.21932 762.9 714.5 17. 5 30.9 48.4
1934 862.0 807.8 9. 2 45.0 54.2
1935 8gh. 5 8541 8 4 33 8 42.2
aIncluded silver through April, 1930. bSeptember 1, 1932. cCo1umn 4 plus 5.
dColumn 2 minus 3. eIncluded bills of exchange drawn in foreign cur rency.
Source: Notes to Table E.2, p. 871.
TABLE E.3
USSR: ESTIMATES OF TOTAL
FOREIGN RESER YES
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As of Gold Non-Gold Reserves Total Foreign Reserves
January stock Minimum Maximum of U. S. S. R.
first estimate estimate Minimum Maximum
estimate estimate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1923 281 10. 0 24.0 291 305
1924 290 70.4 125. 1 360 415
1925 330 115. 4 209. 7 445 540
1926 314 84.4 100. 1 398 414
1927 314 93.6 138.6 408 453
1928 347 96.9 107. 8 444 455
1929 187 125. 6 141. 6 313 329
1930 243 105. 4 117.1 348 360
1931 312 77.4 78.6 389 391
1932 289 69.2 . 358
1933 304 48.4 . 352
1934 372 54.2 . 426
1935 478 42.2 . 520
1936 701 . .
1937 993 . . .
1938 1075- . . .
80
Source: Notes to Table E. 3 are on page 871.
TABLE E.4
USSR: VALUE AND QUANTITY OF
PLATINUM OUTPUT
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Economic Output Exports
Year Kilograms Value Kilograms Value Rubles /
million million kilograma
rubles rubles
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1922/23 299. 1 1,870 6252
1923/24 1770 12. 1 838.4 5,730 6834
1924/25 2950 19. 2 2,924.6 19,010 6500
1925/26 2880 18. 7 4,098.3 26,640 6500
1926/27 3110 16. 3 5,073. 1 26,570 5237
1927/28 2,454.9 9,820 4000
aValued at unit values of Soviet platinum exports.
Source: Note s to Table E. 4 ar e on page
TABLE E. 5
USSR: GOLD OUTPUT
Metric Tons Rubles, millions
(1) (2)
1922/23 11. 2 14. 5
1923/24 20.0 28.8
1924/25 25. 3 32.6
1925/26 25. 1 32.4
1926/27 23.2 30.0
Source: Notes to Table E. 5 are on page
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Notes to Tables in Appendix E
Notes to Table E. 1
Col. 1: Stock of gold as of January 1. Figures for 1923-1925 from
Golowatscheff-38, p. 469. Does not include Rumanian gold of 118 mil-
lion rubles which was shipped to Russia in 1916 for safekeeping (Ibid.,
p. 457 and p. 469). Figures for 1926-1929 from Golowatscheff-39, p.
522. Figures for 1930 and 1931 from Golowatscheff-38, p. 523. Fig-
ures for 1932 -1936 from Golowatscheff -38, p. 581.
Cols. 2 and 3: Output and net exports of gold. Figures for 1923 and
1924 from Golowatscheff-38, p. 469. Figures for 1925-1928 from
Golowatscheff-38, p. 521. Figures for 1929 and 1930 from Golowat-
scheff-38, p. 523. Figures for 1931-1936 and for 1937 from Golowat-
scheff-38, p. 581 and p. 583.
Col. 4: Estimates of Soviet gol.d output. Published in Annual Reports
of Director of the Mint [of the United States]. Data cited in Shimkin-
53, p. 171.
Col. 5: Alternative series of estimates for Soviet gold stock based on
Golowatscheff's estimate of the Soviet gold stock for January 1, 1926
and summing the difference between Golowatscheff's estimates for ex-
ports and the Director of the U. S. Mint's estimates of Soviet gold out-
put (i. e., the sum of column 4 minus column 3).
Notes to Table E. 2
Cols. 1-5: Data from the Balance Sheet of The State Bank of the USSR
and from the Balance Sheet of the Issue Department of the State Bank of
the USSR as published in ERSU (various issues).
Col. 6: Sum of columns 4 and 5.
Col. 7: Column 2 minus column 3.
Notes to Table E. 3
Col. 1: Gold stock. From Table E. 1, column 1.
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Cols. 2 and 3: Non-gold reserves. From Table E. 2, columns 6 and 7.
Col. 4: Sum of columns 1 and 2.
C01. 5: Sum of columns 1 and 3.
Notes to Table E. 4
Col. 1: Output data from Minerals -27, p. 731.
Col. 2: Column 1 multiplied by column 5.
Cols. 3 and 4: ExportdatafromERSU, Vol. IV, No.8 (May 1,1929),
p. 178.
Col. 5: Unit-value of Soviet platinum exports obtained by dividing
column 4 by column 3.
Notes to Table E. 5
Col. 1: Output data from ERSU, Vol. III, No. 16-17 (September 1,
1928), p. 284.
Col. 2: Value of Soviet gold output obtained by multiplying the weight
of gold output in kilogram s by the value of one kilogram of gold at the
official parity rates (1 kg. gold equalled 1291.59 rubles).
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APPENDIX F
ESTIMATING PRICE AND VOLUME INDEXES FOR
SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE 1913, 1924-1928
The purpose of Appendix F is to describe the statistical proce-
dure s used in computing the volume and price indexe s for total exports
and total imports, the basic import and export volume and price in-
dexes, and the price and volume indexes for selected commodity groups.
The indexes have been computed using 1913, 1926/27, 1927/28, 1932
and 1937 price and quantity weights. All tables and notes to tables for
Appendix F are placed at the end of this appendix.
Total volume and price indexes
The volume and price indexes for total exports and total imports
are essentially value-weighted combinations of the basic volume and
price indexes for the major exports and imports with price and volume
indexes of selected commodity groups. These latter groups were spe-
cifally excluded from the basic indexes because of the diverse nature
of the individual commodities in these commodity groups and because
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of inadequate unit-value data for the entire period. Separate indexes
for these latter commodity groups used (1) data from sources other
than VTSSSR-60 and (2) aggregate deflators for entire commodity
groups. These separate indexes and the basic index were combined
into total price and volume indexes using value -based weights, i.e. ,
using the share in total exports or imports in a given "weight year" of
each group specifically excluded from the index for reasons mentioned
above. The value weight for the basic index is one minus the share of
the specifically excluded groups. The groups specifically excluded
from the basic index and the methods of estimating the indexes for
these separate commodity groups are described below.
Basic volume and price indexes
The indexes for prices and volume used in this study were based
largely on the so-called "basic price and volume indexes" which were
calculated using commodities for which fairly reliable "unit-values"
or prices were available.
The price indexes are conventional indexes which use unit-values
of exports (or imports) to represent "prices" and use the quantity ex-
ported in the selected "weight year" for weights. The resultant series
were then converted to a base year of 1927/28 (1927/28 = 100) to facil-
itate comparison of the indexes with different weights. The formulation
for the price indexes for exports is the following:
PI =
y,w 100 =
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. 100
where:
PI
y,w
i
P
w
y
= price index in year "y" weighted with
quantitie s of year "w"
= quantity exported of commodity "i"
= unit-value of commodity "i"
= weight year
= current year
In all, five price indexes have been computed using 1913,
1926/27, 1927/28, 1932, and 1937 quantity weights; all are arithmeti-
cal averages of the same set of prices, varying only in the quantities
used for weighting the various prices.
1 See Moorsteen-62 (pp. 1-8, 35-43) for a description of the pro-
cedures used in calculating such indexes. The procedure in our study
is essentially similar except that unit values were combined directly
with the quantity weights for year "x" and the resultant series was di-
vided by the value of the series for 1927/28 to get an "x-weighted"
price index with 1927/28 as the base year. Moorsteen used price-
relatives for each item and combined these price-relatives using
value-weights for each of the weight years (see Moorsteen-62, pp.
40 -41).
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The volume indexes were calculated in a similar manner using
the quantity of each commodity exported (or imported) weighted by the
unit-value of that commodity in the weight year:
I pi Qiw y
I pi Qi I pi QiV w w . 100 w Y 100=y,w
I pi Qi L pi iQ27/28w Y w
I pi iQ27/28w
where:
V
y,w
w
y
= volume of exports in year "y" using unit-value
weight of year "w"
= quantity exported of commodity "i"
= unit-value of commodity "i"
= weight ye ar
= current year
In most cases, "weight" in metric tons was used as an indicator of
quantity; for selected items, "units" or "area" was used because it
was thought more appropriate for the commodity in question (cloth) 01"
it was the only informatie>n avai.lable (hides).
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Selection of items for basic indexes
and" substitute unit values"
Table F. 1 lists the 73 commodities included in the basic export
indexes and related indexes. The criteria for selection of these items
is less than ideal. The inclusion of a particular item depended on the
homogeneity of the product, the availability of data, and the availability
of reasonable outside information to fill in gaps in the unit-values when
exports ceased or fell to extremely low levels (thereby distorting the
representativeness of the unit-values). The unit-values of some ex-
ports were accepted without any adjustment, but "subtitute unit-values"
were calculated for several years for many series because exports
ceas ed or fell to insignificant levels.
The following procedure was used to estimate these" substitute
unit-values." A price series for the commodity for which reliable
unit-values could not be calculated from export data was obtained from
one of several sources: spot price s on a major commodity market, ex-
port or import unit-values of British, U.S., or German foreign trade,
or wholesale prices in Great Britain (published in STATABUK) or
Germany (published in STATJAHR) , the two major Soviet export mar-
kets. The foreign price series were adjusted for devaluation of the
pound sterling and the dollar in the relevant year s by multiplying the
price by the correction coefficients for devaluation (Table F. 9). A
unit-value of Soviet exports of this commodity for a nearby year, for
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which reliable data were available, was multiplied by an index of the
selected subs titute price series in order to derive the "substitute unit-
values." The resultant "substitute unit-values" were then included in
the price index in the normal manner described above. Substitute
unit-values for any of the years 1913, 1922/23, 1923/24 were often
calculated from the actual unit-values of anyone of these years, for,
in theory, all trade data for these years were entered in 1913 prices
(see Appendix A, Technical Note 2).
Coverage and adjustments for basic volume index
The "basic export indexes" were computed using the 73 commod-
ities listed in Table F. 1. "Machinery" (SQVTC 1) and "furs" (SQVTC
52) wer e specifically excluded from the basic export indexes because
the unit-values for machinery and furs based on the data in VTSSSR-60
did not reflect the actual trend in prices either theoretically or in prac-
tice. Separate price and volume indexes for these "specifically ex-
cluded commodity groups" were estimated and combined with the basic
export indexes to derive the total export indexes.
Adjustments for incomplete coverage in export volume index.
The share of the 73 items in the basic export index and the share of
machinery and fur exports are presented in Table F. 2. The value of
exports not included in either the basic index ~ in the fur or machinery
commodity groups varied from 5% to 19% of the value of total exports.
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The inability to include all items in either the basic index or in the
specifically excluded groups (fur and machinery) introduces the possi-
bility that the basic and total volume indexes do not accurately reflect
the "actual changes in volume" which would be estimated if all com-
modities could be specifically included in the indexes. 2 Thus, in
estimating a volume index for all exports this explicit variation in the
coverage of the basic index and other specifically excluded commodity
groups should be taken into account in order to get a more meaningful
index of the volume of exports. For our index, this adjustment for
changes in the coverage of total exports by the basic index and other
specifically excluded groups was made by dividing the basic volume
inde s by the following ratio:
( value
~ value
of commodities included in basic
value of total exports minus
specifically excluded groups
of commodities included in basic
value of total exports minus
specifically excluded groups
index)
index )
in year "y"
in year "w"
2
Of course, this problem is present in any volume index which
is constructed as a sum of indexes for various commodity groups, the
indexes of which are based only on several commodities within the
group. When these "'representative indexes" are combined using value
weights for the entire commodity group, it implicitly assumes that the
commodities included in the "representative index" for that group
changed (as a group) in proportion to the representative index for that
group.
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The ratio of the value included in the basic volume index (2: pi Qi) to
y y
the total value of exports not explicitly excluded from the basic volume
index (that is, total value of exports minus furs and machinery) is
presented in Table F. 2. The basic volume indexes and the adjusted
basic volume indexes are presented in Table F. 3 and Table F. 4. This
method assumed that all the variations in the percentage coverage of
the basic volume index items of all items not specifically excluded from
the export index resulted from changes in the volume of these items
exported and did not result from change in the relative prices of items
included and excluded in the basic volume index. If the basic volume
index is of the Laspeyres type (past prices), then we have as sumed
implicitly in this method that the Paasche price index of the items
specifically included in the basic volume index and the Paasche price
index of the items not specifically excluded from the basic index were
identical. A proof is provided in an addendum to this appendix.
Examination of the "residual items" which were neither included
in the basic index, nor specifically excluded from the basic index sug-
gest that changes in the coverage reflected changes in the volume of
the residual items rather than changes in the relative prices. This was
especially true in tne mid-1930's when the USSR was exporting almost
any commodity it could find and sell (for example, apatite ore, slag
and scrap of non-ferrous metals, chromite ore, window glass, cement,
yarn, leather, cotton).
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Selection of items for import indexes
Table F. 5 lists the 60 items included in the basic import indexes.
The comments made about the criteria and problems in selecting items
for the index and the types of adjustments in the unit value of exports
apply also to imports.
Coverage. The coverage of the basic indexes for imports is
much less favorable with respect to total imports and also with respect
to that portion of total imports not specifically excluded from the basic
indexes. The three groups of commodities specifically excluded from
the basic import indexes are (1) machinery, (2) all chemicals except
fertilizers and rubber, and (3) all manufactured consumer goods except
cotton and woolen cloth. These three groups formed a much larger
share of total imports (from 18.'30/0to 57.5% according to Table F.6)
than the specifically excluded groups in the export index. Further-
more, the 60 items selected for the basic import indexes wer e also a
smaller share of the items not specifically excluded from the basic
index (see column 6 in Table F. 6) because of the more diversified list
of imports. The composition of imports changed radically during the
1930's -- much more so than the composition of exports!
Adjustment for coverage in the basic import list was done in the
same manner as for exports (see Tables F. 7 and F. 8).
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Commodity groups specifically
excluded from indexes: exports
Soviet machinery exports. Soviet machinery exports (SOVTC 1)
were specifically excluded from the basic index. Machinery exports
played a minimal role in Soviet exports until about 1933. For the pur-
poses of the weight years, Soviet machinery exports were important
only in 1937. Soviet machinery exports were deflated by a German
. 3
price index for industrial machInery.
Soviet fur exports. Soviet fur exports (SOVTC 52) were specific-
ally excluded from the basic export index because the data in VTSSSR-
60 was not detailed. Since fur exports were important in Soviet ex-
ports, we have calculated unit-value based price and volume indexes
using data from other sources. This index is described below.
The fur price and volume indexes. Several price (unit value) and
quantity indexes were calculated for Soviet fur exports because of the
lacuna in Soviet statistics for fur exports.
The simplest indexes (and least reliable on a statistical basis)
are the indexe s based on weight (for the volume index) and the unit
values of the aggregate commodity group, "furs" (SOVTC 52) and the
major subgroups, "raw furs" (SOVTC 520), dressed furs, not dyed
3
See below, p.891, u. 13.
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(SOVTC 520) and dressed furs, dyed (SOVTC 523). These simple in-
dexes are presented in Table F. 10.
The composition of fur exports changed during this period, so
that these simple indexes do not reflect the changes in prices and
volume of Soviet fur exports. The share (in weight and value) of
dressed and dyed furs increased relative to raw furs in the early and
mid-1930's and within the subgroup "raw furs" the importance of
squirrels and k~rakul declined significantly during this same period
(partly because these two furs were being increasingly exported in a
dressed form). A more meaningful price index would be market prices
for individual furs weighted by the quantity exported of each type of
fur. This ideal type of index was unrealizable because of inadequate
data for most of the 54-plus types of raw furs exported during this
period, and because of the almost complete lack of detailed data for
Soviet exports of dressed furs. We had to be satisfied with estimating
price indexes (Tables F. 11 and F. 12) for raw furs based on 8 types of
furs: squirrel, fox, ermine, sable, polar fox, white fitch, black fitch,
and karakul. Even here we had to make several rough estimates for
1913. We combined these indexes using value weights with the simple
unit-value indexes of dressed furs and dressed-and-dyed furs. The
resultant index was then combined using value -weights with the basic
export index de scri bed above.
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The volume index for raw fur exports was estimated in a similar
manner using the eight types of furs for the raw fur volume index and
adjusted for changes in the share of these eight raw furs relative to the
4
total value of raw fur exports. The resultant index was combined with
volume indexes of dyed and dre ssed furs based on the weight of ex-
ported furs; this was not very satisfactory from a theoretical viewpoint
but there was no alternative.
Data for 1913. Tsarist statistics for Russian fur exports were
incomplete and lacked detail. They recorded only 6.5 million rubles
for fur exports in 1913; Soviet writer s, however, estimated that fur
exports in 1913 were roughly 24.5-26.3 million rubles, and these
estimates were based on either recipient countries I statistics, or on
the statistics of the major fairs -- Irbit Yakutsk, Nizhni-Novgorod,
5
etc. -- at which most fur trade occurred before World War I. The
statistics for the trade fairs were relatively detailed and transactions
for exports were separated into a special category. We have used
these "transactions for export" as the source for the quantities and
4 See above, page 878 and Addendum to Appendix F for statis-
tical procedure used for adjustment and a discussion of its implied
assumption about changes in price and volume.
5 VTSSSR-60 (p. 55) for official fur export statistics. SUA, Vol.
5, No. 19 (p. 29) estimated fur exports at 24.5 million rubles.
EIKSSSR (p. 275) estimated fur exports at 26.3 million rubles.
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unit values for 1913 as a substitute for otherwise unavailable official
6
statistics. The eight furs which were chosen for our index (because
of the availability of data) comprised 720/0 of the turnover in these trade
fairs. The division of fur exports in 1913 among raw, dressed, and
dressed-and-dyed furs is not known. Official statistics listed all fur
exports in 1913 as being llraw furs, 11 but other sources noted that some
furs (squirrel, hares, lamb) were exported in the dressed state in
significant quantities. We have not been able to make any reasonable
estimate of the value of these exports of dressed furs and we therefore
accept the official statistics allocation of fur exports between the raw
and dressed classifications. Insofar as dressed furs were included in
the trade fair statistics for the eight furs, this would understate the
increase in prices which occurred after World War 1.
Little data for 1922/23 - 1924/25. No detailed export statistics
have been located for the 1922/23 - 1924/25 period. A published index
of fur exports in 1913 prices and 1924/25 prices has been used for
estimating volumes and prices in the combined fur indexes; the weights
for the price index are not known and may be either 1913 weights or
6 EIKSSSR, pp. 275-277.
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1924/25 weights. 7 These data are presented below: 8
Wild Animal Fur Karakul
1913 1924/25 1913 1924/25
prices price s prices prices
1913 17, 300 47,575 7,200 8,280
23/24 17, 582 48,351 2,615 3,007
24/25 21,488 59,091 4,473 5, 144
"Wild animal fur" prices were 175% higher than 1913 prices; karakul
and similar furs were priced only 150/0higher. Volume estimates for
1922/23 and 1923/24 are based on the statistics presented in VTSSSR-
60 (p. 80) because fur trade statistics were entered in 1913 prices for
these year s.
1925/26 - 1936. Figures for 1925/26 are from SUA, Vol. 6,
No.2 (1927), p. 31. Figures for 1926/27 - 1936 are from VTSSSR-39.
For 1931-33 the unit values of black fitch and white fitch are assumed
to move in proportion to "fitch - total," the only figures reported for
these ye ar s.
7 They probably are in 1924/25 quantity weights, derived by cal-
culating fur exports both in 1913 prices and 1924/25 prices as part of
the statistical process of estimating foreign trade in both pre-war
prices and current prices which was started that year. From calcula-
tion of the volume indexes based on the volume in the so-called" 1913
prices" and" 1924/25 prices," it was obvious that the estimated price
index for 1924/25 was used to revalue the values for price years, ra-
ther than using the individual prices and quantities.
8 SUA, Vol. V, No. 19 (1926), p. 29.
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1937 -1938. Unit values estimated frorD changes in the unit value
of impor ts into the USA of the se fur s from the USSR for 1935 -1938 as
reported in FCNUS-35, -36, -37, -38. In particular, karakul was as-
sumed to move with the unit value of "lamb skin" imports from the
USSR. Black and white fitch unit values were assumed to move with
the unit value of "fitch." The estimated unit values for Soviet exports
were based on the average of 1935 and 1936 unit value of each item for
both US imports and Soviet exports. Checks of early years revealed
that the unit values of Soviet exports and US imports moved together.
Volume for 1937 and 1938 is assumed to move in proportion to weight
no better evidence is available. This assumes implicitly that no
structural change occurred during this time.
Construction of index. The index of raw fur prices is an index of
export unit values weighted by the quantities exported in the selected
base years:
1: Qi pi
P w Y=w,y
2: Qi pi
w w
where:
w = weight base year
y = current year
i = type of fur
Q = quantity in number
P = export unit value s
That is, it is similar in formulation to all the indexe s used in this study.
The unadjusted quantity index was calculated using unit value weights.
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The fraction of total raw fur exports which these eight furs com-
prised varied from year to year as seen in Table F. 11, so that to ob-
tain a more meaningful indicator of v~lume of raw fur exports, we ad-
justed the volume index by dividing the volume index of eight furs
(weighted by unit values) by the ratio of the value of these eight furs to
the value of all raw furs. The "adjusted volume index of raw fur ex-
ports" is presented in Table F. 12. This method of adjustment as-
sumed that the variations in the share of the eight furs in total fur ex-
ports was due entirely to changes in the quantities of the other raw furs
rather than to changes in price fluctuations differing from those of the
eight furs. 9
Dressed furs and dressed-and-dyed furs. Unfortunately, we
were forced to resort to simple unit values as an index of price for
dressed furs, and "weight" as an index of volume. For dressed-and-
dyed furs we followed a similar procedure, except that the unit value
index for dres sed furs was used for the years 1913 -1929 because of the
insignificant amount of exports of dressed-and-dyed furs during this
period.
Combined fur export indexes. The price and quantity indexes for
the above described groups of fur exports were combined using value-
9 See above, p.878, E. 7.
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weights and were calculated for 1913, 1926/27, 1927/28, 1932, and
1937 weight-years. The "combined" price indexes for fur exports are
presented in Table F. 13; quantity indexes are presented in Table F. 14.
Commodity groups specifically excluded
fr om basic import indexe s
The following commodity groups were specifically excluded from
the basic import index be cause of their unsuitability for calculating
meaningful unit values:
Machinery (SOYTC 1)
Industrial chemicals (SOYTC 30)
Dyes (SOVTC 31)
Explosives (SOYTC 32)
Film (SOYTC 33)
Manufactured consumer goods except cotton and woolen
cloth (SOYTC 9 minus SOVTC 900 and 901)10
Volume and price indexes for Soviet machinery imports. The
major problem in calculating the price and volume indexes was that the
data for individual items imported during this period were not suffici-
ently detailed to estimate reliable (meaningful) unit-values to use in the
price indexes and as weights for the quantity indexes. 11 Hence we were
10 See Appendix A, Technical Note 5 for discussion of SOYTC
numbers.
11 Several estimates of unit-values and price indexes based on
Soviet machinery import data from YTSSSR-60 were erratic. Greater
disaggregation of data (available only for 1929 -1933) would be required
to compute the indexes more accurately t~an any of the- available
published price indexes for selected types of machinery, and I felt that
these unit-value indexes were less suitable indicators of the price of
Soviet machinery than available alternative indexes of machinery prices.
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forced to use the machinery price indexes for broad commodity group-
ings of machinery published by several major machinery exporting
nations (Germany and the United States). Machinery imports were
separated into three basic categories for the purposes of estimating
price and volume indexes for machinery imports: "industrial machin-
ery" (a residual of SOVTC 1 minus other groups), "agricultural machin-
ery" (SOVTC 18) and "transport" (SOVTC 19 which consisted mostly
of trucks and automobiles). The price indexes used to deflate the value
of Soviet machinery imports were Ie s s than ideal and, furthermore,
the statistical methodology used for computing these indexes was
largely unknown. These deflators are presented in Table F. 15. The
three separate indexes for machinery - - general machinery, trans-
portation and agricultural - - were combined using the share of each of
these groups in the value of total imports of machinery (SQVTC 1) in
current prices in the weight year and the resultant indexes for Soviet
machinery ir.oports were combined into the total indexes using the share
of machinery imports (SQVTC 1) in total imports in current prices in
12
each of the weight years. Two deflators were tried for "industrial
machinery," a German purchaser's price index for industrial machin-
ery (Arbeitsmaschinen) and the American price index for "general
12 The share of general machinery imports was 1 minus the
share of agricultural equipment (SQVTC 19) and minus the share of
transportation equipment (SQVTC 19) in current prices.
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equipment. ,,13 The German price index for industrial machinery was
used for the total import price and volume indexes presented in Tables
T-25, T-27, T-28, T-30, XV. 5and~V.7. I thought that the German
index for industrial machinery was more appropriate for use in the
total import indexes because a large share of imports of machinery
14
into the USSR during the inter -war period carne from Germany. The
German index for machinery differ s from the American price index in
an important way -- the German index rises less rapidly in the 1920's
and declines much less rapidly in 1930 (and, in fact, it rose during the
first year of the world depression, perhaps because of the large volume
of Russian machinery orders). In terms of estimating the cornmodity
terms of trade for goods actually crossing the border, the German
indexes are also more "suitable'l because of the lag in "delivery datel'
compared to "order date." The Arne rican and German price indexes
are presented in Table F. 15. A large part of the decline from 1932 to
13 The German price index for industrial machinery was pub-
lished in STATJAHR-35, p. 260, and STATJAHR-36, -37, -38, under
the heading "Indexziffern der Grosshandelspreise industriellen Fertig-
ware: Gewerbliche Betriebsmittel, I' based on 1913 = 100; the statistical
procedures (weights, machinery types, costs) for this index were not
therein described. The American price index "general machinery"
was published in Goldsmith-55, p. 887, based on Shaw-47.
14 VTSSSR-60.
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1934 in the American price indexes of both "general equipment" and
"transport (passenger cars)" was caused by the devaluation of the dol-
lar rather than by a decline in U. S. prices (Table F . 9).
The agricultural equipment price index used for deflating the
value of Soviet imports of agricultural machinery was the German price
index for "Landwirtschaftliche Maschinen und Ackerger~te (agricultural
machinery and field equipment" (Table F. 15); 15 a more suitable index
for constructing the agricultural machinery component of price and
volume indexes would have been two American price indexes -- one for
tractors and the other for "agricultural equipment excluding tractors"
for much of Soviet agricultural machinery imports came from the
United States (especially between 1925-1931), but these indexes were
not available.
The price index used for deflating the value of Soviet transporta-
tion equipment imports was the American price index for passenger
cars -- for Soviet transportation equipment imports during the inter-
war period consisted largely of automotive vehicles rather than rail-
16
road equipment (after 1924/25). The second largest item of trans-
portation equipment imports after 1924/25 was ships - - both new and
15 STATJAHR-38, p. 318.
16 VTSSSR-60. See Table F. 15.
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used - - and s orne airplane parts and entire airplane s. 17
Thus, the volume and price indexes for Soviet machinery im-
ports were far from ideal, but I consider them better than available
alternatives. Two volume and price indexes for machinery imports
were also computed -- one using the German price index and the other
using the American price index for "general machinery imports"
(Tables F. 16 and F.17). The volume index for all machinery using
American prices for general machinery imports approximates the in-
dex using German prices up to about 1927/28 (except for 1913). After
1927/28, the volume index for Soviet machinery imports using German
"general machinery" prices rose much less rapidly and declined fur-
ther than the volume index using the American general machinery
price index. The American price index for general machinery fell
faster and more rapidly after 1929 than did German prices because of
Germany's formal retention of the gold standard, because of the large
Russian demand for German machinery in 1930 and 1931, and possibly
because of greater cartelization of German industry.
The choice of the price index for general machinery imports af-
fected the behavior of the aggregate price and volume indexes (and
17 VTSSSR-60. For used ship imports, see ERSU, Vol. II,
No. 7 (April 7, 1927). It was likely that airplane imports were under-
stated in VTSSSR-60 and other sources for military reasons.
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terms of trade). The decline in volume was greater, the decline in
prices less, and the terms of trade declined sooner and faster, using
the German price index for "industrial.machinery" (Tables F. 18 and
F . 19). Because of the direction of trade of Soviet machinery imports,
we have used in this study the indexes based on the German machinery
price indexes.
German wholesale price indexes. Wherever German wholesale
price indexes were used in this study, the index number for the cal-
endar year was used to deflate or was substituted for the latter part of
the split year (economic year), that is, an index number of commodity
group "x" for 1925 was used to represent the Soviet import prices for
commodity group "x" of 1924/25. The German price index numbers
for 1938 are actually a simple arithrnetic average of the first six or
18
seven months of 1938.
Indexes for Soviet chemical imports. Individual items for Soviet
chemical imports - - with the exception of "natural rubber" (SOVTC
35000) and selected fertilizers (SOVTC 34004), 34005, 34200, 34203)
were not included in the basic import indexes because of (1) the large
diver sity and the irregularity or lacuna in the time series for indiv-
idual items for industrial chemicals, and (2) inadequate detail in the
18 For example, see STATJAHR-38, p. 317.
895
data for the important groups of chemicals such as dyes and tanning
chemicals (SOVTC 312 and 313). The SOVTC 3 ( Chemicals) included
basic industrial chemicals (SOVTC 30), dyes and tanning materials
(SOVTC 31), explosives (SOVTC 32), film (SOVTC 33), fertilizers and
pesticides (SOVTC 34), and rubber and rubber -products (SOVTC 35). 19
The commodity group (SOVTC 3) of chemicals minus natural rubber
and fertilizers (SOVTC 35000, 34004, 34005, 34200, 34203) was intro-
duced into the total volume indexes by using the value of SOVTC 3
(Chemicals), minus the selected items mentioned above, deflated by
the German wholesale price index for industrial chemicals. 20 The
re suIting volume index was included in the total index, using as
weights the share of the value of SOVTC 30 (excluding the above-
mentioned items) in total imports in each of the weight-years. Simi-
larly, the "pricesll of Soviet chemical imports were included in the
total price index for Soviet imports by weighting the German wholesale
price index for chemicals by the above described weights. 21
Indexes for Soviet manufactured consumer goods imports. Be-
cause of the large diversity of manufactured goods imports (SOVTC 9)
19 See Appendix A, Technical Note 5 for description of SOVTC
system.
20 STATJAHR-35, p. 259 and STATJAHR-38, p. 319. "Index-
ziffern der Gros shandelspreise. Industrielle Rohstoffe und Halbwaren:
Chemikalien, 1913 = 100."
21
See above note.
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and the lack of adequate time series for construction of unit values (or
even substitute unit values) for most items, we had to be satisfied with
including only two manufactured consumer goods imports in the basic
indexes -- cotton cloth (SOVTC 900) and woolen cloth (SOVTC 901).
The remaining Soviet manufactured goods imports (SOVTC 9) were in-
cluded in the total indexes by constructing separate price and volume
indexes using German wholesale price indexes for categories similar
to commodity groups of Soviet manufactured consumer goods imports.
The resulting indexes were included in the total indexes by using the
share of manufactured consumer goods imports minus cotton and wool
imports (SOVTC 9 - SOVTC 900 - SOVTC 901) in total imports in the
weight-years.
The indexes for manufactured consumer goods were computed
by taking the values of the following SOVTC groups and deflating them
by wholesale price indexes for similar groups of goods in Germany:
1) SOVTC 91 and 92 (Clothing and Haberdashery) were
matched with "Textilwaren (cloth items)" from
STATJAHR-35 (p. 260) and STATJAHR-38 (p. 318).
2) SOVTC 93 (Footwear) was matched with "Leder schuh-
werk (leather footwear)" from STATJAHR references
mentioned above.
3) SOVTC 94 (Domestic Utensils and Tableware) were
matched with "Haus - und KUchger~te (home and kitchen
equipment) from STATJAHR references mentioned
above.
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4) SOVTC 95 (Furniture) was matched with "Mobel"
from STATJAHR references mentioned above.
5) SOVTC 96-98, which included miscellaneous manu-
factured goods, were matcheq with "Industrielle
Fertigwaren: KonsumgUter (manufactured consumer
goods)" from STATJAHR-35, p. 259 and STATJAHR-38,
p. 317.
Each group was deflated by the corresponding German price index and
was combined into a volume index using the share of the value of each
of the groups (SOVTC 91, 92, 93, 94, 95) in total manufactured con-
sumer imports (excluding cotton and woolen cloth), while the weight of
SOVTC 96-98 was a residual calculated by subtracting the above
weights from one. The manufactured consumer goods volume index
computed on this basis is presented in Table F. 20. A price index for
manufactured consumer goods imports (excluding cotton cloth and
woolen cloth) was computed using the same (German) indexes and the
same value weights for various categories of Soviet imports.
Indexes for selected commodity groups. Volume and price in-
dexes for selected commodity groups of imports and exports were also
calculated for this study. These indexes are computed in the same
manner and from the same raw data as the basic volume and price in-
dexes. In this study, all the selected commodity indexes are based on
1927/28 unit values or 1927/28 quantity weights; the one exception is
grain exports, which used 1926/27 quantity and unit-value weights.
Grain exports in 1926/27 were much larger than in 1927/28 and
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therefore the unit values were statistically more reliable and the
structure of grain exports in 1926/27 was more representative of other
years with large grain exports, such as 1913, 1923/24, 1925/26, 1930
and 1931.
The comr.nodities included in each group are listed in the notes
accompanying the tables in which these indexes are presented (Tables
T-26, T-27, T-29, T-30, XIV. 9, XIV. 10).
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Addendum to Appendix F
Adjustment of Basic Volume Indexes for Changes in the Coverage of
the Value of the Items in the Basic Index to Value of All Items.
Proof: Method of adjusting basis volume index for changes in coverage
as sumed that the Paasche price index for items in basic index must
be identical to thePaasche price index for all items.
1. Basic index
V =y,w
~ pi Qi
w y
~pi Qi
w w
(~pi Q )/(~pi Qi + L:pe Qe)
y y y y y y
(~pi Qi ) / (L:pi Qi + ~ pe Qe)
ww ww ww
=
,'~
V""
y,w
2. Basic index adjusted for coverage ("adjusted basic index")
~ pi Qi
w y
~ pi Qi
w w
3. We assumed that Paasche price index of commodities ~nc1.uded
in the basic index would be identical to the Paascheprice index
of all export commodities (omitting specifically excluded ex-
port groups).
~pi Qi }:pi Qi + ~ pe Qey y = y y y Y
~pi Qi ~ pi Qi + ~pe Qew y w y w y
4. Multiplying both sides by L: pi Qi and substituting the resulting
w y ..
product on the right hand side for :E pl Ql gives us:
y y
,,~
V'I'
y,w =
~ pi Qi
w y
~ pi Qi
w w
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5. which give s us:
,,~
'1'V =y,w
2:: pi Qi + ~pe Qe
w y w Y
~pi Qi + ~pe Qe
w w w y
which is the volume index if all commodities were included.
Vy,w
V y,w
p
Q
w
y
i
= volume index in year "y" weighted with year "w"
unit-value weights.
= volume index in year "y" based on V basic
y,w
index adjusted for inc omplete cove rage of exports
not specifically excluded from basic index.
= price (unit-value)
= quantity
= (subscript) weight year
= (subscript) current year
= (superscript) item not included in basic index
e = (superscript) item not included in basic index
and not incl uded in the groups specifically excluded
from basic index.
Thus, ~ pi Qi would be the value of exports of items in the basic index
w y
valued in weight-year prices.
TABLE F.1
ITEMS INCLUDED IN THE BASIC PRICE AND VOLUME
INDEXES FOR SOVIET IMPORTS
901
a
SOVTCSOVTC
Number Description Number Description
2000 Stove coal 530013 Goat skins
20001 Anthracite 54000 Tobacco
21 Crude oil 56322 Licorice root
220 Benzene 580 Oilcake
223 Kerosene 59000 Down feathers
224 Diesel fuel 59008 Guts
225 Mazut 70000 Wheat
226 Oils, grease 70001 Rye
24000 Iron ore 70002 Barley
24001 Manganese 70003 Oats
25000 Asbestos 70004 Corn
260 Pig iron 72001 Soya beans
262 Iron scrap 72003 Flax seed
264 Rolled cast iron pr oducts 80001 Poultry
30100 Caustic soda 800030 Bacon
30101 Soda ash 80100 Butter
30315 Coal tar pitch 803 Eggs
30500 Ethyl alcohol 810 Fresh fish
34000 Apatite concentrate 811 Salted fish
34200 Ammonia sulfate 813 Canned fish
500 Raw timber 81500 Canned crab
50100 Sawn lumber 81600 Black caviar
50200 Plywood 81601 Red caviar
50307 Staves 82000 Wheat flour
51000 Cotton 82101 Peas
51003 Flax fiber 82102 Kidney beans, lentils
51004 Linen tow 84000 Sugar
51006 Hemp 84108 Sunflower seed oil
51008 Hemp tow 900 Cotton material
51013 Hemp combings 903 Linen cloth
51014 Rags 904 Carpeting
511 Wool 931 Rubber shoes
53000 Long-horned cattle 941000 Porcelain table ware
530011 Sheep skins 942 Glas s table ware
530012 Calf skins 98207 Matches
a
See Appendix A, Technical Note 5 for a description of SOVTC
classification system.
TABLE F.2
USSR: WEIGHTS FOR COMBINING COMPONENTS OF TOTAL
EXPORT INDEX AND RATIOS USED FOR ADJUSTING BASIC
EXPOR T VOLUME INDEX FOR CHANGES IN COVERAGE
(based on current prices)
902
Groups as % of Total Exports Ratio
Excluded Items Items 73Items Items of Items
Machinery Furs not in not in in Index
SovTC SovTC Excluded Basic Machinery; to non-
1 52 Index Furs or Excluded
Index Items
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1913 0.26 0.43 99.31 86.94 12.37 1. 1422
1922/23 0.20 3. 81 95.99 82.95 13.04 1. 1572
1923/24 O. 10 4. 99 94.41 87. 14 7.77 1.0834
1924/25 0.29 12.05 87.66 82. 79 4.87 1.0588
1925/26 O. 15 10.24 89.61 83.92 5. 69 1.0678
1926/27 0.09 11.05 88.86 83.87 4.99 1.0594
1927/28 O. 12 15. 15 84. 73 73.94 10. 79 1. 1459
1929 0.27 11. 54 88. 19 76.91 11. 28 1. 1466
1930 0.23 7.41 92.36 82.80 9. 56 1. 1154
1931 O. 58 6.93 92.49 82.71 9. 78 1. 1182
1932 0.87 7.36 91. 77 77.95 13. 82 1. 1772
1933 1.00 8.21 90. 79 73.04 17.75 1.2430
1934 1.48 7.64 90.88 71. 78 19. 10 1.2660
1935 2. 13 8. 16 89. 11 74.90 14.81 1. 1897
1936 2. 16 11.40 86.44 75. 77 10.67 1. 1908
1937 3. 19 8.80 88.81 79.38 9.43 1. 1187
1938 5.01 9.41 85. 58 75. 61 9.97 1. 1318
Source: see page 921 - at end of Appendix F.
TABLE F.3
USSR: BASIC VOLUME INDEXES FOR EXPORTS
1913, 1922/23 - 1938
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1913 1926/27 1927/28 1932 1937
Unit- Unit- Unit- Unit- Unit-
value value value value value
weights weights weights weights weights
1913 285. 7 323.6 355.3 291. 9 328.8
1922/23 23.9 28. 7 31. 6 25. 1 37. 1
1923/24 70.7 77.8 83.2 69.6 87.9
1924/25 66.4 66.3 70.9 64. 7 76.6
1925/26 88.3 93.2 100. 5 87. 1 99. 5
1926/27 105. 0 Ill. 7 115. 1 102. 6 111.0
1927/28 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1929 131.3 132.9 133.9 127.6 141. 1
1930 201. 1 212.6 216.0 186.2 219.5
1931 225. 5 234.4 240.3 207.8 223.3
1932 175. 6 169.9 174.2 155. 2 167.2
1933 159.2 155. 6 160.0 142.6 152. 3
1934 148.2 143.9 147. 0 137.4 139. 1
1935 139.0 136.5 138.7 130. 7 131.4
1936 114.5 109.3 110.4 112. 7 101. 1
1937 114. 9 118. 8 122.2 115. 8 104. 5
1938 94.0 100.8 104. 1 95.8 89.9
Source: see page 921- at end of Appendix F.
TABLE F.4
USSR: BASIC VOLUME INDEXES FOR EXPOR TS ADJUSTED
FOR CHANGES IN COVERAGE OF BASIC INDEX
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1913 1926/27 1927/28 1932 1937
Price Price Price Price Price
Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights
1913 284.8 322.5 354.2 291. 0 327.7
1922/23 24. 1 27.0 32.9 25.3
1923/24 67.2 73.9 79. 1 66. 1 77.8
1924/25 61. 4 61. 3 65. 5 59.8 70.8
1925/26 82.3 93.6 81. 2 92.7
1926/27 97. 1 103.3 106.4 94.9 102. 6
1927/28 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1929 131.4 133.0 134.0 181.2 141. 2
1930 195. 8 206.9 210.3 202.8 213. 7
1931 220. 1 228. 7 234. 5 161.4 217.9
1932 182.6 176.7 181.2 151. 8 173.9
1933 172. 7 168.8 173.6 165.2
1934 163.7 159.0 162.4 153.7
1935 145. 3 142. 7 145. 0 137.3
1936 114. 1 108. 9 110.0 100.7
1937 112. 2 116.0 119.3 102.0
1938 92.8 99.6 102. 8 88.8
Source: see page 921 - at end of Appendix F.
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TABLE F.5
ITEMS INCLUDED IN THE BASIC PRICE AND VOLUME
INDEXES FOR SOVIET IMPORTS
SOVTC
Number
20000
220
24204
26101
26102
26103
26104
26406
26407
26410
26503
266
26800
26806
26812
26903
27000
27003
27004
27005
27006
27007
34004
34005
34200
34203
35000
504
50500
50504
Description
Stove coal, soft
Gasoline
Wolfram ore
Ferro silicone
Ferrochrome
Ferro vanadium
Ferro tungsten
Beams, channel bars
Structural steel
Steel plate
Tinplate
Tubes, pipes
Wire
Nails
Cable
Other metal article s
Copper
Zinc
Lead
Tin
Nickel
Aluminium
Superphosphate
Pho sphori te
Ammonium sulfate
Sodium nitrate
Natural rubber
Cork bark and chips
Wood pulp
Cellulose
SOVTC
Number
506
51000
51009
51010
51014
511000
51200
514000
514004
51401
530000
530011
53100
53101
70000
70001
70104
71000
71001
72007
72100
72101
72103
811022
82000
82003
84000
84107
900
901
Description
Paper
Cotton
Jute
Sisal
Rags
Wool
Silk
Cotton thr ead, yarn
Woolen yarn
Wollem tops
Leather, long -horned
Sheep skin
Leather for sale s
Leather for uppers
Wheat
Rye
Rice
Cattle, long -horned
Short-horned cattle
Copra
Natural coffee
Cocoa beans, butter
Tea
Salted herring
Flour
Hulled grains
Sugar
Olive oil
Cotton cloth
Woolen cloth
TABLE F.6
USSR: WEIGHTS FOR COMBINING COMPONENTS
OF IMPOR T INDEXES
906
Groups as % of Total Imports Ratio
Groups as % of Total Imports Items Sixty of Items
Machin- Chemicals Consumer not Items in Index
ery Excluding Goods Excluded in to non-
Fertili- Excluding from Basic Excluded
zers, Cotton & Basic Index Items
Rubber Woolen Index
Cloth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1913 16. 6 3.8 8.4 71.2 52.5 1.3561
1922/l3 21.4 8.4 11.1 59. 1 44.8 1.31 91
1923/24 13. 3 8.1 3. 7 75.0 62.6 1.1980
1924/25 9.7 5.9 2.7 81. 7 69.4 1.1772
1925/26 20. 6 6.2 3.8 69.4 61.5 1.1284
1926/27 22.0 5.4 1.6 70. 9 62.7 1.1307
1927/28 23. 9 4.9 1. 8 69.4 60.3 1.1509
1929 30.1 4.3 1. 6 64.0 55.6 1.1510
1930 46.8 3.2 1. 0 49.0 41. 9 1.1694
1931 53. 9 1.6 O. 8 43.7 36.1 1. 2105
1932 55. 7 O. 7 1. 0 42.5 35.4 1.2005
1933 43.0 O. 9 1 .5 54.6 43.9 1.2437
1934 25.0 2.4 2.5 70. 1 55.1 1.2722
1935 23.5 2.3 1. 9 72.3 55.0 1.3145
1936 39.0 2.0 1. 9 57.1 43.9 1. 3006
1937 27.4 1.5 8. 0 70.4 56.4 1. 2482
1938 34.5 1 .7 0.6 63.1 49.8 1.2670
Source: see page 922- at end of Appendix F.
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TABLE F.7
USSR: BASIC VOLUME INDEXES FOR IMP ORTSa
1913, 1922/23 - 1938
1913 1926/27 1927/28 1932 1937
Unit Unit Unit Unit Unit
Value Value Value Value Value
Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights
1913 169.3 184. 5 184.4 174.2 173.6
1922/23 15. 0 14. 1 14.4 15. 6 13. 1
1923/24 34. 7 36.4 39.3 41. 6 33.4
1924/25 63.7 70.2 71. 8 70.4 66.6
1925/26 68. 7 72.2 74.9 71. 1 70.0
1926/27 79.6 81. 6 85. 8 84.6 78. 3
1927/28 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1929 89.4 94.6 94.8 88.2 91. 3
1930 95. 3 98.3 93. 2 90.3 98.3
1931 120.4 117.2 107. 5 106.4 125. 3
1932 89. 5 89.4 81. 5 75.2 92.0
1933 73.9 68.5 61. 5 57. 9 67.6
1934 83.8 72. 5 65. 2 54.9 62. 7
1935 84.9 77. 1 72.0 62.9 68.3
1936 77.4 89.8 64.5 56.4 62. 1
1937 81. 7 72.8 67. 5 58. 7 64.6
1938 83. 5 75.2 70.4 62.8 70.4
aExc1udes machinery imports, manufactured consumers' goods and
chemicals.
Source: see page 922 - at end of Appendix F.
TABLE F.8
USSR: BASIC VOLUME INDEXES FOR IMPORTS ADJUSTED
FOR CHANGES IN COVERAGE OF BASIC INDEX
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1913 1926/27 1927/28 1932 1937
Price Price Price Price Price
Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights
1913 143.9 156.9 157.6 148.0 147. 6
1922/23 13. 1 12. 3 12. 6 13. 6 11. 5
1923/24 33.4 35.0 37. 8 40.0 32. 1
1924/25 62.3 68. 7 70.2 68.9 65. 1
1925/26 70.2 73. 7 76.4 72.6 71. 4
1926/27 81. 1 83.2 87.4 86.2 79.8
1927/28 100. 0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1929 89.9 95. 1 95.3 88. 7 91. 8
1930 94.0 97. 1 92.0 89. 1 96.9
1931 114. 6 111.7 102.4 101.2 119.2
1932 86.0 86.0 78.2 72.3 88.3
1933 68.5 63. 5 57.0 53. 6 62. 7
1934 75. 8 65. 7 59. 1 49.8 56.8
1935 74. 5 67.6 63. 1 55. 2 59.9
1936 68. 7 61. 9 57. 2 50.0 55. 1
1937 75. 5 67.3 62.3 54.2 59. 7
1938 75.8 68.3 64.0 57.0 63.9
Source: see page 922- at end of Appendix F.
TABLE F.9
COEFFICIENTS OF DEVALUATION OF
THE DOLLAR AND THE POUND
STERLING
London New York Germany
pounds dollars
1913 1. 000 1. 000
1922/23
1923/24 0.9078 1. 000 0.9880
1924/25 0.9925 1. 000 0.9996
1925/26 0.9983 1.000 0.9993
1926/27 0.9987 1. 000
1927/28 0.9999 1. 000
1929 0.9980 1.000
1930 0.9991 1. 000
1931 0.9317 1. 000
1932 O. 7202 1.000
1933 0.6807 0.8057
1934 0.6177 O. 5905
1935 O. 5979 O. 5905
1936 0.6056 O. 5905
1937 0.6036 O. 5905
1938 0.5950 O. 5905
909
Source: see page 922- at end of Appendix F.
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TABLE F.10
USSR: UNIT VALUES OF SOVIET FUR EXPORTS FOR AGGREGATE
FUR EXPORTS, RAW FURS, DRESSED FURS,
AND DRESSED AND DYED FURS
Unit Values from VTSSSR- 60 Weighted Indexes
All Furs Raw Furs Dressed Dressed All Furs Raw Furs
Exports Exports Furs Dyed Furs 1927/28 1927/28
Exports Exports quantity quantity
weights weights
(8 furs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1913 6. 9 6.0 29.9 O. 0 30.0 30.0
1922/23 7.8 6. 9
1923/24 33.2 30.8 29.9 109. 3
1924/25 107.2 100. 3 106. 9 145. 7 [74. 2]
1925/26 97.2 88.4 130.0 83. 3 81. 3 75. 0
1926/27 89. 1 87. 6 89.3 41. 6 89.6 89.6
1927/28 100.0 100. 0 100.0 100.0 100. 0 100.0
1929 83.4 91. 7 79. 6 64. 5 91. 5 93. 1
1930 70. 2 77. 1 75. 3 58. 3 66.4 65. 3
1931 54. 6 53.4 81. 3 44.7 55. 8 52. 5
1932 39.2 42.0 57. 9 34. 1 39. 3 36.9
1933 31. 7 34. 1 45.8 39.4 36.0 34.8
1934 28. 5 25.2 45. 5 25.6 32.2 30. 5
1935 31. 0 23 ..9 57.8 33. 0 31. 9 28. 7
1936 39. 5 32.2 73. 7 42.3 34.0 29.0
1937 54.3 44.0 113.3 56.9 43. 1 34. 1
1938 50. 1 40.5 114.0 42.4 37.9 27. 6
Source: see page 923 - at end of Appendix F.
TABLE F. 11
USSR: INDEX OF FUR PRICES FOR EIGHT
MAJOR RAW FURSa
1928 = 100
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1913 1926/27 1927/28 1932 1936 8 Furs
Quantity Quantity Quantity Quantity Quantity as % of
Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights all Raw
Furs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1913 29.3 30.0 30.0 30.0 32.2 [72. 2]
1922/23
1923/24
1924/25
1925/26 78. 1 74.2 75.0 72. 5 69. 1 68. 7
1926/27 94.0 88.2 89.6 86.0 80.2 68.8
1927/28 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 70.4
1929 90. 1 95. 6 93. 1 97. 1 105. 3 70. 5
1930 63. 9 66.3 65.3 67.0 73.0 80. 6
1931 52.8 51. 8 52. 5 52.3 53. 5 73. 6
1932 38.3 36.0 36.9 34.8 36. 3 74. 6
1933 36.4 34.2 34.8 31. 7 35. 4 76.0
1934 36.9 29. 7 30. 5 27. 1 29.9 78.4
1935 31. 7 27.4 28.7 24. 5 26. 1 81. 7
1936 32. 2 28.2 29.0 25. 7 26. 5 78. 7
1937 37.4 32. 6 34. 1 30.0 31. 7 68. 5
1938 30.4 26.4 27.6 24.3 25.0 58.8
aSquirre1, fox, ermine, polar fox, sable, white fitch, black fitch,
karakul.
Source: see page 923 - at end of Appendix F.
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TABLE F.12
USSR: VOLUME INDEX OF RAW FUR EXPOR TS
1913, 1922/23 - 1938a
1913 1926/27 1927/28 1932 1937
Unit- Unit- Unit- Unit- Unit-
value value value value value
weights weights weights weights weights
1913 85. 3 91. 7 87.4 90.7 97. 3
1922/23
1923/24
1924/25
1925/26 78.2 77.7 81. 8 74.6 67. 0
1926/27 81. 0 76. 7 81. 0 78.9 78. 7
1927/28 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1929 91. 9 91. 6 90.8 92.0 93. 5
1930 93. 5 93. 6 91.3 94. 7 101. 2
1931 68. 5 62.4 64.0 64.9 67.7
1932 69.4 66.6 69.4 65.4 61. 7
1933 57.3 50. 5 54.2 50. 5 48.0
1934 71. 9 65.2 70. 3 65.6 60.6
1935 77.5 61. 7 70. 1 66.7 63.0
1936 100.4 83. 7 93.6 91. 8 85. 8
1937 71. 8 59.9 66.9 65. 7 61. 3
1938 65. 1 54.3 60. 7 59. 6 55. 6
aBased on a unit-value weighted volume index of eight major raw furs and
and their share in the value of raw fur exports.
Source: see page 923- at end of Appendix F.
TABLE F.13
USSR: PRICE INDEX OF ALL FUR EXPOR TS
1913, 1922/23 - 1938
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1913 1926/27 1927/28 1932 1936
Quantity Quantity Quantity Quantity Quantity
Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights
1913 29.3 30.0 30.0 29.9 31. 8
1922/23
1923/24
1924/25 [ 72.5] [ 74. 2] [ 74. 2] [ 74.0] 78. 7
1925/26 78. 1 79.9 81. 3 91. 1 79.8
1926/27 94.0 88.3 89.6 87.6 82. 5
1927/28 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1929 90. 1 94.0 91. 5 91. 5 100.7
1930 63. 9 67.2 66.4 69. 5 73. 1
1931 52.8 54. 7 55.8 60.0 56.0
1932 38.3 38.4 39.3 41. 3 38.6
1933 36.4 35.4 36.0 36. 5 37. 5
1934 32.9 31. 3 32.2 32. 1 31. 4
1935 31. 7 30. 5 31. 9 34.2 30.2
1936 32.2 32.8 34.0 39.9 32.9
1937 37.4 40. 7 43. 1 54.3 42. 1
1938 30. 5 35. 3 37.9 49. 5 35. 5
Source: see page 887 - at end of Appendix F.
TABLE F.14
USSR: VOLUME INDEX OF ALL FUR EXPOR TS
1913, 1922/23 - 1938
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1913 1926/27 1927/28 1932 1936
Price Price Price Price Price
Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights
1913 85.3 79.6 75. 7 73.9 72.0
1922/23 66.8 62.4 59. 3 57.9 56.4
1923/24 70.3 65. 6 62.4 60.9 59.4
1924/25 90.4 84. 3 80.2 78.3 76.2
1925/26 78.2 74. 1 77. 7 68.7 59. 1
1926/27 81. 0 80. 7 81. 8 79.6 78.8
1927/28 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1929 91. 1 99.9 99.7 104. 5 Ill. 5
1930 93. 5 92.8 94.8 100.7 113. 1
1931 68. 5 73. 5 80.4 84.8 97.0
1932 69.4 81. 0 86. 7 90.3 100.8
1933 57. 3 76. 1 85. 2 93.0 112. 5
1934 71. 9 75. 6 89.6 88.9 98. 7
1935 77. 5 65. 7 80.3 79.3 86. 5
1936 100.4 78.4 91. 4 88.7 87.2
1937 71. 8 61. 7 70.8 68.0 64.6
1938 65. 1 64.3 74.8 70.9 66.8
Source: see page 924- at end of Appendix F.
TABLE F.15
PRICE INDEXES USED FOR DEFLATING SOVIET
MACHINER Y IMPORTS
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Machinery Agricultural Transport
(excluding agricultural Equipment (American
& transport equipment passenger
German American cars)
Price Price
Index Index
1913 69. 1 50.6 78.4 156.2
1922/23 69. 1 50. 6 78.4 156.2
1923/24 69. 1 50. 6 78.4 156.2
1924/25 95. 3 97. 9 98.2 111.6
1925/26 96. 5 98. 5 98.7 106.0
1926/27 96.3 98.9 98.4 102. 7
1927/28 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1929 102.1 101. 1 100.4 108. 5
1930 103.4 93. 1 100.2 102.2
1931 100.8 87. 9 98.0 97. 6
1932 91. 8 82.0 95. 8 95. 1
1933 89.2 66.0 85. 8 73.9
1934 88.7 55. 9 84.2 57.3
1935 88.3 55. 9 83. 3 55.0
1936 88. 5 55. 9 83.2 54.4
1937 88. 5 61.9 83.2 59. 5
1938 88. 5 62. 5 81. 1 62.0
Source: see page 924 - at end of Appendix F.
TABLE F.16
USSR: COMPARISON OF PRICE INDEXES OF MACHINER Y
IMPOR TS BASED ON AMERICAN AND
GERMAN PRICE INDEXES
(1913,1927/28, 1937 weights)
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1913 1927/28 1937
German American German American German American
Mach. Mach. Mach. Mach. Mach. Mach.
Volume Volume Volume Volume Volume Volume
1913 76.0 59.9 77.5 62. 5 77.7 58. 1
1922/23 76.0 59. 9 77.5 62. 5 77. 7 58. 1
1923/24 76.0 59.9 77. 5 62. 5 77. 7 58. 1
1924/25 96.8 98.6 97.0 99. 1 96.9 98.9
1925/26 97. 5 98. 9 97. 5 99. 1 97.4 99.0
1926/27 97. 1 99.0 97. 1 99.2 97.0 99.2
1927/28 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
- -
1929 102. 1 101. 3 102.4 101. 7 102. 7 101.6
1930 100. 1 94. 7 102.9 94.7 103.3 93.8
1931 91. 2 90.0 100.3 89.8 100. 5 88. 7
1932 87.6 83. 6 91. 7 83.8 92. 1 82.9
1933 85. 9 69. 6 87.6 68. 8 87.7 66.6
1934 85. 3 60.6 85. 5 59. 1 85. 6 56.0
1935 85.4 60.3 84.9 58.8 85.0 55. 9
1936 85. 8 60. 3 85. 0 58. 7 85. 1 55. 8
1937 85. 5 65.2 85. 5 64.0 85. 7 61. 7
1938 85. 5 65. 5 85. 5 65. 5 85.9 62. 5
Source: see page 924- at end of App endix F.
TABLE F.17
USSR: COMPARISON OF VOLUME OF MACHINERY IMPORTS
DEFLA TED WITH AMERICAN AND GERMAN PRICE
INDEXES FOR THE GENERAL MACHINERY
COMPONENT
(1913,1927/28, 1937 weights)
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1913 weights 1927/28 weights 1937 weights
German American German American German American
Mach. Mach. Mach. Mach. Mach. Mach.
Price Price Price Price Price Price
Index Index Index Index Index Index
1913 130. 6 161.7 133.0 168.8 133.4 172. 1
1922/23 18. 2 22. 5 14.2 17. 2 13. 1 16. 9
1923/24 17. 7 21. 9 14. 7 17. 8 13. 8 17. 9
1924/25 35. 8 40.5 31. 1 30.8 29. 5 34.0
1925/26 71. 9 75.2 70.2 69.3 69.4 73. 5
1926/27 69. 5 68.3 71. 6 70. 1 72. 1 71. 5
1927/28 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1929 118. 8 125.4 114. 5 115. 2 112. 8 119. 9
1930 219.5 242.0 213.7 229.6 211.3 237.5
1931 272.7 304.8 263. 5 291. 2 260.3 296.5
1932 180.3 188.0 188. 6 209.8 191. 7 202.7
1933 76.2 93. 6 75. 6 99.0 75.6 95. 9
1934 32.2 44.5 30.6 45. 9 30.2 44.3
1935 38.2 51. 3 31. 8 45. 1 29.9 43.3
1936 63. 7 88. 7 62.8 95. 3 62. 7 92.0
1937 41. 4 53.2 41. 2 57. 3 41. 3 55. 2
1938 63. 3 80.3 57.2 76. 5 55.6 73. 6
Source: see page 924 - at end of Appendix F.
TABLE F.18
USSR: COMPARISON OF VOLUME OF IMPORTS ESTIMATED
WITH GERMAN MACHINERY PRICE INDEXES AND
AMERICAN MACHINER Y PRICE INDEXES
(1913, 1927/28, and 1937 quantity and value weights)
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1913 weights 1927/28 weights 1937 weights
Using Using Using Using Using Using
German American German American German American
Mach. Mach. Mach. Mach. Mach. Mach.
Price Price Price Price Price Price
Index Index Index Index Index Index
1913 152. 6 158. 5 169. 6 178. 1 165.4 178.7
1922/23 16.8 17.4 17.0 17.8 17.2 18.6
1923/24 31. 7 60.8 33.9 62.9 28.6 60. 1
1924/25 59.1 74.4 63.0 79.1 56.5 78.1
1925/26 73.8 79.2 79.3 83. 0 76.4 77.9
1926/27 79.0 79.2 83.3 83.0 77.5 77.9
1927/28 100. 0 100. 0 100. 0 100. 0 100. 0 100. 0
1929 95.2 95.4 99.3 99.5 98.1 98. 7
1930 117.4 117.1 120. 0 123. 8 132. 6 132. 5
1931 141.7 141.8 137. 0 143. 7 159. 3 159. 9
1932 101.1 99.3 101 .2 106. 2 116. 9 113.1
1933 67.4 69.8 59.0 64.6 63.2 67.5
1934 64.6 67. 9 50.0 53. 7 45.3 50.4
1935 64.6 67. 8 52.8 56.0 46.7 51. 8
1936 65.4 69.5 56.4 64.2 55.0 62.2
1937 65.7 68.5 54.0 57.8 49.6 54.1
1938 70.3 73.3 59.1 63. 7 57.0 61. 9
Source: see page 924 - at end of Appendix F.
TABLE F.19
USSR: COMPARISON OF PRICE INDEXES FOR IMPORTS
ESTIMATED WITH GERMANY MACHINER Y PRICES
INDEXES AND AMERICAN MACHINER Y
PRICE INDEXES
(1913, 1927/28, and 1937 quantity and value weights)
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1913 weights 1927/28 weights 1937 weights
German American German American German American
Quantity Quantity Quantity Quantity Quantity Quantity
Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights
1913 69.0 66. 3 75.4 71. 8 88. 3 83. 6
1922/23 71. 2 68.4 78. 5 74.9 89.3 84. 5
1923/24 68.3 65. 6 75. 1 71. 5 88.0 83. 3
1924/25 116. 5 116. 0 113. 7 114.2 110. 0 109. 7
1925/26 107. 1 107. 0 109.3 109.7 118. 3 117.4
1926/27 96.0 96.4 96.4 96.9 102. 5 102. 6
1927/28 100.0 100. 0 100. 0 100. 0 100.0 100. 0
1929 94.4 94.5 97.3 97. 1 92.0 92.4
1930 86. 7 85. 8 91. 1 89. 1 81. 0 80.4
1931 75. 1 74.2 75. 8 73.3 66. 1 65.6
1932 62. 7 62.4 67. 6 64. 7 57. 6 57. 7
1933 51. 4 49.5 56. 5 52. 0 49.0 46.9
1934 46.9 43. 8 53. 5 47.2 44. 1 40.3
1935 47.8 44.6 49.8 43.6 42.3 38. 7
1936 50.4 47. 1 51. 6 45. 3 45.2 41. 4
1937 53.6 51. 1 56.8 51. 6 40.2 47.2
1938 51. 5 49. 1 54.3 49.2 46.6 44.0
Source: see page 924 - at end of Appendix F.
TABLE F.20
USSR: VOLUME INDEX FOR SOVIET IMP OR TS
OF MANUFACTURED CONSUMER GOODS
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1913 1926/27 1927/28 1932 1937
Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights
1913 1200 1171 1199 1094 1184
1922/23 183 179 183 190 182
1923/24 91 89 91 90 90
1924/25 132 126 131 133 127
1925/26 249 225 244 270 231
1926/27 76 76 76 77 76
1927/28 100 100 100 100 100
1929 99 94 98 109 95
1930 78 96 78 82 76
1931 57 56 57 62 56
1932 60 57 60 67 58
1933 49 49 49 51 50
1934 55 55 55 56 55
1935 38 37 38 40 37
1936 49 48 49 52 48
1937 18 17 18 18 17
1938 16 16 16 18 15
Source: see page 925- at end of Appendix F.
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Notes to Tables in Appendix F
Notes to Table F. 1
See text, pp. 877 ff
basic export index.
for method or criteria of selecting items for
Notes to Table F. 2
Col. 1: SOVTC 1 (Machinery) divided by total exports (excluding
platinum) .
Col. 2: SOVTC 2 (Furs) divided by total exports (excluding
platinum) .
Col. 3: 100 minus the sum of cols. 1 and 2.
Col. 4: Value in current prices of the 73 items included in basic
export indexes (listed in Table F. 1) divided by total exports (excluding
platinum) •
Col. 5: This column shows the per cent of items not specifically
included in the basic index or in SOVTC 1 and SOVTC 52 and is a
residual, i.e., 100 minus the sum of cols. 1, 2, 4 (or col. 3 minus
col. 4).
Col. 6: Col. 4 divided by col. 5.
Notes to Table F. 3
Source: Based on 73 commodities listed in Table F. 1. See pp. 877 ff
for description of methodology and the procedures used in deriv-
ing unit-values.
Notes to Table F. 4
Source: Based on Tables F. 3 and F. 4 according to procedur es dis-
cussed in the text, pp. 878 ff and Addendum to Appendix F.
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Notes to Table F. 5
Source: See text, pp. 881 ff
items for basic import index.
for method or criteria of selecting
Col. 1: SOVTC 1 (Machinery) divided by total value of import prices.
Col. 2: SOVTC 3 (Chemicals) minus SOVTC 35000 (Natural rubber)
and SOVTC 34 (Fertilizers and Pesticides). The remainder was
divided by the total value of imports.
Col. 3: SOVTC 9 (Manufactured Consumer Goods) minus SOVTC 900
(cotton cloth) and SOVTC 901 (woolen cloth). The remainder was
divided by the total value of imports.
Col. 4: One hundred minus sum of cols. 1-3.
Col. 5: Value of 60 items in basic import index divided by value of
total imports.
Col. 6: Col. 4 divided by col. 5.
Notes to Table F. 7
Source: Based on 60 items listed in Table F. 5. Statistics for Soviet
imports taken from VTSSSR-60. See pp. 877 ff for description of
methodology and the procedures used in deriving unit-values. See
Notes to Table F. 6 for list of commodity groups specifically excluded
from the basic import indexes.
Notes to Table F. 8
Source: Based on Table F. 6 and F. 7 according to procedures dis-
cussed in the text, pp. 877 ff and Addendum to Appendix F.
Notes to Table F. 9
Source: Based on STATJAHR (various years) from the table "Goldwert
der Valuten" in the international statistics section.
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Notes to Table F. 10
Col. 1: Value divided by weight for SOVTC 52 in VTSSSR-60.
Col. 2: Value divided by weight for SOVTC 520 in VTSSSR-60.
Col. 3: Value divided by weight for SOVTC 521 in VTSSSR -60.
Col. 4: Value divided by weight for SOVTC 522 in VTSSSR-60.
Col. 5: From Table F. 13.
Col. 6: From Table F. 11.
Notes to Table F. 11
Source: See text, pp. 883 ff for source of data. The eight furs
are squirrel, fox, ermine, polar fox, sable, white fitch (specie of
European polecat), black fitch, and karakul (fur of various species of
sheep) .
Col. 6: Value of eight furs divided by the value of raw furs as cited in
VTSSSR-60, except for 1913, for which the value of the furs sold for
exports at the trade fairs was used (see p.885 ).
Notes to Table F. 12
Source: Based on a unit-value weighted volume index of eight species
of fur, which accounted for a large share of raw fur exports (see Table
F. 11 and Notes to Table F. 11). The volume index of eight furs was
adjusted for changes in the share of the value of the eight furs (in cur-
rent prices) in the total values of raw fur exports (col. 6 in Table
F. 11) according to the method described on pp. 878 ff and in
Addendum to Appendix F .
Notes to Table F. 13
Source: See text, pp. 887 . Raw fur component of this price
index based on eight furs listed in Table F. 11.
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Notes to Table F. 14
Source: See text, pp. 881 ff Raw fur component from Table
F.12. Individual components weighted by relative shares of raw,
dressed, and dressed-and-dyed furs in total fur exports, as reported
in VTSSSR-60.
Notes to Table F. 15
Source: See text, pp. 889 ff. Indexes based on Ar.oerican general
machinery prices and on American passenger cars adjusted for de-
valuation of the U. S. dollar (Table F. 9).
Note s to Table F. 16
Source: See text, pp. 893 ff These price indexes are based on
identical weights (based on relative share of gene ral machinery, ag-
ricultural machinery, and transport machinery) and identical price
indexes for agricultural and transport machinery. They differ only in
choice of a price index for general machinery imports.
Notes to Table F. 17
Source: See text, pp. 892 ff These series differ only in the
choice of a price deflator for the value of general machinery imports.
See Notes to Table F. 16.
Notes to Table F. 18
Source: These volume series differ only in the choice of the price
deflator for the value of general machinery imports. See Notes to
Table F. 16. See text, p. 894.
Notes to Table F.19
Source: See Notes to Table F.18.
Notes to Table F. 20
Source: See text, pp. 895 ff.
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